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ALFRED  M.  GRAY  MARINE  CORPS 

RESEARCH  CENTER 

ATTN  COLLECTION  MANAGEMENT 

(C40RGL) 

2040  BROADWAY  ST 
QUANTICOVA  22134-diG? 


"Take  up  our  quarrel  with  the  foe: 
To  you  from  failing  hands  we  throw 

The  torch;  be  yours  to  hold  it  high. 

If  ye  break  faith  with  us  who  die 
We  shall  not  sleep,  though  poppies  grow 

In  Flanders  fields" 

JOHN  McCRAE,  "IN  FLANDERS  FIELDS' 


"]y(,5,     hl^/A/e,  Corps  / 

» t  ft 


HOLD  HIGH 
THE  TORCH 

A  History  of  the  4th  Marines 

By  KENNETH  W.  CONDIT 
EDWIN  T.  TURNBLADH 


Historical  Branch,  G-3  Division 
Headquarters,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 
Washington,  D.C.,  i960 


Me 


Library  of  Congress 
Catalog  Card  No.  60-60001 


MAY  24  1961 
3660 


Foreword 


The  4th  Marine  Regiment,  in  its  near  half  century  of  service, 
has  acquired  a  sense  of  tradition  and  esprit  de  corps  distinctive 
even  in  a  Corps  noted  for  these  qualities.  My  first  acquaintance 
with  the  4th  Marines  was  in  1924,  when,  as  a  young  second 
lieutenant,  I  joined  the  regiment  in  Santo  Domingo.  In  1927, 
I  rejoined  to  sail  with  it  to  China  on  another  tour  of  expedi- 
tionary duty. 

Both  these  expeditions  were  typical  of  Marine  Corps  missions 
in  those  days.  Though  less  spectacular  than  the  regiment's 
World  War  II  operations  in  the  Philippines,  Guam,  and  Oki- 
nawa, they  were  nevertheless  essential  to  the  carrying  out  of  our 
national  policy.  Such  military  operations  as  did  take  place  were 
of  the  "small  war"  variety,  which  have  long  been  a  Marine  Corps 
specialty,  but  much  of  the  duty  was  more  diplomatic  than  mili- 
tary, calling  for  achieving  results  through  friendly  cooperation 
with  foreign  peoples  and  governments. 

In  its  performance  of  duty,  the  4th  Marines  has  always  been 
a  "second-to-none"  outfit.  Today,  as  a  vital  part  of  the  Marine 
Corps  as  the  nation's  force  in  readiness,  the  regiment  is  prepared 
to  embark  at  a  moment's  notice  for  duty  anywhere  in  the  world. 
Whatever  the  mission,  the  4th  Marines  will  live  up  to  its  highest 
traditions  for  service.  ^ 


R.  McC.  Pate 


General,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 
Commandant  of  the  Marine  Corps 


v 


Preface 


Hold  High  the  Torch,  the  first  of  a  series  of  regimental  and 
squadron  histories  in  preparation  by  the  Historical  Branch,  G-3 
Division,  Headquarters  U.S.  Marine  Corps,  is  designed  primarily 
to  acquaint  the  members  of  the  4th  Marines,  past  and  present, 
with  the  history  of  their  regiment.  In  addition,  it  is  hoped  this 
volume  will  enlarge  public  understanding  of  the  Marine  Corps' 
worth  both  in  limited  war  and  as  a  force  in  readiness.  During 
most  of  its  existence  the  4th  Marines  was  not  engaged  in  active 
military  operations,  but  service  of  the  regiment  in  China,  the 
Dominican  Republic,  and  off  the  west  coast  of  Mexico,  was 
typical  of  the  Marine  Corps'  support  of  national  policy. 

In  many  of  its  combat  operations,  the  4th  Marines  was  only 
one  element  of  a  much  larger  force.  In  other  instances,  as  in 
the  Dominican  Republic  and  China,  the  regiment  was  a  subordi- 
nate unit  in  situations  which  were  essentially  political  and  diplo- 
matic. Only  so  much  of  these  higher  echelon  activities  as  are 
essential  to  an  understanding  of  the  4th  Marines  story  have  been 
told.  Admittedly,  some  loss  of  perspective  results,  but  this  is  a 
regimental  history  and  the  focus  is  therefore  on  the  4th  Marines. 

Colonel  Charles  W.  Harrison,  Head  of  the  Historical  Branch, 
conceived  the  regimental  history  program  and  edited  the  final 
manuscript.  Many  veterans  of  the  4th  Marines  contributed  to 
this  book  by  commenting  on  preliminary  drafts  or  through  inter- 
views with  the  Historical  Branch.  To  them  grateful  acknowl- 
edgment is  made.  Mr.  John  Marley  and  Mr.  Stephen  Podlusky, 
the  Historical  Branch  archivists,  Mrs.  Nickey  McLain  the  li- 
brarian, and  Mrs.  Laura  Delahanty  of  the  Central  Files  of  Marine 
Corps  Headquarters  were  most  helpful  to  the  authors  in  locating 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 


source  material.  Captain  D'Wayne  Gray  and  Miss  Kay  P.  Sue, 
his  assistant  in  the  Administrative  and  Production  Section  of  the 
Historical  Branch,  processed  the  volume  from  first  drafts  through 
final  printed  form.  Mrs.  Miriam  Smallwood  typed  the  many 
preliminary  versions  and  the  final  manuscript.  The  maps  were 
prepared  by  the  Training  Aids  Group,  Marine  Corps  Educa- 
tional Center,  Marine  Corps  Schools,  Quantico,  Virginia.  Act- 
ing Sergeant  Henry  K.  Phillips  did  most  of  the  actual  drawing. 


W.  J.  Van  Ryzin 
Brigadier  General,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 
Deputy  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3 


Contents 


Page 

Foreword  v 
Preface  vii 

CHAPTER  I 

Force  in  Readiness — Early  20th  Century  Model  1 
chapter  11 

Intervention  in  the  Dominican  Republic  29 

CHAPTER  III 

Occupation  Duty  in  the  Dominican  Republic  69 

CHAPTER  IV 

Force  in  Readiness — Austerity  Model  1 01 

CHAPTER  V 

China  Marines  1 1 9 

CHAPTER  VI 

Japan  Goes  To  Town  1 49 

CHAPTER  VII 

Defense  of  the  Philippines  195 

CHAPTER  VIII 

Emirau  and  Guam  241 

ix 


x  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  IX  Page 

Okinawa  279 

CHAPTER  X 

Occupation  of  Japan  and  China  33 1 

CHAPTER  XI 

Force  in  Readiness — Mid-Century  Model  361 

APPENDIX  A 

Glossary  of  Abbreviations  and  Technical  Terms  389 

APPENDIX  B 

Chronology  394 

APPENDIX  C 

Regimental  Honors  402 

APPENDDC  D 

Regimental  Citations  and  Commendations  405 

APPENDIX  E 

Medal  of  Honor  Citations  41 1 

APPENDDC  F 

Command  List  4J3 

APPENDIX  G 

Regimental  Strength  420 

APPENDIX  H 

Regimental  Casualties  422 

Bibliography  423 

Index  43 1 


List  of  Maps 


Page 

1.  Mexico,  1914-1916  15 

2.  Panama  Canal  Strategic  Area,  1916  32 

3.  Hispaniola  Island  38 

4.  Northwest  Dominican  Republic  40 

5.  Las  Trencheras  48 

6.  Guayacanas  55 

7.  Eastern  Santo  Domingo,  191 6-1 91 8  73 

8.  China  122 

9.  Shanghai,  1927  132 

10.  Shanghai,  1932-1941  155 

11.  4th  Marines  Defense  Sector,  1932  158 

12.  4th  Marines  Defense  Sector,  1937  170 

13.  The  Shanghai  Area  177 

14.  Manila  Bay  197 

15.  Bataan  211 

16.  Longoskaway an  Point  213 

17.  Corregidor  223 

18.  The  Japanese  Landing  235 

19.  The  Western  Pacific  246 

20.  Emirau — 4th  Marines  Landing,  20  March  1943  249 

21.  Guam  255 

22.  4th  Marines  Beachhead,  21-23  July  1944  261 

23.  The  Capture  of  Orote  Peninsula  267 

24.  The  Final  Drive,  7-10  August  275 

25.  Okinawa  286 

26.  Landing  and  Advance,  1-4  April  290 

27.  Capture  of  Mt.  Yaetake  301 

xi 


xii        LIST  OF  MAPS 


Page 


28.  Shuri  Line  and  Naha,  19-27  May  312 

29.  Seizure  of  Oroku  Peninsula  319 

30.  Last  Action  in  Okinawa  329 

3 1 .  4th  Marines  Land  on  Japanese  Soil,  30  August  1 945  336 

32.  Japan  372 

33.  Oahu  Island  381 


CHAPTER  I 


Force  in  Readiness- 
Early  20th  Century  Model 


BIRTH  OF  THE  REGIMENT 

The  4th  Marine  regiment  dates  its  history  from  1  o  March  1 9 1 1 . 
The  occasion  for  activation  of  the  regiment  was  the  outbreak  of 
revolution  in  Mexico,  and,  while  President  Taft  had  no  desire 
for  war  with  the  republic  below  the  Rio  Grande,  he  felt  the  need 
for  a  military  force  in  being  with  which  to  exert  pressure  in 
protection  of  the  interests  of  the  United  States.  Much  is  currently 
being  written  concerning  such  applications  of  limited  military 
force  to  achieve  limited  national  goals.  But  even  in  1 9 1 1 ,  this 
was  not  a  new  concept.  As  early  as  1798,  ships  of  the  nation's 
infant  Navy  had  fought  to  preserve  the  freedom  of  the  seas  for 
American  commerce  in  the  quasi-war  with  France.  In  following 
years,  limited  operations  had  been  conducted  in  many  parts  of 
the  globe  in  support  of  the  national  interest.  By  1 9 1 1 ,  the  Marine 
Corps,  alone,  had  conducted  more  than  100  landings,  exclusive 
of  major  wars. 

In  March  1 9 1 1  the  United  States  acted  to  support  the  existing 
regime  in  Mexico.  Porfirio  Diaz,  after  43  years  of  absolute  rule, 
was  in  danger  of  overthrow  by  Francisco  Madero.  President  Taft 
feared  that  Madero  might  succeed  in  ousting  Diaz,  who  had  al- 

1 


2       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 

ways  been  friendly  to  the  United  States  and  to  American  citizens 
investing  in  Mexican  railroads  and  other  industries.1 

"I  am  glad  to  aid  him,"  the  President  had  written  in  1909, 
".  .  .  for  the  reason  that  we  have  two  billion  American  dollars 
in  Mexico  that  will  be  endangered  if  Diaz  were  to  die  and  his 
government  go  to  pieces."  2 

It  was  to  support  Diaz,  the  friend  of  American  interests,  that 
Taft  ordered  concentrations  of  the  Army,  Navy,  and  Marine  Corps 
along  the  Mexican  border  and  off  both  her  coasts.  Ostensibly 
maneuvers,  they  were,  as  the  State  Department  informed  the 
Mexican  Ambassador  in  Washington,  intended  to  aid  Diaz  by 
discouraging  rebel  activities  near  the  border. 

Four  regiments  of  Marines  participated  in  this  show  of  force, 
but  only  one  is  the  concern  of  this  history.  It  was  destined  to 
become  the  4th  Marines,  although  it  did  not  carry  that  designation 
at  first.  Major  General  Commandant  William  P.  Biddle  received 
the  Navy  Department  order  for  its  activation  on  the  afternoon  of 
Monday,  6  March  1 9 1 1 .  Lights  burned  late  that  night  in  Marine 
Corps  Headquarters,  and  the  next  morning  orders  flashed  across 
the  country  by  telegraph  to  posts  and  stations  on  the  Pacific 
coast.3 

Colonel  Charles  A.  Doyen,  then  commanding  Marine  Barracks, 
Puget  Sound  Navy  Yard,  was  ordered  that  morning  to  report  for 
duty  at  San  Francisco  as  commanding  officer  of  a  provisional 
regiment.  He  was  to  embark  his  command  for  movement  by  sea 
to  San  Diego.  There  he  would  transfer  to  cruisers  of  the  Pacific 
Fleet,  ready  for  a  dash  to  the  west  coast  of  Mexico.   With  4  other 

1  For  Mexican  affairs  and  U.S.-Mexican  relations,  see  Dana  G.  Munro, 
The  Latin  American  Republics  (New  York:  Appleton-Century-Crofts,  1950), 
PP-  383-426;  Wilfred  H.  Calcott,  The  Caribbean  Policy  of  the  United  States, 
i8go—igao  (Baltimore:  The  Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1942),  pp.  258-374;  and 
Thomas  A.  Bailey,  A  Diplomatic  History  of  the  American  People  (New  York: 
F.  S.  Crofts  &  Company,  1947),  PP-  577-631. 

*  Quoted  in  Calcott,  op.  cit.,  p.  294. 

1  "Mobilizing  on  Texas  Frontier,"  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  v.  XLVIII, 
no.  28  ( 1  iMari  1 ),  p.  830. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS—EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  3 


officers  and  215  enlisted  men  slated  for  the  new  outfit,  Colonel 
Doyen  pulled  out  of  Seattle  on  a  special  train  the  following  day, 
Wednesday,  8  March. 

Meanwhile,  Marine  Barracks  at  Mare  Island  Navy  Yard  in 
San  Francisco  Bay  was  bustling  with  activity.  Marines  coming 
off  liberty  could  tell  something  was  up  when  they  returned  to 
barracks  to  see  the  squad  rooms  a  jumble  of  sea  bags,  combat  packs, 
new  equipment,  and  tropical  khaki  uniforms.  Five  officers  and 
193  enlisted  men  of  the  Mare  Island  detachment  were  under 
orders  to  Colonel  Doyen's  provisional  regiment.  Later  in  the  day, 
an  additional  3  officers  and  5 1  men  for  the  regiment  were  ferried 
across  the  bay  to  Mare  Island  from  the  Naval  Training  Station 
on  Yerba  Buena  Island.  That  evening  they  all  embarked  on 
board  the  naval  transport  Buffalo. 

Thursday,  9  March,  was  a  busy  day  for  all  hands.  Working 
parties  of  Marines  and  sailors  loaded  three  months'  rations  and 
a  quarter  of  a  million  rounds  of  .30  caliber  ammunition  on  the  ship. 
They  also  stowed  on  board  two  of  the  Marine  Corps'  latest 
weapons — the  now  famous  Springfield  Model  1903  rifles,  issued 
to  West  Coast  Marines  for  the  first  time,  and  Colt  heavy  machine 
guns.  By  evening  all  the  Marine  supplies  and  gear  had  been 
loaded  below  decks,  and  the  Buffalo  cast  off  her  moorings  from 
the  Mare  Island  wharf  to  anchor  off  Vallejo  Junction,  there  to 
wait  for  the  Puget  Sound  detachment.  It  arrived  on  Friday 
afternoon,  10  March,  and  lost  no  time  in  loading  on  board  the 
naval  tug  Unadilla  to  be  ferried  out  to  the  waiting  transport.  By 
evening  all  were  on  board,  and  the  Buffalo  weighed  her  anchor 
and  steamed  out  through  the  Golden  Gate,  bound  for  San  Diego.4 

Only  four  and  half  days  had  elapsed  between  receipt  of  the 
original  orders  at  Marine  Corps  Headquarters  and  the  departure 
of  the  regiment  from  San  Francisco.  True  to  its  tradition  for 
readiness,  the  Marine  Corps  had  prepared  and  embarked  the 


4  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  8-1 1  Mar  1 1 ;  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  v. 
XLVIII,  no.  29  ( i8Mari  1 ) ,  pp.  867,  869-870. 


4       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


regiment  in  the  minimum  time.  "There  wasn't  any  fuss  about 
their  mobilizing,"  said  the  widely  popular  Harper's  Weekly. 
"There  never  is.  Just  an  order  issued  and  .  .  .  one  regiment 
after  another  are  on  their  way  to  Cuba,  or  Mexico,  or  the  world's 
end.  Where  they  are  going  isn't  the  Marine's  concern.  Their 
business  is  to  be  always  ready  to  go."  5 

From  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  came  a  commendation  in 
more  formal  language.  "In  view  of  the  efficient  and  rapid 
mobilization  of  the  provisional  regiments  of  Marines  recently 
despatched  to  Guantanamo  and  San  Diego,"  he  said,  "all  de- 
tachments having  been  embarked  in  the  transports  in  a  shorter 
time  than  had  been  anticipated,  the  Department  takes  pleasure 
in  congratulating  the  Marine  Corps  on  having  maintained  its 
past  record  for  readiness  for  service."  6 

As  the  Buffalo  steamed  into  San  Diego  harbor  early  Sunday 
morning,  12  March,  Marines  crowding  her  rails  could  see  the 
lean  gray  hulls  of  five  armored  cruisers — the  California,  Mary- 
land, Pennsylvania,  South  Dakota,  and  West  Virginia — swinging 
at  anchor.  Later  in  the  day  the  Leathernecks  transferred  from 
the  transport  to  these  fighting  ships — ready  for  a  dash  southward 
if  it  became  necessary. 

No  orders  came.  After  a  week  of  waiting,  Colonel  Doyen 
and  his  Marines  debarked  on  20  March  to  bivouac  on  North 
Island.  There  they  would  be  able  to  stretch  their  legs  and  get 
in  some  much-needed  training  and  would  still  be  available  if 
needed.7 

North  Island  is  one  of  two  islands  which  transform  San  Diego 
Harbor  from  a  broad  bay,  wide  open  to  the  full  force  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  into  one  of  the  finest  landlocked  harbors  on  the 

6  Charles  Noble,  "Sitting  on  the  Lid,"  Harper's  Weekly,  v.  LV,  no.  2844 
(24Junn),  p.  1912. 

8  SecNav  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  i8Marn.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  official  cor- 
respondence is  filed  in  Case  No.  13425,  HQMC  GenCorrFile,  1904-11,  NA. 

7  4th  ProvRegt,  MRolls,  io-3iMam;  CinCPac  msg  to  CMC,  dtd 
i2Mari  1. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  5 


Pacific  Coast.  North  Island  and  its  neighbor,  Coronado,  are  not 
true  islands  at  all,  for  they  are  linked  to  the  mainland  by  a 
narrow  sandspit  which  runs  from  the  southern  headland  of  the 
harbor  north  across  the  broad  mouth  of  the  bay,  leaving  only 
a  narrow  channel  open  to  the  sea  at  the  northern  end.  A  flat 
expanse  of  sand  and  scrub  growth,  North  Island  presented  no 
cheerful  sight  to  the  Marines  as  the  boats  carrying  them  ashore 
from  the  cruiser  squadron  approached  the  beach. 

Once  ashore  the  Marines  went  into  bivouac,  naming  their 
encampment  Camp  Thomas  in  honor  of  Rear  Admiral  Chauncey 
Thomas,  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet.  Citizens  of 
San  Diego  were  amazed  by  the  efficiency  and  order  displayed 
by  the  Leathernecks. 

"If  one  would  search  the  entire  country  it  would  be  impossible 
to  find  a  camp  which  compares  with  that  of  the  Marines  in 
regard  to  sanitary  arrangement  and  hygienic  conditions,"  re- 
ported the  San  Diego  Union.  "Occupying  a  stretch  of  the  level 
mesa  of  the  island,  the  camp  extends  from  almost  the  water's  edge 
to  a  point  500  feet  from  the  blue  Pacific.  It  is  much  like  a  sub- 
divided tract,"  continued  the  Union.  "Of  course  there  are  no 
contouring  roads,  but  in  their  place  are  streets  of  immaculate 
cleanliness,  kept  clean,  sanitary,  and  healthful  on  account  of  the 
almost  eternal  vigilance  which  is  exercised."  8 

Colonel  Doyen  now  organized  his  command  into  two  battal- 
ions of  two  rifle  companies  each.  Companies  A  and  B  consti- 
tuted the  1  st  Battalion  under  command  of  Captain  John  N. 
Wright,  while  Companies  C  and  E  made  up  the  2d  Battalion, 
commanded  by  Captain  William  W.  Low.  Company  D,  a 
machine  gun  outfit,  came  directly  under  regimental  command.9 

On  20  April,  Doyen's  command  became  officially  the  4th 
Provisional  Regiment,  U.S.  Marines,  a  designation  assigned  by 
the  Commandant  to  distinguish  it  from  the  three  other  provisional 

8  The  San  Diego  Union,  2  7Mari  1. 

9  4th  ProvRegt,  MRolls,  10-3 1  Man  1. 

519667—60  2 


6       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Marine  regiments  organized  in  response  to  the  Mexican  crisis.10 
Each  day  saw  intensive  training  for  all  hands.  Owing  to 
cramped  conditions  at  Mare  Island  and  Puget  Sound,  West 
Coast  Marines  seldom  got  a  chance  for  field  exercises.  A  high 
percentage  of  recruits  with  less  than  three  months  service  in  the 
regiment  made  training  particularly  urgent,  leading  one  of  the 
regimental  officers  later  to  remark  that  "it  was  some  mob  we 
started  out  with."  11  Colonel  Doyen  was  determined  to  take 
advantage  of  training  opportunities  on  North  Island  to  turn 
the  "mob"  into  an  efficient  command. 

From  reveille  at  0615  until  retreat  parade  at  1730  the  Marines 
hustled.  Physical  exercise,  close  order  drill  by  companies,  bat- 
talions, and  regiment,  and  marches  under  full  pack  and  equip- 
ment were  the  order  of  the  day.  Rifle  marksmanship  training 
was  carried  out  on  a  range  constructed  by  1st  Lieutenant  Holland 
M.  Smith.12  The  culmination  of  training  ashore  came  on  27 
April  when  the  Marines  joined  sailors  of  the  cruiser  squadron  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet  in  a  landing  exercise  on  North  Island.  Landing 
from  ships'  boats,  the  Marines  and  bluejackets  waded  ashore  to 
attack  an  imaginary  enemy  entrenched  behind  the  shore  line. 
Having  defeated  the  enemy,  the  landing  force  lined  up  for  in- 
spection by  Admiral  Thomas.13 

That  the  training  program  was  producing  results  was  attested 
by  Brigadier  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  USA,  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, Department  of  California.  After  inspecting  the  regiment 
at  North  Island  he  telegraphed  Admiral  Thomas:  "This  after- 
noon I  inspected  Colonel  Doyen's  regiment  of  Marines,  and  con- 
gratulate you  and  him  on  having  such  a  fine  command."  14  Ad- 

10  CMC  ltr  to  CinCPac,  soApri  1. 

n  Col  Paul  A.  Capron  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  25N0V57  (Monograph  &  Comment 
File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

12  Holland  M.  "Howling  Mad"  Smith  gained  lasting  fame  as  the  dynamic 
leader  of  the  V  Amphibious  Corps  and  Fleet  Marine  Force,  Pacific,  during 
World  War  II. 

13  Capron,  op.  cit.;  The  San  Diego  Union,  27Mam  and  28Aprn. 

14  Gen  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  USA  msg  to  CominCh,  dtd  2gMarii,  quoted  in 
CominCh  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  3oMari  1. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  7 


miral  Thomas,  when  he  inspected  the  regiment  himself  a  few 
weeks  later,  was  also  impressed,  writing  to  the  Commandant 
that  "the  cleanliness  and  hygienic  conditions  of  the  camp,  the 
discipline  of  the  force,  and  their  steadiness  and  perfection  in  drill 
merits  the  highest  praise."  15 

These  good  reports  by  high-ranking  officers  failed  to  take  ac- 
count of  a  serious  morale  problem  in  the  regiment.  By  the  end 
of  May  disturbing  accounts  of  absences  without  leave  began  to 
trickle  into  Marine  Corps  Headquarters  in  Washington.  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Rufus  H.  Lane,  the  Assistant  Adjutant  and  In- 
spector, who  was  sent  out  to  investigate,  learned  that  the  rumors 
were  all  too  true.  When  he  arrived  at  Camp  Thomas  on  i 
June  he  found  that  90  men  were  being  carried  as  deserters. 
Most  of  these  men  were  recruits  with  less  than  three  months' 
service.  Disillusioned  by  the  rigors  of  life  in  bivouac,  these 
short-service  Marines  had  seized  the  first  opportunity  to  take 
French  leave.16 

Before  any  action  could  be  taken  to  reduce  the  absentee  rate, 
Colonel  Doyen  was  ordered  to  disband  the  4th  Provisional  Regi- 
ment. Diaz  had  been  overthrown  at  the  end  of  May.  The 
revolution  was  over — one  of  the  quickest  and  least  bloody  in 
Mexican  history.  Moreover,  the  speedy  Marine  mobilization 
had  so  impressed  the  Navy  Department  that  it  was  no  longer 
considered  necessary  to  keep  Marine  forces  fully  mobilized  within 
striking  distance  of  the  Rio  Grande.  On  24  June,  the  regiment 
was  disbanded,  and  all  but  9  officers  and  204  enlisted  men  re- 
turned to  their  home  stations.  The  officers  and  men  remaining 
at  Camp  Thomas  formed  a  two-company  battalion  for  expedi- 

15  CinCPac  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  sMayi  1. 

"SecNav  ltr  to  LtCol  Rufus  H.  Lane,  dtd  2gMayn;  LtCol  Lane  ltr  to 
CMC,  dtd  3junn.  This  episode  was  not  without  benefit  to  the  Marine 
Corps.  It  was  partly  responsible  for  the  establishment,  later  in  the  year,  of 
the  recruit  depot  system  for  basic  training  of  all  Marines,  which  is  still  in 
effect  today.  CMC,  Report  .  .  .,  in  Annual  Reports  of  the  Navy  Department 
for  the  Fiscal  Year  igu  (Washington:  Navy  Dept,  1912). 


8       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


tionary  duty  with  the  fleet.  On  6  July  this  battalion,  too,  was 
disbanded.17 

TRADITIONAL  MARINE  MISSIONS  AND  TACTICAL 
ORGANIZATION 

The  disbanding  of  the  4th  Provisional  Regiment  and  of  the 
other  regiments  mobilized  in  the  Mexican  crisis  of  1 9 1 1  was  in 
keeping  with  previous  Marine  Corps  policy.18  Originally  con- 
ceived as  a  military  force  for  service  with  the  Navy  afloat  and 
ashore,  the  Marine  Corps  had  consisted  at  first  of  only  two  types 
of  permanent  operational  units.  These  were  the  ship's  detach- 
ment and  the  Marine  guard  for  naval  shore  installations.  There 
were  no  permanent  companies,  battalions,  regiments,  or  other 
tactical  organizations  either  for  landing  operations  or  for  fighting 
ashore.  When  landing  forces  were  required  in  support  of  naval 
operations,  they  were  formed  by  the  Marines  and  sailors  of  the 
fleet  or,  in  cases  where  greater  numbers  were  needed,  by  specially 
organized  battalions  or  regiments  drawn  from  the  Marine  de- 
tachments at  naval  installations  ashore. 

A  secondary  mission,  written  into  the  1798  law  establishing 
the  Marine  Corps,  was  "to  do  duty  in  the  forts  and  garrisons  of 
the  United  States,  on  the  sea-coast  or  any  other  duty  on  shore, 
as  the  President  at  his  discretion,  shall  direct."  19  Under  this 
provision  Marines  had  fought  alongside  Army  troops  in  the 
Florida  Indian  campaigns  of  1 835-1 842,  in  the  War  with  Mex- 
ico, the  Civil  War,  and  the  Spanish-American  War.    But  the 

17  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  v.  XL VIII,  no.  41  (iojunn),  p.  1241;  4th 
ProvRegt  MRolls,  1  Jun-3 1  Jul  1 1 . 

18  Unless  otherwise  cited,  the  material  in  this  section  is  derived  from  Clyde 
H.  Metcalf,  A  History  of  the  United  States  Marine  Corps  (New  York:  G.  P. 
Putnam's  Sons,  1939),  pp.  286-312;  and  Jeter  A.  Isely  and  Philip  A.  Crowl, 
The  U.S.  Marines  and  Amphibious  War  (Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press,  1 951),  pp.  21-24. 

"  "An  Act  for  the  establishing  and  organizing  a  Marine  Corps,  Approved 
July  11,  1798,"  I  Stat.,  594. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  9 


land  operations  occurred  so  infrequently  that  the  Marine  Corps 
did  not  feel  justified  in  maintaining  permanent  tactical  organiza- 
tions for  the  purpose. 

At  the  end  of  the  19th  century  this  country  entered  into  its 
new  role  as  an  important  world  power.  This  brought  new 
missions  to  the  Marine  Corps  and  a  new  tactical  structure  with 
which  to  carry  them  out.  Americans  in  all  walks  of  life  came 
to  believe  that,  now  the  continent  had  been  conquered,  it  was 
the  manifest  destiny  of  the  United  States  to  expand  beyond  its 
continental  boundaries.  The  Spanish-American  War  ushered 
in  a  decade  of  vigorous  expansion,  and  when  the  tumult  and 
shouting  had  died  away  the  American  people  awoke  to  find  their 
country  was,  indeed,  a  World  Power,  owning  the  overseas  terri- 
tories of  Puerto  Rico,  Guam,  Hawaii,  Midway,  Wake,  American 
Samoa,  and  the  Philippines,  and  exercising  a  protectorate  over 
Cuba,  and  virtual  protectorate  over  Panama. 

With  American  expansion  in  full  swing,  the  Marine  Corps 
became  a  vital  component  of  the  military  strength  needed  to 
police  overseas  possessions.  During  the  early  years  of  the  20th 
century,  Marines  served  ashore  for  extended  periods  in  the  newly 
acquired  possessions  and  expanded  spheres  of  interest.  In  the 
Philippines  a  brigade  served  continuously  until  19 14.  Marine 
forces,  which  fluctuated  in  size  from  battalion  to  brigade,  were 
stationed  in  Panama  from  1902  to  19 14,  and  in  Cuba  from  1906 
to  1909.  This  almost  continuous  demand  for  Marine  expedi- 
tionary forces  organized  for  action  ashore  naturally  created  pres- 
sure for  a  permanent  tactical  organization. 

Pressure  for  an  organization  of  this  sort  came  also  from  another 
source  during  these  same  years.  Alfred  Thayer  Mahan,  the 
eloquent  proponent  of  sea  power,  had  pointed  out  the  vital 
necessity  for  advance  fleet  bases  if  the  modern  steam  Navy,  de- 
pendent on  coal,  was  to  operate  at  remote  distances  from  home 
stations.  The  Spanish-American  War  drove  home  to  American 
naval  planners  the  validity  of  Admiral  Mahan's  doctrine.  Even 


10       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


for  extended  fleet  operations  in  waters  as  close  as  the  Caribbean 
such  bases  were  a  necessity,  and  the  acquisition  of  possessions  in 
the  Far  East  made  the  need  even  more  acute. 

Marines  had  been  involved  in  this  new  undertaking  from  the 
first.  An  embryo  advance  base  force  had  been  employed  during 
the  Spanish-American  War,  when  Lieutenant  Colonel  Robert  W. 
Huntington's  Marine  battalion  had  seized  and  successfully  de- 
fended Guantanamo  Bay  in  Cuba.  After  the  war,  the  General 
Board  of  the  Navy,  impressed  by  these  events,  determined  to  set 
up  a  permanent  advance  base  force. 

The  Marine  Corps,  a  military  force  with  naval  experience, 
was  selected  for  this  new  mission.  An  advance  base  class  for 
Marine  officers  and  men  was  conducted  at  Newport,  Rhode 
Island  in  1901,  and  a  battalion  conducted  advance  base  maneu- 
vers on  the  Caribbean  island  of  Culebra  in  the  winter  of  1902-3. 
Involvement  in  expeditionary  duty  in  Cuba,  Panama,  and  the 
Philippines  prevented  further  advance  base  work  until  19 10, 
when  an  advance  base  school  was  established  at  New  London, 
Connecticut,  and  the  job  of  training  Marines  and  of  evolving 
tactics  and  organization  for  advance  base  defense  began  in  ear- 
nest. As  early  as  191 1,  Marine  officers  were  recommending  a 
permanent  advance  base  regiment,  and  the  following  year  Major 
Dion  Williams  outlined  a  proposal  for  an  advance  base  force 
of  two  brigades  of  two  regiments  each,  one  brigade  to  be  sta- 
tioned on  each  coast.20 

No  immediate  action  was  taken  on  this  proposal,  but  the 
Commandant  won  approval  for  a  less  ambitious  scheme  for  the 
rapid  formation  of  advance  base  or  expeditionary  forces.  In 
1 9 1 1 ,  he  directed  the  commanding  officers  at  all  major  Marine 
barracks  to  divide  their  commands  into  two  parts.  The  first  of 
these  was  to  be  a  barracks  detachment  charged  with  routine 
housekeeping  functions.   The  second  was  to  consist  of  tactically 

20 Dion  Williams,  The  Naval  Advance  Base  (Washington:  Government 
Printing  Office,  19 12),  pp.  15-16. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  11 


organized  companies  that  could  be  assembled  to  form  expedi- 
tionary forces  of  battalion,  regiment,  or  even  brigate  size.21 
Marine  expeditionary  forces  could  now  be  created  by  assembling 
whole  companies  rather  than  individuals.22 

The  Advance  Base  Force  became  a  reality  on  23  December 
19 1 3  when  a  brigade  made  up  of  the  1st  and  2d  Regiments  was 
organized  at  Philadelphia.  General  Biddle  hoped  eventually  to 
create  a  similar  force  on  the  West  Coast,  but  Marine  manpower 
was  spread  so  thin  that  only  a  few  companies  could  then  be  or- 
ganized at  Mare  Island  and  Puget  Sound.23 

Thus  by  19 14,  the  first  two  permanent  regiments  in  the  Marine 
Corps  had  been  created.  Unlike  the  regiments  of  previous  years, 
they  were  assembled  not  just  for  a  specific  expedition  but  were 
to  exist  continuously  as  a  regular  part  of  the  Marine  Corps  estab- 
lishment. Marine  Corps  plans  for  further  expansion  of  its  per- 
manent tactical  organization  held  out  hope  for  a  rebirth  of  the 
4th  Regiment,  this  time  on  a  permanent  basis. 

MEXICO— 1Q14 

The  turbulent  affairs  of  our  neighbor  south  of  the  Rio  Grande 
furnished  the  occasion  for  reactivation  of  the  4th  Regiment  on 
16  April  1 9 14.  The  relatively  peaceful  transfer  of  power  from 
Diaz  to  Madero  had  proven  to  be  just  the  beginning  rather  than 
the  end  of  the  Mexican  revolution.  Madero  was  a  weak  man 
who  had  very  little  comprehension  of  the  social  and  economic 
forces  his  revolution  had  unleashed.  Completely  lacking  in 
political  skill,  he  failed  to  grant  the  social  reforms  so  ardently 

21  CMC  ltr  to  OIG  Paymaster's  Dept,  dtd  20J11I11  (Case  No.  16237, 
HQMC  GenCorrFile,  1904-11,  NA). 

23  At  first  the  companies  were  designated  at  each  barracks  by  letter,  A,  B,  G, 
etc.,  but  this  sometimes  resulted  in  the  inclusion  of  more  than  one  company 
with  the  same  letter  in  an  expeditionary  force.  To  avoid  this  confusion 
numerical  designations  assigned  by  Marine  Corps  Headquarters  were  substi- 
tuted. 

23  1st  AdvBaseBrig,  MRolls,  i-3iDeci3. 


12       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


desired  by  the  poorer  classes.  Moreover,  he  was  unable  to  main- 
tain the  strong-handed  order  so  necessary  for  the  continued  sup- 
port of  the  wealthy  and  conservative  elements. 

It  was  only  a  matter  of  time  before  Madero  himself  became 
the  victim  of  revolution.  In  February  19 13,  an  army  revolt  led 
by  Victoriano  Huerta  toppled  Madero  from  power.  Huerta, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Mexican  Congress,  at  once  assumed  the 
presidency  and  within  a  few  months  had  gained  recognition  from 
all  the  leading  European  powers.  President  Wilson,  however, 
refused  to  recognize  the  "unspeakable  Huerta."  In  November 
19 1 3,  he  called  for  the  resignation  of  that  "desperate  brute" 
Huerta,  and  in  February  19 14  he  lifted  the  U.S.  arms  embargo 
so  as  to  permit  materials  of  war  to  reach  Huerta's  principal  op- 
ponents, Venustiano  Carranza  and  Francisco  Villa. 

Relations  between  the  two  countries  took  a  dramatic  turn  for 
the  worse  on  9  April  when  a  ration  party  from  the  Dolphin  was 
seized  at  Tampico.  The  men  were  soon  released,  but  Huerta 
refused  to  make  the  formal  apology  demanded  by  the  United 
States.  Wilson  countered  by  a  show  of  force.  On  the  14th 
he  issued  orders  for  a  concentration  of  ships  and  Marines  on  both 
coasts  of  Mexico.  The  next  day  Colonel  Joseph  H.  Pendleton, 
Commanding  Officer,  Marine  Barracks,  Navy  Yard,  Puget 
Sound,  was  handed  the  following  telegram  from  Marine  Corps 
Headquarters : 

Report  Commandant  Navy  Yard  Puget  Sound  for 
special  temporary  foreign  tropical  shore  service  com- 
manding Fourth  Regiment.  Upon  arrival  San  Fran- 
cisco report  to  senior  officer  present  and  upon  joining 
of  troops  from  Mare  Island  organize  regiment  one  3- 
inch  landing  gun  battery  .  .  .  and  two  battalions  of 
three  companies  each.24 


24  CMC  msg  to  Col  Joseph  H.  Pendleton,  dtd  i5Apri4  (Pendleton,  Joseph 
H.,  0753-2,  Orders  File,  RecsBr,  PersDept,  HQMC). 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  13 


At  both  the  Puget  Sound  and  Mare  Island  Navy  Yards,  the 
scenes  of  March  1 9 1 1  were  re-enacted.  It  was  an  easier  mobili- 
zation, though,  because  of  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  perma- 
nent company  plan.  There  was  no  hasty  throwing  together  of 
companies  at  the  gangplank  this  time.  Instead,  orders  were 
passed  to  the  company  commanders  of  seven  Marine  companies 
to  prepare  for  "temporary  foreign  tropical  shore  service  beyond 
the  seas." 

The  Marines  of  the  25th,  26th,  and  27th  Companies  boarded 
the  armored  cruiser  South  Dakota  at  Puget  Sound  on  the  18th, 
bound  for  San  Francisco.  At  Mare  Island  the  31st,  32d,  34th, 
and  35th  Companies  had  been  alerted  two  days  before  and  were 
now  standing  by,  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  South  Dakota. 
Navy  authorities  were  busy  readying  the  collier  Jupiter  for  sea. 
She  took  on  a  full  load  of  coal  as  well  as  the  Marines'  artillery 
and  small-arms  ammunition  and  supplies. 

At  noon  on  2 1  April  the  34th  and  35th  Companies,  which  had 
been  given  the  dubious  privilege  of  riding  the  Jupiter  to  Mexico, 
boarded  two  Navy  tugs  and  were  ferried  across  the  bay  from 
Mare  Island  to  California  City.  As  the  tugs  neared  the  shore 
the  Marines  on  board  could  hear  band  music  and  see  crowds 
jamming  the  ends  of  the  piers.  Debarking  from  the  tugs,  the 
two  companies  fell  in  for  final  inspection  on  the  dock.  Then, 
to  the  strains  of  "The  Girl  I  Left  Behind  Me,"  they  boarded  the 
Jupiter. 

A  few  minutes  before  sundown  the  31st  and  32d  Companies 
came  over  from  Mare  Island  to  board  the  South  Dakota  which 
had  slipped  quiedy  into  San  Francisco  Bay  that  morning.25  As 
the  Marines  went  on  board,  extras  of  the  San  Francisco  news- 
papers were  proclaiming  in  banner  headlines : 


25  4th  Regt,  MRolls,  i-3oApri4;  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  1 7-18-2 1- 
22Apri4. 


14       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


MARINES  LAND  AT  VERA  CRUZ  26 

Since  the  mobilization  order  of  14  April,  events  had  moved 
swiftly.  Huerta  still  refused  to  apologize  and,  by  the  1 9th,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  was  convinced  that  armed  intervention  might  be 
necessary.  He  went  before  Congress  on  the  20th  to  ask  for  and 
receive  permission  to  use  American  armed  forces  to  obtain  the 
fullest  recognition  of  the  rights  and  dignity  of  the  United  States. 

The  crisis  came  the  next  day.  W ord  reached  Washington  that 
a  German  merchantman  was  about  to  land  a  cargo  of  arms  for 
Huerta  at  Vera  Cruz.  Wilson  gave  the  order  for  armed  inter- 
vention, and,  after  a  naval  bombardment,  Marines  and  blue- 
jackets stormed  ashore  to  capture  the  city.27  It  was  with  every 
expectation  of  a  fight  that  the  4th  Regiment  sailed  from  San 
Francisco  for  the  west  coast  Mexican  port  of  Mazatlan  on  the 
morning  of  22  April.28 

On  the  25th,  the  fourth  day  out,  new  orders  were  received 
directing  the  South  Dakota  to  proceed  with  all  possible  speed 
to  Acapulco,  a  sleepy  little  port  some  300  miles  south  of  Mazatlan. 
(See  Map  1.)  The  American  Consul,  Clement  S.  Edwards,  and 
a  number  of  Americans  had  fled  the  town  a  few  days  before,  in 
fear  of  the  followers  of  the  peon  chieftain,  Emiliano  Zapata.  In 
the  wardroom  of  the  South  Dakota  the  rumor  was  that  the  regi- 
ment would  push  all  the  way  to  Mexico  City.  Colonel  Pendle- 
ton and  his  staff  were  busy  drawing  up  the  landing  plan,  and 
company  officers  briefed  their  men  on  its  details.  Boat  drills 
were  carried  out,  the  men  assembling  fully  equipped  at  their  re- 
spective boat  stations.  Marines  of  the  25th  Company  fired  their 
3 -inch  landing  guns.  Machine  gun  crews,  too,  had  a  chance  to 
shoot  a  few  rounds. 

28  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  22Apri4. 

27  Bailey,  op.  cit.,  pp.  606-607. 

28  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  on  operations  off  the  west  coast  of 
Mexico  is  based  on  eye  witness  accounts  by  Albert  J.  Porter,  special  cor- 
respondent of  the  San  Francisco  Chronicle  on  board  the  cruisers  South  Dakota 
and  California,  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  23Apr-3Juli4. 


16       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


One  cause  for  misgivings  was  that  the  Jupiter,  carrying  most 
of  the  stores  and  ammunition,  remained  at  Mazatlan.  In  the 
event  of  a  march  overland  to  Mexico  City,  some  160  miles  inland 
from  Acapulco,  or  even  a  landing  to  occupy  this  port,  vital  sup- 
plies would  be  300  miles  away. 

On  the  morning  of  28  April  the  South  Dakota  steamed  into 
Acapulco  harbor.  Her  guns  were  trained  on  the  shore,  and  her 
band  played  "The  Star-Spangled  Banner"  as  she  passed  through 
the  broad  passage  between  the  curve  of  the  mainland  and  an 
island  that  hangs  on  the  outer  reef.  Marines  and  sailors  on 
her  deck  could  see  the  Mexican  flag  barely  fluttering  over  the 
ancient  fortress  whose  battered  brown  walls  gleamed  in  the  sun- 
light. The  adobe  huts  of  the  little  town  nestled  about  the  base 
of  the  100-foot  promontory  on  which  the  fortress  was  situated. 
As  the  South  Dakota  swung  around  the  point  into  the  harbor  the 
tiny  figures  of  Mexican  soldiers  detached  themselves  from  the 
base  of  the  fortress  and  scurried  into  the  hills  which  ring  the 
town.  By  the  time  the  cruiser  dropped  her  anchor  some  900 
yards  off  the  fortress,  every  male  inhabitant  had  vanished.  Only 
a  few  women  and  children  scampered  over  the  white  sand  of 
the  beach,  and  they  soon  disappeared,  too. 

In  an  effort  to  induce  the  local  authorities  to  come  out  to  his 
ship,  Captain  William  W.  Gilmer  had  the  yellow  quarantine 
flag  run  up,  but  without  success.  After  about  an  hour  a  small 
boat  was  seen  putting  out  from  the  shore.  It  approached  the 
cruiser,  and  Senor  Fernandez,  a  Spaniard  who  was  representing 
the  American  and  British  governments  as  well  as  his  own,  came 
on  board.  A  salute  of  seven  guns  was  ordered  for  him,  but  he 
raised  his  hand  in  alarm.  "If  you  fire,  all  the  people  will  run 
away  and  never  come  back,"  he  exclaimed.  "They  are  scared 
to  death  of  the  big  ship."  Gilmer,  who  had  received  orders  from 
the  Navy  Department  to  avoid  hostile  actions  towards  the  Mexi- 
cans, assured  Fernandez  that  the  presence  of  the  South  Dakota 
was  merely  a  precautionary  measure. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  17 


Although  the  4th  Regiment  rank  and  file  hoped  for  quick 
action,  Colonel  Pendleton  had  no  orders  to  land.  The  Marines 
and  sailors  settled  down  for  an  uneventful  stay.  The  little  town 
continued  to  drowse  as  before,  and  from  the  ship  Mexican  sentries 
could  be  seen  in  the  fort,  pacing  up  and  down.  A  lone  6-inch 
gun  was  trained  on  the  South  Dakota,  the  tampion  removed,  and 
occasionally  a  Mexican  could  be  seen  to  pat  the  breech.  Ac- 
cording to  current  shipboard  rumors,  there  was  little  to  fear  from 
the  Mexican  ordnance.  The  last  time  they  were  fired  one  gun 
exploded,  and  the  others  failed  to  carry  across  the  harbor. 

Senor  Fernandez  reported  that  the  garrison  was  more  fearful 
of  the  Zapatistas  who  infested  the  country  districts  beyond  the 
town  than  of  the  Americans,  now  that  the  "gringo"  warship  had 
shown  no  hostility  toward  them.  Late  in  the  afternoon  the  train 
which  connected  Acapulco  with  the  interior  could  be  seen  crawl- 
ing down  from  the  hills,  filled  with  soldiers  relieved  from  outpost 
duty. 

When  the  Marines  tired  of  watching  the  Mexicans,  there  were 
other  diversions  organized  for  them  aboard  ship.  Twice  a  day 
there  were  swimming  parties  over  the  side,  and  the  officers  put 
off  in  the  ship's  boats  to  troll  for  snapper  and  Spanish  mackerel. 
At  night  there  were  movies  and  band  concerts  on  deck. 

Captain  Gilmer  and  the  other  officers  hoped  to  vary  this  routine 
by  making  a  liaison  with  the  shore.  If  the  Marines  and  sailors 
could  not  go  ashore,  the  Mexican  bumboats  carrying  fresh  fruits 
and  vegetables  and  souvenirs  could  come  out  to  the  ship.  Each 
evening  after  colors  the  ship's  band  struck  up  the  Mexican  na- 
tional anthem,  but  the  Mexican  commandant e  refused  to  be 
tempted  by  musical  flattery.  His  only  response  was  to  round 
up  a  group  of  musicians  of  his  own,  and  to  return  the  compliment 
by  serenading  the  Americans. 

After  a  little  more  than  two  weeks  of  idleness  the  Marines  left 
Acapulco  when  the  South  Dakota  weighed  anchor  early  on  the 
morning  of  14  May  and  steamed  north  to  Mazatlan,  arriving 


18       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


two  days  later.  The  Marines  aboard  were  the  first  to  visit  there 
since  the  Jupiter  with  two  companies  of  Leathernecks  had  put  in 
for  one  day  on  27  April.  As  at  Acapulco  there  was  no  action 
in  store  for  the  Marines  at  Mazatlan.  On  shore,  however,  there 
was  plenty  of  excitement.  Forces  under  General  Alvaro  Obregon, 
the  military  commander  of  Garranza's  Constitutionalist  Party, 
were  besieging  Huerta's  Federalist  garrison  within  the  town.  Al- 
though there  was  much  maneuvering,  no  serious  fighting  took 
place.  Obregon  did  not  choose  to  assault  the  town  and  soon 
shifted  most  of  his  troops  southward,  leaving  only  a  small  con- 
taining force  encircling  Mazatlan. 

In  spite  of  the  siege,  therefore,  the  daily  routine  for  the  Marines 
was  much  the  same  as  at  Acapulco.  There  were  the  same  swim- 
ming and  fishing  parties,  and  movies  and  band  concerts.  One 
difference  was  that  the  inhabitants,  their  desire  for  profit  proving 
more  powerful  than  fear  of  the  "gringo,"  came  out  to  the  ships 
in  large  numbers.  Every  day  a  bumboat  fleet  swarmed  out  from 
the  shore,  loaded  with  garden  produce  and  souvenirs  of  dubious 
origin. 

Reinforcements  for  the  4th  Regiment  arrived  on  9  May,  when 
the  28th  and  36th  Companies  arrived  at  Mazatlan.  Organized 
at  Puget  Sound  and  Mare  Island  respectively,  the  two  companies 
remained  until  1 1  May  when  the  West  Virginia  steamed  north 
to  take  station  at  Guaymas. 

For  the  rest  of  May  and  most  of  June  the  4th  Regiment  re- 
mained on  board  the  three  naval  vessels,  each  stationed  at  a 
different  Mexican  port.  The  bulk  of  the  regiment,  including 
Regimental  Headquarters  and  the  25th,  26th,  27th,  31st,  and 
32d  Companies,  were  on  board  the  South  Dakota  at  Mazatlan. 
The  34th  and  35th  Companies  were  in  the  Jupiter  which  had 
retired  to  La  Paz  on  27  April,  while  the  28th  and  36th  Companies 
were  on  board  the  West  Virginia  at  Guaymas. 

The  hopes  of  4th  Marines  for  action  were  finally  dashed  when 
the  regiment  withdrew  from  Mexican  waters  at  the  end  of  June. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  19 


On  the  25th,  representatives  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico, 
meeting  at  Niagara  Falls  with  those  of  Argentina,  Brazil,  and 
Chile,  the  "ABC  powers,"  agreed  to  a  peaceful  settlement  of 
differences  and  the  withdrawal  of  American  forces.  On  the  27th 
the  4th  Regiment  started  homeward,  when  the  West  Virginia 
weighed  anchor  and  sailed  for  La  Paz.  Two  days  later  the 
South  Dakota  followed  suit.  At  La  Paz  the  two  companies  on 
board  the  collier  Jupiter  transferred  to  the  cruisers  for  the  trip 
home.  On  2  July  the  South  Dakota  departed,  arriving  in  San 
Diego  on  the  5th.  Two  days  later  the  West  Virginia  followed, 
and  on  1  o  July  the  4th  Regiment  went  into  camp  again  on  North 
Island.29 

SAN  DIEGO'S  OWN 

History  seemed  to  be  repeating  itself  for  the  4th  Regiment 
when  it  was  ordered  ashore  on  North  Island.  This  was  the  same 
ground  occupied  by  the  regiment  three  years  before,  but  19 14 
was  not  to  be  a  repetition  of  1 9 1 1 .  In  the  earlier  year  the  regi- 
ment was  disbanded  as  soon  as  the  crisis  it  was  created  to  meet 
had  passed.  But  in  19 14  the  regiment  outlived  the  immediate 
crisis  to  become  a  permanent  component  of  the  Marine  Corps. 

Retention  of  the  4th  Regiment  resulted  from  a  decision  of  the 
Navy  Department  to  establish  an  advance  base  force  on  the  West 
Coast.  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  had  made  an  inspection  trip  in  April  1 9 1 4  and  had  recom- 
mended San  Diego  as  the  site  for  an  advance  base  post.  His  pro- 
posal met  with  favor  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  the  4th  Regi- 
ment, ordered  ashore  at  San  Diego  for  an  indefinite  stay,  became 
the  nucleus  of  the  West  Coast  advance  base  force.30 

Following  the  precedent  of  191 1,  Colonel  Pendleton  named 

28  4th  Regt,  MRolls,  iMay-30juni4;  Bailey,  op.  cit.,  p.  607. 
30  CMC  ltr  to  SecNav,  dtd  i8Deci3  (Folder  Corr  re  Preparedness  Repts, 
1911-16,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


20       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  4th  Regiment  camp  on  North  Island  in  honor  of  the  Com- 
mander, Pacific  Fleet,  Rear  Admiral  Thomas  B.  Howard.  The 
installation  of  electric  lights  and  running  water  gave  to  the  tents 
of  Camp  Howard  some  of  the  amenities  of  garrison  life.  Wives 
and  children  from  San  Francisco  and  Seattle  made  the  lives  of 
officers  and  men  more  attractive  and  added  to  the  air  of 
permanence.31 

The  4th  Regiment,  as  organized  at  Camp  Howard  in  the 
summer  of  19 14,  followed  the  model  established  for  a  "mobile 
defense"  regiment  of  an  advance  base  force.  This  was  a  bal- 
anced force  of  infantry  and  field  artillery,  intended  to  repulse  any 
enemy  landing  force  that  broke  through  the  heavy  coast  artillery 
and  mine  defenses  of  the  advance  base  "fixed  defense"  regiment. 
The  "mobile  defense"  regiment,  because  it  was  a  balanced  force, 
was  well-suited  for  expeditionary  duty  in  the  Caribbean  where 
regimental-size  units  were  frequently  employed  on  independent 
missions.32 

With  a  strength  of  only  19  officers  and  874  enlisted  men  the 
4th  Regiment  on  31  July  19 14  was  less  than  a  third  as  large  as 
its  present-day  descendant.  Its  organization  provided  two  in- 
fantry battalions,  a  light  field  artillery  company,  and  a  small 
regimental  headquarters.  Each  of  the  infantry  battalions  in- 
cluded three  rifle  companies.  Major  John  Twiggs  Myers'  1st 
Battalion  was  made  up  of  the  31st,  32d,  and  34th  Companies, 
while  Major  William  N.  McKelvey's  2d  Battalion  included  the 
26th,  27th,  and  28th  Companies.  Myers  and  McKelvey  man- 
aged to  run  their  battalions  with  the  help  of  two-man  staffs — an 
adjutant  and  a  sergeant  major. 

Rifle  company  strength  was  about  3  officers  and  95  enlisted 
men.    The  eight-man  squad,  commanded  by  a  corporal,  was 

31  The  San  Diego  Union,  7JUI14. 

82  CMC,  Report  .  .  .,  in  Annual  Reports  of  the  Navy  Department  for  the 
Fiscal  Year  1914  (Washington:  Navy  Dept,  19 15);  Col  John  A.  Lejeune, 
"The  Mobile  Defense  of  an  Advance  Base,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  I,  no.  1 
(Mari6),  pp.  1-18. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  21 


the  basic  unit  of  the  rifle  company.  Three  squads  formed  a  sec- 
tion (the  counterpart  of  the  present-day  platoon),  under  com- 
mand of  a  sergeant,  and  three  sections  made  a  company. 
Company  commanders  got  along  with  a  headquarters  group  of 
a  first  sergeant,  mess  sergeant,  police  sergeant,  and  two  or  three 
field  musics  (drummers  and  buglers). 

Following  the  pattern  of  company  and  battalion,  Colonel 
Pendleton  ran  his  regiment  with  a  staff  that  would  be  con- 
sidered sparse  by  modern  standards.  His  staff  officers  were  an 
adjutant,  quartermaster,  and  paymaster.  The  regimental  ser- 
geant major  and  about  a  dozen  other  enlisted  men,  including 
quartermaster  sergeants  and  clerks,  completed  the  regimental 
staff. 

Attached  to  Regimental  Headquarters  was  a  machine  gun 
detachment.  Later  it  was  absorbed  by  the  28th  Company  which 
was  then  reorganized  as  the  regimental  machine  gun  company. 
As  such  it  was  organized  in  two  platoons,  each  manning  four 
guns.33 

The  fire  power  of  the  4th  Regiment  in  19 14  was  primarily 
that  of  its  rifles,  which  were  the  now  famous  Springfield  Model 
1 903.  Supplementing  the  rifles  were  two  types  of  machine  guns : 
the  Colt  heavy  .30  caliber,  air-cooled,  gas-operated  gun;  and 
the  light  Benet-Mercie,  of  like  caliber,  air-cooled,  and  gas- 
operated.  Both  these  weapons  were  much  prone  to  jam,  al- 
though the  Benet-Mercie,  a  modification  of  the  Hotchkiss  gun, 
had  been  adopted  as  standard  by  both  the  British  and  French 
armies.  Eight  heavy  Colts  were  the  armament  of  the  28th  Com- 
pany, while  a  number  of  Benet-Mercies,  varying  according  to 
availability,  were  carried  in  the  rifle  and  artillery  companies.34 

33  4th  Regt,  MRolls,  1-31J11I14;  The  Landing-Force  and  Small-Arm  In- 
structions, USN,  igi2  (Annapolis:  Naval  Institute,  1912),  pp.  8-12;  Ros- 
well  Winans,  "Campaigning  in  Santo  Domingo,"  Recruiters'  Bulletin,  v.  3, 
no.  5  (Man 7),  pp.  14-15. 

84  Melvin  M.  Johnson,  Jr.,  and  Charles  T.  Haven,  Automatic  Weapons  of 
the  World  (New  York:  William  Morrow  &  Company,  1945),  pp.  101-102. 
519667—60  3 


22       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Additional  fire  support  for  the  regiment  came  from  the  four 
3-inch  naval  landing  guns  of  the  25th  Company.  Field  artillery 
in  the  Marine  Corps  was  in  its  infancy  in  those  days  and  was 
limited  pretty  much  to  direct  fire,  although  Marine  artillery  offi- 
cers were  expected  to  be  familiar  with  indirect  fire  techniques. 
All  the  ammunition  was  shrapnel.  The  greatest  deficiency  of  the 
artillery  company  was  its  almost  total  lack  of  prime  movers.  The 
3 -inch  naval  landing  gun  came  equipped  with  two  long  ropes 
which  Marines  of  the  gun  crew  seized  to  pull  the  gun  across  the 
beach  and  into  firing  position.35 

Being  stationed  at  Camp  Howard  not  only  permitted  the  regi- 
ment to  remain  assembled  within  striking  distance  of  possible 
scenes  of  disturbance  in  Latin  America,  but  it  also  gave  the  people 
of  Southern  California  a  good  chance  to  become  familiar  with 
the  Marine  Corps.  "Uncle  Joe"  Pendleton,  one  of  the  best- 
loved  officers  ever  to  wear  the  Marine  uniform,  lost  few  oppor- 
tunities to  spread  the  Marine  Corps  gospel  in  San  Diego.  He 
seldom  refused  an  invitation  to  attend  civic  functions  and  took  a 
keen  interest  in  local  affairs.  He  held  open  house  at  Camp 
Howard  every  Tuesday  and  Thursday,  when  the  regiment  was 
paraded.  Adding  to  the  martial  color  of  these  occasions  were 
the  regimental  band  and  the  drum  and  bugle  corps.  These 
parades  became  so  popular  with  San  Diegans  that  special  boat 
service  was  started  to  ferry  visitors  across  the  harbor.  Chief 
Trumpeter  George  V.  Rowbottom,  leader  of  the  drum  and  bugle 
corps,  composed  a  special  march  entitled,  "Hail  Sunny  Cali- 
fornia." 36 

An  even  better  opportunity  for  putting  the  Marine  Corps  in 
the  public  eye  arose  at  the  beginning  of  19 15.   The  occasion  was 

35  Col  Thomas  E.  Thrasher  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMG,  dtd  23Sep57; 
LtGen  Pedro  A.  Del  Valle  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMG,  dtd  700157  (both 
in  Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC) ;  SgtMaj  Thomas  F. 
Carney,  "Famous  U.S.  Marine  Corps  Regiment  Makes  San  Diego  Home," 
The  Marines'  Magazine,  v.  I,  no.  5  (May  16),  pp.  32-33. 

36  The  San  Diego  Union,  14J11I14  and  8N0V14. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  23 


assignment  to  duty  at  the  two  great  international  expositions  held 
in  California  during  19 15  to  celebrate  the  opening  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  These  were  the  Panama-California  Exposition  at  San 
Diego  and  the  Panama-Pacific  Exposition  at  San  Francisco. 

Colonel  Pendleton  received  orders  for  Exposition  duty  on  23 
November  19 14.  Work  began  at  once  on  a  model  camp  at 
Balboa  Park,  and  on  12  December  the  25th  Company  moved 
from  Camp  Howard  to  its  new  quarters,  to  be  followed  four  days 
later  by  the  26th,  27th,  and  28th  Companies.  Colonel  Pendle- 
ton and  the  Regimental  Headquarters  moved  into  the  Science 
and  Education  Building  on  the  Exposition  Grounds  on  22  De- 
cember, the  same  day  that  Major  Myers  and  his  1st  Battalion 
sailed  aboard  the  cruiser  West  Virginia  to  set  up  a  model  camp 
at  the  Exposition  in  San  Francisco.37 

The  Panama-California  Exposition  burst  upon  an  expectant 
Southern  California  at  midnight  on  1  January  19 15  when,  "at  the 
touch  of  President  Wilson,  3,000  miles  away  [there  was  set  off] 
a  rainbow  of  light  suspended  1,500  feet  in  midair,  covering  an 
area  of  three  miles  in  the  sky  and  punctuated  by  the  bursting  of 
bombs  .  .  ."38 

Typical  of  Exposition  duty  at  San  Diego,  and  at  San  Francisco 
where  festivities  got  under  way  on  1 6  February,  were  the  sched- 
ules for  the  Marines  at  San  Diego  for  3  and  4  January.  Accord- 
ing to  The  San  Diego  U nion  the  following  events  were  included : 

January  3,  7975 

10:30  a.m. — Marine  band  concert  at  Spreckels  music  pavilion 
2:30  p.m. — Baseball  game  on  Marine  Barracks  parade  ground : 
Marine  team  vs.  Spreckels  team. 

January  4,  7975 

9:15  a.m. — Troop 

9:30  a.m. — Guard  Mount 

37  4th  Regt,  MRolls,  iNov-3iDeci5. 
s*The  San  Diego  Union,  3jani6. 


24       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


i  o :  oo  a.m.  to  noon — Drill 

3:30  p.m. — Review  Inspection — the  Fourth  Regiment  Band 
will  furnish  music.39 

Introduction  of  the  Marine  Corps'  first  mechanical  artillery 
prime  movers  was  an  important  by-product  of  duty  at  the  San 
Diego  Exposition.  One  of  the  industrial  exhibitors,  the  builder 
of  a  track-laying  tractor,  loaned  some  of  his  machines  to  Captain 
Ellis  B.  Miller,  commanding  the  25th  Company.  Experiments 
were  successfully  conducted  in  towing  the  Marines'  3-inch  naval 
landing  guns.  Although  the  primitive  tractors  were  prone  to 
throw  their  tracks,  they  were  superior  as  prime  movers  to  Marines 
"manning  the  drag."  40 

The  4th  Regiment  did  not  enjoy  garrison  life  for  long.  After 
six  months  at  the  two  Expositions,  orders  came  for  a  force  of 
Marines  to  make  ready  once  more  for  service  on  the  west  coast 
of  Mexico. 

MEXICO— 191 5 

The  fall  of  Huerta  had  not  ended  the  Mexican  civil  war.  Villa, 
one  of  the  most  successful  of  Carranza's  generals,  soon  tired  of 
playing  a  subordinate  role.  He  revolted  and  joined  forces  with 
Zapata.  These  two  leaders  succeeded  in  deposing  Carranza  and 
in  assembling  a  convention  of  generals  to  name  a  successor.  The 
generals  soon  fell  to  quarreling  among  themselves,  and  chaos  en- 
sued. Rival  factions  battled  each  other  across  the  land,  and,  as 
Mexican  soldiers  were  not  distinguished  for  their  discipline,  Amer- 
ican lives  and  property  in  Mexico  were  lost.41 

In  June  19 15,  marauding  bands  of  Indians  in  the  Yaqui  valley 


39  Ibid.,  4Jani6. 

40LtGen  Henry  L.  Larsen  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  23Dec57  (Monograph  and 
Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMG). 
41  Munro,  op.  cit.,  p.  412. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  25 


threatened  the  lives  and  property  of  Americans  in  that  region, 
and,  as  the  Mexican  authorities  were  either  too  weak  or  too 
indifferent  to  do  anything  about  it,  the  United  States  decided  to 
intervene.  It  was  to  protect  these  Americans  that  the  armored 
cruiser  Colorado,  with  the  4th  Regiment  Headquarters  and  the 
25th,  26th,  and  28th  Companies  aboard,  steamed  south  from 
San  Diego  on  17  June.  The  Marines  were  due  for  another 
disappointment.  Arriving  off  the  Mexican  port  of  Guaymas  on 
the  20th,  they  found  the  Yaqui  bands  were  no  longer  enough  of 
a  threat  to  justify  a  landing.  The  next  day  the  Colorado  de- 
parted for  San  Diego,  arriving  there  on  the  30th.  The  Marines 
remained  on  board  until  9  August  when  they  went  ashore  and 
rejoined  the  27th  Company  at  the  Exposition  Grounds.42 

Four  months  later,  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  were  hasten- 
ing southward  again  toward  the  Mexican  coast,  for  the  third 
time  in  less  than  two  years.  On  16  November,  a  band  of 
Yaqui  Indians  and  Villistas  had  raided  the  village  of  Los  Mochis, 
a  center  of  American  interests  in  the  sugar-producing  valley  of 
the  same  name.  The  Americans,  along  with  other  foreign  resi- 
dents, made  a  stand  in  the  sugar  plant.  After  suffering  a  num- 
ber of  casualties,  they  fled  in  automobiles  to  safety  under  the  guns 
of  the  gunboat  Annapolis  at  Topolobampo.  The  Carranza 
government,  now  recognized  by  the  United  States,  had  stationed 
a  500-man  garrison  at  Los  Mochis,  but  the  troops  had  pulled  out 
at  the  approach  of  the  Villistas.43 

The  American  consular  agent  at  Los  Mochis  reported  the  raid 
to  General  Munoz,  the  military  commander  of  the  state  of 
Sinaloa,  and  requested  protection  for  American  lives  and  prop- 
erty.   Despite  assurances  that  troops  would  be  sent,  nothing 


42  4th  Regt,  MRolls,  1  Jun— 3 1  Aug  1 5 ;  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  v.  LII,  no.  44 
(3Juli5),  P- 

"SecNav  rept  to  SecState,  dtd  28Deci5,  in  U.S.  Dept.  of  State,  Papers 
Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  191 5  (Washington, 
1924),  p.  854,  hereafter  Foreign  Relations,  191 5. 


26       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


was  done,  and  the  Indians  returned  on  the  20th  to  loot  the  now 
deserted  town.44 

Realizing  that  the  Mexicans  would  have  to  be  jolted  into 
action,  Secretary  of  State  Robert  Lansing  informed  Carranza  on 
23  November  that,  if  the  Mexican  authorities  were  unable  to 
protect  American  lives  and  property,  there  should  be  no  objec- 
tion to  the  landing  of  American  Marines  to  do  so.45  To  have 
the  Marines  on  the  spot  if  needed,  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
Josephus  Daniels  directed  Rear  Admiral  Cameron  McR.  Wins- 
low,  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  to  dispatch  an 
"expeditionary  force  .  .  .  with  the  least  possible  delay  to 
Topolobampo."  46  No  landing  was  to  be  made  without  specific 
authorization  from  the  State  Department.  It  was  in  response 
to  this  directive  that  the  4th  Regiment  was  ordered  southward. 

At  San  Francisco,  the  1st  Battalion  left  the  model  camp  at 
the  Exposition  Grounds  and  made  ready  for  tropical  shore 
service.  "We  are  off  on  a  little  business  trip,"  47  said  Major 
Myers,  as  the  Marines  went  on  board  the  cruiser  San  Diego  for 
the  trip  south.  On  25  November  the  cruiser  put  to  sea,  arriv- 
ing at  San  Diego  the  next  day.  Regimental  Headquarters,  the 
2d  Battalion  minus  the  27th  Company,  and  the  25th  Company 
came  on  board,  and  the  San  Diego  sailed  that  evening,  arriving 
off  Topolobampo  on  30  November.48 

The  Marines  were  in  for  still  another  disappointment.  As  on 
the  previous  trips  to  Mexico,  they  were  not  ordered  to  land.  The 
government  forces  had  at  last  begun  to  move,  a  garrison  of  700 
men  had  arrived  at  Los  Mochis  on  the  29th,  and  a  Mexican  army 
division  was  in  the  field  pursuing  the  revolutionists.  President 

44  Consul  Alger  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  19N0V15,  quoted  in  Foreign  Relations, 
1915,  p.  842. 

^SecNav  msg  to  Consul  Garrett,  dtd  23N0V15,  quoted  in  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, 1915,  p.  850. 

48  SecNav  msg  to  RAdm  Cameron  McR.  Winslow,  dtd  23N0V15,  quoted  in 
Foreign  Relations,  191 5,  p.  847. 

"San  Francisco  Chronicle,  26N0V15. 

48  4th  Regt,  MRolls,  iNov-3iDeci5. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— EARLY  20TH  CENTURY  MODEL  27 


Carranza  notified  our  State  Department  on  3  December  that 
order  had  been  restored.49 

The  United  States  government  was  not  ready  to  accept  Gar- 
ranza's  assurances  at  face  value,  and  the  Marines  were  to  stay 
in  Mexican  waters  for  another  two  months.  On  17  December 
they  transferred  to  the  Buffalo  to  steam  up  the  coast  to  Guaymas, 
where  they  remained  until  28  January  19 16.  On  the  29th  the 
Buffalo  cleared  the  Gulf  of  California  and  headed  home.  On  3 
February,  she  dropped  anchor  in  San  Diego  harbor,  where  all 
but  the  1  st  Battalion  debarked.  Major  Myers  and  his  Marines 
remained  aboard  to  return  to  San  Francisco  for  a  much-needed 
liberty  and  to  pick  up  sea  bags  and  other  gear  left  behind  in  the 
hasty  embarkation  of  the  preceding  November.50 

On  18  February,  when  the  1st  Battalion  returned  again  to  San 
Diego,  the  4th  Regiment  was  reunited  for  the  first  time  since  22 
December  19 14,  when  Major  Myers  had  taken  his  battalion  north 
for  the  San  Francisco  Exposition.  A  signal  company,  the  29th, 
was  now  added,  giving  the  regiment  a  capability  much  needed 
in  independent  expeditionary  duty. 

The  regiment  settled  back  into  the  routine  of  garrison  life  at 
its  home  barracks  in  Balboa  Park.  Gradual  attrition  took  its 
toll,  so  that,  by  the  end  of  May,  there  were  only  23  officers  and 
690  enlisted  men  still  on  the  regimental  rolls.51  The  Marines 
of  the  4th  Regiment  were  beginning  to  feel  that  they  would  never 
see  action.  The  regiment  was  now  more  than  two  years  old,  not 
counting  its  brief  existence  in  1 9 1 1 ,  and  all  it  had  to  show  were 
three  brief  cruises  in  Mexican  waters  and  a  commendation  for 
speedy  embarkation. 

49  Confidential  Agent  of  the  Constitutionalist  Govt  msg  to  SecState,  dtd 
3Deci5;  and  Gen  Munoz  ltr  to  RAdm  Winslow,  dtd  7Deci5,  both  quoted  in 
Foreign  Relations,  191 5,  pp.  835,  864. 

50 4th  Regt,  MRolls,  iDeci5-3iJani6;  "What  the  Marines  Are  Doing,  A 
Monthly  Summary  of  Activities,"  The  Marines'  Magazine,  v.  I,  no.  2 
(Jani6),  pp.  4-5. 

51 4th  Regt,  MRolls,  1-3 1  May  16. 


28       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


But  orders  from  Washington  which  were  handed  to  Pendleton 
on  4  June  1 9 1 6  were  no  false  alarm.  They  called  for  the  regiment 
to  embark  for  Santo  Domingo  and  marked  the  beginning  of  an 
eight-year  tour  of  duty  in  that  Caribbean  republic. 


CHAPTER  II 


Intervention  in  the 
Dominican  Republic 

"The  Fourth  Regiment  ...  is  assigned  to  temporary  foreign 
shore  service  in  Santo  Domingo  and  Haiti,"  read  the  Comman- 
dant's order.  'The  Regiment,  fully  equipped  together  with  its 
complete  expeditionary  outfit,  will  proceed  by  rail  to  New  Or- 
leans for  embarkation  aboard  the  Hancock."  1 

The  regiment  left  San  Diego  on  6  June  and  arrived  in  New 
Orleans  four  days  later.  There  it  was  joined  by  the  8th  Com- 
pany. Men  and  gear  were  speedily  loaded  aboard  the  naval 
transport  Hancock,  and  on  the  evening  of  12  June  the  loaded 
ship  dropped  down  the  Mississippi,  bound  for  the  Dominican 
Republic.2 

THE  PANAMA  CANAL  STRATEGY 3 

The  Latin  American  nation,  for  which  Marines  of  the  4th 
Regiment  were  headed,  was  a  country  with  a  long  and  colorful 

1  CMC  msg  to  CO  MarCorpsBks  San  Diego,  dtd  4Juni6.  Unless  other- 
wise noted  all  official  documents  are  filed  in  1975-70/5-2,  Central  Files, 
HQMC. 

2  CMC  ltr  to  SecNav,  dtd  2oApri6. 

'Unless  otherwise  noted  the  material  in  this  section  is  from  Carl  Kelsey, 
The  American  Intervention  in  Haiti  and  the  Dominican  Republic  (Phila- 
delphia: American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  1922) ;  Dana  G. 


29 


30       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


history.  Visited  by  Columbus  on  his  first  voyage  in  1492,  it 
became  the  site  of  the  first  permanent  European  settlement  in 
the  New  World.  It  enjoyed  an  early  period  of  prosperity  as 
capital  of  the  Spanish  Empire  in  the  Americas  but  declined  into 
obscurity  with  the  discovery  of  gold  on  the  mainland.  A  chaotic 
period  of  invasion  and  insurrection  following  the  outbreak  of 
the  French  Revolution  in  1789  led  to  a  further  deterioration 
of  Dominican  society. 

Independence,  achieved  in  1844,  did  little  to  reverse  the 
downward  trend.  Revolution  after  revolution  racked  the 
newly-declared  republic  until  1882,  when  the  dictator  Ulises 
Heureaux  seized  power  and  began  a  rule  which  was  to  last  until 
1899.  The  Dominican  Republic  now  enjoyed  the  first  period 
of  peace  and  prosperity  in  its  history,  but  the  better  life  under 
Heureaux  was  the  beginning  of  new  trouble  for  the  unhappy 
Caribbean  republic  because  it  was  financed  by  foreign  loans 
which  the  Dominican  government  could  not  repay.  When 
Heureaux  was  assassinated  in  1899,  his  government  had  just 
defaulted  on  a  consolidated  loan  by  which  the  foreign  debt  had 
been  refunded  only  four  years  before. 

The  governments  which  succeeded  Heureaux  took  over  a 
country  in  desperate  financial  straits.  They  were  no  more  able 
to  deal  with  the  problem  than  the  dictator  had  been,  and  by 
1904  the  country  was  bankrupt.  Worse  still,  the  French,  Ger- 
man, Italian,  Spanish,  and  Belgian  governments  were  threaten- 
ing to  collect  by  force  the  sums  owed  their  nationals.  The 
danger  of  European  intervention  in  the  Dominican  Republic  led 
to  an  immediate  response  by  the  United  States.  President 
Roosevelt  in  1905  began  a  process  of  supervision  over  Dominican 

Munro,  The  United  States  and  the  Caribbean  Area  (Boston:  World  Peace 
Foundation,  1934),  hereafter  Munro,  U.S.  and  the  Caribbean;  Sumner 
Welles,  Naboth's  Vineyard,  2  vols.  (New  York:  Parson  &  Clark,  Ltd.,  1928), 
hereafter  Welles,  Naboth's  Vineyard;  and  Samuel  F.  Bemis,  The  Latin  Ameri- 
can Policy  of  the  United  States  (New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace  and  Co.,  1943), 
pp.  185-190. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  31 


affairs  which  was  to  lead  eventually  to  the  establishment  of 
American  military  government  over  the  country. 

The  defense  of  the  as  yet  unconstructed  Panama  Canal  was 
the  reason  for  Uncle  Sam's  sensitivity  to  control  of  the  Dominican 
Republic  by  a  major  European  power.  Even  before  it  was  com- 
pleted "the  big  ditch"  became  a  prime  factor  in  planning  for 
the  security  of  the  United  States.  With  it  the  Fleet  could  pass 
rapidly  from  Pacific  to  Atlantic  and  back  again,  thereby  making 
possible  speedy  concentration  of  force  on  either  coast  of  the 
United  States. 

Essential  to  the  security  of  the  canal  was  control  of  its  ap- 
proaches. On  the  Pacific  side  this  was  strictly  a  Fleet  problem 
as  there  were  no  off-lying  land  masses,  but  on  the  Atlantic  it  was 
a  different  story.  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  an  arc  of  islands 
swinging  all  the  way  from  a  point  about  100  miles  off  Mexico's 
Yucatan  Peninsula  to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Venezuelan  coast. 
(See  Map  2.) 

Hispaniola,  wedged  between  Cuba  on  the  west  and  Puerto 
Rico  on  the  east,  and  containing  the  Dominican  Republic  and 
Haiti,  was  the  keystone  of  this  island  arc.  The  Windward  and 
Mona  Passages,  to  the  west  and  east  of  Hispaniola  respectively, 
were  the  principal  routes  through  the  island  barrier  from  the  At- 
lantic Ocean  into  the  Caribbean  Sea.  Control  of  these  passages 
by  an  unfriendly  power  would  cut  off  or,  at  least,  seriously  impede 
American  shipping  bound  to  and  from  the  canal,  and  a  foothold 
in  the  island  arc  would  provide  a  potential  enemy  with  a  base 
for  operations  against  the  strategic  waterway. 

Keeping  the  island  arc  in  friendly  hands  became  a  fundamental 
of  American  policy.  In  1905  all  the  lesser  islands  east  of  Puerto 
Rico  were  in  the  hands  of  the  British,  French,  Danes  or  Dutch. 
Puerto  Rico  was  a  United  States  possession,  and  Cuba  a  protec- 
torate. Only  Hispaniola  remained  as  a  spot  where  an  unfriendly 
foreign  power  could  gain  a  foothold.  It  was  to  prevent  the  cre- 
ation of  such  a  foothold  that  President  Roosevelt  acted  in  1905. 


32       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  33 


Roosevelt  realized  that  if  the  United  States,  in  order  to  block 
European  intrusion  into  the  Panama  defense  area,  were  to  pre- 
vent European  governments  from  collecting  just  debts,  the  United 
States  would  have  to  do  so  for  them.  Accordingly  he  began  ne- 
gotiations with  the  Dominican  government  which  ultimately  re- 
sulted in  the  treaty  of  1907.  Under  its  terms,  an  American 
receivership  of  the  Dominican  customs  was  established,  empow- 
ered to  collect  all  duties  and  to  distribute  the  proceeds,  55  per 
cent  to  the  foreign  creditors  and  45  per  cent  to  the  Dominican 
government.  The  treaty  also  prohibited  the  Dominican  govern- 
ment from  increasing  its  national  debt  until  the  full  amount  of 
the  foreign  obligations  had  been  paid. 

Two  other  stabilizing  results  were  hoped  for  from  this  treaty. 
First,  the  cutting  off  of  the  traditional  source  of  income  of  revolu- 
tionists— the  revenue  from  captured  customs  houses — was  ex- 
pected to  put  a  crimp  in  their  activities.  Second,  through  the 
efficient  collection  of  duties  by  Americans,  it  was  anticipated  that 
the  Dominican  government  would  have  sufficient  funds  with 
which  to  operate  effectively. 

At  first,  these  hopes  seemed  justified.  Ramon  Caceres,  who 
took  office  as  president  in  1906,  set  an  endurance  record  for 
Dominican  presidents  of  the  20th  century  by  remaining  in  office 
for  five  years.  The  belief  in  some  quarters  that  the  Dominicans 
had  improved  their  political  habits  proved  unfounded,  for 
Caceres,  who  had  first  gained  public  notice  as  the  assassin  of  the 
dictator  Heureaux,  was  himself  assassinated  in  1 9 1 1 . 

To  the  American  government  the  assassination  of  Caceres  was 
taken  as  proof  that  the  remedies  applied  under  the  treaty  of 
1907  were  not  drastic  enough.  In  19 12,  the  United  States  re- 
placed the  uncooperative  president,  Alfredo  Victoria,  with  the 
Archbishop  Adolfo  Nouel.  Unable  to  reconcile  the  conflicting 
interests  of  powerful  politicians,  the  prelate  resigned.  He  was 
succeeded  by  Jose  Bordas  Valdes,  a  compromise  candidate  elected 
by  the  Dominican  Congress.   Like  most  compromise  candidates, 


34       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Bordas  lacked  the  support  of  any  dominant  faction  and  was  soon 
faced  with  revolution. 

This  was  the  state  of  affairs  facing  Wilson's  administration 
when  it  took  office  in  March  19 13.  A  staunch  believer  in  the 
efficacy  of  the  democratic  process,  President  Wilson  was  deter- 
mined to  settle  the  Dominicans'  troubles  by  establishing  a  consti- 
tutional democracy  in  the  country.  Taking  advantage  of  a 
threatening  revolution  against  Bordas  in  19 14,  he  compelled  the 
rival  Dominican  politicians  to  agree  on  a  provisional  president 
who  would  then  arrange  a  regular  election  of  a  president  and 
congress.  Once  the  constitutional  government  took  office,  no 
further  revolutions  would  be  tolerated.  These  steps  were  carried 
out,  and  on  5  December  19 14,  Juan  Isidro  Jimenez  was  inau- 
gurated as  the  constitutional  president. 

The  Wilson  plan  was  doomed  to  failure  from  the  start.  Jime- 
nez had  only  won  election  by  granting  Desiderio  Arias,  a  peren- 
nial revolutionary,  a  cabinet  post  as  minister  of  war.  Trouble 
started  in  February  19 15  when  the  United  States  sought  to  in- 
crease its  control  over  the  Dominican  government  by  securing 
the  appointment  of  an  American  comptroller  of  finances  whose 
duties  would  be  to  draw  up  a  budget  and  approve  disbursements. 
The  Dominican  Congress  refused  to  surrender  the  power  of  the 
purse.  The  outbreak  of  revolution  in  the  spring  of  1 9 1 5  led  our 
government  to  increase  its  demands.  In  addition  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  financial  adviser,  the  United  States  sought  to  organize 
a  constabulary  under  American  officers  to  replace  the  army. 

Jimenez  was  now  in  an  impossible  position.  Arias  was  plotting 
his  downfall  within  the  government.  He  was,  as  usual,  broke; 
and  the  American  government  would  not  approve  additional 
loans  without  the  granting  of  financial  control,  a  measure  the 
country  would  not  accept.  When  it  became  known  that  the 
government  would  not  receive  any  money  without  acceding  to 
the  demands  of  the  United  States,  the  agitation  against  Jimenez 
became  open  and  determined. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  35 


On  14  April  19 16  the  long-expected  crisis  broke.  President 
Jimenez,  in  an  effort  to  destroy  his  enemies  within  the  govern- 
ment, arrested  the  commanders  of  the  national  guard  and  of  the 
army  garrison  in  the  capital,  both  of  whom  were  followers  of 
Arias.  He  then  ordered  Arias  to  report  to  him  at  the  presidential 
country  villa.  But  Arias,  having  learned  of  the  arrest  of  his 
followers,  went  instead  to  the  fortress  in  the  city,  forced  his  way 
past  the  guard  at  the  point  of  a  pistol,  and  took  command  of  the 
garrison.  The  Dominican  Congress,  no  doubt  impressed  by  the 
fact  that  their  building  was  surrounded  by  revolutionary  soldiers, 
voted  to  impeach  the  president.  This  unfortunate  individual 
found  himself  declared  a  traitor  by  his  own  government,  with 
his  army  in  revolt,  and  with  only  a  few  troops  remaining  loyal 
to  him.  Apparently  undaunted  by  the  odds  against  him,  Jimenez 
assembled  his  meagre  forces  outside  the  city,  charged  Arias  with 
treason  and  demanded  his  surrender. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  STEPS  IN 

At  this  point  the  United  States  intervened  again.  Acting  in 
accordance  with  the  Wilsonian  principles  of  19 14,  Secretary  of 
State  Robert  Lansing  instructed  the  American  minister,  William 
H.  Russell,  to  announce  that  Jimenez  would  be  supported  by  the 
United  States.  To  give  substance  to  the  announcement,  Marines 
were  ordered  on  30  April  to  Santo  Domingo  City.  Troop  move- 
ments from  Haiti,  Guantanamo  Bay,  Cuba,  and  the  United 
States  began  at  once,  and  by  13  May  there  were  approximately 
450  Marines  ashore  in  positions  north  and  west  of  the  capital. 
Two  days  later  Jimenez  resigned,  leaving  the  country  without  a 
president. 

On  the  1 3th,  Rear  Admiral  William  B.  Caperton,  Commander 
Cruiser  Force,  Atlantic  Fleet,  arrived  to  take  command  of  all 
American  forces  in  the  area.  He  conferred  with  Russell,  who 
had  been  given  full  authority  by  the  State  Department  to  act. 


36       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


They  issued  an  ultimatum  to  Arias,  calling  on  him  to  surrender 
and  to  turn  over  all  arms  and  ammunition  by  0600  on  15  May, 
or  the  Marines  would  occupy  the  city  and  disarm  the  revolu- 
tionists by  force.  On  the  15th,  the  Marines  moved  in  to  find 
that  Arias  and  his  forces  had  slipped  out  of  the  city  and  had 
withdrawn  into  the  interior. 

Once  the  Marines  were  in  possession  of  the  capital,  Russell 
began  what  were  to  be  long  dragged-out  but  ultimately  unsuc- 
cessful negotiations  to  get  a  government  acceptable  to  the  United 
States.  The  chief  stumbling  block  was  Arias,  whose  supporters 
in  the  Congress  persisted  in  their  efforts  to  elect  him  provisional 
president.   To  this  the  United  States  was  obviously  opposed. 

As  the  political  negotiations  dragged  out,  Admiral  Caperton 
tightened  his  grip  on  the  country  by  occupying  the  two  principal 
northern  seaports,  Monte  Cristi  and  Puerto  Plata.  Puerto  Plata 
was  taken  on  1  June  by  a  force  of  Marines  and  bluejackets  from 
the  battleships  Rhode  Island  and  New  Jersey,  and  the  gunboat 
Sacramento,  who  stormed  ashore  under  heavy  but  inaccurate 
small-arms  fire.  The  revolutionists  fled  after  putting  up  a  brief 
resistance.  Monte  Cristi  was  taken  without  opposition  the  same 
day  by  Marines  and  sailors  from  the  cruiser  Memphis,  the  battle- 
ship Louisiana,  and  the  torpedo  tender  Panther.41 

The  Marines  had  now  occupied  the  principal  Dominican  sea- 
ports. But  in  view  of  the  political  stalemate  and  the  control  of 
large  areas  of  the  interior  by  Arias,  Admiral  Caperton  felt  he 
needed  substantial  reinforcements  if  he  were  to  subdue  the  Arias 
faction  and  pacify  the  country.  On  3  June  the  Navy  Department 
granted  his  request  for  a  regiment  of  Marines,  and  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  the  Commandant  telegraphed  the  order  which  set 
the  4th  Regiment  in  motion  towards  the  Dominican  Republic. 

*  GO  MarBn  Ft  San  Filipe,  Puerto  Plata  rept  to  CMC,  dtd  4jum6;  Capt 
Frederick  M.  Wise,  rept  to  CMC,  dtd  8Juni6. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  37 


THE  SANTIAGO  OPERATION 

On  1 8  June,  six  days  out  of  New  Orleans,  Marines  of  the  4th 
Regiment  aboard  the  Hancock  could  see  the  dark  mass  of  His- 
paniola  looming  on  the  horizon.  Shaped  like  the  open  claw  of 
a  lobster  with  the  business  end  pointed  towards  the  west,  Hispani- 
ola  is  divided  by  an  irregular  north-south  boundary  into  the  two 
independent  countries  of  Haiti  and  the  Dominican  Republic. 
The  latter,  which  occupies  the  eastern  two-thirds  of  the  island, 
is  about  the  size  of  New  Hampshire  and  Vermont  combined. 
The  Cordillera  Central,  a  mountain  range  with  peaks  as  high 
as  10,000  feet,  runs  east  and  west  through  the  center  of  the 
country,  dividing  it  in  two.    (See  Map  3.) 

North  of  the  mountains  lies  the  great  valley  known  as  the 
Cibao,  separated  from  the  north  coast  by  a  smaller  mountain 
range,  the  Cordillera  Septentrional.  Two  rivers  drain  the  Cibao, 
the  Yaque  del  Norte  flowing  to  the  west,  and  the  Yuna  flowing 
in  the  opposite  direction  to  empty  into  Samana  Bay,  a  deep  in- 
dentation at  the  northeast  corner  of  the  island.  The  Cibao  is 
a  region  of  diversified  agriculture  and  small  family  farms.  Major 
crops  are  tobacco,  cacao,  and  coffee.  Trade  in  these  crops  sup- 
ports a  number  of  fair-sized  towns  in  the  interior  (the  principal 
one  being  Santiago)  and  the  seaports  of  Monte  Cristi  and  Puerto 
Plata  on  the  north  coast,  and  Sanchez  on  Samana  Bay.  Of  the 
country's  894,000  inhabitants  about  500,000  lived  north  of  the 
mountains  in  19 16.5 

South  of  the  mountains  lies  the  capital  city,  Santo  Domingo, 
and  the  sugar-producing  district.  Sugar,  largest  cash  crop  of 
the  country,  is  a  big  business.  It  is  financed  and  managed  largely 
by  foreigners  but  employs  great  numbers  of  Dominicans  as  field 
laborers. 

Aggravating  the  natural  division  of  the  country  into  northern 
and  southern  sectors  was  the  almost  complete  lack  of  communica- 

5  Figures  from  the  census  of  192 1,  the  first  ever  taken,  cited  in  Kelsey, 
op.  cit.,  p.  167. 

519667—60  i 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  39 


tions.  Roads,  except  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  larger 
towns,  were  all  but  nonexistent  in  1 9 1 6.  Most  of  them  were  little 
better  than  trails  passable  on  foot  or  on  horseback.  In  rainy 
weather  they  were  barely  passable  at  all.  One  exception  was  the 
road  from  Monte  Cristi  to  Santiago  which,  as  the  4th  Regiment 
was  to  prove,  could  be  traversed  by  motor  vehicles.  There  were 
two  narrow-gauge  railroad  lines,  one  running  from  Puerto  Plata 
to  Santiago;  the  other  from  Sanchez  to  La  Vega  with  branches 
to  Moca  and  San  Francisco  de  Macoris. 

When  the  Hancock  docked  at  Santo  Domingo  City  on  1 8  June, 
Admiral  Caperton  ordered  Pendleton  north  to  occupy  Santiago 
and  the  other  towns  of  the  Cibao  region.  This  was  not  to  be 
an  attack  against  an  enemy  power,  but  a  police  action  designed 
to  support  the  constitutional  government  of  the  country.  Revo- 
lutionary activities  were  to  be  put  down,  but  they  were  to  be  put 
down  without  alienating  the  population  and  with  a  minimum  of 
bloodshed  and  destruction  of  property. 

This  view  of  the  character  of  the  operation  led  Admiral  Caper- 
ton  to  violate  a  cardinal  principle  of  war — surprise.  In  an  effort 
to  win  popular  support,  the  admiral  made  public  the  target  for 
the  Marine  operation.  In  a  proclamation  issued  on  the  19th 
he  announced  that  it  was  his  purpose  to  "occupy  immediately  the 
towns  of  Santiago,  Moca,  and  La  Vega  ...  as  these  towns  are 
now  in  the  possession  of,  or  menaced  by,  a  considerable  force  of 
revolutionists  against  the  constituted  government."  6 

There  were  three  possible  routes  into  the  Cibao.  ( See  Map  4. ) 
One  was  along  the  railroad  from  Sanchez,  rejected  because  of 
the  vulnerability  of  the  rail  line  where  it  crossed  ten  miles  of 
swamp  on  a  causeway  at  the  eastern  end.  A  second  was  by  the 
railroad  over  the  mountains  from  the  north-coast  port  of  Puerto 
Plata.  This  was  the  shortest  route,  but  it,  too,  was  rejected  be- 
cause of  terrain  difficulties.    It  was,  however,  to  be  opened  up 


6  ComCruLant  msg  to  SecNav,  dtd  20  Jun  16. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  41 


as  a  secondary  operation.  The  third  alternative,  the  road  from 
Monte  Cristi,  was  the  one  chosen.  Advantages  of  this  route  were 
generally  level  terrain  all  the  way,  a  ready  water  supply  from 
the  Yaque  del  Norte  River,  which  parallels  the  road,  and  low 
rainfall,  an  important  consideration  in  a  land  of  unsurfaced 
roads.7 

The  Hancock  departed  Santo  Domingo  City  on  the  evening 
of  19  June,  arriving  at  Monte  Cristi  on  the  21st.  Preparations 
for  the  arrival  of  the  4th  Regiment  had  already  been  completed 
by  Major  Robert  H.  Dunlap,  commanding  the  Marines  in  the 
town.  In  response  to  an  order  of  14  June,  he  had  assembled  all 
available  lighters  to  transport  troops  and  supplies  ashore  and 
had  arranged  for  camp  sites  and  quartermaster  storage.8 

Adding  to  his  own  4th  Regiment  the  troops  already  ashore  in 
northern  Santo  Domingo,  Pendleton  organized  a  task  force  for 
the  seizure  of  Santiago  and  the  other  inland  towns.  Under  the 
long-winded  title  of  "Provisional  Detachment,  U.S.  Naval  Forces 
Operating  Ashore  in  Santo  Domingo,"  the  force  consisted  of  a 
main  column,  a  Monte  Cristi  base  detachment,  and  the  Puerto 
Plata  detachment.  Total  strength  of  Pendleton's  command  was 
41  officers  and  1,297  enlisted  men.  Its  organization  is  shown  in 
detail  in  the  accompanying  chart.9    (See  Figure  1.) 

The  main  column,  directly  under  Pendleton's  command,  was 
to  advance  on  Santiago  by  the  road  from  Monte  Cristi.  Added 
to  the  4th  Regiment  to  comprise  this  force  were  the  6th  and  1 3th 
Companies.  The  latter,  an  artillery  unit,  replaced  the  25th 
Company,  designated,  along  with  the  Marine  detachments  from 
the  Louisiana  and  Memphis,  to  secure  the  Monte  Cristi  base. 


7  Maj  Samuel  M.  Harrington,  "The  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  Small  Wars," 
Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  VI,  no.  4  (Dec2i ),  p.  478. 

8  CO  US  Forces  Operating  Ashore  in  Santo  Domingo,  ltr  to  CO  Monte 
Cristi,  dtd  I4juni6. 

9  Unless  otherwise  cited  the  following  section  is  based  on  CO  US  Naval 
Forces  Operating  Ashore  in  Santo  Domingo,  rept  to  ComCruLant,  dtd 
20J11I16,  with  attached  repts  of  subordinate  units,  hereafter  Pendleton  report. 


42       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


From  Puerto  Plata  the  4th  (rifle)  and  9th  (artillery)  Companies, 
and  the  Marine  detachments  from  the  New  Jersey  and  the  Rhode 
Island  were  to  move  on  Santiago  along  the  railroad,  opening  it 
to  Marine  traffic.  Contact  between  the  two  columns  was  ex- 
pected at  Navarette,  a  village  about  20  kilometers  west  of  San- 
tiago where  the  railway  from  Puerto  Plata  met  the  road  from 
Monte  Cristi. 

FIGURE  1 

PROVISIONAL  DETACHMENT,  U.S.  NAVAL  FORCES 
OPERATING  ASHORE  IN  NORTHERN  SANTO  DOMINGO 


Provisional  Det 
Col  Pendleton 


1  3th  Co  (Arty) 
Capt  Campbell 


6th  Co  (Provost) 
Capt  Wise 


29th  Co  (Signal)* 
Capt  Ramsey 


28th  Co  (MG)* 
Capt  Pritchett 


Mounted  Det 
1st  Lt  Thrasher 


1st  Bn* 
Capt  Mari 


Base  Troops 
Capt  Miller 


2d  Bn* 
Maj  Shav 


31st  Co* 
1st  Lt  Vulte 


8th  Co* 
1st  Lt  Smith 


32d  Co* 

1st  Lt  Harrington 


26th  Co* 
1st  Lt  Davis 


34th  Co* 
Capt  Williams 


27th  Co* 
Capt  Barker 


Puerto  Plata  Det 
Maj  Bearss 


9th  Co  (Arty) 
Capt  Fortson 


4th  Co 
1st  Lt  Pierce 


25th  Co  (Arty)* 
Capt  Miller 


New  Jersey  Det 
1  st  Lt  Berry 


Louisiana  Det 
2d  Lt  Macrone 


:4th  Regt. 


Rhode  Island  Det 
1st  Lt  White 


Memphis  Det 
1st  Lt  Shepard 


Pendleton  planned  to  keep  his  communications  open  by  post- 
ing detachments  along  the  route.    When  he  had  advanced  a 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  43 


sufficient  distance  to  warrant  doing  so,  the  Marine  commander 
planned  to  draw  in  his  forces  guarding  the  communications  line, 
thus  cutting  off  from  the  base  and  becoming  a  "flying  column." 

Pendleton  and  his  staff  were  handicapped  in  their  operational 
planning  by  a  virtual  nonexistence  of  intelligence  of  the  enemy. 
Admiral  Gaperton  at  Santo  Domingo  City  received  reports  from 
citizens  of  the  northern  section  of  the  country  that  Arias  was  in 
Santiago  with  1,000  men.  Colonel  Pendleton  at  Monte  Cristi 
was  in  possession  of  reports  from  similar  sources  that  about  100 
of  the  enemy  were  entrenched  at  Kilometer  27  on  the  Monte 
Cristi-Santiago  road.  Aside  from  these  two  bits  of  information, 
the  strength,  organization,  and  location  of  the  Arias  forces  were 
unknown.10 

Logistical  arrangements  were  extremely  simple  by  modern 
standards.  A  Marine  expeditionary  force  of  those  days  was 
provided  with  little  but  clothing,  rations,  tentage,  arms  and 
ammunition,  and  medical  supplies.  Any  other  items  were  ordi- 
narily purchased  locally.  For  this  reason,  Captain  Russell  B. 
Putnam,  the  regimental  paymaster,  played  a  vital  role.  Not 
until  he  arrived  at  Monte  Cristi  with  $150,000  in  his  field  safe 
was  it  possible  to  procure  the  transportation  needed  for  the  1 17- 
kilometer  march  to  Santiago.11 

With  few  exceptions  hand-carts  were  the  only  vehicles  avail- 
able to  Marine  expeditionary  forces  in  those  days.  Space  limita- 
tions on  board  naval  vessels  prevented  the  transportation  of  ani- 
mals, and  motor  vehicles  were  scarce.  The  Marine  Corps  had 
purchased  its  first  truck  only  in  1909,  and  during  the  next  four 
years  a  few  more  had  been  obtained  for  use  at  posts  in  the  United 
States.  In  19 14  the  Marine  Corps  procured  its  first  vehicle  for 
field  use,  the  Jeff ery  Quad  four-wheel  drive  truck,  four  of  them 

10  ProvDet  FieldO  No.  1,  dtd  26Juni6;  ComCruLant  msg  to  SecNav,  dtd 
I2juni6.  Distances  were  measured  starting  at  Monte  Cristi  by  stone 
kilometer  posts  which  were  used  by  the  Marines  as  reference  points. 

"BriGen  Russell  B.  Putnam,  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  20ct57, 
hereafter  Putnam  interview  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


44       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


accompanying  the  expeditionary  forces  to  Haiti  in  19 15  for  use 
as  artillery  prime  movers.12 

When  the  4th  Regiment  arrived  at  Monte  Cristi,  a  Holt  tractor, 
still  on  loan  from  the  manufacturer,  was  the  unit's  only  motor 
vehicle.  The  13th  Company  brought  from  Haiti  two  JefTery 
Quads  and  was  included  in  the  main  column  because  of  its  ability 
to  move  the  artillery  pieces.  To  supplement  these  three  vehicles 
the  Marines  bought  or  rented  everything  in  the  area  with  four 
wheels  and  a  motor.  Fred  Sparks  sold  the  1 2  Model  T  touring 
cars  and  1  truck,  constituting  the  entire  stock  of  his  Ford  agency 
and  volunteered  his  own  services  to  keep  them  mnning.  Two 
White  trucks  were  also  purchased  locally.  The  two  Whites  towed 
wagons  as  trailers,  and  the  Ford  truck  hauled  the  town  water 
cart. 

Supplementing  the  motor  vehicles  was  a  weird  assortment  of 
Dorriinican  carts  and  wagons,  drawn  by  animals  of  every  descrip- 
tion. The  revolutionists  had  taken  all  the  livestock  worth  taking, 
leaving  only  a  conglomeration  of  runty  horses,  mules,  burros, 
oxen,  and  even  a  few  cows  for  the  Marines  to  put  between  the 
shafts.  Because  of  the  poor  quality  of  the  animals,  only  individ- 
ual packs  and  company  kitchens  were  loaded  aboard  the  carts 
and  wagons.  The  bulk  of  the  supplies  were  carried  by  the  trucks 
and  trailers. 

The  1 2  Model  T  touring  cars  served  much  as  jeeps  do  today. 
Under  the  command  of  2d  Lieutenant  Henry  L.  Larsen,  they 
were  used  for  reconnaissance,  transporting  the  wounded,  main- 
taining contact  with  the  base,  and  similar  missions.13 

The  Marines  displayed  considerable  ingenuity  in  improvising 
additional  transportation.  Men  of  the  28th  Company  lashed 
their  machine-gun  carts  together  in  pairs,  attached  broken  tent 


32  "Motor  Transportation  in  the  United  States  Marine  Corps"  MS.  no 
author,  n.d.  (Subj  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

^LtGen  Henry  L.  Larsen,  ltr  to  ACofS,  G-3,  HQMC,  dtd  23Dec57 
(Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC) . 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  45 


poles  to  serve  as  shafts,  and  fashioned  harness  and  lashings  from 
canvas.  Six  "volunteers"  took  on  the  job  of  caring  for  the  runty 
Dominican  mules  issued  to  the  company.14 

Medical  service  was  under  the  direction  of  Surgeon  Frederick 
L.  Benton  who  had  under  his  command  3  medical  officers  and 
16  Hospital  Corps  men.  Passed  Assistant  Surgeons  Kent  C.  Mel- 
horn  and  John  B.  Mears  served  as  battalion  surgeons  with  the 
1  st  and  2d  Battalions,  while  Passed  Assistant  Surgeon  Dow  H. 
Gasto  served  in  a  similar  capacity  with  the  machine  gun,  artillery, 
and  signal  companies.15  Each  company  had  a  hospital  apprentice 
attached  to  it,  and  with  each  battalion  was  a  hospital  steward. 
The  one  Ford  ambulance  was  driven  by  the  chaplain,  Leroy  N. 
Taylor. 

Shortly  after  dawn  on  26  June  the  Provisional  Detachment 
pulled  out  of  camp  at  Monte  Cristi  on  the  first  lap  of  the  long 
march  to  Santiago.  Pendleton  had  organized  his  column  into 
four  elements.  These  were  a  mounted  point  of  1 5  men  from  the 
13th  Company  under  1st  Lieutenant  Thomas  E.  Thrasher;  the 
advance  guard  made  up  of  the  2d  Battalion;  the  main  body  com- 
prised of  the  1  st  Battalion  and  the  13th,  28th,  and  29th  Com- 
panies; and  the  vehicle  train  guarded  by  the  6th  Company. 

The  march  was  uneventful  at  first,  but,  beginning  at  the  nine- 
kilometer  post,  small  groups  of  armed  Dominicans  were  spotted, 
just  out  of  range,  falling  back  before  the  Marine  advance.  At 
the  18-kilometer  post,  snipers,  who  opened  fire  on  the  27th 
Company  at  a  range  of  about  600  to  700  yards,  were  put  to 
flight  by  a  few  bursts  of  machine-gun  fire. 

By  1530  the  column  had  reached  the  25-kilometer  post.  From 
a  low  ridge  to  the  left  of  the  road  Las  Trencheras  could  be  clearly 


14  Roswell  Winans,  "Campaigning  in  Santo  Domingo,"  Recruiters'  Bulletin, 
v.  3,  no.  5  (Man 7),  pp.  14-15. 

"The  rank  of  surgeon  was  equivalent  to  that  of  lieutenant  commander; 
that  of  passed  assistant  surgeon  to  lieutenant;  and  that  of  assistant  surgeon  to 
lieutenant  (junior  grade). 


46       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


seen  about  three  kilometers  ahead.  Located  on  two  hills,  the 
position  dominated  the  flat  surrounding  country.  The  first  hill 
rose  abruptly  to  a  height  of  about  75  feet  above  the  road;  the 
second  hill,  behind  the  first,  was  somewhat  higher.  Rather  than 
attack  what  was  believed  to  be  a  strongly  fortified  enemy  position 
late  in  the  day,  Pendleton  ordered  his  forces  into  camp  for  the 
night. 

First  Lieutenant  Julian  C.  Smith,16  the  harassed  young  officer 
in  command  of  the  train  and  rear  guard,  had  the  toughest  time 
of  it  that  first  day  on  the  road.  His  train  was  an  ill-matched 
assortment  of  animal-drawn  and  motor  vehicles.  The  trucks 
could  not  slow  down  to  mule  pace  without  their  radiators  boiling 
over,  so  they  had  to  move  out  first,  advancing  until  they  caught 
up  with  the  tail  of  the  infantry  column,  then  halting  to  wait  for 
the  mule  carts  to  come  up.  The  mule  drivers  had  their  troubles, 
too,  because  their  animals  could  not  understand  English.  But, 
except  for  one  beast  who  always  ran  away  going  down  hill,  the 
Marines  and  mules  achieved  a  state  of  uneasy  coexistence.  For 
security  of  the  train,  Lieutenant  Smith  placed  four  Colt  machine 
guns  and  crews  aboard  the  trucks  and  stationed  a  platoon  of 
riflemen  on  each  flank  of  the  wagon  train.  A  squad  armed  with 
a  Colt  machine  gun  brought  up  the  rear.17 

Added  to  the  problems  of  shaking  down  this  motley  outfit  on 
the  march  was  a  torrential  downpour  which  deluged  men,  beasts, 
and  machines  and  turned  the  dirt  road  into  a  sea  of  mud.  All 
hands  pitched  in  to  drag  and  push  the  vehicles  through  the 
morass.  Not  until  2000  did  these  mud-spattered  Marines  reach 
camp. 

In  spite  of  this  deluge,  water  was  a  problem  for  the  Marines 
in  camp  that  night.    Nobody  had  bothered  to  catch  any  of  the 

16  Julian  C.  Smith  is  best  known  to  thousands  of  Marines  as  the  Command- 
ing General  of  the  2d  Marine  Division  in  the  bloody  battle  for  Tarawa,  20-23 
November  1943. 

17LtGen  Julian  C.  Smith,  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  25Sep57, 
hereafter  Julian  Smith  interview. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  47 


water  which  fell  in  such  liberal  quantities  that  afternoon,  and 
when  i st  Lieutenant  Holland  M.  Smith  and  his  8th  Company 
attempted  to  take  the  quad  trucks  the  four  miles  to  the  Yaque 
River  for  water,  sniper  fire  forced  them  back  with  the  loss  of 
one  man  wounded. 

During  the  night,  preparations  went  forward  for  an  attack 
on  Las  Trencheras  the  next  morning.  Captain  Chandler  C. 
Campbell  emplaced  the  four  3-inch  landing  guns  of  his  13th 
Company  to  the  left  of  the  main  road  between  the  25th  and  26th 
kilometer  posts  and  located  his  observation  post  on  a  ridge  north 
of  the  road.  Patrols  worked  their  way  forward  to  reconnoiter 
the  enemy  trenches.  Pendleton  and  his  staff  worked  late  pre- 
paring the  plans  and  orders  for  the  attack. 

Field  Order  No.  2,  issued  early  the  next  morning  was  the 
result  of  their  work.  It  called  for  a  frontal  attack  on  Las  Tren- 
cheras by  two  battalions  abreast:  Major  Melville  J.  Shaw's  2d 
Battalion,  less  the  8th  Company,  on  the  left,  and  Captain  Arthur 
T.  Marix'  1st  Battalion,  reinforced  by  the  1st  Platoon  of  the 
28th  Company,  on  the  right.  Fire  support  was  to  be  provided 
by  the  field  pieces  of  the  1 3th  Company  and  the  four  Colt  machine 
guns  of  the  2d  Platoon,  28th  Company,  emplaced  on  the  right 
next  to  the  artillery  observation  post.    (See  Map  5.) 

At  0810  the  1st  Battalion  began  its  approach  march  along 
the  Camino  Real,  the  old  abandoned  Monte  Cristi-Santiago 
road  which  paralleled  the  new  highway  on  the  south.  Twenty 
minutes  later  the  2d  Battalion  deployed  north  of  the  new  road, 
with  the  26th  Company  on  the  left  and  the  27th  Company  on  the 
right.  The  artillery  and  machine-gun  supporting  fires  began  at 
0845.  At  first  the  two  battalions  advanced  out  of  contact,  the 
2d  deployed  but  the  1st  still  in  column  on  the  Camino  Real. 
Visibility  was  extremely  limited  by  the  heavy  underbrush,  so,  at 
0900,  Major  Shaw  halted  his  battalion  and  attempted  to  make 
contact  with  Captain  Marix.  At  this  moment  the  Dominicans 
opened  up  a  heavy  small-arms  fire  at  a  range  of  about  1000  yards. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  49 


For  a  few  moments  the  Marine  attack  stalled  as  Shaw  attempted 
to  locate  Marix'  battalion  in  the  heavy  brush.  Marix,  mean- 
while, was  deploying  his  battalion  and  also  attempting  to  make 
contact.  About  0910  his  left  flank  company,  the  34th,  located 
the  2d  Battalion.  The  32d  Company,  reinforced  by  a  section  of 
the  31st  Company,  took  position  on  the  right,  while  the  remainder 
of  the  company  was  held  in  battalion  reserve. 

Under  orders  of  Major  Robert  H.  Dunlap,  Pendleton's  chief 
of  staff,  who  had  just  come  forward  to  coordinate  the  attack,  both 
battalions  resumed  the  advance.  The  Marine  skirmish  line 
pushed  forward,  opening  fire  on  the  enemy  trenches  at  a  range 
of  about  750  yards  on  the  left  flank  and  at  600  yards  on  the  right. 
The  machine  guns  of  the  1st  Platoon,  28th  Company  went  into 
action  about  0920,  giving  the  trenches  a  thorough  going-over. 
Under  the  Marines'  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  the  enemy  fire 
faltered  and  became  increasingly  erratic. 

Because  of  the  heavy  undergrowth,  the  going  was  slow,  par- 
ticularly on  the  right,  where  the  32d  Company  found  itself 
entering  a  swamp  as  it  approached  the  enemy  position.  The 
27th  Company  was  slowed  as  a  consequence  of  overindulgence 
in  "liberated"  canned  honey  the  night  before,  but  by  0949  the 
Marine  skirmish  line  had  reached  the  foot  of  Las  Trencheras. 
At  a  whistle  signal,  firing  ceased.  Then,  with  bayonets  fixed,  the 
Marines  of  the  26th,  27th,  and  34th  companies  leaped  forward 
to  scramble  up  the  steep  slope  and  drive  the  enemy  from  his 
trenches.  At  sight  of  the  Marines  coming  toward  them,  the 
Dominicans  lost  all  stomach  for  fighting  and  fled  to  the  higher 
line  of  trenches.  Only  a  few  stopped  there,  however,  and  they 
were  quickly  driven  out  by  Marine  fire. 

On  the  right  of  the  line  the  reinforced  3 2d  Company  was 
blocked  by  swampy  ground  from  carrying  out  its  mission  of  en- 
veloping the  enemy  left  flank.  Leathernecks  of  this  outfit  could 
do  no  more  than  neutralize  with  small-arms  fire  the  enemy  flank 
position  on  a  knoll  to  the  right  of  the  road.   The  neutralization 


50       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


fires  were  all  that  were  required,  however,  as  the  enemy  fled 
when  the  main  position  fell. 

The  whole  fight  for  Las  Trencheras,  from  the  first  artillery  shot 
to  the  seizure  of  the  enemy  trenches,  lasted  about  an  hour. 
Marine  casualties  were  one  killed  and  four  wounded.  No  enemy 
dead  or  wounded,  arms  or  ammunition  were  found  in  the 
trenches,  but  five  bodies  were  discovered  later  in  the  woods.  Ac- 
cording to  Dominicans,  the  enemy  losses  were  much  greater,  but 
no  accurate  count  of  his  casualties  could  be  made.  In  any  event, 
the  revolutionary  forces  had  not  been  crushed.  They  had  been 
put  to  flight,  but  they  were  still  able  to  offer  resistance. 

The  Marines  advanced  no  farther  on  the  27th.  The  train  was 
brought  up,  and  all  hands  went  into  bivouac.  About  1300  the 
8th  Company  returned  from  the  river  with  water,  having  been 
under  sniper  fire  for  the  entire  five-mile  trip. 

That  the  enemy  was  not  completely  crushed  became  evident 
on  the  28th  when  the  Marines  resumed  their  march  towards 
Santiago.  Mounted  enemy  scouts  hung  on  the  flanks  just  out  of 
range,  as  the  column,  less  the  1st  Battalion,  8th  Company,  and 
train,  moved  out  for  Kilometer  42,  the  day's  objective.  The 
Marine  mounted  detachment  could  do  little  about  it  because  it 
numbered  only  1 5  men  and  its  mounts  were  poor.  As  the  column 
approached  the  42 -kilometer  post,  one  of  the  enemy  horsemen 
ventured  in  too  close  and  was  killed. 

This  stretch  of  road  was  the  worst  encountered  on  the  entire 
march,  making  particularly  heavy  going  for  the  trucks  which 
had  to  crawl  along  in  low  gear.  Undaunted  by  the  rough  going, 
the  Ford  train  doubled  back  to  Monte  Cristi  from  Las  Trencheras, 
a  distance  of  27  kilometers,  then  turned  around  and  caught  up 
with  the  column  at  Kilometer  42.  As  the  Fords  started  from  Las 
Trencheras  that  morning,  the  last  car  in  column  fell  behind  and 
was  fired  on  by  a  small  party  of  Dominicans.  The  Marines  in 
the  car  returned  the  fire,  then  fell  back  to  Las  Trencheras  to  get 
assistance  from  the  8th  Company  garrisoning  that  place.   A  pa- 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  51 


trol  dispatched  to  the  scene  discovered  a  cache  of  32  rifles  and 
ammunition  near  the  spot  from  which  the  shots  had  been  fired. 
Aside  from  this  one  incident,  no  enemy  action  was  encountered 
on  the  trip. 

The  1  st  Battalion  had  an  independent  mission  on  the  28th. 
While  the  main  column  was  advancing  along  the  Santiago  road, 
Captain  Marix'  unit  moved  out  from  Las  Trencheras  along  the 
G amino  Real  to  Guayubin,  a  village  five  miles  to  the  south  on 
the  Yaque  River.  To  a  reception  committee  of  30  citizens 
Marix  read  a  proclamation  by  Admiral  Caperton,  stating  that 
the  Americans  were  friendly  and  wished  to  cooperate  with  the 
Dominicans  in  restoring  law  and  order.  The  proclamation  was 
not  totally  effective,  however,  for  snipers  fired  on  the  Marine 
rear  guard  during  the  return  march  to  Las  Trencheras. 

At  Kilometer  42  the  main  body  made  camp  for  the  night  on 
both  sides  of  an  "S"  curve  in  the  road.  Ditches  on  both  sides 
offered  some  protection.  A  machine  gun  outpost  was  placed  on 
a  commanding  hill  some  750  yards  to  the  east,  and  other  out- 
guards  were  established  on  the  road  to  the  rear  and  in  the  dense 
brush  surrounding  the  camp  on  all  sides.  At  about  1 9 1 5  small- 
arms  fire  erupted  all  around  the  Marine  position.  The  Marine 
machine-guns  opened  up  in  reply,  killing  one  of  the  enemy  on 
the  road  and  driving  off  the  rest.  Some  of  them  retreated  to  the 
east,  evidently  unaware  of  the  Marine  machine  gun  outpost,  for 
they  came  very  close,  talking  in  loud  excited  voices,  until  "Jack," 
a  dog  belonging  to  the  13th  Company,  barked.  At  the  sound, 
the  enemy  fired  wildly  and  ran.  The  Marines  opened  up  with 
their  machine  guns,  killing  at  least  two  Dominicans  whose  bodies 
were  found  later.    One  Marine  was  slightly  wounded. 

The  Dominicans  evidently  did  not  care  for  their  reception,  for 
they  never  again  attacked  the  Marine  camp  at  night.  Later, 
after  Santiago  had  been  taken,  Arias  told  the  Marines  that  his 
men  believed  that  the  "sprinklers,"  as  they  called  machine  guns, 


52        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


could  not  be  fired  at  night.  That  was  one  reason  for  attempting 
a  night  attack.18 

Two  destroyed  bridges  delayed  the  start  of  the  march  on  the 
29th.  These  had  spanned  two  dry  arroyos  just  beyond  the  camp 
and  were  both  about  100  feet  long.  Marine  working  parties 
under  1st  Lieutenant  Ralph  E.  Davis  of  the  26th  Company  and 
Lieutenant  Thrasher  of  the  Mounted  Detachment,  quickly 
remedied  the  matter  by  constructing  a  corduroyed  driveway  down 
into  the  first  arroyo,  and  building  a  new  bridge  at  a  lower  level 
in  the  second  one. 

By  1 100,  work  had  been  completed,  and  the  column,  now 
including  the  1st  Battalion  which  had  just  come  up  from  Las 
Trencheras,  moved  out,  leaving  the  8th  Company  to  guard  the 
bridges.  At  Kilometer  49  the  new  road  ended,  and  the  Marine 
column  turned  south  on  a  cross  road  to  pick  up  the  Camino  Real. 
Small-arms  fire  came  from  the  brush  as  the  27th  Company, 
serving  as  advance  guard,  completed  this  detour.  The  Marines 
returned  the  fire,  and  the  enemy  beat  a  hasty  retreat. 

The  Marines  camped  for  the  night  at  the  junction  of  the 
cross  road  with  the  Camino  Real.  Apparently  friendly  natives 
came  into  camp  during  the  evening,  but  any  hope  that  their 
presence  meant  an  end  to  Dominican  resistance  was  quickly 
dispelled  the  next  morning. 

The  1  st  Battalion,  serving  as  advance  guard  on  the  30th,  had 
been  on  the  march  for  about  half  an  hour  when  it  came  under 
fire  from  enemy  concealed  in  the  dense  undergrowth  at  Savannah 
Ranch.  Captain  Marix  threw  out  the  31st  Company  and  one 
section  of  the  32 d  Company  to  the  left  of  the  road  and  put  the 
other  32 d  Company  section  on  the  right,  while  machine  gunners 
of  the  28th  Company  delivered  fire  support  from  the  road.  The 
ensuing  fire  fight  lasted  only  about  10  minutes,  before  the  enemy, 
as  usual,  faded  into  the  bush.  One  Marine  was  killed;  enemy 
casualties,  if  any,  were  not  reported. 

19  Putnam  interview. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  53 


As  the  march  resumed  at  about  1200  Marix  ordered  Captain 
Charles  F.  Williams  to  take  his  34th  Company  down  a  side  road 
which  looped  to  the  south,  then  rejoined  the  Camino  Real.  For 
more  than  two  hours  the  34th  Company  marched  along  this 
route;  then,  within  sight  of  the  main  road,  brisk  rifle  fire  burst 
from  enemy  concealed  in  the  woods  just  north  of  the  junction  in 
position  to  cover  both  roads.  The  34th  Company  deployed  and 
returned  the  enemy  fire.  While  the  fire  fight  was  in  progress  the 
remainder  of  the  1st  Battalion  came  up  along  the  main  road  and 
joined  in  the  fight.  This  proved  too  much  for  the  Dominicans 
who  vanished  into  the  forest. 

By  the  evening  of  the  30th,  the  Marines  had  reached  the 
village  of  Jaibon,  64  kilometers  from  Monte  Cristi.  Navarette, 
the  junction  of  the  Monte  Cristi-Santiago  highway  with  the 
railroad  from  Puerto  Plata,  was  only  26  kilometers  away,  and 
29th  Company  radio  operators  had  received  a  message  indicating 
that  the  Puerto  Plata  detachment  had  crossed  the  mountains. 
Colonel  Pendleton  then  decided  to  cut  off  from  his  base  at 
Monte  Cristi  and  make  his  force  a  "flying  column."  In  prep- 
aration for  severing  communications  he  dispatched  the  Ford  train 
on  a  final  run  to  Monte  Cristi,  pulled  in  the  6th  and  8th 
Companies,  which  had  been  guarding  the  line  of  communication 
at  Kilometers  42  and  50,  and  brought  up  part  of  the  train 
which  had  been  at  Kilometer  50.  The  Louisiana  detachment 
returned  to  Monte  Cristi  from  Kilometer  27. 

Patrols  were  sent  out  on  both  1  and  2  July,  the  3 2d  Company 
providing  the  troops  on  the  1st  and  the  34th  Company  on  the  2d. 
The  32 d  Company  hit  "pay  dirt."  One  of  its  patrols  brought 
in  a  prisoner  who  reported  the  enemy  dug  in  across  the  road  at 
about  Kilometer  74,  a  point  just  beyond  the  village  of  Guaya- 
canas.  According  to  this  prisoner,  the  enemy  were  in  position 
on  a  low  ridge  which  was  pierced  through  the  center  by  a  deep 
road  cut.   About  50  yards  in  front  of  the  trenches,  the  prisoner 

519667—60  5 


54       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


reported,  was  an  undefended  road  block  of  palm  logs.  His 
information  was  to  prove  remarkably  accurate. 

By  the  morning  of  3  July  all  detachments  along  the  line  of 
communications  had  joined  up  or  had  returned  to  Monte  Cristi. 
It  was  as  a  "flying  column"  that  the  Marines  moved  out  that 
morning  towards  Guayacanas.  At  0800,  after  advancing  about 
four  miles,  the  26th  Company,  in  the  lead,  drew  fire  from  rebel 
outposts,  believed  to  be  screening  the  Guayacanas  position. 
Major  Shaw  called  up  the  27th  Company,  which  was  next  in 
line,  and  directed  Captain  Frederick  A.  Barker,  its  company 
commander,  to  assist  Lieutenant  Davis  and  his  26th  Company 
in  driving  in  the  enemy  outposts.  By  0830  the  last  of  the  enemy 
had  pulled  back  out  of  contact. 

Pendleton  now  halted  his  force  and  ordered  the  1st  Battalion, 
minus  the  8th  Company  but  reinforced  by  the  29th,  to  attack. 
Shaw  sent  out  a  squad-size  patrol  from  the  27th  under  2d  Lieu- 
tenant Egbert  T.  Lloyd  to  reconnoiter.  Lloyd  and  his  Marines 
worked  their  way  through  the  dense  undergrowth  to  within  200 
yards  of  the  enemy  and  then  returned  to  report  their  position 
much  stronger  than  the  one  at  Las  Trencheras.  The  fortifica- 
tions included  a  trench  across  the  road,  a  trench  on  a  hill  north 
of  the  road,  and  another  on  the  continuation  of  the  hill  south 
of  the  road — all  skillfully  camouflaged  by  the  removal  of  exca- 
vated earth.  The  ground  for  200  yards  in  front  of  the  trenches 
had  been  cleared,  offering  an  unrestricted  field  of  fire.  About 
1 50  yards  in  front  of  the  trenches  was  an  undefended  roadblock 
consisting  of  a  large  tree  felled  across  the  road.    (See  Map  6.) 

The  2d  Battalion  attack  jumped  off  at  0900  with  all  three  com- 
panies abreast — 26th  south  of  the  road,  27th  in  the  center  and 
north  of  the  road,  and  29th  on  the  left.  For  these  companies  the 
advance  was  slow,  not  because  of  enemy  action  but  because  of 
the  dense  brush. 

Artillery  fires  were  not  only  useless  but  nearly  ended  in  a 
serious  error.    When  the  13th  Company  opened  fire  with  their 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  55 


56       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


3-inch  guns,  an  error  in  fuse  settings  caused  the  shrapnel  shells 
to  burst  over  the  heads  of  the  advancing  Marine  infantry.  Had 
these  rounds  been  high  explosive  they  might  have  killed  or 
wounded  a  number  of  Marines.  Fortunately,  shrapnel  explod- 
ing above  the  tree  tops  proved  of  little  effect.  Tree  limbs  fell 
among  the  infantry  without  causing  casualties,  and  the  13th 
Company  ceased  fire  when  their  error  in  range  was  reported.19 

Major  Dunlap,  going  forward  on  the  road  with  a  Benet-Mercie 
crew  from  the  13th  Company,  outstripped  the  advance  of  the 
skirmishers.  Passing  around  a  bend  in  the  road,  he  found  him- 
self fully  exposed  to  enemy  fire  from  the  trenches  a  little  more  than 
200  yards  away.  He  and  his  machine  gunners  rushed  forward 
to  take  cover  behind  the  log  roadblock.  Corporal  Joseph  A. 
Glowin  emplaced  the  gun  and  opened  fire.  He  was  hit  but  con- 
tinued to  serve  his  weapon  until  he  was  hit  again  and  had  to  be 
dragged  from  the  gun.  Dunlap  took  over  the  gun,  only  to  have 
it  jam  just  as  another  Benet-Mercie  crew  from  the  27th  Company 
arrived  and  went  into  action.  This  gun,  too,  jammed. 

At  this  point  the  2d  Platoon  of  the  28th  Company  with  their 
four  Colt  machine  guns  began  to  come  up.  They  had  been 
committed  when  Captain  William  H.  Pritchett,  the  company 
commander,  was  given  permission  by  Colonel  Pendleton  to  take 
a  platoon  forward  to  support  the  infantry  attack.  The  men  had 
come  under  long-range  rifle  fire  from  the  enemy  trenches  almost 
as  soon  as  they  started  to  advance.  In  the  running  fight  one  man 
had  already  been  seriously  wounded.  Owing  to  frequent  jams, 
the  platoon  had  become  strung  out  and  now  came  up  one  gun 
at  a  time. 

Captain  Pritchett,  who  arrived  with  the  first  gun,  ordered  it 
into  action  at  once.  Within  a  few  moments  Corporal  George 
Frazee,  the  gun  captain,  had  been  killed,  and  four  others  had 
been  wounded. 

19Maj  Norman  C.  Bates,  1st  end.  to  CMC  ltr  to  Maj  N.  C.  Bates,  dtd 
8N0V57  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  57 


First  Sergeant  Roswell  Winans  came  up  with  the  second  gun. 
He  set  it  up  and  began  firing  it  himself.  From  his  seat  on  the 
Colt  tripod,  Winans  was  in  plain  view  to  the  enemy  in  their 
trenches  only  200  yards  away.  Their  return  fire  became  erratic 
and  slackened  in  volume  as  the  .30  caliber  slugs  from  the  Colt 
began  to  graze  the  top  of  the  fortifications.  The  last  round  of  the 
250-cartridge  belt  jammed,  temporarily  silencing  the  gun.  Un- 
daunted, Winans  stood  up  and  set  about  clearing  it  in  full  view 
of  the  enemy.  Not  until  Captain  Pritchett  ordered  him  to  do  so 
did  he  pull  the  gun  back  under  cover  of  the  undergrowth.  Re- 
pairs completed,  Winans  and  another  Marine  put  the  gun  back 
into  action.  Meanwhile,  the  third  gun  had  come  up  and  gone 
back  into  action.  With  three  guns  firing,  the  Marines  now  were 
able  to  establish  fire  superiority  over  the  Dominicans. 

It  was  under  cover  of  the  deadly  machine  gun  fire  that  the 
riflemen  advanced  to  within  150  yards  of  the  trenches.  The  27th 
and  29th  Companies  north  of  the  road  worked  their  way  north, 
cut  through  a  dense  cactus  hedge,  and  outflanked  the  enemy  posi- 
tion. With  a  loud  cheer  the  Marines  of  these  two  companies 
charged  the  northern  enemy  trench.  First  to  enter  were  the  29th 
Company  signalmen  who  demonstrated  in  this  engagement  the 
ability  of  specialist  Marines  to  fight  as  infantry  when  necessary. 
Sergeant  John  H.  Crall,  mess  sergeant  of  the  29th,  shot  and  killed 
the  rebel  commander,  General  Maximo  Gabral.  This  was  enough 
for  the  Dominicans.  They  fled,  abandoning  all  three  trenches, 
although  only  their  right  flank  was  actually  under  assault.  Three 
of  their  number  were  cut  down  by  Marine  rifle  fire  as  they  ran 
out  of  the  trench. 

While  the  1  st  Battalion  was  attacking  the  enemy  fortifications, 
Lieutenant  Julian  Smith  and  his  rear  guard  were  beating  off  an 
attack  by  a  group  of  about  75  Dominicans.  Taking  position  be- 
hind a  log  fence,  the  enemy  opened  up  on  Smith's  rear  squad  with 
small-arms  fire.  The  Marines  hit  the  deck  and  returned  the  fire 
until  Smith  with  two  additional  squads  came  back  to  reinforce 


58       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


them.  A  Colt  machine  gun  was  put  into  operation,  and,  when 
the  bullets  began  to  knock  splinters  off  the  top  fence  rail,  the 
enemy  decided  the  action  was  too  hot  and  pulled  out.20 

Marine  casualties  during  the  engagement  at  Guayacanas  were 
one  killed  and  eight  wounded,  all  but  three  hit  at  the  machine 
gun  position  on  the  road.  The  number  of  enemy  casualties  could 
not  be  determined.  For  their  part  in  the  battle  Winans  and 
Glowin  were  awarded  the  Medal  of  Honor. 

The  enemy  trenches  were  carried  about  noon,  and  the  26th 
Company  was  pushed  out  about  200  yards  to  the  east  to  cover  the 
position.  The  train  was  brought  up,  and  for  the  next  three  hours 
all  hands  sweated  to  haul  the  trucks  and  wagons  over  a  section 
where  the  Dominicans  had  done  a  thorough  job  of  demolition. 
This  obstacle  passed,  the  Marine  column  resumed  its  march, 
arriving  at  the  village  of  Esperanza  where  camp  was  made  for 
the  night. 

With  the  1  st  Battalion  as  advance  guard,  the  column  got  under 
way  on  4  July  about  0730.  Just  after  the  start,  Marines  of  the 
32 d  Company  on  the  point  exchanged  shots  with  an  enemy 
mounted  patrol,  easily  driving  them  off.  About  eleven  o'clock 
a  Ford  flying  a  Red  Cross  flag  approached  from  the  direction  of 
Santiago  carrying  four  Dominican  doctors  on  their  way  to  treat 
the  enemy  soldiers  wounded  at  Guayacanas.  After  being  blind- 
folded, they  were  allowed  to  pass  through  the  Marine  lines. 

The  Marine  column  pulled  into  Navarette  in  the  middle  of 
the  afternoon  to  find  Major  Hiram  A.  "Hiking  Hiram"  Bearss 
and  his  detachment  camped  at  the  railroad  station,  where  they 
had  arrived  the  day  before  after  fighting  their  way  from  Puerto 
Plata.  The  "flying  column"  was  now  back  to  earth  after  a  flight 
of  three  days.  Rail  communications  to  the  coast  were  immedi- 
ately put  to  use  to  evacuate  the  wounded  to  Puerto  Plata  for 
treatment  aboard  the  hospital  ship  Solace.  Logistic  problems  for 
the  remainder  of  the  march  to  Santiago  were  now  greatly  simpli- 

20  Julian  Smith  interview. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  59 


fied.  Not  only  could  supplies  be  brought  up  to  Navarette  by  rail 
from  the  coast,  but,  as  the  tracks  continued  into  Santiago,  Colonel 
Pendleton  could  now  move  his  heavy  gear  and  supplies  by  rail, 
thus  relieving  his  overworked  motor  and  animal  transport. 

Mountainous  terrain  and  track  and  rolling  stock  in  an  ad- 
vanced state  of  decay  had  proven  to  be  more  formidable  obstacles 
to  Bearss'  advance  than  the  enemy.  About  four  kilometers 
from  Puerto  Plata  the  railroad  crossed  a  spur  of  the  coastal  range 
so  steep  that  a  cog  rail  was  necessary.  Once  over  this  preliminary 
obstacle,  trains  began  the  ascent  of  the  coastal  range  to  an  alti- 
tude of  1,580  feet.  At  this  height  a  short  tunnel  pierced  the 
mountain  below  the  summit  of  the  range  which  at  this  point  was 
1,720  feet  above  sea  level.  After  emerging  from  the  tunnel, 
there  was  an  equally  dizzy  descent  to  the  Cibao  plain.21 

The  Ferrocarril  Central  Dominicano,  was,  according  to  Major 
Bearss,  ".  .  .  in  a  most  deplorable  condition;  another  two  months 
under  Dominican  rule  and  the  entire  outfit  would  have  been 
worthless  and  useless."  22 

On  25  June  Captain  Eugene  P.  Fortson,  commanding  the 
9th  Company,  and  temporarily  in  command  of  the  detachment 
at  Puerto  Plata  pending  the  arrival  of  Bearss  from  the  United 
States,  had  received  a  radio  message  from  Colonel  Pendleton. 
He  was  informed  that  the  main  body  of  the  Provisional  Detach- 
ment would  begin  the  advance  on  Santiago  the  following  day; 
that  it  would  establish  a  base  at  Navarette;  and  that  rail  com- 
munciations  with  Puerto  Plata  were  to  be  established  upon 
arrival  at  Santiago.  In  support  of  this  operation  Captain 
Fortson  was  ordered  to  ".  .  .  reconnoiter  about  20  miles  along 
the  railroad  and  keep  it  in  repair."  23 

21  Otto  Schoenrich,  Santo  Domingo,  a  Country  with  a  Future  (New  York: 
The  Macmillan  Company,  19 18),  pp.  210-213. 

22  GO  Railroad  Bn,  rept  to  GO  US  Naval  Forces  Operating  Ashore  in 
Santo  Domingo,  dtd  13J11I16. 

^USS  Prairie  msg  to  CO  Puerto  Plata  Det  via  USS  Sacramento,  dtd 
25juni6. 


60       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Fortson  was  delayed  in  beginning  his  reconnaissance  on  the 
26th  because  of  the  disappearance  of  the  Dominican  engineer. 
A  substitute  was  rounded  up  and  the  4th  and  9th  Companies, 
with  four  Colt  and  two  Benet-Mercie  machine  guns  and  a  3 -inch 
naval  landing  gun,  pulled  out  of  Puerto  Plata  at  1030.  By 
1830  the  detachment  had  arrived  at  the  village  of  Perez  where 
it  bivouacked  for  the  night.  Total  distance  traveled  during  the 
day  was  about  10  miles.  There  was  no  enemy  opposition;  the 
slow  rate  of  progress  was  due  to  the  necessity  of  hauling  one 
car  at  a  time  up  the  spur  of  the  coastal  range. 

Two  squads  of  the  4th  Company  reconnoitered  along  the 
track  for  about  a  half-mile  south  of  Perez  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th.  This  patrol  reported  all  quiet  and  the  rails  in  working 
order,  so  the  train  moved  out  to  the  south  at  about  1300.  So 
steep  was  the  grade  that  it  was  necessary  to  haul  the  train  in  two 
sections  as  far  as  the  village  of  Llanos,  a  distance  of  about  one 
mile.  While  the  first  section  was  halted  at  Llanos,  waiting  for 
the  locomotive  to  bring  up  the  remainder  of  the  train,  an  enemy 
outpost  opened  fire  on  the  halted  Marines  from  extreme  range. 
They  replied  with  their  3 -inch  gun,  firing  it  from  its  position  on 
the  flat  car. 

By  1 500  the  second  section  had  been  hauled  up  to  the  top 
of  the  grade  at  Llanos,  and  the  advance  was  resumed  with  the 
train  now  coupled  together  in  a  single  section.  The  4th  Com- 
pany, deployed  ahead  of  the  train  in  an  effort  to  locate  the 
enemy  and  silence  his  fire,  advanced  for  about  one  and  a  half 
miles  before  locating  the  Dominican  position  on  a  wooded  hill 
to  the  left  of  the  track.  The  4th  Company  Marines  opened 
up  with  rifle  fire  at  a  range  of  about  600  yards.  The  Domini- 
cans kept  up  a  heavy  return  fire  until  a  Colt  machine  gun  was 
brought  into  action,  then  withdrew  to  a  prepared  position  on  a 
higher  ridge. 

The  Marines  quickly  followed  up  their  advantage,  occupying 
the  recently  vacated  enemy  position,  and  building  up  fire  superi- 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  61 


ority  against  the  new  Dominican  position  on  the  higher  ridge. 
Once  again  the  Colt  machine  gun  proved  decisive.  The  enemy 
fire  quickly  ceased,  and  the  Marines  moved  up  and  occupied 
the  higher  ridge  without  further  opposition. 

Marines  with  the  train,  meanwhile,  advanced  slowly,  repair- 
ing one  section  of  torn-up  track,  and  arriving  at  the  town  of 
Quebreda  Honda  by  1830.  Ahead,  a  long  stretch  of  track  had 
been  torn  up,  so  the  advance  halted  for  the  night. 

The  28th  was  a  day  of  railroad  reconstruction.  In  addition 
to  repairing  track  outside  Quebreda  Honda,  the  Marines  turned 
section-hands  had  to  remove  a  fallen  water  tower  lying  on  fire 
across  the  bridge  at  Lajas — and  then  repair  the  bridge  itself. 
Work  on  the  bridge  continued  throughout  the  day,  undisturbed 
by  enemy  action,  and  was  completed  the  following  morning. 

During  the  night  of  the  28th,  Major  Bearss,  who  had  landed 
at  Puerto  Plata  during  the  afternoon,  arrived  at  Lajas  with  the 
New  Jersey  detachment.  He  assumed  command,  and,  after  a 
quick  appraisal  of  the  situation,  determined  to  keep  the  enemy 
on  the  run  by  a  rapid  advance,  thereby  preventing  further  de- 
struction of  track,  bridges,  or  the  tunnel  at  the  top  of  the  pass. 
The  terrain,  however,  was  anything  but  encouraging  for  swift 
movement.  From  Lajas  the  rails  headed  steeply  upward,  wind- 
ing and  twisting  along  the  slope  of  a  steep  mountain  gorge  to  the 
tunnel  which  pierced  the  mountainside  a  short  distance  from 
the  top  of  the  pass. 

Acting  on  reports  that  the  enemy  were  strongly  entrenched 
on  the  heights  above  the  town  of  Alta  Mira,  Bearss  ordered  the 
4th  Company  to  advance  along  ridges  east  of  the  track  and  the 
9th  Company  to  accompany  the  train  with  a  strong  advance 
guard  thrown  out  ahead.  The  New  Jersey  detachment  served  as 
rear  guard. 

The  Marines  moved  out  at  0800  on  29  June,  and  40  minutes 
later  the  4th  Company  was  on  the  outskirts  of  Alta  Mira.  Enemy 
troops  rapidly  evacuated  the  town  as  the  Marines  approached 


62       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


but,  as  they  passed  through  the  town,  Dominicans  on  the  hill 
to  the  west  opened  fire.  The  ensuing  fire  fight  was  put  to  an 
end  by  the  gth  Company  artillerists,  who,  coming  up  with  the 
train,  opened  up  with  their  3-inch  gun.  After  a  half-hour  of 
shelling,  the  enemy  retreated  up  the  mountain  towards  the  tunnel. 

The  enemy  were  now  reported  to  be  in  a  strong  position  on 
La  Cumbre,  a  mountain  peak  dominating  the  tunnel  entrance. 
Major  Bearss  ordered  the  4th  Company  to  swing  around  in  an 
effort  to  flank  La  Cumbre  from  the  east.  After  an  arduous  climb, 
the  Marines  located  the  enemy  position  about  3,000  yards  distant. 
They  signalled  this  information  to  the  train  below,  and  the  3- 
inch  gun  was  unloaded  and  emplaced  in  a  position  to  bear  upon 
the  enemy  on  La  Cumbre. 

The  first  shot  was  a  little  short,  the  second  shot  was  over,  the 
third  shot  took  off  the  corner  of  a  shack  overlooking  the  enemy 
trenches,  the  fourth  shot  took  away  the  right  side  of  the  shack, 
and  the  fifth  shot  exploded  in  the  center  of  it.  By  this  time  the 
enemy  could  be  seen  scurrying  down  the  mountainside  towards 
the  tunnel.  Two  rounds  of  shrapnel  burst  over  them  to  speed 
their  progress. 

Major  Bearss  now  determined  on  a  sprint  through  the  tunnel 
in  order  to  catch  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  Accompanied  by  55 
men  from  the  9th  Company  and  New  Jersey  detachment,  he 
dashed  through  the  300-yard  passage  to  see  the  last  of  the  enemy 
in  full  flight  towards  Santiago.  This  ended  Dominican  resistance 
along  the  railroad,  but  owing  to  the  necessity  for  sending  the  train 
back  to  Puerto  Plata  with  the  wounded  and  the  time  spent  repair- 
ing a  destroyed  bridge,  Bearss'  detachment  did  not  arrive  at 
Navarette  until  3  July,  four  days  later. 

The  24th  Company,  an  independent  rifle  unit,  joined  Pendle- 
ton's forces  at  Navarette  on  the  5th,  having  landed  at  Puerto 
Plata  the  previous  day.  These  Marines  arrived  too  late  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  fighting  but  added  to  the  strength  available  for 
occupation  duties. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  63 


Pendleton  and  his  united  command  were  now  ready  to  fight 
their  way  on  into  Santiago,  but  there  was  to  be  no  further  action. 
The  Arias  faction  was  ready  to  come  to  terms.  On  5  July, 
Dominican  officials  called  on  Colonel  Pendleton  to  inform  him 
that  there  would  be  no  further  resistance.  These  emissaries  were 
not  of  the  revolutionary  party  but  had  come  from  Santo  Domingo 
City  to  persuade  Arias  to  accept  Admiral  Caperton's  surrender 
terms.  The  admiral  had  offered  to  pardon  the  Dominican  revolu- 
tionists resisting  American  troops  if  they  would  disarm  and  dis- 
perse. Now  that  he  had  been  defeated  in  battle,  Arias  was 
willing  to  accept  the  American  conditions.24 

At  daybreak  on  the  6th,  the  Marines  resumed  the  march  on 
Santiago,  arriving  at  the  outskirts  of  the  city  by  0800.  Colonel 
Pendleton  summoned  the  members  of  the  peace  commission  and 
the  newly-appointed  governor,  Dr.  Juan  B.  Perez,  over  a  tele- 
phone line  connected  to  the  Santiago  city  system  by  the  signalmen 
of  the  29th  Company.  When  these  Dominicans  reported  to  the 
Marine  command  post,  arrangements  were  made  for  an  im- 
mediate occupation  of  the  city.  Early  in  the  afternoon  the 
Marine  column  marched  into  Santiago  and  occupied  the  Fortaleza 
San  Luis,  which  was  the  military  barracks,  and  the  Castillo,  a 
fortified  hill  position  overlooking  the  city  from  the  east. 

COMPLETING  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  THE  NORTH 

With  the  defeat  of  Arias  and  the  occupation  of  Santiago  the 
4th  Regiment  had  accomplished  the  major  part  of  its  mission. 
It  now  remained  to  complete  the  occupation  of  the  northern 
region  of  the  country  and  to  assure  the  maintenance  of  law  and 
order  in  support  of  the  constitutional  government. 

Pendleton,  a  skillful  military  diplomat,  realized  from  the  first 
that  success  in  this  mission  would  depend  upon  the  attitude  of 
the  Dominican  people  towards  the  occupation  forces.  With 

24  ComCruLant  msg  to  SecNav,  dtd  26Juni6. 


64       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


extraordinary  tact  he  was  able  to  convince  the  leading  citizens 
that  the  Marines  had  no  purpose  other  than  to  help  in  setting 
Dominican  affairs  in  order.25  Conditions  had  become  so  anarchic 
by  the  summer  of  19 16  that  the  more  thoughtful  Dominicans 
accepted  the  Marines,  at  least  at  first,  with  the  feeling  that  a 
temporary  foreign  occupation  could  not  make  matters  worse  and 
might  lead  to  an  improvement.26 

Pendleton  insisted  that  Marine  performance  live  up  to 
promises.  He  demanded  absolute  integrity  in  dealings  with  the 
Dominicans.  The  Marines  paid  in  cash  for  what  they  needed 
and  they  were  expected  to  live  up  to  their  obligations.  On  one 
occasion  a  group  of  local  merchants  came  to  Captain  Campbell, 
commanding  the  13th  Company,  with  a  large  bundle  of  bar  chits 
bearing  the  names  of  "George  W ashington,"  "Abraham  Lincoln," 
"Woodrow  Wilson,"  and  other  illustrious  Americans.  Campbell 
was  able  to  identify  some  of  the  men  by  comparing  handwriting. 
These  were  required  to  honor  their  debts.  The  remainder  of  the 
bills  were  paid  out  of  the  Company  funds.  The  merchants  were 
directed  to  conduct  only  a  cash  business  with  Marines  thereafter.27 

A  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  Marines  to  help  Dominicans 
in  their  business  affairs  also  served  to  cement  friendly  relations. 
The  opening  of  the  Puerto  Plata  railroad  offered  a  good  oppor- 
tunity to  be  of  service  by  shipping  the  coffee  and  cacao  crops  to 
the  coast  for  shipment  to  world  markets  where,  under  the  infla- 
tionary conditions  of  World  War  I,  they  brought  fancy  prices. 
And,  too,  the  Marine  payroll  and  open-market  purchases  of  sup- 
plies in  Santiago  and  the  surrounding  country  stimulated  local 
trade.28 

These  practices  paid  off  in  an  attitude,  if  not  of  approval,  at 

25LtGen  Pedro  A.  Del  Valle,  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  70ct57. 
Del  Valle,  a  Puerto  Rican  by  birth,  was  Pendleton's  interpreter  during  this 
period. 

26  Welles,  Naboth's  Vineyard,  pp.  801-824. 

27  Thrasher  interview. 

28  Ibid.,  and  Julian  Smith  interview. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  65 


least  of  acquiescence  on  the  part  of  leading  Dominicans.  Rear 
Admiral  Charles  F.  Pond,  who  had  relieved  Admiral  Caperton 
as  Commander  Cruiser  Force,  was  particularly  impressed  by  the 
apparent  cordiality  existing  between  Marines  and  Dominicans 
in  Santiago.  "Interviews  with  Dominican  officials  [were]  cordial 
and  satisfactory  with  no  evidence  of  distrust  or  dissatisfaction," 
he  reported  after  an  inspection  of  the  northern  region.  "Each 
gave  assurance  of  willing  cooperation."  29 

This  concern  for  good  working  relations  with  the  Dominicans 
also  characterized  the  completion  of  the  occupation  of  the  north- 
ern section  of  the  country.  During  the  period  22  to  24  July 
Colonel  Pendleton  and  his  staff  visited  the  towns  of  Moca,  La 
Vega,  and  San  Francisco  de  Macoris,  and,  in  conferences  with 
local  officials,  arranged  for  the  occupation  of  those  places  by 
Marines.  By  the  end  of  the  month,  garrisons  had  been  estab- 
lished by  the  9th  Company  at  Moca,  by  the  34th  Company  at 
La  Vega,  and  by  the  31st  at  San  Francisco  de  Macoris.  In  addi- 
tion, the  32d  Company  had  garrisoned  Sanchez,  a  port  on 
Samana  Bay  and  eastern  terminus  of  the  Samana-Santiago  rail- 
road. Completing  the  system  of  outlying  garrisons  were  the  25th 
and  24th  Companies,  the  latter  a  new  arrival  attached  to  Pendle- 
ton's command,  stationed  at  Monte  Cristi  and  Puerto  Plata  re- 
spectively. Puerto  Plata,  with  its  rail  connection  to  the  interior, 
became  the  supply  port  for  the  4th  Regiment  and  other  Marine 
units  operating  in  the  northern  region.  Colonel  Pendleton's 
headquarters  and  all  troops  not  assigned  to  outpost  duties  took 
station  at  Santiago.  Except  at  San  Francisco  de  Macoris,  these 
occupations  went  off  smoothly.30 

To  assure  effective  control  of  the  occupation  forces,  two  gen- 
eral subordinate  commands  were  set  up  in  northern  Santo 
Domingo.  Major  Shaw,  commanding  the  2d  Battalion,  was 
placed  in  charge  of  the  Santiago  garrison,  while  Captain  Marix, 

29  GomCruLant  rept  of  ops,  23-31J11I16,  to  SecNav,  dtd  2Augi6. 

30  See  Chapter  III. 


66       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  i  st  Battalion  Commander,  assumed  responsibility  for  the 
La  Vega  district,  an  area  embracing  all  northeast  Santo  Domingo 
and  including  the  provinces  of  La  Vega,  Pacificador,  and 
Samana.31 

Pendleton's  U.S.  Naval  Forces  Ashore  in  Northern  Santo  Do- 
mingo underwent  a  series  of  organizational  changes  in  the  late 
summer  of  191 6.  In  August,  the  24th  Company  and  the  Marine 
detachments  of  the  Memphis  and  Rhode  Island  departed.  The 
next  month,  the  two  remaining  shipboard  detachments  ashore 
in  northern  Santo  Domingo,  those  of  the  New  Jersey  and  Louisi- 
ana, were  reorganized  as  the  45th  and  47th  Companies  and  added 
to  the  4th  Regiment.  Pendleton  then  had  under  his  command, 
in  addition  to  his  own  regiment,  the  4th,  6th,  gth,  and  13th 
Companies. 

On  18  October,  Colonel  Pendleton  left  Santiago  for  Santo 
Domingo  City,  where  he  assumed  larger  responsibilities  as  com- 
mander of  all  U.S.  naval  forces  ashore  in  Santo  Domingo.  A 
month  later,  on  22  November,  this  command  was  redesignated 
2d  Marine  Brigade.  Colonel  Theodore  P.  Kane  took  over  as 
commander  of  U.S.  naval  forces  ashore  in  northern  Santo  Do- 
mingo but  did  not  take  command  of  the  4th  Regiment  until 
1  January  19 17.  Pendleton  retained  command  of  the.  regiment 
until  1 1  December,  the  date  of  his  promotion  to  brigadier  gen- 
eral. He  was  then  relieved  by  Major  Marix  who  commanded 
the  regiment  until  Kane  took  over.32 

DIPLOMATIC  STALEMATE 

With  the  occupation  of  the  Cibao  towns  and  the  establishment 
of  law  and  order  throughout  the  country  north  of  the  mountains 
the  4th  Regiment  had  successfully  completed  its  mission.  But 
neither  Admiral  Pond  nor  Minister  Russell  in  Santo  Domingo 


81  4th  Regt  MRolls,  iJul-3iDeci6. 

82  4th  Regt  MRolls,  iAug-3iDeci6. 


INTERVENTION  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  67 


City  could  claim  any  diplomatic  success  comparable  to  the  mili- 
tary victory  scored  by  Colonel  Pendleton  and  his  Marines  north 
of  the  mountains.33  The  policy  of  the  United  States  in  July  19 16 
was  to  put  into  office  a  Dominican  government  which  would 
agree  to  American  control  of  finances  and  of  the  army.  Dr. 
Federico  Henriquez  y  Carvajal,  the  leading  candidate  for  the 
presidency,  was  an  avowed  follower  of  Arias  and  was  obviously 
unacceptable  to  the  United  States.  As  neither  the  Americans 
nor  the  Dominicans  could  agree  on  a  new  government,  they  at 
last  settled  on  a  compromise  to  break  the  political  deadlock.  On 
25  July  the  Dominican  Congress  elected  Dr.  Francisco  Henriquez 
y  Carvajal,  brother  of  Federico  and  a  man  completely  aloof 
from  politics,  to  be  provisional  president  for  five  months. 

The  election  of  a  chief  executive  did  nothing  to  bring  closer 
a  solution  to  the  political  problem.  Although  Henriquez  y 
Carvajal  was  willing  to  accept  most  of  the  United  States  demands 
for  financial  control,  he  balked  at  placing  the  Dominican  armed 
forces  under  the  command  of  American  officers.  Negotiations 
dragged  on  into  the  autumn  without  results.  Then,  in  Novem- 
ber, the  provisional  president  ordered  elections  foi  members  of 
Congress,  whose  terms  were  about  to  expire.  He  feared  that 
the  United  States  would  use  the  nonexistence  of  a  Congress  as  a 
justification  for  imposing  military  government. 

Ironically,  this  action,  intended  to  forestall  the  imposition  of 
military  government,  was  exactly  what  brought  it  about.  Under 
the  complicated  Dominican  electoral  law,  members  of  Congress 
were  chosen  by  electoral  colleges.  Most  of  these  were  controlled 
by  Arias.  To  forestall  such  a  result,  and  also  because  there 
seemed  to  be  no  other  way  to  achieve  the  desired  reforms,  Sec- 
retary of  State  Lansing  recommended  to  President  Wilson  the 
establishment  of  a  military  government.  To  this  the  President 
reluctantly  consented. 

33  This  section  is  based  on  Munro,  U.S.  and  the  Caribbean,  pp.  126-129; 
and  Welles,  Naboth's  Vineyard,  pp.  773-792. 


CHAPTER  III 


Occupation  Duty  in  the 
Dominican  Republic 

THE  SAN  FRANCISCO  DE  MACORIS  REVOLT 

"The  Republic  of  Santo  Domingo  is  hereby  placed  in  a  state 
of  military  occupation  by  the  forces  under  my  command  and  is 
made  subject  to  military  government  and  to  the  exercise  of  mili- 
tary law  applicable  to  such  occupation,"  read  the  proclamation 
issued  on  29  November  19 16  by  Rear  Admiral  Harry  S.  Knapp, 
the  newly  designated  military  governor.1 

It  was  shortly  past  midnight  at  Marine  headquarters  in  Santi- 
ago when  Colonel  Kane  was  handed  a  dispatch  from  Knapp 
announcing  the  beginning  of  military  government.  Plans  for 
putting  it  in  operation  had  already  been  drawn  up.  They  were 
now  ordered  into  effect.  By  radio,  telegraph,  and  telephone 
Knapp's  message  was  passed  to  every  4th  Regiment  post  in  north- 
ern Santo  Domingo.  In  Santiago  MP  patrols  roved  through 
the  streets  and  checked  the  cantinas  to  pass  the  word  that  liberty 
was  cancelled  and  for  all  hands  to  return  to  barracks  at  once. 

At  the  Fortaleza  San  Luis  Colonel  Kane  briefed  company 
commanders  of  the  Santiago  garrison  on  the  military  government 
plans.    He  appointed  a  censor  to  keep  watch  on  the  press  and 


1  Quoted  in  Munro,  U.S.  and  the  Caribbean,  p.  129. 
519667—60  6 


69 


70       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


a  provost  marshal  and  provost  judge  to  apprehend  and  try 
offenders  against  the  newly  established  military  rule.  He  ordered 
patrols  strengthened  and  all  companies  kept  on  alert. 

The  next  morning  the  Dominican  officials — the  judges,  the 
ayuntiamento  (city  council),  the  chief  of  police,  and  the  padre — 
were  summoned  to  the  fortaleza,  where  Colonel  Kane  told  them 
they  were  expected  to  carry  on  in  their  duties,  but,  if  any  of  them 
refused,  the  Marines  were  ready  to  take  over.  All  readily  agreed 
except  Padre  Gonzales,  who  flew  into  a  rage,  but  he  finally  calmed 
down  and  agreed  to  cooperate.2 

Inhabitants  of  northern  Santo  Domingo  accepted  the  procla- 
mation of  military  government  without  protest  except  in  San 
Francisco  de  Macoris.  A  town  of  about  5,000  inhabitants  lo- 
cated 30  miles  southeast  of  Santiago,  it  had  long  been  a  center 
of  opposition  to  American  occupation.  When  the  31st  Company 
moved  into  town  on  27  July,  Juan  Perez,  the  provincial  governor 
and  an  undetermined  number  of  armed  Dominicans  occupied 
the  local  fortaleza.  At  first,  the  populace  greeted  the  Marines 
cordially.  No  effort  was  made  to  disarm  Perez'  followers  or  to 
dispossess  them  from  the  fortaleza.  Relations  degenerated 
quickly  when  it  became  obvious  to  the  Dominicans  that  the 
Marines  intended  to  remain,  and  there  was  occasional  sniping 
in  the  town. 

A  weak  and  vacillating  Marine  commander,  unable  to  deal 
with  the  situation,  was  relieved  by  1st  Lieutenant  Ernest  C. 
Williams  on  4  September.  Reinforcements,  consisting  of  the  47th 
Company  arrived  at  San  Francisco  de  Macoris  on  the  2 1st,  bring- 
ing the  Marine  command  to  a  total  of  3  officers  and  1 1 5  men. 
Williams  lost  no  time  in  restoring  order  in  the  town,  but  the 
fortaleza  appeared  to  be  too  tough  to  take  with  the  available 
forces.  The  Marine  officers  estimated  that  a  battalion  of  infantry 

2  CO  Northern  Dist,  U.S.  Forces  on  Shore  in  Santo  Domingo  Itr  to  CO 
U.S.  Forces  on  Shore  in  Santo  Domingo,  dtd  i2Deci6.  Unless  otherwise 
indicated,  all  official  records  are  filed  in  1975-70/5-2,  Central  Files,  HQMC. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  EN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  71 


supported  by  an  artillery  battery  would  be  needed  to  do  the  job.3 
Undaunted  by  these  odds,  Williams  determined  to  act.  On 
29  November  he  called  on  Perez  and  demanded  the  surrender 
of  the  fortaleza.  The  Dominican  governor  refused,  and  Williams 
returned  to  his  headquarters  to  prepare  for  an  attack  on  the  local 
stronghold.  The  Marine  commander  planned  to  overcome 
superior  force  by  surprise.  Picking  12  enlisted  men  who  were 
quartered  in  the  Marine  headquarters  building,  he  ordered  them 
to  assemble  that  evening  just  before  taps.  Leaving  the  building 
as  though  on  a  routine  patrol,  they  were  to  march  as  close  to  the 
fortaleza  as  possible  without  arousing  suspicion,  then  rush  the 
gate  before  it  could  be  closed.  The  remainder  of  the  command 
was  to  assemble  at  designated  points  in  support  of  the  assault, 
to  attack  after  the  storming  party  had  secured  the  gate. 

At  the  last  note  of  taps,  the  prearranged  signal,  the  Marines 
moved  out  on  their  assigned  missions.  Williams  and  his  12 -man 
assault  group  marched  along  the  street  toward  the  Dominican 
stronghold.  As  they  approached  they  could  see  the  native  soldiers 
preparing  to  swing  the  massive  double  doors  shut  for  the  night. 
Calling  for  his  men  to  follow,  Williams  sprinted  the  last  few  yards 
and  flung  his  200-pound  bulk  against  the  doors,  bursting  them 
wide  open.  He  rushed  inside  followed  by  his  men.  The  Domin- 
icans had  been  taken  completely  by  surprise  but  quickly  re- 
covered. A  short  but  fierce  struggle  ensued.  Within  ten  minutes 
the  fight  was  over.  Many  of  the  Dominicans  escaped  over  the 
rear  wall;  others  surrendered,  throwing  themselves  face  down  on 
the  floor. 

Of  Williams'  12 -man  assault  party,  eight  had  been  wounded. 
The  Dominicans  suffered  casualties  of  three  killed  and  two 

3  The  account  of  the  episode  at  San  Francisco  de  Macoris  is  from  MRolls, 
31st  and  47th  Companies,  iJul-3iDeci6;  CO  31st  Co  rept  to  CO  2/4,  dtd 
iDeci6;  Maj  Norman  C.  Bates  ltr  to  CMC,  i2Dec57;  Otto  E.  Hagstrom 
ltr  to  Col  Charles  W.  Harrison,  dtd  3iMar58,  both  ltrs  in  Monograph  & 
Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC.  Bates  and  Hagstrom  were  members  of  the 
31st  Co  at  the  time. 


72       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


wounded.  For  his  exploit,  Williams  was  awarded  the  Medal  of 
Honor. 

The  jortaleza  secured,  Williams  sent  a  patrol  to  take  the  police 
station.  This  was  done  without  incident,  as  the  police  offered  no 
resistance,  but  the  Marines  were  fired  on  by  the  snipers  as  they 
returned.  At  about  midnight  Williams  ordered  2d  Lieutenant 
James  T.  Reid  to  take  a  detachment  and  occupy  the  railroad 
station  and  telephone  exchange,  but  they  arrived  too  late.  When 
Reid  and  his  Marines  reached  the  depot  they  found  the  wires  cut 
and  the  train,  carrying  Perez  and  200  others,  already  departed. 

Major  Marix  at  La  Vega  received  the  first  news  of  trouble 
at  2200  when  a  radio  report  of  the  fight  at  the  fort ale za  came  in 
from  Williams.  At  2300  word  came  from  Marix5  adjutant,  2d 
Lieutenant  Arthur  Kingston,  at  the  La  Vega  railroad  station 
that  a  band  of  100  Dominicans  had  seized  a  train  at  San  Fran- 
cisco de  Macoris.  Within  a  few  minutes  the  stationmaster  at 
La  Gina  reported  by  telegraph  that  a  train  was  coming  in  from 
the  direction  of  San  Francisco  de  Macoris.  At  0240  another 
telegraph  message  arrived,  this  time  from  the  Barbero  station- 
master,  reporting  that  the  train  had  passed  through  that  village 
going  east  toward  Sanchez.    ( See  Map  7. ) 

Marix  now  realized  that  the  Dominican  insurrectionist  band 
was  like  a  base  runner  caught  betwen  first  and  second.  All  that 
remained  was  to  make  the  run  down.  Radio  orders  were  dis- 
patched to  1  st  Lieutenant  Samuel  M.  Harrington  at  Sanchez  to 
move  out  with  his  32d  Company  west  along  the  rail  line,  and  2d 
Lieutenant  Charles  A.  King  was  ordered  to  take  a  detachment 
from  the  34th  and  48th  Companies  east  along  the  railroad  from 
La  Vega. 

Harrington's  Marines  had  been  manning  defensive  positions 
on  the  western  outskirts  of  Sanchez  for  about  an  hour  and  a  half 
when  Marix'  order  came  through  at  0430.  Rumors,  which 
proved  to  be  unfounded,  that  the  rebels  were  approaching  were 
the  occasion  for  the  32 d  Company  alert.    The  Marines  now 


74       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


rounded  up  a  train  consisting  of  an  engine,  a  box  car,  and  three 
flat  cars,  sandbagged  it  for  defense,  and  put  on  board  ten  days' 
rations.  While  these  preparations  were  in  progress  a  radio 
message  from  Major  Marix  was  received  transferring  command 
of  the  company  to  Captain  John  A.  "Johnny  the  Hard"  Hughes, 
a  tough  Marine  of  the  old  school  who  was  passing  through  on 
his  way  to  Santiago. 

At  0800  Hughes'  command,  3  officers,  70  enlisted  men,  and 
a  civilian  interpreter,  pulled  out  of  Sanchez  bound  for  San  Fran- 
cisco de  Macoris.  By  0930  the  Marines  had  covered  about  20 
miles  and  were  crossing  a  trestle  on  the  outskirts  of  the  village 
of  La  Ceiba  when  a  torn-up  rail  threw  the  train  from  the  track. 
Hughes  at  once  established  an  outpost  ahead  of  the  train.  This 
position  within  sight  of  La  Ceiba  railroad  station  was  fired  upon  by 
a  small  group  of  Dominicans  armed  with  pistols  and  a  few  rifles. 
Leaving  one  squad  to  guard  the  train,  Hughes  deployed  the  re- 
mainder of  his  command  as  skirmishers  and  swept  through  the 
village,  driving  out  the  rebel  band,  and  killing  one  of  them. 

Loading  their  ammunition,  blanket  rolls,  and  one  day's  rations 
aboard  two  handcars  found  at  La  Ceiba,  the  Marines  pushed  on. 
Occasional  snipers  fired  on  the  advancing  column,  but  the 
swampy  ground  and  dense  undergrowth  prevented  the  use  of 
patrols  to  clear  the  flanks.  The  heaviest  sniping  occurred  on  the 
outskirts  of  the  town  of  Pimental,  where  the  Marines  were  fired 
on  at  close  range  from  the  swamp  on  the  left  of  the  tracks.  They 
returned  the  fire  and  could  hear  the  attackers  shouting  and 
crashing  about  in  the  underbrush  as  they  retreated. 

At  this  point  a  Dominican  on  horseback  rode  out  of  the  town 
waving  a  white  flag.  He  said  that  all  but  a  few  of  the  citizens 
of  Pimental  were  friendly.  Accompanied  by  their  new-found 
friend,  the  Marines  entered  the  town  and  pushed  on  across  the 
open  savannahs  beyond.  About  three  miles  beyond  Pimental 
they  saw  a  locomotive  and  three  coaches  approaching  on  the 
far  side  of  a  savannah.    The  Dominican  assured  the  Marines 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  75 


that  the  train  was  in  the  hands  of  friends,  took  a  swig  of  rum, 
rode  forward,  and  returned  with  the  train.  It  turned  out  to  be 
the  one  stolen  by  the  revolutionaries  at  San  Francisco  de  Macoris 
the  night  before.  They  had  evidently  abandoned  it  when  they 
realized  they  were  trapped  between  two  Marine  forces  converging 
from  Sanchez  and  La  Vega.  Mounting  the  recaptured  train, 
the  Marines  of  the  32 d  Company  pushed  on  to  San  Francisco 
de  Macoris  without  further  incident,  arriving  there  about  1900.4 

Lieutenant  King  and  his  detachment,  55  men  from  the  48th 
Company  and  a  five-man  machine  gun  crew  from  the  34th  Com- 
pany, left  La  Vega  at  1 1 15  with  orders  to  clear  the  track  as  far 
as  La  Gina  and  make  a  junction  with  Captain  Hughes  at  the 
point.  As  he  neared  La  Gina,  King  saw  a  train  approaching 
from  the  opposite  direction.  Upon  sighting  the  Marines,  the 
engineer  threw  the  locomotive  into  reverse  and  beat  a  hasty  re- 
treat. King  did  not  give  chase  because  he  interpreted  his  orders 
to  mean  that  he  should  not  go  farther  along  the  main  line  than 
La  Gina.  Instead,  without  waiting  for  Hughes,  he  turned  north 
towards  San  Francisco  de  Macoris  where  he  arrived  without 
further  incident.5 

Captain  Hughes,  as  senior  officer  present,  now  took  command 
of  the  Marine  forces  in  San  Francisco  de  Macoris.  The  prompt 
action  of  Colonel  Kane  in  concentrating  troops  in  the  trouble 
spot  proved  effective  in  quenching  the  revolutionary  spark  before 
it  could  be  farmed  into  flame.  Except  for  occasional  sniping 
there  was  no  further  opposition  to  the  occupation  forces.  By  2 
December  the  situation  was  well  enough  in  hand  for  the  32 d 
and  48th  Companies  to  return  to  their  regular  stations  at  Sanchez 
and  La  Vega.  Manuel  Perez,  the  rebel  leader,  surrendered  to 
the  military  government  in  March  19 1 7. 


4  CO  32d  Co  rept  to  Dist  Cdr,  dtd  8Deci6;  Capt  John  A.  Hughes  rept  to 
Dist  Cdr,  La  Vega,  dtd  1  Dec  16. 

5 HQ  La  Vega  Dist,  FieldO  No.  1,  dtd  30N0V16;  2dLt  Charles  A.  King 
rept  to  HQ  La  Vega  Dist,  dtd  3Deci6. 


76       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


OCCUPATION  DUTIES  UNDER  THE  MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT 

The  abortive  revolt  at  San  Francisco  de  Macoris  was  the  last 
organized  resistance  to  the  4th  Regiment  in  northern  Santo 
Domingo.  During  the  next  five  and  a  half  years  Marines  of 
the  4th  were  to  be  engaged  in  police  and  civil  administration 
functions  under  the  military  government.  These  duties  were  new 
and  strange  to  most  men  of  the  regiment.  They  were  trained 
as  soldiers  of  the  sea,  equally  at  home  aboard  the  cruisers  and 
battlewagons  of  the  fleet,  in  landing  on  foreign  shores  to  protect 
American  lives  and  property,  or  in  conducting  extended  combat 
operations  ashore.  Administering  the  affairs  of  a  foreign  country, 
with  strange  customs  and  language,  was  outside  their  experience, 
but  versatility  is  a  tradition  of  the  Marine  Corps,  and  Marines 
of  the  4th  Regiment  had  ample  opportunity  to  demonstrate  it 
in  the  Dominican  Republic. 

The  intention  of  the  United  States  in  establishing  military 
government  was  to  restore  order  and  to  reform  local  institutions 
so  that  order,  once  restored,  could  be  maintained  by  the  Domini- 
cans themselves.  There  was,  however,  no  intention  to  remodel 
completely  the  political  structure;  only  the  changes  necessary 
to  the  conduct  of  responsible  government  were  to  be  undertaken. 
With  this  objective  in  mind,  the  Military  Governor  was  directed 
to  maintain  as  many  of  the  Dominican  officials  in  office  as  pos- 
sible. But  the  native  cabinet  ministers  all  resigned  and,  as  no 
other  Dominicans  were  willing  to  serve,  the  cabinet  posts  had 
to  be  filled  by  Marine  and  naval  officers.  Below  the  minister 
level,  the  native  civil  servants  remained  on  the  job  in  the  execu- 
tive departments.  In  the  provincial  and  local  governments,  too, 
Dominicans  stuck  to  their  posts.6 

6  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based  on  Munro,  U.S.  and  the 
Caribbean,  pp.  129-137;  Sumner  Welles,  Naboth's  Vineyard,  pp.  792-820; 
and  Lt  Col  Charles  J.  Miller,  "Diplomatic  Spurs,  Our  Experience  in  Santo 
Domingo,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  19,  no's.  1,  2,  and  3  (Feb,  May, 
Aug35). 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  77 


In  like  manner,  the  Dominican  judicial  system  was  kept  in 
operation.  The  republic's  own  civil  and  criminal  codes  remained 
in  force,  and  the  native  courts  and  prosecutors  continued  to 
administer  justice.  But  they  could  not  be  expected  to  try  cases 
involving  members  of  the  American  military  occupation,  nor 
could  they  function  where  violations  of  executive  orders  of  the 
military  government  were  concerned.  Provost  marshals  and 
judges  were  appointed  by  the  military  government  to  handle 
such  cases. 

Political  and  economic  reforms  undertaken  by  the  military 
government  included  the  creation  of  up-to-date  systems  of  edu- 
cation, public  health,  and  public  finance,  and  the  construction 
of  modern  roads,  bridges,  port  facilities  and  other  public  works. 
They  were  the  responsibility  of  the  executive  departments  of  the 
military  government. 

Maintenance  of  law  and  order  was  primarily  the  responsibility 
of  the  2d  Marine  Brigade.  As  the  military  garrison  of  the  coun- 
try, it  stood  ready  to  put  down  insurrections  against  the  military 
government.  In  addition,  it  carried  out  a  wide  variety  of  civil 
functions.  These  included  the  collection  of  firearms,  the  arrest 
and  trial  of  offenders  against  military  government  decrees  or 
personnel,  administration  of  prisons,  prevention  of  smuggling, 
enforcement  of  health  regulations,  and  the  preparation  of  military 
maps  and  handbooks  of  the  country. 

Assisting  the  Marines  in  these  police  and  security  duties  was 
the  Guardia  Nacional  Dominic  ana. 7  Established  on  7  April 
191 7  with  a  strength  of  about  1,000  officers  and  men,  it  was  at 
first  too  poorly  trained  and  equipped  to  be  very  effective.  Not 
until  1 92 1,  when  a  complete  reorganization  was  carried  out  and 
a  thorough  training  program  introduced,  did  the  Policia  begin 
to  measure  up  as  a  security  force.  Organization  and  training 
were  carried  out  by  Marine  officers  and  NCOs  assigned  exclu- 


7  The  title  was  changed  to  Policia  Nacional  in  June  192 1. 


78       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


sively  to  that  duty  by  brigade  headquarters.  Unlike  the  various 
civil  functions  assigned  to  the  brigade,  the  regiments  did  not 
participate  in  this  native  training  program.  When  the  Marines 
departed  in  the  summer  of  1924,  they  left  behind  a  well-disci- 
plined military  force  commanded  by  competent  native  officers. 

To  assure  effective  execution  of  occupation  duties  the  country 
was  divided  into  Northern  and  Southern  Districts,  with  the 
boundary  line  running  generally  along  the  crest  of  the  Cordillera 
Central.  Each  district  was  made  the  responsibility  of  a  regi- 
ment— the  4th  in  the  north  and  the  3d  in  the  south.  In  19 19 
an  Eastern  District  was  carved  out  of  the  Southern  District  to 
give  better  direction  to  anti-bandit  operations  there,  and  an  ad- 
ditional regiment,  the  1 5th,  was  brought  in  as  the  garrison.  The 
regimental  commanders  doubled  as  district  commanders.  In 
this  capacity  they  were  the  representatives  of  the  military  gov- 
ernor in  their  respective  districts,  responsible  for  carrying  out 
the  edicts  of  the  military  government. 

In  the  absence  of  insurrection  or  the  threat  of  insurrection  in 
the  Northern  District,  Colonel  Kane  and  his  successors  in  com- 
mand of  the  4th  Regiment  functioned  mostly  in  this  latter  capac- 
ity. It  was  as  commanders  of  the  Northern  District  that  they 
performed  all  their  duties  which  were  not  of  a  purely  military 
character.  The  provost  marshals  and  provost  judges  were  the 
principal  agents  of  the  district  commanders  in  carrying  out  civil 
functions.  Without  exception  they  were  Marine  or  naval  medical 
officers  of  the  regiment,  serving  in  their  provost  capacities  as 
additional  duty.  These  provost  marshal  offices  and  provost 
courts,  located  in  each  of  the  provinces  composing  the  Northern 
District,  were  the  most  intimate  point  of  contact  between  the 
military  government  and  the  Dominican  people.  It  was  the 
provost  marshals  and  the  provost  judges  who  enforced  the  orders 
of  the  military  government,  who  apprehended  and  tried  persons 
accused  of  crimes  against  the  occupation  forces,  and  who  investi- 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  79 


gated  charges  brought  by  Dominicans  against  members  of  the 
occupying  forces. 

Much  of  the  credit  for  the  peaceful  occupation  of  the  Northern 
District  must  go  to  the  junior  officers  of  the  4th  Regiment  who 
performed  these  exacting  duties.  They  were  the  visible  agents 
of  the  military  government,  and  their  conduct  largely  determined 
the  attitude  of  the  Dominican  population  toward  the  occupying 
forces.  That  the  occupation  of  the  Northern  District  was  carried 
on  for  eight  years  with  so  little  friction  attests  to  the  skill  with 
which  the  junior  officers  discharged  their  responsibilities. 

One  of  these  young  officers,  Captain  Samuel  M.  Harrington, 
received  tangible  evidence  of  the  success  of  his  efforts  in  the  form 
of  a  petition  to  the  military  governor  signd  by  39  citizens  of 
Sanchez.  "Captain  Samuel  M.  Harrington  is  an  admirable 
example  of  moral  greatness,  his  heart  inspired  by  pure  and  gener- 
ous sentiments,  dedicated  entirely  to  justice,  social  and  juridicial, 
on  which  rests  human  fraternity,"  read  the  petition.  "Having 
unofficial  knowledge  that  it  is  intended  to  take  [him]  .  .  . 
away  .  .  .,  this  town  .  .  .  collectively  request  of  you,  high 
Functionary  of  the  Executive,  to  grant  us  a  reconsideration  .  .  . 
of  the  disposition  ordering  a  change  in  the  authority  who  serves 
the  interests  of  peace  in  this  town,  to  who  we  are  so  grateful  for 
the  treatment  given  us,  who  is  adorned  by  such  unquestioned 
merit  and  virtue,  for  whom  we  treasure  imperishably  loyal  affec- 
tion and  the  cordiality  inspired  by  respect."  8 

If  the  Marine  provost  marshals  and  judges  did  not  always  act 
perfectly  to  serve  the  cause  of  justice  in  every  case  brought  before 
them,  at  least  no  accusations  of  unfair  or  cruel  treatment  were 
made  against  members  of  the  4th  Regiment.  A  Senate  investi- 
gating committee,  which  visited  the  country  in  192 1,  held  hear- 
ings at  which  many  Dominicans  testified,  accusing  the  occupation 


8  Juanico  Jose,  et  al.  ltr  to  Military  Governor,  dtd  28Febi  7. 


80       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


forces  of  acts  of  cruelty  and  injustice.  None  of  the  accusations, 
however,  was  directed  against  the  4th  Regiment.9 

STRENGTH  AND  ORGANIZATION 

The  Northern  District  covered  an  area  of  8,350  square  miles 
and  contained  a  population  of  about  500,000.  To  discharge  its 
many  occupation  duties  the  4th  Regiment  had  only  26  officers 
and  908  enlisted  men  in  January  191 7.  By  June  this  figure  had 
increased  to  24  officers  and  997  enlisted  men,  a  figure  which 
represented  the  peak  strength  of  the  regiment  during  the  eight- 
year  occupation  of  the  Dominican  Republic.  The  low  point 
came  in  July  19 18  when  the  regiment  could  muster  only  32 
officers  and  424  men.  After  that  date  the  strength  gradually 
increased  to  over  800  officers  and  men,  only  to  decline  again  to 
a  little  more  than  500  by  January  1920  as  a  result  of  the  demobili- 
zation of  those  who  enlisted  for  the  duration  of  World  War  I. 
The  4th  Regiment's  strength  was  built  up  once  more,  and,  for 
the  remainder  of  the  occupation,  fluctuated  between  about  650 
and  750  officers  and  men.10 

Organizational  changes  were  frequent  during  the  occupation 
of  the  Dominican  Republic.  In  December  19 16,  the  4th,  6th, 
and  9th  Companies  had  departed,  leaving  the  4th  Regiment  in 
sole  occupation  of  the  Northern  District.  Reinforcements  con- 
sisting of  the  10th  and  48th  Companies  arrived  in  January  19 17 
to  offset  the  loss.  The  33d  Company,  mounted,  was  organized 
in  March,  giving  the  regiment  a  highly  mobile  unit  which  proved 
invaluable  for  extensive  patrolling  and  anti-guerrilla  operations. 

a  Of  the  charges  made  before  this  committee,  the  only  proved  cases  of 
cruelty  involved  one  Marine  officer  who  was  engaged  in  anti-guerrilla  opera- 
tions in  the  Eastern  District  in  19 18.  The  officer  in  question  was  arrested 
for  his  misdeeds  in  19 18  and  committed  suicide  while  waiting  trial.  U.S. 
Congress,  Senate,  Inquiry  into  Occupation  and  Administration  of  Haiti  and 
Santo  Domingo,  Hearings  before  a  Select  Committee  on  Haiti  and  Santo 
Domingo,  67th  Congress,  1st  and  2d  Sessions,  2  vols.  (Washington:  1922). 

10  Strength  figures  from  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1917-24. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  81 


These  additions  brought  the  4th  Regiment  up  to  a  total  of 
14  companies,  but  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into  World 
War  I  quickly  led  to  a  decline  in  this  number.  In  April  19 17, 
the  8th,  26th,  34th,  45th,  and  47th  Companies  were  transferred, 
reducing  the  regiment  once  again  to  nine  companies.  The  addi- 
tion of  the  69th  Company  in  June  19 17  partially  made  up  the 
loss.  In  moves  to  strengthen  the  command  and  administrative 
capabilities  of  the  regiment,  Headquarters  Detachment  was  ex- 
panded to  a  Headquarters  Company,  and  a  Supply  Company 
was  added  in  September  19 19.  The  29th  Company  was  dis- 
banded and  the  communication  personnel  were  added  to  Head- 
quarters Company.  A  little  more  than  a  year  later,  in  July 
1920,  the  27th  Company  was  also  disbanded. 

The  battalion  organization  did  not  prove  effective  for  occu- 
pation duties.  The  companies  were  scattered  in  individual 
garrisons,  and  the  Northern  District  was  small  enough  for  the 
regimental  commander  to  control  all  the  garrisons  directly.  Only 
at  Santiago,  where  the  garrison  consisted  of  two  or  more  com- 
panies, was  a  battalion  commander  useful  in  the  capacity  of 
garrison  commander.  In  August  191 7,  the  1st  Battalion  head- 
quarters moved  to  Santiago  and  the  2d  Battalion  headquarters 
to  La  Vega  where  it  remained  until  it  was  dropped  from  the 
rolls  in  September  19 18. 11 

Early  in  1922  the  Commandant  ordered  a  much  more  sweep- 
ing change  in  the  organization  of  the  4th  Regiment.  New  tables 
of  organization  were  being  published  incorporating  the  combat 
experience  of  World  War  I.  These  called  for  an  infantry  regi- 
ment made  up  of  a  headquarters  and  headquarters  company, 
service  company,  howitzer  company,  and  three  battalions.  Each 
battalion  included  a  machine  gun  company  and  three  rifle  com- 
panies. Authorized  strength  of  this  new  regiment  was  58  officers 
and  1,510  enlisted  men — more  than  twice  the  size  of  the  4th 
Regiment  in  February  i922.    Lack  of  personnel  made  it  im- 

11  4th  Regt  MRolls,  iDeci6-3iJul20. 


82       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


possible  to  adopt  the  new  organization  in  the  4th  Regiment. 
All  that  could  be  done  was  to  add  to  the  existing  organization  a 
Howitzer  Company,  which  did  not  function  as  such  but  ran 
the  regimental  training  center  near  Santiago,  and  a  Headquarters 
Company,  1st  Battalion.  For  the  remainder  of  the  Dominican 
occupation  the  4th  Regiment  was  organized  as  shown  in  the 
Table  below.12 


4th  Regiment 


HqCo 


HowitzerCo 


ServiceCo 


1stBn 


—  HqCc 


—    1 0thCo 


25thCo 


—  28thCo 


32dCo 


33dCo 


69thCc 


ANTI-BANDIT  OPERATIONS 

The  tranquil  conditions  of  the  Northern  District  were  unfor- 
tunately not  duplicated  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  From  the 
beginning  of  19 17  until  the  middle  of  1922  the  2d  Marine 
Brigade  was  engaged  in  almost  continuous  operations  against 
guerilla  bands  in  the  two  eastern  provinces.  To  Marines, 
Dominican  guerrillas  were  all  "bandits,"  a  term  which  govern- 
ments have  all  too  frequently  applied  to  rebellious  subjects.  It 
is  a  natural  reaction  to  lump  together  in  one  group  all  who 
violate  the  laws  of  the  regime,  whether  they  be  common  criminals 
who  seek  personal  financial  gain  or  persons  seeking  to  bring  about 


"USMG  T/O  No.  25,  dtd  25Apr22;  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1922-24. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  83 


by  force  changes  in  the  political  and  economic  structure  of  their 
country. 

The  Marines  in  Santo  Domingo  had  to  deal  almost  exclusively 
with  the  criminal  variety.  Not  that  opposition  to  the  American 
occupation  did  not  exist.  There  were  many  Dominicans  who 
disliked  American  rule  and  who  strove  to  bring  the  occupation 
to  an  end,  but  their  activities  were  largely  in  the  political  and 
propaganda  spheres.  Seldom,  if  ever,  did  these  eloquent  patriots 
take  the  field  in  guerrilla  operations  against  the  Marines. 

Banditry,  as  practised  in  the  Dominican  Republic,  long  ante- 
dated the  American  occupation.  When  the  Marines  arrived  in 
the  summer  of  1 9 1 6  they  found  the  central  government  exercising 
only  the  haziest  sort  of  control  over  the  two  easternmost 
provinces — Seibo  and  Macoris.  (See  Map  7.)  All  but  a  narrow 
strip  of  mountains  on  the  northern  edge  of  these  two  provinces 
is  fertile  coastal  plain,  but  only  a  small  portion  had  been  cleared 
and  put  under  cultivation.  A  12 -mile  strip  on  the  south  coast 
was  devoted  to  the  raising  of  sugar  cane,  an  industry  dominated 
by  large  corporations,  mostly  foreign-owned.  To  the  north  of 
the  sugar-producing  district,  the  country  was  sparsely  populated. 
There  were  a  few  cattle  raisers  and  small  subsistence  farmers, 
but,  for  the  most  part,  the  land  was  uninhabited.  A  dense  scrub 
forest,  traversed  by  a  few  trails,  this  region  was  a  natural  refuge 
for  outlaw  bands. 

Towns  were  few  in  number  and  sparse  in  population.  San 
Pedro  de  Macoris,  with  about  14,000  inhabitants,  was  the  largest 
of  these  and  the  principal  seaport  of  the  eastern  region.  The  only 
other  port  of  consequence  was  La  Romana,  a  company  town  of 
the  Romana  sugar  estate  with  a  population  of  about  5,600.  Three 
inland  villages  which  were  the  centers  of  communications  and 
administration  were  the  only  other  places  of  consequence.  From 
west  to  east,  they  were  Hato  Mayor,  Seibo,  and  Higuey.  None 
had  more  than  2,000  inhabitants. 

The  sugar  estates  were  big  employers  of  labor,  but  employment 


84       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


in  the  cane  fields  was,  for  the  most  part,  restricted  to  the  grinding 
season.  There  were,  therefore,  long  periods  of  unemployment. 
Once  having  become  wage-earners,  even  under  these  unfavorable 
conditions,  the  inhabitants  were  reluctant  to  return  to  their  farms, 
particularly  as  the  depredations  of  bandits  made  the  country  dis- 
tricts unsafe.  As  a  result,  production  of  foodstuffs  declined, 
forcing  up  prices  and  further  aggravating  the  misery  of  the 
wage-earners.13 

These  conditions,  added  to  all  but  impassable  country,  con- 
stituted a  most  favorable  environment  for  banditry.  Local 
chieftains  controlled  much  of  the  back  country  in  both  provinces. 
They  exacted  tribute  from  the  large  sugar  estates,  robbed  the 
small  farmers  and  storekeepers  for  supplies  and  animals,  and  im- 
pressed the  poor  field  hands  and  laborers  into  service  in  their 
private  armies.  The  Americans  refused  to  condone  this  system, 
but,  at  first,  there  were  too  few  Marines  to  do  anything  about  it. 
Not  until  the  beginning  of  19 17  were  troops  available  for  the 
occupation  of  the  eastern  provinces. 

Outside  this  area,  banditry  was  practically  nonexistent.  In  the 
remainder  of  the  Southern  District  and  in  the  Northern  District 
it  never  became  a  problem.  The  4th  Regiment  was,  therefore, 
not  primarily  concerned  with  bandit  suppression.  So  short  was 
Marine  manpower  on  the  island,  however,  that  4th  Regiment 
detachments  up  to  company  size  were  pressed  into  service  under 
3d  Regiment  command  in  the  eastern  provinces  in  two  separate 
anti-bandit  operations. 

The  first  of  these,  the  Chacha-Vicentico  operation,  began  in 
January  191 7  when  "Hiking  Hiram"  Bearss,  by  then  a  lieutenant 
colonel  and  commanding  officer  of  the  3d  Provisional  Regiment, 
ordered  one  mounted  and  two  rifle  companies  to  make  a  sweep 
through  Macoris  and  Seibo.  The  Marines  were  to  investigate 
conditions,  confer  with  local  officials,  suppress  disorder,  protect 

13  2d  MarBrig,  Handbook  of  the  Dominican  Republic,  Pt.  1,  dtd  23Apr23 
(Santo  Domingo  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  85 


life  and  property  of  persons  and  communities  along  the  line  of 
march,  and  collect  arms  and  ammunition.14 

On  10  January,  Major  Jay  McK.  Salladay,  with  the  two  rifle 
companies,  put  into  San  Pedro  de  Macoris  aboard  two  small 
vessels.  Ashore,  Salladay  found  everything  quiet,  but  there  were 
rumors  that  the  bandit  Chacha  had  taken  to  the  bush  with  about 
ioo  followers.  While  Major  Salladay  was  making  his  inspection, 
a  small  group  of  Dominicans  opened  fire  on  the  Marines'  ships, 
killing  one  officer  and  wounding  another.  Patrols  fanned  out 
from  the  docks  throughout  the  city,  but  there  was  no  trace  of  the 
assailants. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Bearss,  on  receiving  the  news  of  the  attack, 
set  out  at  once  himself  with  an  additional  rifle  company  for  San 
Pedro  de  Macoris  on  board  the  New  Hampshire.  He  arrived  on 
the  night  of  the  ioth,  and  the  next  day  advanced  inland  with  the 
full  Marine  force  to  the  Consuelo  sugar  estate,  where  a  band  of 
Chacha's  men  under  Vicentico  Evangelista  was  contacted  and 
put  to  flight.  Eleven  days  of  vigorous  patrolling  followed,  culmi- 
nating in  the  surrender  of  Chacha  on  23  January.  His  capture 
did  not  put  an  end  to  bandit  activities,  for  Vicentico  and  a  band 
of  varying  size  remained  at  liberty.  But  in  a  skirmish  on  the 
27th  Vicentico  was  reported  to  have  been  badly  knocked  about, 
most  of  his  arms  and  horses  lost,  and  his  band  scattered.  The 
Marines  continued  to  scour  the  country  but  without  further 
bandit  contacts.  By  the  middle  of  February,  Bearss  reported  that, 
although  the  search  for  Vicentico  was  continuing,  Macoris  and 
Seibo  had  been  effectively  pacified.15 

Bearss  proved  to  be  overly  optimistic,  for,  in  the  middle  of 
March,  Vicentico  ambushed  a  30-man  patrol  near  Hato  Mayor. 
He  was  repulsed,  however,  and  left  11  of  his  men  dead  on  the 

14  HQ  US  Forces  South  Santo  Domingo,  FieldO's  3  and  4,  dtd  7  and 
9Jani7. 

15  CO  3d  ProvRegt  repts  to  CG  2d  ProvMarBrig,  dtd  2Febi7,  8Febi7, 
i8Febi7. 

519667—60  7 


86       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


field.  Following  this  engagement  the  bandit  leader  disappeared, 
and  the  Marine  command  assumed  that  he  had  learned  his  lesson. 
Except  for  a  garrison  in  San  Pedro  de  Macoris  and  a  few  scattered 
outposts,  Marines  were  withdrawn  from  the  eastern  provinces. 

Fighting  broke  out  again  in  May  when  two  American  engi- 
neers in  the  employ  of  the  Romana  Sugar  Company  were  waylaid 
and  murdered  by  bandits  believed  to  be  members  of  Vicentico's 
band.  Reinforcements  were  rushed  to  the  eastern  area,  and 
Lieutenant  Colonel  George  C.  Thorpe,  newly  appointed  com- 
mander of  the  3d  Regiment,  went  out  with  them  to  take  com- 
mand in  person.  Small  Marine  patrols  combed  the  brush  over 
a  wide  area  with  indifferent  success.  They  had  very  few  con- 
tacts with  the  bandits,  none  of  them  decisive. 

Where  military  measures  failed,  diplomacy  succeeded.  First 
Sergeant  William  West,  in  command  of  a  Marine  outpost  at  Hato 
Mayor,  visited  Vicentico's  camp  and  found  the  rebel  chief  ready 
to  surrender  for  a  price.  West  arranged  a  meeting  between  Vi- 
centico  and  Thorpe,  who  persuaded  the  outlaw  to  surrender 
himself  and  his  whole  band.  On  4  July  the  bandits  came  in. 
All  but  Vicentico  and  two  of  his  relatives  were  disarmed  and 
allowed  to  return  to  their  homes.  Vicentico  was  sent  under  guard 
to  San  Pedro  de  Macoris,  where  he  was  killed  while  attempting  to 
escape.16 

The  4th  Regiment  played  a  very  minor  role  in  these  operations 
in  pursuit  of  Chacha  and  Vicentico.  It  contributed  one  small 
detachment  for  a  brief  period  at  the  end  of  January  and  another 
during  May,  June,  and  July.  The  first  unit,  2  officers  and  50 
enlisted  men  of  the  48th  Company  under  1st  Lieutenant  Harry 
W.  Weitzel,  left  its  home  station  at  La  Vega  on  1 6  January  for 
Consuelo.  It  travelled  by  train  to  Sanchez  where  it  went  on 
board  the  gunboat  Machias  to  ferry  across  Samana  Bay  to  Sabana 
de  la  Mar.  On  the  1 8th  the  Marines  struck  out  across  country 
for  Consuelo.   For  the  next  five  days  they  struggled  over  narrow 

18  GO  3d  ProvRegt  rept  to  CG  2d  ProvMarBrig,  dtd  8J11I17. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  87 


muddy  trails,  up  and  down  slopes  so  steep  they  seemed  like 
vertical  walls,  and  through  woods  so  thick  the  sun  could  hardly 
penetrate.  On  the  2 2d,  Weitzel  and  his  men  reached  Consuelo 
and  reported  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bearss.17 

On  the  25th,  26th,  and  27th  of  January  the  48th  Company 
Marines  patrolled  in  the  vicinity  of  Consuelo.  But  they  en- 
countered no  bandits,  nor  did  they  uncover  any  persons  or 
activities  which  could  even  be  considered  suspicious.  On  the 
31st,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bearss  decided  that  the  48th  Company 
was  no  longer  needed,  and,  on  2  February,  Weitzel  and  his 
Marines,  feeling  like  the  King  of  France  who  "marched  up  the 
hill  and  marched  down  again,"  started  on  the  long  return  trip 
to  La  Vega.18 

Major  William  H.  Pritchett  and  a  detachment  of  the  32d 
Company  operated  on  the  south  shore  of  Samana  Bay  during 
May,  June,  and  July  to  block  Vicentico's  escape  in  that  direction. 
These  Marines  crossed  the  mountains  to  the  south  in  early  June 
and  again  a  few  days  after  Vicentico  surrendered.  Owing  to 
poor  communications,  Thorpe,  in  the  south,  was  unable  to  co- 
ordinate effectively  with  Pritchett  north  of  the  mountains. 

After  the  surrender  of  Vicentico  a  deceptive  calm  settled  over 
the  provinces  of  Seibo  and  Macoris.  Bandit  depredations  ceased, 
country  people  came  freely  into  the  towns  to  sell  their  produce, 
and  travel  became  safe  again.  But  this  state  of  affairs  was  not 
to  last.  On  21  March  19 18,  Sergeant  William  R.  Knox  was 
ambushed  and  killed  between  Seibo  and  Hato  Mayor.  The 
Marine  garrisons  took  the  field  at  once  to  track  down  the  killers. 
They  made  a  couple  of  contacts  with  bandit  groups  during  April, 
but  the  Marine  numbers  had  been  so  reduced  during  the  peaceful 
period  that  not  enough  troops  remained  to  cover  the  area 
thoroughly.   Bandit  activities  increased,  until  by  July  Lieutenant 

17  CO  48th  Co  Rept  to  CO,  dtd  23 Jam  7. 

"CO  48th  Co  Rept  to  CO,  dtd  28Jani7;  and  CO  US  Forces  Operating 
in  the  Province  of  Macoris  rept  to  CG  2d  ProvMarBrig,  dtd  2Febi7. 


88       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Colonel  Thorpe  determined  to  wage  an  aggressive  campaign 
against  the  lawless  elements. 

Three  detachments  of  the  4th  Regiment  crossed  the  mountains 
to  reinforce  the  3d  Regiment's  anti-bandit  drive  at  the  end  of 
July  1 9 1 8.  These  included  the  33d  Mounted  Company,  3  officers 
and  54  enlisted  men  under  command  of  Captain  Harry  L.  Jones; 
a  30 -man  detachment  of  the  25th  Company  commanded  by 
Captain  James  M.  Bain;  and  a  30-man  detachment  of  the  48th 
Company  commanded  by  Captain  James  T.  Moore.  Totalling  5 
officers  and  114  enlisted  men,  these  detachments  constituted 
nearly  25  per  cent  of  the  4th  Regiment.19 

Captain  Bain  and  the  25th  Company  detachment  had  a  skir- 
mish with  bandits  before  they  even  arrived  in  the  3d  Regiment 
zone  of  operations.  The  25th  Company  Marines  departed  Sa- 
bana  de  la  Mar  on  3 1  July.  Two  days  later  they  were  climbing 
the  mountain  ridge  just  south  of  the  village  of  La  Loma.  The 
Marine  column  had  climbed  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  up  the 
slope  when  fire  erupted  from  the  top  of  an  embankment  to  the 
right  of  the  trail.  Corporal  Clyde  R.  Darrah,  in  command  of 
the  point,  ordered  his  men  to  take  cover  and  to  return  the  fire. 
Marines  of  the  main  body  also  opened  up,  aiming  at  puffs  of 
smoke  in  the  bush.  Once  the  Marines  began  shooting,  the  Do- 
minicans lost  all  stomach  for  fighting.  They  ceased  fire  and 
found  nothing  but  a  few  tracks,  which  they  made  no  effort  to 
follow  up. 

They  were  to  learn  by  bitter  experience  the  folly  of  their  fail- 
ure to  follow  up  the  enemy.  In  anti-guerilla  operations  contacts 
were  to  be  cherished.  The  elusive  enemy,  operating  in  his  home 
territory  and  indistinguishable  from  the  peaceful  inhabitants, 
proved  to  be  an  elusive  quarry.  In  fact,  Bain's  detachment  made 
its  first  and  last  contact  with  Dominican  bandits  on  2  August.20 

Upon  arrival  in  the  3d  Regiment  zone  the  three  4th  Regiment 

19  GO  1/3  rept  to  CO  3d  ProvRegt,  w/encl,  dtd  4Sepi8. 

20  Capt  James  M.  Bain  rept  to  CO  San  Pedro  de  Macoris,  dtd  5Sepi7. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  89 


detachment  commanders  reported  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Thorpe 
who  assigned  to  each  a  zone  of  responsibility.  The  33d  Company 
zone  of  about  180  square  miles  lay  southwest  of  Hato  Mayor, 
with  the  base  of  operations  at  the  La  Paja  sugar  plantation  on 
the  southern  edge  of  the  zone.  Captain  Bain  and  his  detachment 
were  assigned  responsibility  for  an  area  of  about  1 50  square  miles 
southeast  of  Hato  Mayor.  Their  base  was  at  Diego  on  the  south- 
ern edge  of  their  area.  With  a  base  at  Seibo,  Captain  Moore 
and  his  detachment  were  responsible  for  an  area  of  about  190 
square  miles  to  the  east  of  their  base.21 

The  3d  Regiment  suffered  the  frustrations  usual  to  regular 
troops  attempting  to  engage  guerrillas.  The  enemy,  of  course, 
wore  no  uniforms.  If  cornered  by  a  Marine  patrol  they  simply 
threw  their  weapons  into  the  brush  and  then  could  not  be 
distinguished  from  peaceful  citizens.  To  identify  them  as  guer- 
rillas under  these  conditions  proved  all  but  impossible.  In  most 
cases,  a  Marine  detachment  would  receive  a  report  that  bandits 
had  raided  a  village  or  country  store.  Rushing  to  the  scene  to 
find  the  bandits  gone,  the  Marines  would  pursue,  following  tracks 
or  using  information  from  the  inhabitants.  Invariably  the  tracks 
would  peter  out  or  the  information  prove  inaccurate,  so,  after 
hiking  vigorously  over  the  countryside  for  a  day  or  two,  the 
Marines  would  return  to  base  to  wait  the  next  report  of  a  bandit 
raid.  Contacts  between  Marines  and  bandits  did  occur,  but  only 
when  the  bandits  chose  to  attack  small  Marine  partols  with 
greatly  superior  numbers. 

Of  the  three  4th  Regiment  detachments,  those  under  Captains 
Bain  and  Moore  never  made  a  bandit  contact  in  operations  under 
3d  Regiment  command.  They  were  called  out  on  several  fruit- 
less pursuits  but  never  caught  up  with  their  quarry. 

In  the  33d  Gompany  zone  the  bandits  were  both  more  active 
and  more  daring.  On  15  August,  2d  Lieutenant  Jack  H.  Tandy, 
Assistant  Surgeon  Herbert  L.  Shinn  and  10  enlisted  men  on 

21  CO  1/3  rept  to  GO  3d  ProvRegt,  dtd  4Sepi8. 


90       HOLD  HJGH  THE  TORCH 


patrol  north  of  La  Paja  stopped  at  a  farm  house  for  supper. 
The  woman  of  the  house  appeared  friendly,  inviting  the  Marines 
to  use  the  fire  in  her  kitchen.  Her  husband  left  soon  after  the 
Marines  arrived,  saying  he  had  to  go  into  the  woods  to  look 
for  his  cattle. 

By  the  time  the  meal  was  prepared  it  was  already  dark. 
The  men  went  into  the  house  to  get  their  food,  coming  outside 
again  to  eat.  All  but  four  were  gathered  on  one  side  of  the 
building  when  a  rifle  bullet  pierced  the  house  from  the  opposite 
side  and  passed  through  Private  John  M.  Poe's  hat.  Bullets 
then  began  whining  out  of  the  darkness  from  all  sides,  and  a 
band  of  about  80  men,  armed  with  an  assortment  of  rifles, 
pistols,  and  machetes  closed  in  on  the  Marines.  Within  five 
minutes  the  Marines  and  bandits  were  locked  in  hand  to  hand 
combat.  After  about  20  minutes  the  bandits  withdrew,  leaving 
17  dead  on  the  field. 

During  the  fight  Lieutenant  Tandy  had  been  separated  from 
his  men.  Assistant  Surgeon  Shinn  had  taken  command  and  di- 
rected the  Marine  defense.  After  the  bandits  withdrew,  he  led 
his  men  out  onto  the  open  savannah  about  100  yards  from  the 
house  where  they  spent  the  remainder  of  the  night.  The  next 
morning  the  Marines  rounded  up  their  horses  and  returned  to 
base.  There  was  no  trace  of  Lieutenant  Tandy,  and  he  was 
believed  to  have  been  killed  or  captured.  He  turned  up  two 
days  later  at  La  Paja,  having  made  his  way  back  alone  through 
the  woods  for  fear  of  being  discovered  by  the  bandits.22 

The  failure  of  patrolling  tactics  to  eradicate  banditry  led 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Thorpe  to  adopt  more  drastic  measures.  His 
Campaign  Order  No.  1  called  for  the  zone  commanders  to 
advise  all  law-abiding  people  in  their  respective  zones  to  come 
into  the  towns  by  24  August,  bringing  their  livestock  and  enough 
food  for  a  month.    After  that  date  the  Marine  detachments  in 

22  istLt  Jack  H.  Tandy,  rept  to  CO,  La  Paja,  dtd  3oSepti8;  AsstSurg 
Herbert  L.  Shinn,  rept  to  GO,  33d  Go,  dtd  1 1  Sep  18. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  91 


the  several  zones  were  to  make  a  thorough  sweep,  arresting  all 
armed  Dominicans,  shooting  those  who  refused  to  surrender,  and 
arresting  any  suspected  of  banditry.23 

In  the  operations  that  followed,  the  4th  Regiment  detachments 
made  only  three  contacts  with  bandits.  The  first  occurred  on 
25  August  when  the  33d  Company  pack  train  encountered  a 
large  band  of  armed  men  between  the  villages  of  Mata  Palacio 
and  Pringamosa.  The  Marines  escorting  the  pack  train  opened 
fire,  killing  two  of  the  Dominicans.  At  the  sound  of  the  shots 
a  patrol  under  Lieutenant  Tandy  came  up  on  the  flank  of  the 
Dominican  band,  putting  it  to  flight.  As  usual,  the  Dominicans 
disappeared  into  the  brush  without  a  trace. 

In  spite  of  this  defeat  the  bandits  continued  to  act  with  great 
boldness.  On  28  August  they  raided  the  town  of  Dos  Rios  in 
the  33d  Company  zone,  carrying  off  all  foodstuffs  in  the  local 
store  and  picking  up  a  number  of  recruits.  Ten  days  later,  they 
ambushed  Colonel  Thorpe  and  a  ten-man  detachment  in  this 
same  vicinity.  The  Marines,  including  two  privates  of  the  33d 
Company,  were  attacked  while  crossing  a  stream  just  west  of 
Dos  Rios.  After  a  desperate  fight  at  close  quarters  the  Domini- 
cans withdrew,  leaving  at  least  nine  dead.  The  Marines  suffered 
no  casualties,  but,  as  their  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted 
and  the  pack  mule  carrying  their  rations  had  disappeared  during 
the  fight,  they  were  unable  to  pursue.24 

The  33d  Company  kept  up  its  vigorous  patrolling,  and  on 
24  September  very  nearly  succeeded  in  trapping  a  major  bandit 
group.  The  previous  day  a  1 5-man  patrol  exchanged  shots  with 
bandits  near  Mata  Palacio.  Captain  Jones  turned  out  a  30-man 
patrol  the  next  morning  before  dawn,  and  by  daybreak  it  had 
reached  the  spot  where  the  skirmish  had  taken  place  the  day 
before.  Leaving  their  horses,  the  Marines  deployed  and  started 
into  the  bush.    They  had  advanced  about  2,000  yards  when 

23  GO  1/3  Campaign  Order  No.  1,  n.d. 

21  CO  1/3  rept  to  CO  3d  Regt,  dtd  8Sepi8. 


92       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


they  were  challenged  by  a  bandit  sentry  who  fired  his  revolver 
and  dived  into  the  brush.  Other  shots  rang  out  from  different 
parts  of  the  wood,  and  the  Marines  rushed  toward  two  or  three 
shacks  they  could  see  ahead  of  them.  They  searched  the  build- 
ings, then  scattered  through  the  woods  and  found  about  30  other 
shacks,  all  showing  signs  of  having  been  hastily  evacuated. 
Clothing  and  fresh  food  were  scattered  all  around,  and  four 
horses  and  a  mule  were  tied  nearby.  Seven  trails,  all  cleverly 
concealed,  led  out  from  the  bandit  camp,  which  had  evidently 
been  used  as  headquarters  for  some  time.  The  Marines  searched 
in  all  directions  from  the  camp  but  found  nothing  except  three 
fresh  graves  about  two  miles  away.25 

The  33d  Company,  still  assigned  to  the  4th  Regiment,  con- 
tinued its  operations  against  bandits  under  3d  Regiment  command 
until  25  February  19 19  when  it  was  reassigned  to  the  newly 
activated  15th  Regiment.  As  the  Bain  and  Moore  detachments 
had  already  rejoined  their  parent  unit  in  northern  Santo  Do- 
mingo, the  reassignment  of  the  33d  Company  ended  the  partici- 
pation of  the  4th  Regiment  in  anti-bandit  operations  in  Santo 
Domingo. 

The  15th  Regiment  was  no  more  successful  at  wiping  out 
banditry  than  the  3d  and  4th  Regiments  had  been.  Tactics  of 
the  type  already  mentioned  were  continued  by  the  new  regiment, 
and  with  the  same  lack  of  results.  Operations  dragged  on  year 
after  year,  and  by  the  beginning  of  1922  the  Marines  were  no 
nearer  to  stamping  out  banditry  than  they  had  been  three  years 
before. 

During  the  spring  of  1922  new  leaders  employing  new  tactics 
finally  put  an  end  to  banditry  in  the  Dominican  Republic. 
Brigadier  General  Harry  Lee,  an  outstanding  Marine  leader  of 
World  War  I,  was  now  in  command  of  the  2d  Brigade.  On  13 
March  he  assigned  Colonel  Charles  H.  Lyman  to  command  of 
the  15th  Regiment  and  the  Eastern  District.    Lee  and  Lyman 

25  GO  33d  Co  rept  to  CO  1/3,  dtd  24Sepi8. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  93 


devised  a  new  double-barreled  approach  to  the  bandit  problem. 
Learning  from  native  sources  that  many  Dominicans  had  joined 
outlaw  bands  out  of  fear  of  the  Marines,  they  offered  to  pardon 
all  bandits  who  surrendered,  gave  up  their  arms,  and  returned 
to  peaceful  occupations.  Those  guilty  of  "criminal  acts  of  a 
heinous  nature"  would  have  to  take  their  chances  before  a  provost 
court.  To  deal  with  bandits  who  failed  to  accept  these  terms, 
a  special  force  of  civil  guards  was  recruited  and  organized  into 
groups  of  15,  each  commanded  by  a  Marine  officer.  Most  of 
these  civil  guards  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  bandits. 

On  19  April  the  civil  guards  took  the  field,  and,  by  the  end  of 
the  month,  they  had  fought  six  engagements  with  bandits,  inflict- 
ing heavy  casualties  upon  them.  Following  these  encounters, 
the  bandits  began  to  surrender  in  large  numbers,  and  by  22  May 
all  the  leaders  had  surrendered,  together  with  their  followers  and 
arms.26 

POLITICAL  AND  PROPAGANDA  ATTACKS 
ON  THE  OCCUPATION 

The  "bandit"  operations  had  not  been  the  work  of  patriots 
seeking  to  drive  the  invaders  from  Dominican  soil.  There  was, 
however,  a  determined  political  and  propaganda  effort  to  end 
the  occupation.27  The  resignation  with  which  the  Dominicans 
had  accepted  military  government  of  their  country  at  first,  turned 
to  resentment  when  it  became  apparent  that  the  Americans  did 
not  plan  an  early  departure.  Rear  Admiral  Thomas  R.  Snowden, 
who  had  relieved  Knapp  as  military  governor  in  1 9 1 8,  shocked 
the  Dominicans  when  he  declared,  early  in  19 19,  that  the  occupa- 
tion would  last  until  citizens  then  in  the  cradle  reached  adult  age. 

Dr.  Francisco  Henriquez  y  Carvajal,  who  had  been  provisional 

26  CG  2d  MarBrig  rept  to  CMC,  dtd  24AugQ2. 

27  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  section  is  based  on  Munro,  U.S.  and  the 
Caribbean,  pp.  133-136;  and  Welles,  Naboth's  Vineyard,  pp.  830-834. 


94       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


president  in  1916,  assumed  the  leadership  of  an  independence 
movement  and  organized  juntas  of  intellectuals  and  prominent 
business  and  professional  men  to  work  by  political  and  propa- 
ganda means  for  a  return  of  home  rule.  In  February  1919, 
Henriquez  y  Carvajal  sailed  for  Paris  where  he  attempted  to 
bring  the  Dominican  question  before  the  World  War  I  peace 
conference.  He  later  visited  Washington  to  urge  a  speedy  end 
to  the  American  occupation  of  the  country.  This  visit  brought 
the  Dominican  problem,  neglected  because  of  preoccupation  with 
World  War  I,  to  the  attention  of  the  American  government  and 
people.  To  the  public,  military  rule  of  the  Dominican  people 
against  their  consent  was  distasteful,  and  the  government  was 
concerned  about  rising  anti- Americanism  all  over  Latin  America. 

Secretary  of  State  Lansing  took  control  of  Dominican  affairs. 
Seeking  to  make  the  occupation  more  responsive  to  Dominican 
needs,  he  directed  the  military  governor  to  appoint  a  Junta 
Consultiva  of  prominent  citizens  to  advise  the  military  govern- 
ment. Upon  the  advice  of  the  Junta  and  at  the  insistence  of  the 
State  Department,  Snowden  repealed  the  censorship  order  of 
19 16  requiring  prior  submission  of  all  articles  mentioning  the 
military  government.  But  he  replaced  it  with  what  was,  in  effect, 
a  sterner  restriction  on  freedom  of  expression  by  making  it  a 
crime  to  write  or  say  anything  which  might  lead  to  overthrow  of 
the  military  government  or  which  was  of  a  "socialistic  or  bolshe- 
vik" character. 

When  a  great  number  of  violently  inflammatory  articles  ap- 
peared in  Dominican  newspapers  following  repeal  of  the  earlier 
law  requiring  submission  prior  to  publication,  the  military  govern- 
ment cracked  down  hard,  fining  and  imprisoning  a  number  of 
editors  and  writers  for  violation  of  the  later  law  prohibiting 
seditious  statements.  The  Junta  Consultiva  then  resigned  and 
an  extreme  nationalist  group,  the  U nion  Nacional  Dominicana, 
appeared.  Its  announced  objective  was  the  immediate  end  of 
the  American  occupation. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  95 


Colonel  Dion  Williams,  commanding  officer  of  the  4th  Regi- 
ment since  18  April  19 19,  attempted  to  enforce  the  censorship 
orders  in  the  Northern  District  without  antagonizing  the  Domin- 
icans any  more  than  necessary.  Most  news  critical  of  the  occupa- 
tion originated  in  the  capital,  Santo  Domingo  City,  either  in  one 
of  the  capital  papers  or  as  a  reprint  from  them  in  the  Santiago 
Informacion.  Williams  took  the  position  that  news  already 
printed  elsewhere  in  the  country  was  not  his  responsibility  and 
took  no  action  against  it.28 

The  same  moderation  was  followed  with  regard  to  public 
speeches  and  lectures.  When  the  Spanish  poet,  Francisco  Villa- 
espesa,  lectured  in  northern  Santo  Domingo  during  the  winter 
of  1920  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  helping  the  Dominican  people 
free  themselves  from  American  rule,  Williams  merely  kept  "track 
of  his  movements  and  speeches  ...  To  arrest  him  would  make 
a  hero  of  him  and  do  more  harm  than  good."  29 

Following  Villaespesa's  visit,  signs  of  unrest  were  reported  to 
the  district  commander.  From  Puerto  Plata,  the  commander  of 
the  28th  Company  in  garrison  there  reported  that,  according  to 
a  former  provincial  governor,  Emilio  Garden,  a  violent  uprising 
could  be  expected.  According  to  another  report,  labor  agitators 
were  planning  a  general  strike  as  a  prelude  to  active  revolution. 
Williams  doubted  that  such  a  plan  would  be  very  effective,  but 
he  did  expect  "considerable  disorder  in  the  towns  and  agitations 
under  the  guise  of  banditry  in  the  outlying  districts."  30 

To  meet  these  reported  threats,  the  4th  Regiment  commander 
requested  reinforcements,  particularly  of  officers  and  NCOs. 
Only  29  officers  and  525  enlisted  men  were  assigned  on  1  Janu- 
ary 1920  to  the  regiment  for  occupation  of  the  entire  northern 
district.    Upon  the  request  of  the  military  governor,  the  Marine 

28Cdr  Northern  District  ltr  to  CG  2d  MarBrig,  dtd  i5Mar20  (Box  16, 
RG  38,  NA). 

wCdr  Northern  District  ltr  to  CG  2d  MarBrig,  dtd  25jan20. 
^Cdr  Northern  District  ltrs  to  CG  2d  MarBrig,  4Feb20  and  i2Feb20 
( 1 975-70/5-2  Box  4,  RG  38,  NA) . 


96       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Corps  Commandant,  Major  General  John  A.  Lejeune,  agreed 
to  a  modest  increase  for  the  2d  Brigade.  Reinforcements  began 
arriving  in  the  late  summer  and  fall  of  1920,  and  by  the  end  of 
the  year  the  4th  Regiment  stood  at  29  officers  and  687  enlisted 
men. 

The  uprisings  feared  by  Colonel  Williams  never  materialized, 
and  the  danger  of  armed  revolution  diminished  when,  on  24  De- 
cember 1920,  President  Wilson  announced  that  the  time  had 
come  to  begin  an  orderly  withdrawal  of  United  States  forces 
from  the  Dominican  Republic. 

LIQUIDATING  THE  OCCUPATION 

The  first  United  States  proposal  for  ending  the  occupation 
was  presented  in  a  proclamation  of  14  June  1921.  Its  terms, 
calling  for  continued  American  control  of  the  Dominican  armed 
forces  and  finances  after  withdrawal,  were  not  acceptable  to  the 
Dominican  representatives.  They  continued  negotiations,  how- 
ever, resulting,  in  June  1922,  in  an  agreement  eliminating  the 
objectionable  provisions.  Its  terms  were  as  follows : 

1.  A  provisional  government,  appointed  by  a  committee  of 
representative  Dominicans,  was  to  conduct  elections  for  a  perma- 
nent government  without  interference  from  American  occupation 
authorities. 

2.  When  the  provisional  government  took  office  the  2d  Marine 
Brigade  was  to  turn  over  all  law  enforcement  functions  to  the 
Policia  Nacional  and  concentrate  in  one,  two  or  three  places  to 
be  determined  by  the  military  governor. 

3.  The  provisional  government  would  accept  a  convention  rati- 
fying all  contracts  made  by  the  military  govenment  and  ratifying 
all  its  acts  and  executive  orders  which  had  levied  taxes  or  au- 
thorized expenditures. 

4.  When  the  duly  elected  government  was  installed  the  Marines 
would  be  withdrawn. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  97 


An  agreement  was  reached  between  the  military  governor  and 
the  brigade  commander  early  in  August  1922  specifying  the  con- 
centration points  for  the  Marines.  The  4th  Regiment  was  to 
concentrate  at  Santiago,  except  for  one  company,  the  69th,  which 
was  to  remain  in  Puerto  Plata  to  secure  the  regiment's  supply 
port.31 

Withdrawal  of  the  4th  Regiment  from  its  outposts  began  soon 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  concentration  agreement.  On  1 1  Au- 
gust the  25th  Company  evacuated  Monte  Cristi,  to  be  followed 
on  the  31st  by  the  Howitzer  Company  from  Sanchez,  and  on 
24  September  by  the  33d  Company  from  San  Francisco  de 
Macoris.  As  the  posts  at  Moca  and  La  Vega  had  been  given 
up  the  year  before — 15  July  and  1  December  192 1  respectively — 
the  withdrawal  of  the  33d  completed  the  concentration  of  the 
regiment.32 

The  provisional  government  took  office  on  21  October  1922, 
and,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  took  over 
all  civil  functions  as  of  that  date.33  The  4th  Regiment  and  the 
other  units  of  the  2d  Brigade  now  became  a  garrison  force  only. 
Their  presence  was  still  required  because  the  Policia  Nacional, 
though  adequate  for  routine  constabulary  duty,  was  still  not 
ready  to  take  on  full  responsibility  for  maintaining  law  and  order. 
The  Marines  were  on  hand  to  back  up  the  Policia  in  case  of  an 
attempt  at  revolution  against  the  provisional  government. 

Under  the  guidance  of  Sumner  Welles,  special  United  States 

commissioner,  the  Dominican  provisional  government  set  about 

the  task  of  preparing  for  national  elections,  and  on  15  March 

1924  the  Dominican  voters  went  to  the  polls  to  elect  Horacio 

Vasquez  as  president.    His  inauguration  was  set  tentatively  for 

the  first  ten  days  in  June.    Planning  for  withdrawal  of  the 

Marines  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable  now  began. 

31  MilGov  ltr  to  Mr.  Welles,  dtd  3iAug22  (Folder  2,  Box  98,  RG  38,  NA). 
82  4th  Regt  MRolls,  iAug~3oSep22.    The  33d  Company  had  rejoined  the 
4th  Regiment  on  8  March  1920. 

33  ActSecNav  ltr  to  MilGov,  dtd  23May22. 


9a       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Among  the  first  decisions  made  was  that  the  4th  Regiment 
would  go  back  "home"  to  San  Diego  to  reinforce  West  Coast 
expeditionary  forces.  As  the  first  Marine  unit  to  be  stationed 
there,  the  4th  Regiment  was  considered  by  San  Diegans  to  belong 
in  San  Diego.  Strength  of  the  regiment  upon  departure  from 
the  Dominican  Republic  was  to  be  cut  back  to  a  little  more  than 
400  officers  and  men.34 

The  reduction  in  strength  took  effect  on  1  July,  at  which  time 
all  the  existing  companies  within  the  regiment  were  disbanded 
to  be  replaced  by  Companies  A,  B,  and  C.  An  additional  com- 
pany, Company  D,  was  organized  from  other  2d  Brigade  units 
and  added  to  the  4th  Regiment  the  following  day.  On  the  6th 
of  July  the  reorganized  regiment  moved  overland  to  Santo 
Domingo  City  by  the  new  highway  built  under  the  military 
government.35 

On  12  July,  Vasquez  was  inaugurated  as  President  of  the 
Dominican  Republic  in  impressive  ceremonies  at  the  capital. 
Three  weeks  later,  on  6  August,  the  Henderson,  with  the  4th 
Regiment  on  board,  slipped  quiety  out  of  the  harbor  of  Santo 
Domingo  City,  bound  for  San  Diego. 

What  had  been  accomplished  in  eight  years  of  occupation? 
The  regiment  had  restored  and  maintained  order  in  the  Northern 
District,  thereby  attaining  the  minimum  requirement  for  the 
reform  program  instituted  by  the  military  government.  Whether 
that  program  was  successful  or  whether  it  should  have  been 
undertaken  in  the  first  place  are  still  controversial  questions.  But 
the  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  were  not  concerned  with  de- 
termining matters  of  high  policy.  Their  job  was  to  carry  out 
orders  of  higher  authority;  they  had  no  voice  in  preparing  those 
orders. 

As  is  generally  the  case  when  a  nation  is  forcibly  occupied  by 
troops  of  a  foreign  power,  the  Marines  were  not  universally  liked 


34  CMC  ltr  to  SecNav,  dtd  2gMay24. 
85  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1-31J11I24. 


OCCUPATION  DUTY  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  99 


by  the  Dominican  people.  But  it  is  to  their  credit  that  dislike 
stemmed  from  their  presence  as  an  occupying  force  and  not  from 
acts  of  cruelty  or  abuses  of  power. 


USMC  Photo  522071 


San  Diego  Exposition,  1915— Above,  RAdm  T.  B.  Howard,  Commander  in 
Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  inspects  the  regiment.  Below,  the  regimental  band  enter- 
tains exposition  visitors. 

USMC  Photo  517225 


519667—60  S 


USMC  Photo  517356 


Action  in  Santo  Domingo,  1916 — Above,  riflemen  of  the  8th  Company  some- 
where between  Monte  Cristi  and  Santiago.  Below,  cannoneers  of  the  13th 
Company  at  Guayacanas. 

USMC  Photo  521542 


USMC  Photo  521541 


The  march  to  Santiago — Above,  truck-drawn  artillery  on  the  road  from  Monte 
Cristi.  Below,  riflemen  of  the  Puerto  Plata  Detachment  cross  the  mountains 
by  rail. 


USMC  Photo  515346 


"V  •••• 


USMC  Photo  521559 


Mounted  troops  in  Santo  Domingo-Above,  Dominican  guerrillas.  Belo 
the  33d  Company  ready  to  leave  on  patrol  from  La  Romana  sugar  estate. 


USMC  Photo  P.  B.  1825 


USMC  Photo  521567 


Above,  4th  Regiment  staff,  Santiago,  19 16.  Front  (1  to  r)  Capt  F.  C.  Ramsey, 
istLt  H.  B.  Pratt,  Capt  R.  B.  Putnam,  Col  J.  H.  Pendleton,  Maj  R.  H.  Dun- 
lap,  istLt  D.  M.  Randall.  Rear  (1  to  r)  Surg  F.  L.  Benton,  istLt  D.  S.  Barry, 
istLt  P.  A.  del  Valle,  Chaplain  L.  N.  Taylor.  Below,  Fortaleza,  San  Francisco 
de  Macoris,  after  its  capture. 


USMC  Photo  521790 


USMC  Photo  521793 


Above,  Marines  wounded  in  the  capture  of  the  Fortaleza  at  San  Francisco  de 
Macoris.   Below.  Marines  guard  the  mails. 


USMC  Photo  521128 


USMC  Photo  522279 


Shanghai— Above,  marching  into  the  city,  21  March  1927.  Below,  billet  of 
Hq  and  Hq  Co,  1st  Battalion,  4th  Regiment. 


USMC  Photo  6183 


USMC  Photo  522631 


Troops  and  commanders — Above,  1/4  passes  in  review  on  the  race  course. 
Below,  Col  C.  S.  Hill,  who  brought  the  regiment  to  Shanghai  in  1927,  and 
Col  R.  S.  Hooker,  regimental  CO  during  the  Sino- Japanese  fighting  of  1932. 


USMC  Photo  P.  B.  3694 


USMC  Photo  515646 


USMC  Photo  522635 


Recreation  at  Shanghai — Above,  a  Rugby  match  with  the  Shanghai  Interpost 
Team.   Below,  a  2d  Battalion  dance. 


USMC  Photo 


USMC  Photo  521024 


Regimental  officers,  1937.  Front  (1  to  r),  Maj  H.  N.  Stent,  LtCol  W.  H. 
Rupertus,  Col  C.  F.  B.  Price,  LtCol  R.  Winans,  Cdr  Virgil  H.  Carson;  2d 
row  (1  to  r),  Capt  R.  A.  Boone,  Maj  L.  S.  Swindler,  LtCol  H.  C.  Pierce,  Maj 
M.  A.  Edson,  Capt  W.  M.  Greene.  Jr.  ;  3d  row  (1  to  r),  Maj  M.  J.  Kelleher, 
istLt  V.  H.  Krulak,  Capt  R.  E.  Hogaboom,  Maj  B.  G.  Jones;  4th  row  (1  to  r), 
Capt  M.  H.  Mizell,  Maj  R.  E.  West,  Chaplain  F.  R.  Hamilton,  Maj  P.  Lesser, 
Capt  H.  R.  Huff. 


USMC  Photo  522049 


Defending  the  International  Settlement,  1932 — Above,  Marines  of  the  3d 
Battalion  guarding  the  barrier  across  Markham  Road  Bridge.  Below,  a  sand- 
bagged heavy  machine-gun  position  on  the  bank  of  Soochow  Creek. 

USMC  Photo  522630 

\  i 


The  International  Settlement  in  peril,  1937 — Above,  Marines  man  sandbag 
defenses.    Below,  Japanese  victory  march  passes  through  the  Settlement. 


USMC  Photo  522637 


U.  S.  Army  Photo  224672 


The  Philippines— Above,  a  view  of  Corregidor  looking  east  from  Topside 
towards  Malinta  Hill  and  the  tail  of  the  island.  Below,  a  Marine  machine- 
gun  unit  with  its  weapons  loaded  on  carts. 


USMC  Photo  58752 


USMC  Photo  58735 


USMC  Photo  50578 


Rank  and  file  on  Corregidor — Above.  left,  LtCol  C.  T.  Beecher,  CO  of  1/4; 
above  right,  LtCol  J.  P.  Adams.  CO  of  3  4,  Col  S.  L.  Howard,  CO  4th  Marines, 
MajGen  G.  F.  Moore,  USA,  commander  of  the  fortified  islands  in  Manila  Bay. 
Below,  enlisted  Marines  relax  during  a  lull  in  the  siege. 


USMC  Photo  58749 


USMC  Photo  58733-A 


Defensive  preparations — Above,  Marines  teach  Filipinos  how  to  operate  a 
heavy  machine  gun.    Below,  barbed  wire  strung  along  the  beach. 


USMC  Photo  58733 


U.S.  Army  Photo 


The  end  on  Corregidor — Above,  the  Japanese  land.  Below,  American  prisoners 
under  Japanese  guard. 

USMC  Photo  114538 


CHAPTER  IV 


Force  in  Readiness- 
Austerity  Model 


It  was  a  happy  lot  of  Marines  who  crowded  the  decks  of  the 
Henderson  when  she  docked  at  San  Diego  on  a  summer  Mon- 
day, 25  August  1924.  After  words  of  welcome  by  civic  officials, 
the  regiment  marched  up  a  flag-and-bunting  decorated  Broad- 
way, to  be  reviewed  at  the  Plaza  by  Major  General  "Uncle  Joe" 
Pendleton,  their  former  commanding  officer,  now  retired.  At 
the  gate  of  the  new  Marine  Corps  Base,  on  the  north  shore  of 
the  harbor,  "a  bevy  of  pretty  San  Diego  maidens"  presented  the 
men  with  baskets  of  fruit  to  conclude  a  heart- wanning  welcome.1 

The  4th  Regiment,  "San  Diego's  Own,"  was  home  again  after 
eight  years  of  foreign  service.  But  it  was  a  changed  San  Diego 
and  a  changed  United  States  to  which  the  regiment  returned  in 
the  summer  of  1924.  The  new  base,  begun  in  19 17  as  a  perma- 
nent home  station  for  West  Coast  expeditionary  forces,  was  ready 
for  occupancy.2  Of  much  more  consequence  to  the  regiment, 
and  to  the  whole  Marine  Corps,  was  the  postwar  letdown  with 
its  resulting  neglect  of  national  defense.  Having  just  finished 
the  "war  to  end  war"  the  American  people  were  in  no  mood  to 

1  Los  Angeles  Times,  26Aug24. 

2  Elmore  A.  Champie,  Brief  History  of  the  Marine  Corps  Recruit  Depot, 
San  Diego,  California — Marine  Corps  Historical  Reference  Series,  No.  9 
(Washington:  HistBr,  HQMG),  p.  13. 


519667—60  9 


101 


102       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


pay  heavy  taxes  for  military  expenditures.  For  the  armed  serv- 
ices a  period  of  austerity  had  set  in. 

But,  for  the  Marine  Corps,  dwindling  means  were  not  accom- 
panied by  reduced  missions.  The  nation  still  expected  its  force- 
in-readiness  to  live  up  to  its  name.  "The  Marines  have  landed 
and  have  the  situation  well  in  hand"  was  a  message  most  Ameri- 
cans never  doubted  they  would  hear  whenever  the  Corps  was 
called  upon  to  protect  the  national  interest. 

The  4th  Regiment  was  momentarily  spared  from  the  economy 
ax  by  an  alert  for  expeditionary  service  in  China.  Alarmed  by 
the  danger  to  American  lives  and  property  in  a  China  torn  by 
civil  war,  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiastic  Fleet,  had  asked 
for  a  reinforcement  of  500  Marines.  He  was  assigned  the  Marine 
garrison  on  Guam.  The  4th  Regiment  was  to  replace  them,  or, 
if  necessary,  proceed  directly  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet.3 

In  preparation  for  China  service  the  Commandant,  Major 
General  John  A.  Lejeune,  on  19  September,  ordered  the  4th 
Regiment  increased  to  42  officers  and  1,000  enlisted  men.  By 
transfer  from  other  units  at  San  Diego  the  existing  strength  of 
26  officers  and  653  men  was  built  up  to  the  desired  size.4 

Every  day  saw  a  busy  schedule  of  training.  Specialist  schools 
were  organized.  Men  practiced  at  bayonet  fighting,  communica- 
tions, and  the  building  of  entrenchments.  They  worked  with 
machine  guns,  automatic  rifles,  Stokes  mortars,  and  37mm  guns. 
Lectures  on  gas  warfare  and  use  of  the  gas  mask  were  part  of 
the  training.  In  short,  the  4th  Regiment  again  geared — and 
fast — for  combat.  By  10  October,  Colonel  Alexander  S.  Wil- 
liams, who  had  taken  command  on  23  July  1923,  reported  the 
regiment  was  at  "a  high  state  of  efficiency" — set  to  go. 

The  revocation  of  the  orders  on  15  October  may,  therefore, 


3  CMC  msg  to  CG,  MarPac,  dtd  igSep24,  and  CMC  msg  to  CG,  MarPac, 
dtd  2oSep24  (both  in  Subj  File:  MarCorps  Bks  San  Diego,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

*CMC  msg  to  CG,  MarPac,  dtd  igSep24  (Subj  File:  MarCorps  Bks  San 
Diego,  HistBr,  HQMC)  ;  4th  Regt  MRolls,  iAug-3oSep24. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— AUSTERITY  MODEL  103 


have  been  disappointing,  yet  the  work  had  provided  good  experi- 
ence. The  men  could  resume  garrison  duty  with  added  confi- 
dence that  they  would  always  be,  in  the  Marine  Corps  tradition, 
a  force-in-readiness,  whatever  happened.  As  General  Lejeune 
had  said,  the  orders  were  "in  the  direction  of  readiness,  so  that 
we  may  not  fail  to  be  ready  in  the  event  of  the  emergency 
arising."  5 

Once  the  China  alert  was  cancelled,  the  4th  Regiment  felt 
the  stroke  of  the  economy  ax  with  a  vengeance.  Demands  from 
other  posts  subtracted  rapidly  from  its  numbers.  By  3 1  October, 
the  strength  had  fallen  to  34  officers  and  765  men,  and  this  was 
just  the  beginning.  Congressional  appropriations  for  the  fiscal 
year  1926  provided  for  only  18,000  Marines,  a  cut  of  1,500  over 
the  previous  year.  The  4th  Regiment  took  its  share  of  the  reduc- 
tion, and  by  30  September  1925  could  muster  only  44  officers  and 
493  enlisted  men.6 

THE  CADRE  SYSTEM 

Working  with  what  was  left,  the  Marine  Corps  turned  to  per- 
fecting a  device  which  would  minimize  the  effects  of  economy, 
namely,  the  cadre  system — the  small,  highly  trained  nucleus  of 
key  personnel,  quickly  expandable. 

Previously,  when  no  fully-organized  regiment  was  available, 
emergency  had  been  met  by  hastily  throwing  together  individuals 
or  small  units  at  the  gangplank.  Colonel  Doyen,  in  191 1,  had 
resorted  to  the  former  expedient;  Colonel  Pendleton,  in  19 14, 
had  employed  the  latter.  The  resulting  military  efficiency  left 
something  to  be  desired  in  both  cases. 

5  CO  4th  Regt  rept  to  CO,  MarCorps  Bks,  San  Diego,  dtd  23jun25,  and 
CO,  MarCorps  Bks,  San  Diego  rept  to  CMC,  dtd  1J11I25  (both  in  2295- 
40/7-525,  Central  Files,  HQMC)  ;  CMC  msg  to  CG,  MarPac,  dtd  2oSep24 
(Subj  File :  MarCorps  Bks  San  Diego,  HistBr,  HQMC) . 

9  4th  Regt  MRolls,  i-3iOct24  and  i-3oSep25;  CMC,  Report  .  .  in 
Annual  Reports  of  the  Navy  Department,  IQ25  (Washington:  Navy  Dept, 
1926). 


104       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


The  plan  now  was  to  maintain  a  nucleus  of  trained  key  per- 
sonnel for  each  unit  called  for  by  the  Table  of  Organization  and 
to  add  the  necessary  individuals  to  bring  the  regiment  to  full 
strength  on  the  eve  of  active  service.  No  claim  was  made  that 
the  regiment  would  then  be  combat  ready,  but  it  would  be  more 
nearly  so.  In  any  event,  it  was  the  best  that  could  be  done  with 
the  limited  personnel  at  hand. 

The  4th  Regiment  was,  therefore,  again  reorganized  on  1  Octo- 
ber 1925.  However  short  of  personnel,  it  was  to  contain  all  the 
units  called  for  by  the  Table  of  Organization  of  1922.  These 
included  a  headquarters  company,  service  company,  howitzer 
company,  and  three  battalions,  each  with  a  headquarters  com- 
pany, machine  gun  company,  and  three  rifle  companies. 

Only  two  battalions  had  been  included  in  the  4th  Regiment 
when  it  was  reorganized  upon  its  return  from  Santo  Domingo  at 
the  end  of  August  1924.  Originally  below  complement,  all 
regimental  units  had  been  built  up  to  full  authorized  strength 
for  expeditionary  service  in  China,  but  no  additional  organiza- 
tions had  been  added. 

The  few  available  officers  and  men  were  to  be  spread  thin 
enough  to  provide  a  cadre  for  every  unit.  So  reduced  in  numbers 
was  the  regiment,  however,  that  the  third  rifle  companies  could 
not  be  activated.  Upon  completion  of  the  reorganization  the 
regiment  was  formed  as  shown  below :  7 


Hq  Co                  istBn:  2d  Bn:  3dBn: 

Service  Co                Hq  Co  Hq  Co  Hq  Co 

Howitzer  Co              10th  Co  31st  Co  25th  Co 

27th  Co  3 2d  Co  29th  Co 

28th  Co  33d  Co  26th  Co 

(MG)  (MG)  (MG) 


7  CMC  ltr  to  CO  4th  Regt,  dtd  18JU1125  (2385-30/9-4,  Central  Files, 
HQMC);  4th  Regt  MRolls,  i-3oSep24  and  i-3iOct25. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — AUSTERITY  MODEL  105 


AMPHIBIOUS  EXERCISE  IN  HAWAII 

Participation  in  large-scale  Army-Navy  amphibious  maneuvers 
in  Hawaii  in  the  spring  of  1925  helped  sharpen  preparedness  of 
the  4th  Regiment.  The  maneuver  plan  called  for  an  assault  on 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  by  the  United  States  Fleet,  with  a  landing 
force  of  Marines  to  seize  Pearl  Harbor  and  Honolulu  for  use  as 
advance  fleet  bases.8 

General  Lejeune  welcomed  the  chance  for  Marine  participation 
in  the  exercise,  particularly  as  he  wished  to  refute  the  Army 
contention  that  Marines  were  incapable  of  conducting  any  opera- 
tion of  larger  than  regimental  size.9 

He  approved  the  basic  plan  for  Marine  Corps  participation 
on  8  January  1925.  This  called  for  a  Blue  Expeditionary  Force 
of  two  divisions  with  a  strength  of  42,000.  The  Marine  Corps 
was,  of  course,  unable  to  put  in  the  field  a  force  anywhere  near 
that  size.  In  fact,  only  about  120  officers  and  1,500  men  could 
be  scraped  together  from  Quantico  and  San  Diego.10 

The  4th  Regiment  was  to  supply  the  largest  contingent.  On 
29  January  the  Commandant  ordered  the  4th  raised  to  a  strength 
of  750  men  by  1  March  and  maintained  at  that  level  until  the 
departure  in  the  Henderson,  scheduled  for  early  April.  For  ma- 
neuver purposes  a  Provisional  Company  of  specialists,  mostly  com- 
municators, was  authorized.  Organized  on  1  March,  it  included 
97  men  drawn  from  units  of  the  regiment.  This  new  company 
was  attached  to  the  1st  Battalion  which  was  itself  reorganized 
for  the  maneuvers  to  include  the  Headquarters,  10th,  25th,  28th, 
3 1  st  and  32d  Companies — all  built  up  to  full  strength  by  stripping 
the  other  units  of  the  regiment.   It  furnished  the  one  actual  bat- 

8  GNO  memo  to  CMC,  dtd  5N0V24  (Exercise  File,  Plans  &  Policies  Div, 
HQMC,  at  HistBr,  HQMC,  hereafter  P&P  File) ;  Blue  MarCorpsExpedFor, 
JANExercise,  1925,  Problem  No.  3,  Basic  Plan,  dtd  8Jan25,  hereafter  Basic 
Plan  (P&P  File.) 

9LtGen  Merrill  B.  Twining  ltr  to  ACofS,  G-3,  HQMC,  dtd  25^57 
(Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 
10 Basic  Plan;  CMC  ltr  to  CG,  MarPac,  dtd  3ijan25  (P&P  File). 


106       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


talion  which  landed.  The  2d  and  3d  Battalions  were  represented 
during  the  maneuvers  by  Marines  from  the  ships'  detachments.11 

From  Quantico  came  one  troop  unit,  the  692-man  1st  Pro- 
visional Battalion,  10th  Regiment  (artillery).  It  joined  the  1st 
Battalion,  4th  Marines  for  a  week  of  preliminary  training,  cul- 
minating in  a  full-dress  attack  problem  in  Mission  Valley,  four 
miles  inland  from  San  Diego. 

In  addition,  the  Quantico  contingent  included  staff  officers 
and  students  of  Marine  Corps  Schools,  designated  for  command 
and  staff  posts.  Colonel  Williams,  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
4th  Marines,  joined  this  group  as  a  brigade  commander.  Other 
command  and  staff  billets  were  filled  by  some  of  the  Corps'  most 
distinguished  officers — Major  General  Wendell  C.  Neville,  a  fu- 
ture Commandant;  Brigadier  General  Logan  Feland,  a  combat 
leader  of  World  War  I;  and  Colonel  Robert  H.  Dunlap,  a  pio- 
neer in  the  development  of  amphibious  doctrine.12 

On  10  April  the  1st  Battalion,  4th  Regiment  and  the  Provi- 
sional Battalion,  10th  Regiment  sailed  on  board  the  Henderson 
for  a  rendezvous  with  the  Blue  Fleet  at  San  Francisco.  Here  a 
number  of  the  Quantico  Marines  were  transferred  from  the 
Henderson  to  other  ships.  On  the  15th,  the  Blue  Fleet  sortied 
from  San  Francisco  bound  for  Hawaii.  It  included  the  advance 
force,  made  up  of  the  scouting  force  and  the  aircraft  carrier 
Langley;  the  main  body,  comprised  of  the  battle  fleet;  and  the 
train  which  included  the  transports  carrying  the  Marine  Corps 
Expeditionary  Force. 

In  Hawaii  the  Black  defenders  stood  ready  to  repulse  the  land- 
ing.   Unlike  many  of  the  attacking  units,  the  defense  force  was 

11  CMC  ltr  to  CG,  MarPac,  dtd  2oJan25  (2385-30/9-4,  Central  Files, 
HQMG)  ;  Blue  MarCorpsExpedFor,  ForMemo  No.  1,  dtd  gFeb25  (P&P 
File);  4th  Regt  MRolls,  i~3iMar25;  CMC  ltr  to  CinC,  BattleFlt,  USS 
California  (Flagship),  dtd  i3Feb25,  P&P  File;  CMC  ltr  to  GO,  MarCorps 
Bks  San  Diego,  dtd  i4Feb25  (P&P  File). 

12  "Marines  Stage  Final  Practice  for  Oahu  Maneuver,"  Leatherneck,  v.  8, 
no.  17  (25Apr25),p.  1;  iothRegt  MRolls,  i~3iMar25. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— AUSTERITY  MODEL  107 


actual,  not  constructive.  To  Black  were  assigned  the  Regular 
Army  garrison  of  Oahu,  the  Hawaiian  National  Guard,  and  the 
Army  reserves  in  the  islands — a  total  force  of  about  16,000  men 
and  63  aircraft.  Black  naval  forces  included  30  scout  and  tor- 
pedo-bombing aircraft,  20  submarines,  and  a  few  mine  sweepers, 
mine  layers,  and  light  auxiliary  vessels.13 

Seizure  of  Molokai  Island  for  use  as  an  air  base  by  the  Blue 
Advance  Force  on  25  April  was  the  opening  round  of  the  exer- 
cise. A  Marine  landing  force  from  cruisers  and  the  battleship 
Wyoming  stormed  ashore  to  capture  an  airfield,  and  84  con- 
structive Marine  planes  flew  off  the  carrier  Langley  to  base  there. 
But  Blue  was  not  to  profit  from  this  success.  Before  any  strikes 
could  be  flown,  either  for  preliminary  softening  up  of  the  Black 
defenses  or  for  direct  support  of  the  landings  on  Oahu,  the 
umpires  grounded  the  simulated  Marine  aircraft  for  the 
duration.14 

It  was  a  weakened  Blue  force  that  moved  in  to  assault  the 
Oahu  beaches  on  the  night  of  26-27  April.  Following  a  feint 
at  Maunalua  Bay  near  Diamond  Head,  the  ships  took  position 
for  the  landing  operations.  The  main  effort  was  to  be  made  on 
the  northwest  coast,  an  area  of  good  beaches  backed  by  enough 
open  ground  to  deploy  a  large  force.  By  way  of  diversion,  a 
secondary  landing  attack  was  to  go  in  at  Barber's  Point  on  the 
southwest  corner  of  the  island. 

Battleships,  cruisers,  and  destroyers,  defying  Lord  Nelson's 
axiom  that  "a  ship's  a  fool  to  fight  a  fort,"  moved  in  close  to 
soften  up  the  Black  defenses.  Searchlights,  used  by  both  sides 
to  simulate  heavy  artillery,  stabbed  the  darkness  as  the  ships  and 
shore  batteries  engaged  in  a  spirited  duel. 

It  had  been  planned  to  begin  the  landings  at  0130  on  27  April, 
but  the  time  was  moved  up  four  hours  to  avoid  "the  inevitable 

13  ComAdvFor,  Advance  Force  Tasks  Solution,  JANProblem  No.  3.  dtd 
7Apr25  {P&P  File). 

14  ComBlueFlt,  JAN  Problem  No.  3,  Rept  to  CominCh,  n.d.  (P&P  File). 


108       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


hazards  to  life  and  materiel  involved  in  making  landings  at 
night."  15    So  the  first  waves  landed  just  before  daylight. 

As  the  morning  of  27  April  dawned,  nature  seemed  inclined 
to  play  along  with  the  game.  In  fact,  for  almost  the  first  time 
in  the  history  of  the  Islands,  she  withdrew  the  seasonal  winds 
from  the  northwest  coast,  moving  them  to  the  south.  So,  con- 
trary to  expectations,  there  was  practically  no  surf,  and  the 
weather  was  ideal — almost  too  good  for  adequate  tests  of  landing 
equipment  and  techniques.16 

As  if  to  counterbalance  the  benevolence  of  the  weather,  aircraft 
of  the  greatly  superior  Black  air  force  flew  low,  raining  blank 
machine  gun  fire  on  the  boat  waves  and  the  Marines  on  the 
beaches.  Fighter  aircraft  launched  from  the  Langley  were  too 
few  in  numbers  to  offer  effective  resistance. 

The  small  secondary  landing  force  was  stopped  by  superior 
numbers  of  the  Black  force,  but  the  diversionary  purpose  of  the 
landing  was  served.  At  the  main  landing  on  the  northwest  coast, 
successive  waves  got  ashore,  consolidated  for  attack,  and  moved 
inland.  When  the  Blue  2d  Division  penetrated  a  depth  of  sev- 
eral miles  by  noontime  the  umpires  called  a  halt,  leading  to 
facetious  comment  by  a  correspondent  that  the  action  "began 
and  ended  between  breakfast  and  lunch,"  a  "war  [which  was] 
born  in  an  egg  and  died  in  a  can."  17 

The  umpires  made  no  decision  as  to  the  over-all  victor  on 
Oahu.  That  would  have  required  further  action  under  tactical 
conditions.  What  was  important,  anyhow,  were  the  lessons 
learned. 


^MajGen  John  L.  Hines,  USA,  "Grand  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Exercise 
No.  3,"  lecture  at  ARWC,  26Jun25,  hereafter  Hines  Lecture  (P&P  File). 

16  BriGen  Dion  Williams,  "Blue  Marine  Corps  Expeditionary  Force," 
Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  X,  no.  2  (Sep25),  pp.  77-78,  84-86;  Basic  Plan; 
Hines  Lecture. 

"Williams,  op.  cit.,  p.  86;  "This  Glorious  War,"  Leatherneck,  v.  8,  no.  21 
(23May25),  p.  6. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — AUSTERITY  MODEL  109 


First  was  the  need  to  develop  special  landing  craft  to  replace 
the  awkward  ships'  boats  with  their  high  bows  and  relatively 
deep  drafts.  Training  at  rapid  debarking  on  the  beach  was  being 
defeated  by  the  total  unsuitability  of  ships'  boats,  which  were  the 
only  landing  craft  at  this  time.  At  the  secondary  landing  the 
boats  were  surprised  by  an  unexpectedly  large  wave  and  thrown 
headlong  onto  the  beach.  As  the  first  craft  grounded,  a  coral 
head  tore  a  gash  in  its  side,  and  all  hands  and  equipment  were 
tossed  overboard.18 

The  second  point  emphasized  by  the  exercise  was  the  need  of 
additional  aviation  with  the  attacking  fleet.  Black's  air  superior- 
ity had  been  overwhelming.  But  this  requirement  was  already 
being  met  by  the  current  fleet  construction  program.  The  car- 
riers Saratoga  and  Lexington  were  commissioned  in  1927. 

In  the  realm  of  communication — by  radio,  field  telegraph, 
and  telephone — the  maneuvers  showed  the  desirability  of  small 
compact  apparatus.  The  Marine  force  had  carried  11  Army 
Signal  Corps  radio  sets,  while  ships  of  the  fleet  were  equipped 
with  24  portable  field  sets,  complete  with  bluejacket  crews,  for 
use  on  shore.19 

As  General  Hines  recalled  the  maneuvers,  he  held  "no  doubt 
that  highly-trained,  well-led  infantry  can  establish  a  beachhead 
once  the  troops  are  ashore — but  getting  ashore,  there's  the  rub."  20 
To  iron  out  that  rub  became  a  main  task  of  the  Marine  Corps 
through  the  years  which  lay  ahead  before  World  War  II.  This 
was  the  essence  of  amphibious  warfare:  "getting  ashore." 

While  Headquarters  Marine  Corps  was  already  examining  the 
lessons  of  the  maneuvers,  men  of  the  4th  Regiment  enjoyed  a 

18  Hines  Lecture;  "No  'Constructive'  War,"  Leatherneck,  v.  8,  no.  21 
(23May25),  p.  11;  Williams,  op.  cit.,  pp.  87-88;  Div  Ops  &  Trng,  HQMC, 
memo  to  BriGen  Logan  Feland,  dtd  igjan25  {P&P  File). 

"Williams,  op.  cit.,  87-88;  CinC,  BattleFlt,  msg  to  CMC,  dtd  i6Feb25, 
P&P  File. 

20  Hines  Lecture. 


110       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


liberty  in  Honolulu  before  the  Henderson  weighed  anchor  for 
home  on  30  April.  By  8  May,  when  the  Henderson  docked  at 
San  Diego,  the  4th  Regiment  was  again  in  business  on  its  familiar 
site.21 

As  the  regiment  resumed  its  daily  training  at  San  Diego,  it 
stood  ready,  at  a  moment's  notice,  for  any  call  to  service.  Such 
an  occasion  was  not  long  in  coming. 

Hardly  had  the  Marines  heard  of  an  earthquake  at  Santa 
Barbara  on  the  morning  of  29  June  1925  before  they  found  them- 
selves en  route  to  the  scene.  President  Coolidge,  then  at  Plym- 
outh, Vermont,  telegraphed  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  dispatch 
aid  to  the  stricken  area.  Second  Lieutenant  Thomas  B.  White, 
regimental  communication  officer,  left  with  the  radio  unit  of 
Headquarters  Company  the  same  day  for  Santa  Barbara  to 
restore  her  contacts  with  the  outside  world.  At  first  it  was  neces- 
sary to  work  from  the  naval  tug  Koka  offshore.  Then,  on  1 
July,  Major  Francis  T.  Evans  took  218  Marines  of  the  2d  Bat- 
talion to  Santa  Barbara,  to  relieve  the  Los  Angeles  police  as 
guards.    A  Marine  camp  was  set  up  at  Peabody  Stadium. 

Throughout  July  the  Marines  lent  a  helping  hand,  winning 
the  gratitude  of  citizens  of  Santa  Barbara.  These  people  would 
have  echoed  the  sentiments  of  the  Chicago  Evening  Post  which, 
just  a  few  days  before  the  earthquake,  had  said  editorially :  22 

'Emergency'  and  'Marine'  may  not  be  synonymous  terms, 
but  they  come  pretty  close  to  being  simultaneous.  In  the 
matter  of  mobility,  to  say  nothing  of  agility,  these  sea- 
soldiers  have  a  way  of  being  johnny-on-the-spot,  and  Amer- 
ican minds  rest  easier,  whatever  the  disturbing  occasion, 
when  the  message  is  flashed:  'The  Marines  have  landed.' 

21  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1  Apr-3 iMay25- 

22  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1-31J11I25;  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  30JUI125,  1- 
2JUI25;  "The  Broadcast,"  Leatherneck,  v.  8,  no.  29  (18J11I25),  p.  6,  and 
"The  Broadcast,"  Leatherneck,  v.  8,  no.  34  (22Aug25),  p.  3;  editorial, 
"The  Marines  Are  on  the  Job,"  Chicago  Evening  Post,  25jun25. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— AUSTERITY  MODEL  111 


For  more  than  a  year  after  their  return  to  San  Diego  at  the 
end  of  July,  life  for  the  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  was  one 
of  uneventful  garrison  routine.  Strength  fluctuated  sharply  dur- 
ing the  period — from  45  officers  and  670  men  at  the  end  of 
July  1925  to  a  low  of  37  officers  and  347  men  by  the  end  of 
January  1926.  Six  months  later,  the  figure  had  risen  to  20  offi- 
cers and  581  men.  With  so  few  personnel  it  was  no  longer  prac- 
tical to  maintain  a  three-battalion  organization,  and,  on  6  July 
1926  the  regiment  was  reorganized  again  into  two  battalions.23 
Then,  in  October,  emergency  once  again  called  the  4th  Regiment 
to  service. 

GUARDING  THE  MAILS 

A  product  of  the  gangster  1920's  was  a  crime  now  hardly 
heard  of:  mail  robbery.  In  192 1,  President  Harding  had  turned 
out  the  Marines  to  fight  it.  By  1926,  however,  a  new  series  of 
outrages  broke  out. 

Violence  reached  a  climax  in  a  robbery  by  eight  men  at  Eliza- 
beth, New  Jersey,  when  on  14  October  one  of  two  bandit  cars 
crowded  a  mail  truck  to  the  curb  while  another  slammed  against 
a  motorcycle  policeman,  throwing  him  to  the  street.  After  kill- 
ing the  mail  truck  driver,  wounding  a  postal  guard  and  a  by- 
stander, the  bandits  fled  with  five  bags  of  mail — a  loot  of  some 
$150,000 — while  shielding  their  escape  with  machine  guns  and 
sawed-off  shotguns. 

There  had  been  other  incidents,  no  less  a  mockery  of  the  law, 
but  it  was  the  Elizabeth  robbery  which  prompted  decisive  action. 
On  the  next  day,  15  October,  Postmaster  General  Harry  S.  New 
addressed  a  letter  to  Curtis  D.  Wilbur,  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
citing  the  necessity  of  immediate  moves.  Receiving  quick  agree- 
ment, New  then  conferred  with  General  Lejeune.    In  less  than 

23  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1-31J11I25,  i-3ijan26,  and  1-31J11I26. 


112 


HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


a  week,  on  20  October,  President  Coolidge  formally  approved  the 
use  of  2,500  Marines  to  guard  the  mails.  It  brought  a  public 
sigh  of  relief.24 

On  the  basis  of  an  informal  understanding  that  the  President 
would  approve,  the  Commandant  had  wired  on  18  October  to 
Headquarters,  Department  of  the  Pacific :  "You  will  organize  a 
force  from  the  Fourth  Regiment,  to  be  known  as  the  Western 
Mail  Guards  .  .  .  ."  He  designated  Brigadier  General  Smedley 
D.  Butler  to  command  it,  with  Headquarters  at  San  Francisco. 

The  4th  Regiment  would  be  spread  out  through  Montana, 
Wyoming,  Colorado,  New  Mexico,  Idaho,  Utah,  Arizona,  Wash- 
ington, Oregon,  Nevada,  and  California.  But  the  Commandant 
desired  that  the  existing  organization  of  the  4th  be  preserved  "as 
far  as  practicable."  The  inactive  31st  and  32d  Companies  were 
restored  to  strength  for  the  mail  guard  duty. 

The  eastern  boundary  of  the  Western  Mail  Guard  area  was 
modified  on  22  October  to  weave  through  Williston,  North  Da- 
kota; Green  River,  Wyoming;  Denver,  Colorado;  Albuquerque, 
New  Mexico;  and  El  Paso,  Texas.  On  the  other  side  of  the  line 
were  the  Eastern  Mail  Guards,  commanded  by  General  Feland 
at  Quantico.25 

Just  three  days  after  the  Commandant's  first  order,  15  officers 
and  630  men  left  San  Diego  en  route  to  their  posts  as  the  Western 
Mail  Guards.  Four  officers  and  1 74  men  reported  to  Los  Angeles 
and  neighboring  towns.  Four  officers  and  234  men  went  on  to 
San  Francisco.    Proceeding  to  Portland  were  1  officer  and  41 


2*"The  Mail  Guard,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  XI,  no.  4  (Dec26), 
pp.  267,  270;  "Marines  to  Guard  the  Mails,"  Leatherneck,  v.  9,  no.  15 
(DeC26),  pp.  45-46;  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  I50ct26  and  I70ct26;  Capt 
Allen  H.  Turnage  ltr  to  Maj  Edward  W.  Sturdevant,  dtd  16N0V26,  in 
1645-80,  Central  Files,  HQMG.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  all  further  docu- 
ments on  the  Western  Mail  Guard  are  from  this  file. 

25  HQMC  msg  to  CG,  MarPac,  dtd  i80ct26;  HQMG  msg  to  CG,  MarPac, 
dtd  220ct26;  4th  Regt  MRolls,  i-3iOct26. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— AUSTERITY  MODEL  113 


men;  to  Seattle,  2  officers  and  60  men;  to  Salt  Lake  City,  2  officers 
and  55  men;  to  Spokane,  1  officer  and  34  men;  and  to  Denver, 
1  officer  and  32  men.26 

As  in  192 1,  Marines  were  assigned  not  only  to  trains  carrying 
precious  mail  shipments  but  also  to  mail  trucks  and  to  guard  duty 
at  post  offices  and  railway  stations.  Altogether,  some  40,000 
miles  of  railroad  and  post  offices  in  28  cities  west  of  the  Mississippi 
came  under  Marine  protection.27 

Each  Marine  was  well-armed.  The  gangster  in  the  jungles 
of  America's  underworld  in  the  1920's  was  not  the  poorly  armed 
bandit  the  Marines  had  often  encountered  in  Santo  Domingo. 
To  fight  fire  with  fire,  the  mail  guards  were  equipped  with 
pistols,  1 2 -gauge  riot  type  shotguns,  and  the  .45  calibre  Thompson 
submachine  gun. 

The  men  were  quartered,  wherever  practicable,  in  buildings 
owned  or  controlled  by  the  Government.  Otherwise,  the  Corps' 
Quartermaster  General  leased  space.  For  example,  in  San 
Francisco  the  Marines  lived  at  the  Army  &  Navy  YMCA.28 

On  9  November,  General  Butler  reported  to  Headquarters 
Marine  Corps  that  the  strength  of  the  Western  Mail  Guard 
stood  at  25  officers  and  679  men,  and  he  listed  where  they  were, 
as  follows:  29 


29  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1-3  iOct26. 

27  CG,  MarPac  msg  to  HQMG,  dtd  240ct26;  CG,  MarPac  ltr  to  CO, 
MarCorps  Bks,  San  Diego,  dtd  260ct26;  CG,  WMG  msg  to  HQMC,  dtd 
9N0V26;  CMC,  Report  .  .  ..  in  Annual  Reports  of  the  Navy  Department  for 
the  Fiscal  Year  IQ21  (Washington:  Navy  Dept,  1921);  San  Francisco 
Chronicle,  22-23-24-290^26. 

28  "Marine  Corps  Mail  Guards  Carry  Improved  Machine  Gun,"  Leather- 
neck, v.  9,  no.  15  (Dec26),  p.  44;  "Marines  to  Guard  the  Mails,"  op.  cit.} 
pp.  45-46;  "The  Mail  Guard,"  op.  cit.,  pp.  267-68;  4th  Regt  MRolls, 
1-30N0V26;  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  220ct26. 

29  CG,  MarPac  ltr  to  CO,  MarCorps  Bks  San  Diego,  dtd  260ct26;  4th  Regt 
MRolls,  i-3iOct26;  CG,  WMG,  msg  to  HQMC,  dtd  9N0V26. 


114       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


DISTRICTS  UNITS                    OFFICERS  MEN 

ist: 

San  Francisco  28th  Co  and  29th  Co,  2d  Bn     8  148 

Stockton  6 

Fresno  8 

Reno  16 

Sacramento  13 

Bakersfield  6 

San  Jose  8 

Oakland  30 

Berkeley  1 
2d: 

Los  Angeles  27th  Co  and  31st  Co,  ist  Bn     5  127 

Albuquerque  8 

El  Paso  1 1 

Phoenix  5 

Pasadena  1 

Riverside  1 

San  Bernardino  1 
3d: 

Salt  Lake  City  10th  Co,  ist  Bn                     2  45 

Ogden  18 

Boise  4 
4th: 

Portland  Hq  Co,  2d  Bn  2  42 
5th: 

Seattle  25th  Co,  2d  Bn                     3  59 

Tacoma  4 

Bellingham  4 
6th: 

Spokane  3  2d  Co,  2d  Bn                       2  31 

Helena  1  13 

Butte  13 
7th: 

Denver  Regimental  Hq  Co                 2  43 

Pueblo  9 

Trinidad  4 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — AUSTERITY  MODEL  115 


In  carrying  out  their  new  task,  Marines  were  instructed  to 
follow  the  Manual  for  the  Western  Mail  Guards,  1926.  This 
prescribed  that  "if  your  duty  requires  you  will,  after  proper 
warning,  arrest  or  shoot,  but  never,  under  any  circumstances, 
enter  into  an  argument  with,  or  lay  hands  on,  anyone."  30 

Whether  the  mail  robbers  read  the  Manual  is  not  known.  At 
least,  not  one  of  them  chose  to  argue  with  a  Marine.  Just  a 
single  attempt  at  mail  robbery  occurred  during  the  guard  duty — 
and  that  happened  on  a  train  which  did  not  carry  valuable  mail 
and  was  therefore  not  accompanied  by  Marines. 

Viewing  the  peaceful  landscape,  Leatherneck  inquired: 
"Where  Are  the  Mail  Bandits  Now?"  Where,  asked  the  editor, 
are  "all  those  gentlemen  who  have  been  making  an  easy  living 
by  robbing  mail  trains  and  mail  trucks  .  .  .?"  31 

Instead  of  chasing  mail  robbers,  the  4th  Regiment  became  a 
quiet  and  assuring  presence  throughout  the  West — a  fact  which 
brought  fully  as  much  credit  to  the  Marine  Corps.  Many  Ameri- 
cans met,  for  the  first  time,  their  nation's  historic  sea-soldiers, 
whose  "splendid  military  appearance"  they  praised.  At  the  daily 
inspection,  citizens  could  stop  to  admire  the  colorful  holding  of 
troop. 

A  movie,  "Tell  It  to  the  Marines,"  which  featured  4th  Regi- 
ment personnel  and  starred  Lon  Chaney  as  a  gunnery  sergeant, 
was  shown  during  January  at  various  towns  where  mail  guards 
were  stationed.32  It  served  to  inform  Americans  further  on  the 
tasks  performed  by  the  Marine  Corps,  both  in  war  and  peace. 

Toward  the  end  of  1926,  it  became  evident  that  the  4th  Regi- 
ment's next  task  was  again  going  to  be  expeditionary  duty. 

30  Manual  for  the  Western  Mail  Guards,  1Q26  (1645-80,  Central  Files, 
HQMG). 

31  Editorial,  "Where  Are  the  Mail  Bandits  Now?"  Leatherneck,  v.  10,  no.  1 
(Jan27),  p.  26. 

82  CO  Det  32d  Co,  4th  Regt,  WMG,  Spokane,  wkly  rept  to  CG,  WMG, 
dtd  i5Feb27;  "'Tell  It  To  the  Marines'  Opens,"  Leatherneck,  v.  10,  no.  1 
(Jan27),  p.  35;  4th  Regt  MRolls,  1-31J11I27. 


116       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Rebel  forces  in  Nicaragua  were  seizing  American  property,  while, 
across  the  Pacific,  in  China,  civil  war  and  prejudice  against 
foreigners  threatened  the  lives  of  Americans. 

In  view  of  affairs,  the  Commandant  decided  upon  a  gradual 
withdrawal  of  Marines  from  mail  guard  duty.  Started  on  10 
January,  the  withdrawal  was  set  for  completion  by  July.  But 
it  soon  became  imperative  to  execute  full  withdrawal  before  the 
end  of  February.33   Foreign  needs  could  not  wait. 

On  10  January,  General  Butler  reported  to  Washington  that 
9  officers  and  138  men  had  been  returned  to  San  Diego  in  the 
first  of  the  homeward  moves.  The  withdrawals  continued 
throughout  the  month  and  on  into  February.  The  10th  Com- 
pany at  Salt  Lake  City  and  the  29th  Company  at  San  Francisco, 
among  the  last  units  to  be  recalled,  continued  on  mail  guard  duty 
until  1 8  February.  A  day  later,  Headquarters  and  Headquarters 
Company,  2d  Battalion,  at  Portland,  the  31st  Company  at  Los 
Angeles,  and  the  3 2d  Company  at  Spokane  were  secured.  When 
these  units  returned  to  San  Diego  they  found  that  most  of  their 
buddies  in  the  regiment  had  sailed  for  Shanghai  on  3  February.34 

At  the  end  of  the  mail  guard  duty  the  Marine  Corps  was 
showered  with  praise  for  the  service  it  had  performed.  Of  the 
"highest  order  of  excellence,"  wrote  Postmaster  General  New. 
The  San  Francisco  postmaster  summed  up  the  tone  of  the  praise : 

Efficiency  and  courtesy  were  combined  to  a  degree  that 
could  not  but  evoke  a  wholesome  respect  for  the  Marine 
Corps,  that  fine  arm  of  the  service  which  by  reason  of  its 
training  may  be  utilized  in  any  character  of  emergency. 

The  mail  guard  duty  had  taxed  the  Marine  Corps'  pocket- 


33  CMC,  Report  .  .  .,  in  Annual  Reports  of  the  Navy  Department  for  the 
Fiscal  Year  ig2y  (Washington:  Navy  Dept,  1928);  Professional  Notes — 
"Mail  Guard,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  XII,  no.  1  (Mar27),  pp.  51-52; 
Clyde  H.  Metcalf,  A  History  of  the  United  States  Marine  Corps  (New  York: 
G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1939),  PP-  5*9-53 

84  CG,  WMG,  msg  to  HQMG,  dtd  ioJan27;  4*h  Regt  MRolls,  ijan- 
28Feb27. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — AUSTERITY  MODEL  117 


book,  but  from  a  public  relations  standpoint  it  was  well  worth 
the  cost.  As  the  Gazette  remarked,  it  "made  the  Marine  in  uni- 
form a  familiar  sight  to  millions  of  citizens."  35 

Without  a  shot  or  a  casualty,  the  Marines  had  won  a  sizeable 
victory. 

35  Postmaster  General  ltr  to  SecNav,  dtd  i6Feb2  7;  James  E.  Power,  Post- 
master, San  Francisco,  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  i7Mar2  7;  editorial,  Marine  Corps 
Gazette,  v.  XII,  no.  i  (Mar27),  pp.  67-68. 


519667—60  10 


CHAPTER  V 


China  Marines 


On  28  January  1927,  the  4th  Regiment  received  orders  to 
embark  for  expeditionary  duty  in  the  Far  East.  Thus  began  a 
15-year  tour  in  China,  protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  Ameri- 
can citizens  in  the  International  Settlement  of  Shanghai.  The 
Marines  never  engaged  in  combat  during  all  those  years,  yet  they 
successfully  carried  out  their  mission,  though  next  door  to  the 
Chinese  revolution  and  the  pitched  battles  of  the  Sino- Japanese 
war.  It  was  a  situation  where  the  existence  of  a  force  in  readi- 
ness on  the  spot  achieved  a  national  policy  merely  by  its  presence. 
It  was  a  condition  where,  according  to  John  Van  A.  Mac  Murray, 
the  American  minister  to  China,  "the  only  possible  escape  from 
the  necessity  to  apply  force  .  .  .  [was]  an  obvious  readiness  to 
employ  it."  1 

MOVEMENT  TO  CHINA 

The  regiment,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Charles  S.  Hill, 
sailed  from  San  Diego  in  the  naval  transport  Chaumont  on 
3  February.  On  board  were  the  regimental  Headquarters  and 
Service  Companies,  Major  Theodore  A.  Secor's  1st  Battalion, 
and  the  newly  organized  3d  Battalion.    Formed  on  10  January 


1  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  I5jan2  7,  Foreign  Relations,  1927, 
p.  47. 

119 


120       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


under  the  command  of  Major  Alexander  A.  Vandegrift,2  the  new 
battalion  included  the  19th,  21st,  2 2d,  and  24th  Companies. 
Total  strength  on  board  the  Chaumont  was  66  officers  and  1,162 
enlisted  men.  The  2d  Battalion,  which  was  still  engaged  in 
winding  up  the  mail  guard  operations,  had  to  remain  behind. 
No  more  disappointed  group  of  Marines  ever  wore  the  uniform 
than  those  of  the  2d  Battalion  when  their  comrades  sailed  for 
expeditionary  service  without  them.3 

The  Chaumont  reached  the  China  coast  on  24  February. 
Long  before  sighting  the  shore,  Marines  crowding  her  decks 
could  tell  they  were  approaching  land,  as  the  water  was  colored  a 
dismal  yellow  for  miles  out  to  sea  by  the  tons  of  mud  disgorged 
by  the  Yangtze  River.  The  first  sight  of  China  was  a  disappoint- 
ment. There  were  no  pagodas,  no  temple  bells,  no  spice-laden 
breezes.  Instead,  there  was  a  large  billboard  stuck  in  a  mud 
bank  advertising,  in  English,  a  well-known  brand  of  American 
chewing  gum. 

As  the  Chaumont  churned  her  way  through  the  silt-laden 
waters  of  the  Yangtze,  a  thin  blue  line  on  either  side  gradually 
materialized  into  the  shore.  Then,  to  port,  was  a  cluster  of  low 
houses — the  first  Chinese  village,  Woosung,  squatting  on  the 
corner  where  the  Whangpoo  River  flows  into  the  Yangtze. 
Turning  hard  to  port,  the  transport  steamed  up  this  tributary 
stream.  The  river  was  crowded  now  with  junks,  chunky  wooden 
vessels,  with  eyes  painted  on  their  bows,  their  dark,  patched  sails 
bellying  in  the  chill  breeze.  There  were  occasional  villages,  with 
low  houses  and  willow  trees  on  both  banks.  Then  the  silver 
storage  tanks  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company  came  into  view  on 

2  Vandegrift  became  one  of  the  great  Marine  combat  leaders  of  WW  II. 
He  commanded  the  1st  MarDiv  at  Guadalcanal,  and  later  served  as  the  18th 
Commandant  of  the  Marine  Corps. 

3  Div  Ops  &  Trng,  HQMC,  "Protection  of  American  Interests,"  Marine 
Corps  Gazette,  v.  XII,  no.  3  (Sep27),  pp.  179-183;  1st  and  3d  Bns,  4th 
Regt,  Recs  of  Events,  3Feb2  7«  Unless  otherwise  cited,  official  records  are  in 
MarCorps  Units  in  China,  192  7-1 938  File,  HistBr,  HQMC. 


CHINA  MARINES  121 


the  left  shore.  Here  the  Chaumont  stopped  and  picked  up  a 
mooring  off  the  oil  company  property.    (See  Map  8.) 

Colonel  Hill  boarded  a  launch  and  continued  on  up  river  the 
remaining  five  miles  to  Shanghai.  There  he  reported  to  Admiral 
Clarence  S.  Williams,  Commander  in  Chief  Asiatic  Fleet,  in  his 
flagship,  the  cruiser  Pittsburgh.  The  admiral  assigned  to  the 
4th  Regiment  the  mission  of  protecting  the  lives  and  property 
of  Americans  within  the  International  Settlement  of  Shanghai.4 

SHANGHAI  AND  THE  INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENT 

The  International  Settlement  had  its  origins  in  the  Opium 
War  of  1842  when  Great  Britain  forced  the  Chinese  to  grant 
full  trading  privileges  and  the  right  of  residence  at  Shanghai.5  In 
an  area  set  aside  for  them  outside  the  city  walls,  the  British  and 
other  foreign  merchants,  under  the  doctrine  of  extraterritoriality, 
established  a  settlement  where  they  governed  themselves,  exempt 
from  Chinese  authority.  A  form  of  city  government  was  estab- 
lished under  regulations  drawn  up  in  1 854  by  the  British,  Ameri- 
can, and  French  consuls,  providing  a  municipal  council,  elected 
by  the  foreign  taxpayers. 

The  French  withdrew  in  1862  under  orders  from  Paris  and 
established  an  independent  concession  on  land  they  held  under 
treaty  with  the  Chinese  just  south  of  the  International  Settlement. 

Shanghai  in  1842  was  a  sleepy  provincial  town,  but  the  ar- 
rival of  the  white  man  began  a  remarkable  commercial  boom. 
By  1927  the  city  had  a  population  of  about  three  million.  It  was 
the  leading  port  of  China,  the  gateway  to  the  vast  Yangtze  Valley. 


4  CO  4th  Regt  ltr  to  CinCAF,  dtd  26Feb27  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 

6  The  material  on  Chinese  history  is  from  Foster  Rhea  Dulles,  China  and 
America,  the  Story  of  their  Relations  Since  1784  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1946). 


122       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


CHINA  MARINES  123 


Nearly  34  million  tons  of  merchandise  passed  through  it  each 
year.6 

The  nerve  centers  for  this  commercial  activity  were  the  for- 
eign concessions  of  which  the  International  Settlement  was  the 
largest  and  most  important.  It  covered  about  5,500  acres,  or 
nearly  half  the  entire  metropolitan  area.  Within  its  borders 
lived  about  one-third  of  the  city's  population.  The  French  Con- 
cession was  about  half  the  size  of  the  International  Settlement, 
both  in  population  and  area. 

Surrounding  the  foreign  concessions  was  the  native  city.  In 
addition  to  the  old  quarter,  squeezed  between  the  French  Con- 
cession and  the  river,  were  three  sectors  which  had  sprung  up 
after  the  arrival  of  the  foreigners.  These  were  Nantao  to  the 
south,  Pootung  across  the  Whangpoo  to  the  east,  and  Chapei 
to  the  north.  This  last  was  the  most  important,  containing  many 
businesses  and  factories,  both  Chinese  and  foreign-owned.  Here 
lived  many  of  the  young  progressive  Chinese.  The  native  sec- 
tions were  only  about  one-fourth  the  size  of  the  foreign  conces- 
sions, but  they  contained  about  the  same  number  of  inhabitants. 

The  British,  who  had  taken  the  lead  in  extracting  special  privi- 
leges from  China,  had  dominated  the  life  of  the  Settlement  ever 
since.  They  handled  about  a  third  of  the  tonnage  passing  through 
the  port;  they  set  the  social  tone;  and  they  represented  the  second 
largest  group  of  foreigners,  with  7,047  residents  in  1926.  This 
dominant  position  was  increasingly  threatened  by  the  Japanese, 
who,  by  1926,  already  had  twice  the  number  of  residents  and 
were  handling  more  than  a  fourth  of  the  tonnage. 

The  American  stake  in  Shanghai  was  a  modest  one.  Only 
1,800  Americans  resided  there  in  1926,  and  they  handled  only 
1 2  per  cent  of  the  tonnage  passing  through  the  port.  This  was 
representative  of  the  total  United  States  stake  in  China,  where 


6  "Shanghai,"  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  1944,  v.  20,  pp.  455-458. 


124       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


our  commerce  amounted  to  less  than  four  per  cent  of  our  for- 
eign trade  during  the  decade  1921-1930.7 

THE  DANGER  TO  FOREIGNERS 

The  danger  to  foreigners  living  in  the  International  Settlement 
in  1927  was  the  end  result  of  nearly  a  century  of  commercial  ex- 
ploitation carried  out  with  little  regard  for  Chinese  sovereignty 
or  national  pride.  The  original  privileges,  which  had  been  ex- 
tracted from  a  reluctant  Chinese  government  at  the  mouth  of  a 
cannon,  were  only  the  beginning  of  coercive  exploitation  on  a 
grand  scale. 

The  British  and  French  forced  the  opening  of  the  interior  to 
foreign  trade  in  1858.  Extraterritoriality  was  demanded  by,  and 
accorded  to,  almost  all  Western  nations;  coastal  trade  was  domi- 
nated by  foreigners ;  and  a  five  per  cent  limitation  on  tariff  rates 
was  enforced  in  the  face  of  rising  domestic  prices,  giving  foreign 
merchants  every  advantage  in  the  Chinese  market.  Concessions 
were  also  obtained  for  the  construction  of  railroads  and  telegraph 
lines. 

The  crowning  humiliation  came  in  1895  when  defeat  by  Japan 
in  war  revealed  the  utter  impotence  of  China.  Formosa  and  the 
Pescadores  fell  to  the  victor  as  spoils.  To  make  matters  worse, 
the  European  powers  were  encouraged  by  this  evidence  of  weak- 
ness to  step  up  their  encroachments  on  Chinese  sovereignty. 
Germany  acquired  the  port  of  Tsingtao  and  recognition  of  the 
province  of  Shantung  as  her  special  sphere  of  influence;  Russia 
exacted  a  leasehold  at  Port  Arthur ;  Britain  extended  her  grip  on 
the  Yangtze  Valley ;  and  France  seized  Kwangchow  Bay  in  South 
China. 

The  reaction  of  the  Chinese  to  these  foreign  aggressions  can 
well  be  imagined.  Citizens  of  one  of  the  world's  oldest  and  great- 

7  Samuel  F.  Bemis,  A  Diplomatic  History  of  the  United  States  (New  York: 
Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  1942),  pp.  759-760. 


CHINA  MARINES  125 


est  empires,  they  took  pride  in  their  own  society,  and,  though  not 
generally  hostile  to  strangers,  looked  upon  them  as  inferiors.  The 
violent  intrusion  of  foreigners  into  China  was  bitterly  resented. 

This  resentment  came  to  a  head  in  1900  in  the  Boxer  Rebellion. 
The  Boxers  were  a  Chinese  patriotic  society,  which,  with  the 
acquiescence  of  the  Chinese  government,  stirred  up  an  armed 
rebellion  against  the  "foreign  devils."  Ripping  up  portions  of 
the  Peking-Tientsin  railway,  the  Boxers  cut  off  Peking  from  the 
outside  world,  murdered  the  secretary  of  the  Japanese  legation 
and  the  German  ambassador,  and  besieged  the  legations  in  the 
city.  An  international  relief  force  of  about  1 9,000  men,  includ- 
ing a  regiment  of  Marines,  finally  fought  its  way  through  to 
relieve  the  besieged  legations. 

Hatred  for  "foreign  devils"  and  a  determination  to  drive  them 
from  the  country  continued  to  flourish.  It  was  one  of  the  pri- 
mary objectives  of  the  revolutionary  party  organized  by  Dr.  Sun 
Yat-sen  which  overthrew  the  Manchu  dynasty  in  1 9 1 1 .  Dr.  Sun, 
unable  to  give  China  a  strong  central  government,  was  soon 
reduced  to  nominal  control  of  the  Canton  area.  A  period  of 
anarchy,  dominated  by  local  war  lords,  set  in. 

Though  deprived  of  real  political  authority,  Sun  Yat-sen  still 
exerted  a  wide  ideological  influence.  His  "Three  Principles" — 
nationalism,  democracy,  and  the  peoples'  welfare — had  a  strong 
appeal  among  the  new  student  and  merchant  classes  of  the  coastal 
cities.  After  World  War  I,  Dr.  Sun  gained  powerful  allies  in 
the  Communists,  both  Chinese  and  Russian.  From  the  latter  he 
received  military  and  political  advisers  and  arms. 

He  also  acquired,  in  Chiang  Kai-shek,  a  competent  Chinese 
military  commander  who  established  an  officer  training  school, 
the  famous  Whampoa  Academy,  which  began  to  turn  out  the 
nucleus  for  professional  military  leadership.  With  the  Whampoa 
graduates,  Chiang  organized  and  trained  what  was,  by  Chinese 
standards,  an  efficient  modern  army. 

With  this  new  army  Sun  Yat-sen  planned  the  conquest  of  all 


126       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


China,  but  he  died  before  military  operations  got  under  way. 
Chiang  Kai-shek  then  took  over  and,  in  July  1926,  set  his  armies 
in  motion.  Using  a  combination  of  military  operations,  bribery, 
and  political  infiltration,  the  Nationalists  swept  everything  before 
them.  By  autumn  they  were  in  the  Yangtze  Valley  of  central 
China.8 

As  Chiang  Kai-shek's  force  ground  its  way  steadily  northward, 
foreigners  in  the  International  Settlement  became  increasingly 
apprehensive.  Nobody  expected  the  poorly  trained  and  half- 
starved  troops  of  the  war  lord  Chang  Tsung-ch'ang,  who  was  then 
in  control  of  the  area  around  Shanghai,  to  put  up  effective  re- 
sistance. Moreover,  the  anti-foreign  sentiment  of  the  National- 
ists, particularly  their  Communist  faction,  was  not  reassuring. 
Old  China  hands  recalled  the  violent  outbursts  of  the  Boxer 
Rebellion  and  began  to  urge  their  governments  to  send  ships  and 
troops. 

As  if  to  confirm  the  worst  fears  of  the  most  jittery  treaty  port 
residents,  Nationalist  soldiers  overran  the  British  concession  in 
Hankow  early  in  January  1927,  looting  and  burning.  Loss  of 
life  was  averted  only  by  the  timely  arrival  of  landing  parties  from 
British  destroyers  and  gun  boats.  To  make  matters  even  more 
alarming,  the  Nationalist  commander  in  the  area  had  previously 
assumed  responsibility  for  maintaining  law  and  order  and  had 
assured  the  British  that  they  had  nothing  to  fear. 

In  response  to  the  violence  at  Hankow,  Minister  MacMurray 
cabled  the  State  Department  on  10  January  1927  an  urgent  rec- 
ommendation that,  "in  order  to  protect  foreign  life  and  property 
at  Shanghai  and  prevent  the  seizure  of  the  Settlement  ...  by 
mob  violence  .  .  .,  landing  forces  at  Shanghai  should  be  in- 
creased to  maximum  available  .  ..."  9  A  few  days  later  Mac- 


8  F.  F.  Liu,  A  Military  History  of  Modern  China  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1956),  pp.  25-35. 

9  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  ioJan2  7,  Foreign  Relations,  1927, 
p.  44. 


CHINA  MARINES  127 


Murray  forwarded  to  Washington  an  estimate  by  Admiral  Wil- 
liams, that  20,000  troops  would  be  required  to  defend  the  Settle- 
ment against  a  determined  attack  by  the  Nationalists.10 

CIRCUMSCRIBING  THE  MARINE  MISSION 

President  Coolidge,  realizing  that  the  American  people  were 
in  no  mood  for  a  war  with  China,  opposed  sending  a  large  regu- 
lar Army  force.  He  preferred  to  use  naval  forces  in  numbers 
sufficient  to  protect  American  life  and  property  at  Shanghai,  but 
not  so  great  as  to  arouse  the  Chinese  or  to  become  embroiled  in 
fighting  the  Nationalist  army.  On  28  January  he  ordered  a 
Marine  regiment  sent  to  the  Far  East. 

In  his  desire  to  avoid  a  clash  with  organized  Chinese  armies, 
Coolidge  handicapped  our  forces  in  carrying  out  their  mission 
of  protecting  American  lives  and  property.  Even  before  addi- 
tional Marines  were  ordered  to  Shanghai,  Secretary  of  State 
Frank  B.  Kellogg  cabled  MacMurray  that  "it  must  be  definitely 
understood  that  this  force  is  present  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
American  life  and  property  at  Shanghai.  This  Government  is 
not  prepared  to  use  its  naval  force  at  Shanghai  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  the  integrity  of  the  Settlement  .  ..."  11 

MacMurray  replied  that  protection  of  American  lives  and 
property  could  not  be  divorced  from  the  defense  of  the  Inter- 
national Settlement.  "Conditions  in  Shanghai  are  so  inflam- 
mable," he  reported,  "that  there  is  certain  to  be  an  explosion  if 
the  Nationalists  extend  control  to  that  area  unless  .  .  .  [they]  are 
convinced  .  .  .  that  the  powers  are  prepared  wholeheartedly  to 
unite  on  a  stand  for  the  protection  of  their  nationals  and  interests 
in  Shanghai.  To  distinguish  between  concerted  attack  by  or- 
ganized forces  and  mob  violence  would  prove  to  be  .  .  .  impossi- 

10  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  i6Jan27,  Foreign  Relations,  1927, 
p.  50. 

11  SecState  msg  to  Minister  in  China,  dtd  23Dec26,  Foreign  Relations,  1926, 
P-  663. 


128       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


ble,"  he  continued.  "Throughout  their  recent  campaign  the 
characteristic  tactics  of  the  Nationalists  have  been  to  filter  their 
men  into  hostile  territory  where  later  they  would  assmble  as  an 
organized  .  .  .  force.  When  in  the  midst  of  dealing  with  mob 
violence  within  the  Settlement  it  is  altogether  likely  that  foreign 
forces  would  suddenly  find  themselves  confronted  with  such  Na- 
tionalist units."  12 

The  question  of  Settlement  defense  came  up  in  concrete  form 
on  22  February  at  a  meeting  of  the  British,  French,  Japanese, 
and  American  naval  commanders.  The  British  commander, 
whose  government  had  already  decided  to  defend  the  Settlement 
at  all  costs,13  proposed  the  formation  of  an  international  defense 
force.  Admiral  Williams  felt  that  his  instructions  would  not  per- 
mit unqualified  American  participation,  so  he  replied  that  U.S. 
naval  landing  forces  could  not  join  the  perimeter  defense.  They 
would  operate  within  the  Settlement  to  protect  American  lives 
and  property  up  to  the  moment  when  the  Nationalists  should  de- 
mand to  take  control  of  the  city,  when  they  would  be  withdrawn. 
The  only  protection  afforded  American  citizens  would  then  be 
assistance  in  evacuation.14 

MacMurray,  when  he  learned  of  this,  sent  a  strongly  worded 
cable  to  Washington,  pointing  out  that  our  honor  was  involved, 
and  that  we  could  not  withdraw  our  troops  under  fire,  leaving 
the  forces  of  other  nations  to  protect  our  citizens. 

The  State  Department  replied  with  a  cautiously  worded  in- 
struction for  Williams  as  follows:  "You  are  hereby  authorized, 
at  your  discretion,  to  utilize  in  the  protection  of  the  lives  and 
property  of  American  citizens  all  forces  under  your  command."  15 

12  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  I5jan27,  Foreign  Relations,  1927, 
p.  47. 

13  British  Embassy  to  the  Dept  of  State,  dtd  26Jan2  7,  Foreign  Relations, 
1927,  p.  56. 

14  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  22Feb27,  Foreign  Relations,  1927, 
P-  75- 

15  Quoted  in  ActSecState  msg  to  Minister  in  China,  dtd  23Feb27,  Foreign 
Relations,  1927,  p.  78. 


CHINA  MARINES  129 


In  view  of  the  repeated  statements  from  Washington  that  Ameri- 
can forces  were  to  avoid  conflict  with  regular  Chinese  armies, 
Williams  did  not  feel  that  he  should  exercise  his  discretion  to 
order  the  Marines  to  defend  the  Settlement  perimeter.  He  in- 
formed Hill  that  the  4th  Regiment  would  be  limited  to  internal 
security  duty. 

The  landing  of  the  4th  Regiment  in  Shanghai  was  also  delayed 
by  political  considerations.  Fearing  that  the  appearance  of  the 
Marines  on  the  streets  would  be  used  as  a  pretext  for  anti-foreign 
propaganda,  the  State  Department  instructed  Clarence  Gauss, 
the  consul  general  in  Shanghai,  not  to  request  military  aid  until 
danger  to  American  life  and  property  was  irnminent.  As  a 
result,  the  Marines  remained  in  their  cramped  quarters  aboard 
the  Chaumont.16 

DEFENSIVE  PLANS  AND  PREPARATIONS 

Although  an  immediate  landing  was  prohibited,  there  was 
nothing  in  the  orders  to  prevent  planning  for  the  defense  of  the 
International  Settlement.  At  the  direction  of  Admiral  Williams, 
Colonel  Hill  called  upon  Major  General  John  Duncan,  senior 
British  Army  commander,  who  had  been  requested  by  the 
Municipal  Council  to  take  charge  of  the  defense  of  the 
Settlement. 

General  Duncan's  plan  was  to  throw  a  cordon  around  the 
perimeter  of  the  International  Settlement  and  two  areas  outside 
where  foreign  interests  were  concentrated.  These  extra-Settle- 
ment areas  were  the  residential  district  to  the  west,  and  the 
predominantly  Japanese  district,  a  narrow  salient  extending  to 
the  north  along  North  Szechuan  Road.  The  French  did  not 
join  in  the  common  defense  scheme  but  made  their  own  military 
arrangements.17 

16  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  I3jan27,  Foreign  Relations,  1927, 

P.  45- 

17  Ibid. 


130       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


The  International  Settlement  was  a  Western  enclave  in  a 
hostile  city  of  three  million  inhabitants.  About  half  of  its  bound- 
ary rested  on  natural  barriers — Soochow  Creek  on  the  northwest, 
and  the  Whangpoo  River  on  the  southeast.  On  the  west,  the 
defense  perimeter  was  pushed  out  beyond  the  political  boundary 
to  the  tracks  of  the  Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo  Railroad,  the 
embankment  of  which  made  a  natural  defensive  position.  On 
the  south  the  French  Concession  offered  a  measure  of  protection, 
but,  in  the  absence  of  any  agreement  with  the  French  or  any 
knowledge  of  their  plans,  this  boundary  also  had  to  be  fortified 
and  manned.  To  the  northeast  was  the  densely  populated 
Chinese  quarter  of  Chapei. 

Except  as  previously  mentioned,  General  Duncan  could  not 
occupy  terrain  outside  the  Settlement  boundaries  where  he  might 
more  advantageously  fend  off  a  Chinese  army.  All  he  could 
do  was  to  outpost  a  few  exterior  key  points  and  rely  on  the 
manned  barricades  of  sandbags  and  barbed  wire  forming  the 
perimeter.18 

Duncan's  forces  numbered  about  20,000.  Great  Britain,  with 
the  most  at  stake,  contributed  the  largest  contingent — a  division 
of  about  13,500,  consisting  of  three  infantry  and  four  artillery 
brigades  and  an  armored  car  company.19  Other  elements  in- 
cluded 3,000  Japanese,  1,505  Americans,  230  Italians,  160 
Spanish,  130  Portuguese,  and  120  Dutch.  In  addition,  there 
was  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps,  a  local  militia  of  1,426, 
equipped  by  Great  Britain  and  trained  and  commanded  by  reg- 
ular British  army  officers.  Of  these  troops  only  the  British, 
Japanese,  and  Italians  were  employed  on  the  perimeter,  the 

l8LtCol  Baird  Smith,  British  Army,  "The  Shanghai  War,"  The  Army 
Quarterly,  v.  XXIV,  no.  2  (J11I32),  pp.  323-330. 

19  The  British  infantry  brigade  at  this  time  was  the  equivalent  of  an 
American  infantry  regiment  and  their  artillery  brigade  the  equivalent  of  a 
U.S.  artillery  battalion. 


CHINA  MARINES  131 

remainder  being  used  for  internal  security.  In  their  Concession 
the  French  had  about  3,000  troops.20 

Reinforcing  the  4th  Regiment  as  the  American  contingent 
was  the  Provisional  Battalion  made  up  of  Marines  sent  from 
Guam  and  the  Philippines,  and  from  the  Marine  detachments  of 
the  Yangtze  River  gunboats  Sacramento  and  Asheville.  Under 
the  command  of  Major  Julian  P.  Willcox,  this  battalion  included 
the  88th,  89th,  90th,  91st  (machine  gun),  and  headquarters 
companies.  Total  strength  of  the  battalion  as  of  1  March  was 
1 6  officers  and  321  men.21 

The  Marines  were  responsible  for  internal  security  in  two 
unconnected  areas  comprising  about  two-thirds  of  the  Settlement. 
The  Eastern  Area  included  all  of  the  Settlement  east  of  Hongkew 
Creek,  and  the  Western  Area  encompassed  all  of  the  Settlement 
west  of  Carter  Road  except  for  the  northwest  tip.  Vandegrift's 
3d  Battalion  was  assigned  the  Western  Area,  while  Secor's  1st 
Battalion  and  Willcox'  Provisional  Battalion  divided  the  Eastern 
Area.  All  officers  and  a  good  many  noncommissioned  officers  of 
the  regiment  made  a  thorough  reconnaissance  of  these  areas, 
while  Colonel  Hill  and  his  staff  conferred  with  municipal  officials 
to  determine  the  location  of  vital  installations,  such  as  telephone 
exchanges  and  power  plants,  which  would  require  guards.22  (See 
Map  9.) 

The  regiment  remained  cramped  aboard  ship  some  five  miles 
down  stream  from  the  Bund,  the  heart  of  Shanghai's  waterfront. 
The  only  transportation  to  the  city  was  by  lighter — a  matter  of 
concern  to  Colonel  Hill  who  requested  Admiral  Williams  to 

20  4th  Regt  strength  is  as  of  1  Apr  and  includes  the  ProvBn,  4th  Regt 
MRolls,  i-3oApr27;  SVC  strength  is  from  H.  G.  W.  Woodhead,  ed.,  The 
China  Year  Book,  1928  (Tientsin:  Tientsin  Press,  n.d.),  p.  1301;  all  others 
are  from  LtCol  Frederick  D.  Kilgore  ltr  to  CO  4th  Regt,  dtd  28Jun29 
(Subj  File:  China,  HistBr,  HQMC),  hereafter  Kilgore  letter. 

21  ProvBn,  4th  Regt  MRolls,  i-3iMar2  7. 

22  3/4  FieldO  No.  2,  dtd  8Mar27. 


132       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


CHINA  MARINES  133 


order  the  Chaumont  to  move  to  a  wharf  on  the  Shanghai  side 
of  the  stream.  Nothing  was  done,  however,  in  spite  of  a  com- 
munication from  her  skipper,  Captain  John  H.  Blackburn,  that 
unloading  by  lighter  would  take  four  times  as  long  as  at  dockside. 
For  the  officers  and  men  of  the  regiment,  the  position  of  the 
Chaumont  was  a  hard  blow.  Liberty  was  liberally  granted,  but 
boats  were  in  such  short  supply  that  the  Marines  had  to  hire  a 
civilian  lighter  to  carry  them  between  the  ship  and  Shanghai  for 
$100  (U.S.)  a  day.23 

A  limited  amount  of  training  was  possible  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  the  regiment  was  still  aboard  ship.  The  Standard  Oil 
Company  compound  was  used  for  close  order  drill  and  exercise, 
and  on  5  March  the  regiment  made  a  practice  march  through  the 
Settlement. 

Enlivening  the  training  routine  on  4  March  was  the  recapture 
of  a  Standard  Oil  Company  launch.  The  stolen  boat,  Mee  Foo 
XIV,  was  sighted  towing  a  string  of  barges  loaded  with  Chinese 
troops  of  the  local  warlord.  Piling  into  another  oil  company 
boat,  30  Marines  of  the  2 2d  Company,  commanded  by  Lieuten- 
ant Colonel  Frederick  D.  Kilgore,  the  regimental  executive  officer, 
gave  chase,  overhauled  the  stolen  vessel,  and  retook  her  without 
resistance.24 

A  second  training  march  took  place  on  2 1  March.  When  the 
Marines  left  the  Chaumont  that  morning  they  were  ready  for 
action.  Every  man  had  been  issued  ammunition,  and  an  addi- 
tional supply  of  20  boxes  had  been  loaded  aboard  the  lighters — 
a  precaution  taken  because  the  Nationalist  vanguard  had  arrived 
at  Lungwha  Junction  on  the  southern  outskirts  of  the  city  the 
previous  evening.  Along  the  Settlement  perimeter  General  Dun- 
can's men  stood  ready  for  trouble.    The  4th  Regiment's  march 


23 Kilgore  letter  and  end  (b)  thereto:  CO  4th  Regt  ltr  to  CinCAF,  dtd 
26Feb2  7;  1st  end  to  Kilgore  letter,  CO  Chaumont  to  CinCAF,  dtd  26Feb27- 
24  2 2d  Co  Rec  of  Events,  dtd  4Mar2  7. 
519667—60  11 


134       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


through  the  Settlement  went  off  uneventfully,  however,  and  by 
noon  the  Marines  were  back  on  board  their  ship. 

THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  SHANGHAI 

As  he  stepped  aboard  the  Chaumont,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Kilgore,  temporarily  in  command  because  of  Colonel  Hill's  ab- 
sence in  the  city,  was  called  to  the  phone  and  ordered  by 
Admiral  Williams'  chief  of  staff  to  land  the  regiment  at  once. 
Consul  General  Gauss  had  finally  approved  the  landing,  for 
the  Municipal  Council  had  declared  an  emergency,  called  out 
the  Volunteers,  and  requested  assistance  of  the  foreign  forces. 
The  troops  were  handed  hot  coffee  and  sandwiches  on  the  run 
as  they  piled  back  on  board  the  lighters.  Five  hours  later  they 
were  on  duty  in  the  Eastern  and  Western  Areas.25 

As  the  Marines  manned  their  fixed  posts  and  sent  out  their 
patrols,  they  could  hear  sporadic  small-arms  fire  from  Chapei. 
Anticipating  the  arrival  of  the  Nationalist  Army,  the  Communist 
Workers'  Militia  had  staged  an  uprising,  and  a  fierce  struggle 
was  in  progress  between  them  and  the  remnants  of  the  army  of 
Chang  Tsung-ch'ang. 

The  miserable  peasants  making  up  the  forces  of  this  warlord 
were  only  too  eager  to  escape,  and  most  of  them  quickly  melted 
away.  One  group  numbering  about  1,000  sought  to  enter  the 
Settlement  through  the  lines  of  the  Durham  Light  Infantry  along 
Range  Road  late  in  the  afternoon.  They  were  turned  back,  but 
with  the  Communist  militia  closing  in  on  them,  the  desperate 
Chinese  attempted  to  rush  the  British  barricades,  only  to  be 
mowed  down  by  machine  gun  and  rifle  fire.  The  survivors 
threw  down  their  arms  and  were  then  allowed  to  pass  through 
the  British  lines  to  be  rounded  up  and  interned. 


Kilgore  letter;  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  2iMar2  7, 
Foreign  Relations,  1927,  p.  89. 


CHINA  MARINES  135 


Around  the  North  Station  a  group  of  White  Russian  mer- 
cenaries, manning  an  armored  train,  put  up  the  stiff  est  fight 
against  the  Communists.  Throughout  the  night  and  the  next 
day  they  resisted  bitterly  but  finally  surrendered  about  1800 
on  the  2 2d.  Shortly  afterward,  the  Nationalist  1st  Division, 
which  had  been  at  Lungwha  Junction,  only  ten  miles  away,  since 
the  previous  evening,  finally  moved  in  and  took  up  positions  in 
Chapei.26 

An  uneasy  calm  now  settled  over  the  Chinese  sectors  of  the 
city.  General  Pai  Tsung-hsi,  the  Nationalist  commander  in  the 
Shanghai  area,  had  issued  a  statement  on  the  2 2d,  accepting 
responsibility  for  maintaining  law  and  order  and  denying  that 
the  Nationalists  intended  to  recover  China's  sovereign  rights  by 
force.  But  Pai  was  having  serious  troubles  of  his  own,  which 
cast  doubt  on  his  ability  to  live  up  to  his  promises.  The  Com- 
munist militia  controlled  most  of  the  native  city,  and  the  1st 
Division,  Pai's  only  troop  unit  in  Shanghai,  was  thoroughly 
infected  by  Communism.27 

On  the  other  side  of  the  barricades,  General  Duncan's  Defense 
Force  tightened  its  grip  on  the  Chinese  population.  On  25 
March  a  curfew  was  imposed  between  the  hours  of  2200  and 
0400.  Security  patrols  were  ordered  to  arrest  and  turn  over  to 
the  Municipal  Police  all  Chinese  found  abroad  during  those 
hours,  except  employes  of  essential  services  to  whom  special 

26  Failure  of  the  Nationalist  army  to  come  to  the  help  of  the  Communist 
Workers'  Militia  on  21-22  March  has  been  interpreted  as  a  stratagem  in  the 
struggle  for  power  between  the  Communists  and  the  Right  Wing  within  the 
Kuomintang.  The  Communist  leaders  in  Shanghai  still  looked  upon  the 
advancing  Nationalists  as  liberators.  They  rose  in  anticipation  of  the  early 
entry  of  these  supposed  allies  into  the  city.  But  Chiang,  according  to  some 
authorities,  deliberately  held  up  his  forces  outside  in  the  hope  that  the 
rising  would  be  crushed.  The  plan  backfired,  however,  when  the  Communists 
were  victorious  over  the  forces  of  Chang  Tsung-ch'ang.  Harold  N.  Isaacs, 
The  Tragedy  of  the  Chinese  Revolution  (Stanford:  Stanford  University 
Press,  1954),  PP.  1 36-141. 

27  Ibid.;  and  The  North  China  Daily  Herald,  26Mar27- 


136       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


passes  had  been  issued.  Foreigners  not  on  urgent  business  were 
warned  to  return  home.28 

While  the  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  braced  for  an  attack 
on  the  Settlement  by  Chinese  Nationalists,  Admiral  Williams  con- 
sidered the  situation  so  serious  that  he  requested  of  the  Navy 
Department  a  reinforcement  of  1,500  Marines.  His  request  was 
granted  the  same  day,  and  orders  were  issued  by  the  Comman- 
dant to  embark  the  6th  Regiment,  less  the  3d  Battalion,  one 
battery  of  75mm  tractor-drawn  artillery  from  the  10th  Regiment, 
two  squadrons  of  aircraft,  and  brigade  service  and  headquarters 
companies.  These  troops  sailed  from  San  Diego  on  board  the 
Henderson  on  7  April.29 

Along  the  perimeter  British,  Italian,  and  Japanese  troops  con- 
tinued to  stand  on  guard.  Although  there  were  no  attempts  to 
rush  the  barricades  after  the  abortive  effort  of  21  March,  the 
British  officer  commanding  the  front  along  Soochow  Creek,  antic- 
ipated trouble.  On  the  23d  he  asked  Major  Vandegrift  for 
support  at  Markham  Road  Bridge.  With  the  approval  of  Colonel 
Hill,  the  3d  Battalion  commander  moved  a  rifle  squad,  a  machine 
gun  section,  and  a  mortar  section  to  the  threatened  area.  The 
expected  trouble  failed  to  materialize,  and  the  Marines  returned 
to  their  billets  two  days  later.30 

On  the  25th,  Brigadier  General  Smedley  D.  Butler  31  arrived 
at  Shanghai  to  take  command  of  all  Marines  ashore.  At  first 
designated  Marine  Corps  Expeditionary  Force,  Asiatic  Fleet, 
Butler's  command  was  renamed  3d  Marine  Brigade  on  4  April. 

After  familiarizing  himself  with  the  situation,  Butler  issued  an 


28  Internal  SctyFor,  Special  Instructions  No.  3,  25Mar2  7- 

29SecState  to  Sec  War,  dtd  26Mar27,  Foreign  Relations,  1927,  p.  93;  Div 

Ops  &  Trng,  HQMC,  "Protection  of  American  Interests,"  Marine  Corps 

Gazette,  v.  XII,  no.  3  (Sep2  7),pp.  179-183. 

30  4th  Regt  Rec  of  Events,  23-25Mar2  7. 

31  General  Butler  was  no  newcomer  to  China.  At  the  age  of  1 9  he  had 
won  a  brevet  captaincy  for  gallantry  before  the  walls  of  Peking  during  the 
Boxer  Rebellion. 


CHINA  MARINES  137 


order  clarifying  the  mission  of  the  4th  Regiment.  Under  the 
original  instructions  from  Admiral  Williams,  U.S.  naval  landing 
forces  were  only  to  protect  American  lives  and  property  within 
the  Settlement.  They  were  not  to  man  the  perimeter  nor  were 
they  to  assume  responsibility  for  preserving  the  integrity  of  the 
Settlement.  Colonel  Hill's  order  to  Vandegrift  on  the  23d,  to 
support  the  British  line,  might  have  been  interpreted  as  a  viola- 
tion of  Williams'  instructions.  Butler  now  vindicated  Hill's  ac- 
tion by  directing  the  Marines  to  support  the  perimeter  defenses 
if  necessary  to  prevent  a  breakthrough.  Only  in  this  way  could 
the  Marine  mission  be  accomplished,  for  if  armed  Chinese  mobs 
were  to  break  through  the  defenses  it  would  be  impossible  to 
protect  the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners  within  the  Settlement. 

To  make  sure  that  supporting  action  would  be  speedily  and 
effectively  carried  out,  Butler  revised  the  Marine  tactics.  From 
the  date  of  landing,  the  4th  Regiment  had  been  discharging  its 
responsibility  for  internal  security  by  an  extensive  system  of  foot 
patrols.  But  the  area  was  so  large  and  the  Marines  so  few  that 
they  were  being  run  ragged.  Even  with  patrols  reduced  to  as 
few  as  four  men,  some  Marines  were  on  duty  as  long  as  24  hours 
at  a  stretch. 

This  exhausting  work  was  unnecessary  as  the  Shanghai  Mu- 
nicipal Police  and  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps  were  doing  a 
thorough  job  of  interior  patrolling.  Availability  as  a  powerful 
centrally  located  reserve  force  to  deal  with  a  major  uprising 
within  the  Settlement  or  a  breakthrough  from  outside  was  the 
proper  mission  for  the  Marines. 

To  remedy  this  situation  Butler  replaced  the  foot  with  motor 
patrols  on  26  March.  In  each  area  a  truck  carrying  an  officer 
or  NCO-led  patrol  of  eight  men  armed  with  a  Browning  Auto- 
matic Rifle  (BAR)  and  a  Thompson  sub-machine  gun  was 
constantly  patrolling  the  streets.  At  each  billet  another  similar 
truck  patrol  was  on  constant  alert.  In  the  event  of  a  Chinese 
attack,  battalion  commanders  were  authorized  to  commit  as  much 


138       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


as  50  per  cent  of  their  commands  to  defense  of  the  perimeter 
without  further  authority  from  Expeditionary  Force  Head- 
quarters.32 

Reassuring  nervous  Americans  was  an  additional  responsi- 
bility for  the  Marine  commanders  in  Shanghai.  Many  individ- 
uals who  lived  in  residential  districts  in  the  French  Concession, 
where  Marines  were  not  allowed  to  operate,  were  naturally 
worried.  On  15  April,  the  Safety  Committee  of  the  American 
Chamber  of  Commerce  called  on  General  Butler  who  explained 
that  American  forces  could  not  set  foot  on  French  soil  without 
permission  of  the  French  authorities,  but  that,  in  case  of  real 
danger,  the  Marines  would  take  whatever  steps  were  necessary 
to  protect  American  lives.33 

Fortunately,  there  was  no  occasion  to  take  these  "necessary 
steps."  Neither  General  Butler  nor  Colonel  Hill  had  made  any 
effort  at  liaison  with  the  French  authorities  who  were  conducting 
the  defense  of  their  own  Concession  independently  of  the  Inter- 
national Settlement.  So  complete  was  the  isolation  of  the  two 
foreign  communities  that  the  British  commander  had  ordered 
barbed  wire  and  sandbag  defenses  installed  along  the  boundary 
between  them.  After  receiving  the  first  complaints  from  Ameri- 
can residents  of  the  French  Concession,  Butler  inspected  its  de- 
fenses without  asking  the  consent  of  French  officials  beforehand 
or  paying  courtesy  calls  during  the  inspection  tour.  A  formal 
protest  from  the  French  to  the  American  consul  general  was  the 
result.34 

A  new  threat  to  the  Settlement  appeared  imminent  on  the  26th 
when  the  4th  Regiment  was  requested  by  General  Duncan  to 
man  the  line  between  the  International  Settlement  and  the 

82  GG  MarCorpsExpedFor  memo  to  GO  4th  Regt,  dtd  26Mar27;  CG 
MarCorpsExpedFor  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  iApr27  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr, 
HQMG). 

83  CG  MarCorpsExpedFor  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  iApr2  7- 

84  CG  3dMarBrig  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  iApr27  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 


CHINA  MARINES  139 


French  Concession.  Nationalist  troops  were  reported  entering 
French  territory,  and  it  was  feared  that  they  might  try  to  break 
into  the  Settlement.  Colonel  Hill  ordered  Major  Vandegrift 
to  man  all  crossroads  along  Avenue  Foch,  the  boundary  line, 
in  his  battalion  zone.  Vandegrift  in  turn  directed  Captain 
Ray  A.  Robinson,  commanding  the  21st  Company,  to  block  all 
these  intersections  with  squad-size  posts.  In  addition  the  25th 
Company  of  the  1st  Battalion  was  moved  over  to  reinforce  the 
3d  Battalion  in  the  Western  District. 

Marines  worked  most  of  a  cold,  rainy  night  filling  and  piling 
sandbags  to  reinforce  the  defenses  already  installed  by  the  Brit- 
ish. General  Butler,  who  inspected  the  positions  at  about  1900, 
reported  that  "the  sight  of  these  tired  men,  out  along  these  empty 
streets,  with  everything  quiet  as  a  grave  .  .  .  irritated  me  very 
greatly.  The  following  morning,  I  spoke  to  the  Admiral  [Wil- 
liams] and  he  stopped  it."35  As  a  result  of  the  admiral's  inter- 
vention with  the  British  authorities  the  alert  was  cancelled  on  the 
27th,  the  25th  Company  returning  to  the  Eastern  District,  and 
the  21st  Company  abandoning  positions  on  Avenue  Foch  and 
resuming  regular  patrol  duties.36 

CHIANG  KAI-SHEK  DEFEATS  THE  COMMUNISTS 

Across  the  barricades  in  the  Chinese  city  a  bitter  struggle  for 
power  was  in  progress — a  struggle  which  was  to  have  a  profound 
effect  on  the  safety  of  the  Settlement.  On  26  March,  Chiang 
Kai-shek  had  arrived  in  Shanghai  on  board  a  Nationalist  gun- 
boat to  find  a  precarious  balance  of  power  between  the  Com- 
munists and  his  own  Nationalist  forces  under  Pai  Tsung-hsi. 
Chiang,  who  had  accepted  Communist  support  reluctantly  and 
primarily  because  Soviet  Russia  had  been  the  sole  source  of  arms 

35  CG  MarCorpsExpedFor  Itr  to  CMC,  dtd  iApr27  (Subj  File:  China, 
HistBr,  HQMG). 

88  4th  Regt  Rec  of  Events,  26-2  7Mar27. 


140       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


and  needed  military  guidance,  now  realized  that  he  must  destroy 
the  Communists  or  be  destroyed  by  them. 

As  he  looked  about  him  that  gray  March  afternoon,  the  Na- 
tionalist leader  saw  that  this  position  was  precarious.  Patrolling 
the  city  were  about  2,700  armed  Communists,  a  number  which 
could  be  instantly  expanded  by  the  Communist  General  Labor 
Union  which  was  functioning  as  a  military  command.  Only 
3,000  Nationalist  troops  were  in  the  city,  and  these  were  of  the 
red-tainted  1st  Division. 

Chiang,  however,  could  count  on  the  support  of  powerful 
allies.  The  Chinese  bankers  and  industrialists  were  with  him  to 
a  man,  and  they  were  ready  to  back  their  convictions  with  cash. 
Standing  ready  to  put  the  money  to  good  use  were  the  Green 
and  Red  Societies — tremendously  powerful  underworld  gangs 
which  controlled  much  of  the  criminal  activity  in  Shanghai. 

By  1 2  April,  Chiang  was  ready  to  strike.  He  had  replaced  the 
1  st  Division  with  troops  whose  political  reliability  was  unques- 
tioned, and  the  underworld  gangs  had  organized  a  so-called 
"white  labor  movement"  which  was  actually  an  organization  of 
armed  hoodlums.  At  a  given  signal  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 2th,  these  gangs  fell  upon  the  Communist  headquarters  through- 
out the  city.  Those  who  resisted  were  shot  down  where  they 
stood,  while  the  remainder  were  led  away  to  be  killed  elsewhere. 
Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  could  hear  sporadic  bursts  of  rifle 
and  machine  gun  fire  as  Chiang's  forces  went  about  their  grisly 
work.  By  the  next  day  it  was  all  over,  and  Chiang  was  uncon- 
tested master  of  Shanghai.37 

The  crisis  at  Shanghai  had  passed.  Security  measures  within 
the  Settlement  were  gradually  reduced.  The  4th  Regiment  cut 
officer-led  patrols  to  three  a  day  on  26  April,  discontinued  all 
patrolling  on  10  May,  and  on  the  16th  secured  all  guard  posts 
except  those  at  its  own  billets  and  sentries  at  the  American  Con- 
sulate General.    "The  regiment  is  now  taking  up  normal  train- 

37  Isaacs,  op.  ext.,  pp.  142-175;  hiu,op.  cit.,  pp.  41-43. 


CHINA  MARINES  141 


ing,"  wrote  Colonel  Hill  in  his  Record  of  Events  for  the  day. 
"Record  of  Events  will  be  suspended  until  such  time  as  events 
or  operations  are  of  sufficient  importance  to  justify  its  prep- 
aration." 38 

MARINES  IN  NORTH  CHINA 

The  victorious  advance  of  the  Nationalist  armies  into  the 
Yangtze  Valley,  in  addition  to  endangering  foreign  life  and  prop- 
erty at  Shanghai,  posed  a  threat  of  future  danger  to  foreigners 
in  North  China.  As  early  as  29  March,  MacMurray  had  cabled 
the  State  Department  predicting  a  victory  for  Chiang  Kai-shek 
over  the  northern  war  lords,  and  warning  that  violence,  similar 
to  that  at  Hankow  and  Nanking,  was  likely  to  be  repeated. 
Admiral  Williams,  who  agreed  with  MacMurray  as  to  the  danger 
to  foreign  life  and  property,  proposed  the  establishment  of  a 
strong  point  on  or  near  the  North  China  coast  where  Americans 
could  be  gathered  in  behind  a  defensive  perimeter  if  necessary. 

These  views  met  with  a  friendly  reception  by  the  Administra- 
tion in  Washington  and  led  to  the  following  plan :  Tientsin  was 
to  be  the  concentration  point  in  North  China;  at  his  discretion, 
Admiral  Williams  was  to  move  the  6th  Regiment  there;  and  a 
reinforcement  of  another  1,500  Marines  was  to  be  sent  out  from 
the  United  States.39 

The  Marine  reinforcement,  which  included  the  remainder  of 
the  1  st  Battalion,  10th  Regiment  (artillery),  a  light  tank  platoon, 
an  engineer  company,  an  aviation  unit,  the  3d  Battalion,  6th 
Regiment,  and  the  2d  Battalion,  4th  Regiment,  departed  San 
Diego  on  17  April  on  board  the  liner  President  Grant.  Upon 
arrival  at  Olongapo  in  the  Philippines  on  4  May,  the  engineers, 


38  4th  Regt  Rec  of  Events,  i6May2  7. 

39  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  2gMar27;  GinCAF  msg  to  CNO, 
dtd  2Apr2  7;  SecState  to  Minister  in  China,  dtd  i2Apr27,  all  in  Foreign 
Relations,  1927,  pp.  94-107. 


142       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


artillery,  and  tanks  transferred  to  the  Chaumont  and  proceeded 
to  Shanghai,  where  they  constituted,  along  with  the  6th  Regiment, 
a  balanced  force  which  could  be  lifted  in  a  single  ship.  The  two 
infantry  battalions  left  behind  at  Olongapo  were  formed  into  a 
Provisional  Regiment.40 

The  movement  to  Tientsin  began  at  the  request  of  MacMurray, 
on  2  June,  when  the  6th  Regiment  and  supporting  elements  left 
Shanghai  aboard  the  Henderson.  General  Butler  and  the  3d 
Brigade  headquarters  departed  for  the  north  on  the  21st  to  be 
followed  two  days  later  by  the  Provisional  Regiment  from 
Olongapo.41 

With  the  departure  of  these  units  the  4th  Regiment  became 
the  only  Marine  organization  in  Shanghai.  This  reduced  gar- 
rison was  further  cut  back  the  following  October  when  its  Pro- 
visional Battalion  was  disbanded.  That  same  month  the  4th 
Regiment  lost  its  only  connection  with  the  Tientsin  garrison, 
when  the  Provisional  Regiment  was  redesignated  the  12  th  Regi- 
ment. The  2d  Battalion,  4th  Regiment — which  had  had  only  a 
tenuous  connection  with  its  parent  regiment — became  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  new  organization.42 

Smedley  Butler  and  his  command  were  due  for  a  disappoint- 
ment in  Tientsin.  North  China  was  quiet  and  peaceful  when 
they  arrived  and  it  continued  to  be  so.  No  Nationalist  invasion 
of  the  north  was  in  progress,  for  Chiang  Kai-shek  was  still  en- 
gaged in  his  struggle  with  the  Communists.  It  was  January  1928 
before  he  got  his  armies  under  way.  In  a  series  of  battles  he 
completely  crushed  the  northern  war  lords,  and  on  4  June  the 
Nationalists  entered  Peiping.  Contrary  to  the  expectations  of 
the  old  China  hands,  their  behavior  was  reasonably  correct. 

40CofS  3d  MarBrig,  ltr  to  GO  ProvRegt,  dtd  4May27  ( i975-7o/5-3> 
Central  Files,  HQMC). 

41  Div  Ops  &  Trng,  "Protection  of  American  Interests,"  op.  cit.,  pp.  1 79- 
183. 

42  3d  MarBrig  MRolls,  i-3iOct27- 


CHINA  MARINES  143 


There  was  no  looting  of  foreign  property  nor  attacks  upon  for- 
eign residents.43 

REDUCTION  OF  MARINE  FORCES  IN  CHINA 

After  the  transfer  of  power  in  North  China  to  Chiang  Kai- 
shek's  forces  had  gone  off  without  harm  to  Americans,  our  govern- 
ment began  the  gradual  reduction  of  the  numbers  of  Marines 
ashore  in  China.  Over  a  period  of  about  five  months,  beginning 
in  September  1928,  all  of  the  3d  Brigade,  except  the  4th  Regi- 
ment, was  pulled  out.  The  Brigade  was  disbanded  on  1 3  Janu- 
ary 1929,  and  the  last  Marines  left  Tientsin  on  the  23d.44 

Admiral  Mark  L.  Bristol,  who  had  relieved  Admiral  Williams 
as  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  proved  to  be  the  most 
persuasive  of  the  senior  American  representatives  in  China  when 
this  redistribution  of  Marines  was  decided  upon.  From  the  first 
he  had  been  uneasy  about  the  stationing  of  the  bulk  of  the  3d 
Marine  Brigade  at  Tientsin,  where  it  was  20  miles  from  the  near- 
est water  navigable  by  warships  and  could  be  neither  supported 
nor  evacuated  by  the  Asiatic  Fleet.  To  encourage  Americans 
to  concentrate  there  would  afford  them  protection  from  mobs  or 
disorganized  soldiers,  but  it  would  invite  isolation  if  a  Chinese 
army  were  to  cut  the  route  of  withdrawal. 

Shanghai,  in  Admiral  Bristol's  opinion,  had  none  of  these  dis- 
advantages. The  metropolis  on  the  Whangpoo  was  within  easy 
reach  of  the  largest  vessels  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet.  If  worse  came 
to  worst,  cruisers  and  destroyers  could  back  up  the  Marines 
ashore  with  naval  gunfire;  passenger  liners  could  carry  Ameri- 
cans away  from  the  troubled  zone;  and,  if  our  government  de- 
cided to  abandon  the  China  mainland  altogether,  Marine  land- 
ing forces  could  easily  be  embarked  in  transports  under  cover  of 
guns  of  the  fleet.    Shanghai  was  also  a  centrally  located  base 

43  Liu,  op.  cit.}  pp.  48-52. 

44  CG  3d  MarBrig,  Final  Rept  to  CMC,  dtd  I4jan2g  (1975-70/5-3, 
Central  Files,  HQMG). 


144       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


from  which  contingents  of  the  4th  Regiment  could  be  embarked 
to  protect  American  interests  wherever  the  Asiatic  Fleet  could 
operate. 

In  drawing  up  his  recommendation  to  the  Navy  Department, 
Admiral  Bristol  had  overruled  General  Butler  who  proposed 
the  retention  of  the  6th  Regiment,  reinforced,  at  Tientsin  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  4th  Regiment  from  Shanghai.  He  had 
also  opposed  MacMurray's  recommendation  that  both  Tientsin 
and  Shanghai  continue  to  be  garrisoned  by  Marines.  The  ad- 
miral's plan  was  accepted  by  both  the  State  and  Navy 
Departments.45 

GARRISON  SERVICE 

Admiral  Bristol,  in  his  recommendations  for  reducing  Ameri- 
can forces  ashore  in  China,  had  expressed  the  hope  that  condi- 
tions would  soon  permit  evacuation  of  all  Marines.  But  our 
government  never  found  it  opportune  to  make  this  final  with- 
drawal until  the  end  of  November  1941 — only  a  few  days  before 
Pearl  Harbor.  So  the  4th  Regiment  became,  in  effect,  a  per- 
manent garrison  in  the  International  Settlement  at  Shanghai. 
As  such,  it  was  maintained  as  a  two-battalion  unit  with  an 
approximate  strength  of  1,200  officers  and  men,  a  size  and 
structure  established  in  October  1927  when  the  Provisional  Bat- 
talion had  been  disbanded  and  the  2d  Battalion  had  been 
transferred  to  the  12th  Regiment. 

Its  mission  was  still  the  protection  of  American  lives  and 
property  within  the  Settlement.  Since  Chiang  Kai-shek's  con- 
quest of  the  Yangtze  Valley  and  his  split  with  the  Communists 
in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1927,  immediate  threats  to  Ameri- 
cans at  Shanghai  had  practically  ceased.  There  was,  however, 
always  the  possibility  that  trouble  might  break  out  again,  for 
Chiang  was  still  engaged  in  fighting  the  Communists,  and  he 

45  Ibid.;  CinCAF  msg  to  American  Minister  in  China,  dtd  7N0V28;  Minis- 
ter in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  1N0V28,  Foreign  Relations,  1928,  p.  316. 


CHINA  MARINES  145 


had  made  deals  with  powerful  war  lords  which  might  break 
down  at  any  moment. 

A  primary  requirement  for  the  4th  Regiment  was,  therefore, 
accurate  intelligence  of  all  things  Chinese.  Accordingly,  the 
regimental  intelligence  section  was  gradually  expanded  to  in- 
clude some  functions  normally  performed  by  a  national  intelli- 
gence service.  These  included  collection  and  evaluation  of 
information  concerning  political,  economic,  and  military  condi- 
tions. An  additional  function  was  to  keep  track  of  the  military 
and  political  activities  of  other  foreign  powers  in  China.  The 
Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  and  the  Commander, 
Yangtze  River  Patrol,  used  the  4th  Regiment's  reports  to 
supplement  their  own  intelligence  services.46 

Shanghai  was  one  of  the  worst  places  on  earth  to  maintain 
a  regiment  in  fighting  trim.  Temptations  were  plentiful  and 
cheap,  and  were  close  at  hand  with  the  regiment  quartered  in 
the  narrow  confines  of  the  International  Settlement.  Lack  of 
space  also  placed  a  serious  limitation  on  training.  Only  small 
areas  around  the  Columbia  Country  Club  and  Jessfield  Park, 
both  on  the  western  outskirts,  were  available  for  field  problems; 
close  order  drill  was  held  on  vacant  lots  near  the  billets;  regi- 
mental parades  and  ceremonies  were  conducted  on  the  huge 
Shanghai  Race  Course  in  the  center  of  the  city;  and  marches 
were  made  early  in  the  morning  over  city  streets  before  traffic 
became  heavy.  Marksmanship  facilities  were  the  one  bright 
spot  in  the  training  picture.  The  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps' 
excellent  range  in  Hongkew  was  made  available  to  the  Marines 
for  machine  gun,  rifle,  and  pistol  firing.  Chinese  range  crews 
who  pulled  the  targets  made  the  Hongkew  range  particularly 
desirable  to  the  Marines  who  were  accustomed  to  labor  in  the 
butts  themselves.47 

46  4th  Regt  1929  AnnlntelRept,  dtd  1J11I29  (2295-10-10/9-4,  Central 
Files,  HQMG ) . 

47  4th  Regt  Ann  Ops  &  Trng  Repts,  1929-31  (2295-10-10/9-4,  Central 
Files,  HQMC ) . 


146       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Regimental  commanders  hoped  for  a  disposition  of  troops 
on  the  Asiatic  Station  which  would  permit  rotation  of  units 
from  China  to  the  Philippines.  Colonel  Henry  Davis,  who  com- 
manded the  4th  Regiment  from  7  October  1927  to  28  September 
1928,  wrote  longingly  of  the  advantages  of  the  Islands  where  he 
could  institute  a  schedule  "of  an  intensive  nature  and  get  the 
booze  and  deviltry  boiled  out  of  these  men  by  keeping  them  hard 
at  field  work  in  the  hot  weather  and  over  the  wide  terrain  which 
is  available  in  Olongapo."  48 

Billets  and  headquarters  buildings  were  converted  schools,  office 
buildings,  or  private  mansions,  rented  from  their  owners  or  the 
Shanghai  Municipal  Council.  When  the  regiment  landed  in 
March  1927,  Shanghai  was  so  crowded  with  foreign  troops  that 
good  quarters  were  at  a  premium.  Only  the  3d  Battalion,  in  the 
residential  Western  Area,  could  be  housed  in  comfortable  modern 
buildings  at  first;  the  other  two  battalions  in  the  industrial  East- 
ern Area  were  housed  in  old  buildings  and  temporary  huts  so 
unsanitary  as  to  be  condemned  by  the  regimental  surgeon.  On 
14  May  modern  buildings  were  finally  obtained  in  the  Western 
Area  for  the  1st  Battalion,  but  the  Provisional  Battalion  had  to 
remain  where  it  was  until  it  was  disbanded  in  October.49 

As  the  permanent  American  garrison  at  Shanghai,  the  4th 
Regiment  was  not  only  the  guardian  of  American  lives  and  prop- 
erty but  also  the  representative  of  our  country  in  a  foreign  land. 
Every  Marine,  from  the  regimental  commander  to  the  youngest 
private,  was  a  model  for  opinions  formed  about  America  and 
Americans  by  Chinese  and  foreigners  alike.  There  was  also  a 
natural  desire  to  out-do  the  crack  British  regiments  present,  such 
as  the  Coldstream  Guards.  The  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment 
impressed  even  that  seasoned  campaigner,  General  Butler,  who 


48  CO  4th  Regt  ltr  to  GMG}  dtd  3N0V27  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 

49  CO  4th  Mars  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  7J11I27  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr, 
HQMC) ;  4th  Mars  MRolls,  1  May-3 1  Oct2 7. 


CHINA  MARINES  147 


remarked  after  an  inspection  that  "the  men  were  blancoed  and 
shined  until  one  was  positively  dazzled  by  looking  at  them."  50 
After  a  review  on  the  Race  Course,  Butler  remarked  that  he  had 
"never  seen  a  finer  regiment.  It  reminded  me  of  the  5th  at 
Quantico  in  its  palmiest  days."  51 

An  ambitious  sports  program  in  a  sports-minded  city  served 
also  to  foster  friendly  relations  between  the  Marines  and  Shanghai 
residents  and  members  of  the  other  foreign  garrisons.  In  addi- 
tion to  military  and  naval  teams  of  many  nations,  there  were 
numerous  civilian  athletic  clubs.  Nor  was  competition  limited 
to  Shanghai.  Teams  from  Tientsin,  Hong  Kong,  and  Japan 
made  frequent  visits  to  take  on  the  Marines  and  other  local  teams. 
The  Marines'  baseball  team  repaid  the  Japanese  visits,  making 
several  trips  to  Japan  to  play  college  and  professional  teams. 

Basketball,  boxing,  wrestling,  track,  swimming,  tennis,  golf, 
and  bowling,  as  well  as  baseball,  were  popular  sports  with  the 
Marines.  Because  there  was  no  competition,  football  was  seldom 
played,  but  the  British  game  of  Rugby  proved  an  excellent  sub- 
stitute. The  Marines  took  to  it  with  such  enthusiasm  that  they 
quickly  equalled  the  British  at  their  own  game,  winning  for 
several  years  the  Spunt  Cup,  symbol  of  the  Shanghai  Rugby 
championship.  This  ability  to  beat  the  other  fellow  at  his  own 
game  won  respect  for  the  regiment  from  foreign  residents  and 
garrisons  alike.52 

The  4th  Regiment  band  also  served  to  foster  friendly  rela- 
tions. It  played  for  parades,  reviews,  and  other  military  cere- 
monies. It  gave  concerts  for  the  entertainment  of  the  Marines 
and  the  public.    Its  dance  orchestra  was  much  in  demand  for 


60  CG  3d  MarBrig  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  5 Aprs 7  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 

51  CG  3d  MarBrig  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  5May27  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 

53  For  sports  see  the  Walla  Walla  (4th  Regt  newspaper),  Shanghai,  1928- 
1941 ;  Leatherneck;  Fourth  Marines  Annual,  1931-1932  (Shanghai:  Mercury 
Press,  n.d.) ;  Annual  Fourth  Marines,  1935  (Shanghai:  Mercury  Press,  n.d.). 


148       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


dances  and  social  gatherings  of  the  regiment,  other  foreign  mili- 
tary organizations,  and  civilian  groups.  And  its  concert  orches- 
tra contributed  to  Shanghai's  cultural  life. 

In  one  respect,  the  4th  Regiment  band  was  unique.  It  was 
the  only  one  in  the  Marine  Corps  to  include  a  fife  and  drum 
corps.  This  was  the  result  of  a  gift  of  a  set  of  fifes  and  drums 
from  the  American  Company  and  Troop  of  the  Shanghai  Volun- 
teer Corps.  Named  the  Fessenden  Fifes  in  honor  of  Sterling 
Fessenden,  the  American  chairman  of  the  Shanghai  Municipal 
Council,  the  new  musical  corps  was  taught  to  play  the  instru- 
ments by  drummers  and  fifers  of  the  Green  Howards,  a  famous 
British  regiment  then  stationed  in  Shanghai.53 

A  sign  of  progress  during  the  years  of  garrison  service  was  the 
acquisition  of  a  new  regimental  designation.  By  order  of  the 
Commandant,  the  regiment  changed  its  name  on  13  February 
1 930.  From  that  date,  the  4th  Regiment  was  officially  designated 
the  4th  Marines,  a  change  which  applied  to  all  regiments  in  the 
Marine  Corps.54 

The  peaceful  years  of  garrison  service  passed  uneventfully,  but 
by  the  summer  of  1931  a  new  crisis  was  in  the  making.  It  was 
to  have  far-reaching  consequences  for  the  4th  Marines  in  the 
International  Settlement  of  Shanghai  and  was  to  impose  new 
obstacles  to  the  protection  of  American  lives  and  property  far 
more  serious  than  any  yet  encountered.  The  source  of  the  new 
danger  came  not  from  anti-foreign  agitation  by  the  Chinese  but 
from  the  imperialist  ambitions  of  Japan.  This  new  crisis  began 
on  18  September  1931  when  the  invasion  of  Manchuria  marked 
the  beginning  of  Japanese  efforts  to  conquer  China. 

53  Capt  Evans  F.  Carlson,  "The  Fessenden  Fifes,"  Leatherneck,  v.  n,  no.  2 
(Feb28),  p.  11. 

54  Change  4  to  Art  5-41,  Marine  Corps  Manual  (1926)  was  authority  for 
this  change,  put  into  effect  13  February  1930;  4th  Regt  MRolls,  i-28Feb30. 


CHAPTER  VI 


Japan  Goes  to  Town 


THE  RISE  OF  MODERN  JAPAN 

"In  establishing  relations  with  foreign  countries,"  said  Lord 
Hotta,  the  Japanese  prime  minister  in  1858,  "the  object  should 
always  be  kept  in  view  of  laying  a  foundation  for  securing  the 
hegemony  over  all  nations  .  ..."  1  To  make  this  object  a  reality 
became  the  goal  of  Japanese  policy,  with  only  short  lapses,  until 
the  end  of  World  War  II.2 

The  rapid  westernization  of  Japan — political,  economic,  and 
military — which  followed  Commodore  Matthew  C.  Perry's  open- 
ing of  the  country  to  foreign  intercourse  in  1853  was  ^e  ^rst 
step  towards  world  dominion.  Exploitation  of  the  newly  ac- 
quired military  power  quickly  followed.  Defeat  of  China  in 
1 894-1 895  added  Formosa  to  the  Mikado's  dominions;  ten  years 
later  his  warriors  challenged  and  defeated  a  major  power,  Russia ; 
and  in  19 10  they  annexed  the  kingdom  of  Korea.    In  19 14, 

1  Quoted  by  Samuel  F.  Bemis,  A  Diplomatic  History  of  the  United  States 
(New  York:  Henry  Holt  and  Company,  1942),  p.  360. 

2  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based  on  A.  Whitney  Griswold, 
The  Far  Eastern  Policy  of  the  United  States  (New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace 
and  Company,  1938) ;  Harold  M.  Vinacke,  A  History  of  the  Far  East  in 
Modern  Times  (New  York:  F.  S.  Crofts  and  Company,  1947),  pp.  76-115, 
166-182,  35i-373>  494-536;  and  Samuel  Eliot  Morison,  The  Rising  Sun 
in  the  Pacific,  1931-April  1942 — History  of  United  States  Naval  Operations 
in  World  War  II,  v.  Ill  (Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Company,  1954),  pp.  3- 
79,  hereafter  Morison,  Rising  Sun  in  the  Pacific. 

519667—60  12  1  49 


150       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Japan  entered  World  War  I  on  the  side  of  Great  Britain  and 
France,  and,  with  no  fighting  worth  mentioning,  acquired  the 
former  German  Pacific  island  possessions,  her  concession  at  Tsing- 
tao,  and  her  special  rights  in  the  Shantung  Peninsula.  This  was 
only  the  beginning.  In  the  21  Demands,  made  on  Peking  in 
19 1 5,  the  Japanese  revealed  their  objective  to  be  the  complete 
subjugation  of  China.  Protests  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  forced  the  postponement,  but  not  the  abandonment,  of 
this  ambition.  At  the  Versailles  Peace  Conference  of  19 19  the 
Japanese  had  to  be  content  with  a  mandate  over  all  former  Ger- 
man Pacific  possessions  north  of  the  equator. 

There  was  a  pause  in  the  march  of  conquest  during  the  1920's. 
A  liberal  Japanese  government  accepted  the  five-five-three  Naval 
ratio  at  the  Washington  Conference  of  1921-1922,  returned 
control  of  the  Shantung  Peninsula  to  China,  and  signed  the 
Nine-Power  Treaty  safeguarding  the  rights  of  China.  More 
important  than  the  surrender  of  territory  and  the  renunciation 
of  aggression  as  a  policy,  was  the  assumption  by  the  elected 
government  of  power  over  the  armed  forces.  Since  1889,  under 
the  doctrine  of  "imperial  command,"  only  the  emperor  could 
determine  the  size  and  composition  of  the  Japanese  armed  forces, 
but  if  the  civilian  government  could  regulate  the  size  of  the  navy 
by  treaty,  it  could  deprive  the  army  and  navy  leaders  of  their 
dominance  over  national  policy  and  effectively  block  their 
program  of  world  domination. 

The  rise  to  power  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  also  worried  the  Jap- 
anese militarists,  who  realized  that  the  Nationalist  drive  to  the 
north  was  a  threat  to  Japanese  ambitions  in  Manchuria.  Japan 
did  not  want  a  strong  China;  she  wished  to  keep  China  weak 
and  to  exploit  the  weakness.  The  growing  power  of  Chiang 
Kai-shek  forced  the  Japanese  militarists  to  take  drastic  action 
before  it  was  too  late. 

On  18  September  193 1,  following  a  minor  explosion  on  the 
South  Manchuria  Railway,  the  Japanese  forces  moved  out  from 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  151 


positions  guarding  the  track  to  occupy  the  principal  southern 
Manchurian  cities  against  negligible  Chinese  resistance.  This 
action  effectively  stopped  the  Nationalist  Chinese  from  seizing 
control  of  what  they  called  the  northeastern  provinces.  It  also 
led  to  a  state  of  war  between  China  and  Japan  which  permitted 
the  militarists  to  take  control  legally  of  the  Japanese  government. 

The  opposition  of  the  United  States  to  the  invasion  of  Man- 
churia was  expressed  by  Secretary  of  State  Henry  L.  Stimson. 
He  perceived  three  reasons  why  America  should  attempt  to 
restrain  Japan: 

First:  The  direct  material  damage  to  our  trade  which 
would  inevitably  be  caused  .... 

Second:  The  immense  blow  to  the  cause  of  peace  and 
war  prevention  throughout  the  world  which  would  in- 
evitably result  if  .  .  .  Japan  were  permitted  to  violate  .  .  . 
the  group  of  post-war  treaties  which  she  had  ratified  .... 

Third:  The  incalculable  harm  which  would  be  done 
immediately  to  American  prestige  in  China  and  ultimately 
to  the  material  interests  of  America  and  her  people  in  that 
region,  if  after  having  for  many  years  assisted  by  public  and 
private  effort  in  the  education  and  development  of  China 
towards  the  ideals  of  modern  Christian  civilization,  and 
having  taken  the  lead  in  the  movement  which  secured  the 
covenant  of  all  the  great  powers,  including  ourselves,  "to 
respect  her  sovereignty,  her  independence  and  her  terri- 
torial and  administrative  integrity,"  we  should  now  cyni- 
cally abandon  her  to  her  fate  when  this  same  covenant  was 
violated.3 

Cooperation  with  the  League  of  Nations  in  its  appeal  to  both 
the  Japanese  and  Chinese  to  refrain  from  further  hostilities  was 
Stimson's  first  effort  to  protect  the  vital  interests  of  the  United 
States.  When  the  Japanese  ignored  this  appeal,  Stimson  took 
the  lead  in  urging  the  League  to  apply  economic  sanctions. 


8  Henry  L.  Stimson,  The  Far  Eastern  Crisis  (New  York:  Harper  and 
Brothers,  1936),  pp.  88-90,  quoted  in  Griswold,  op.  cit.,  pp.  422-423. 


152       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


When  this  proposal  also  met  with  failure,  Stimson  decided  to 
act  on  his  own.  On  7  January  1932,  he  announced  that  the 
United  States  would  not  recognize  Japan's  Manchurian  con- 
quest. Japan's  answer  was  to  proclaim  "independence"  of 
Manchukuo  under  the  puppet  emperor,  Henry  Pu  Yi. 

THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  SHANGHAI— 28  JANUARY  TO 
2  MARCH  1932 

Defeated  on  the  battlefield,  the  Chinese  turned  to  economic 
warfare.  A  crippling  anti- Japanese  boycott  went  into  effect, 
and  nowhere  was  it  more  effective  than  in  Shanghai,  the  com- 
mercial capital  of  China.  Chinese  firms  refused  to  handle  Jap- 
anese merchandise,  Chinese  shopkeepers  no  longer  served 
Japanese,  Chinese  customers  stopped  buying  Japanese  goods, 
and  Chinese  banks  would  not  honor  Japanese  bills  of  lading, 
even  when  the  necessary  funds  were  on  deposit.  On  the  docks, 
Japanese  goods  piled  up  because  the  coolies  refused  to  move 
them,  and  Chinese  passengers  no  longer  took  passage  in  Japanese 
ships. 

Commercial  relations  between  China  and  Japan  were  shat- 
tered. Japanese  stores  and  businesses  were  closed.  Many  of 
the  owners  and  employees  departed  for  home,  and  those  who 
remained  did  so  at  the  risk  of  bodily  harm.  Vicious  posters 
appeared  in  the  streets.  "Down  with  Japanese  Imperialism," 
"Kill  the  Japanese,"  they  said.  And  a  Chinese  field  army,  the 
Nineteenth  Route,  moved  into  Chapei. 

Violence  flared  up  on  18  January  1932,  when  a  Chinese  mob 
attacked  five  Japanese  Buddhist  monks,  killing  one  and  seriously 
wounding  three  others.  At  a  protest  meeting  two  days  later  a 
Japanese  crowd  estimated  at  12,000  listened  to  speakers  denounce 
the  Japanese  consul  for  not  obtaining  satisfaction  for  the  outrage 
and  for  failing  to  put  a  stop  to  the  boycott.  Inflamed  by  the 
oratory,  the  crowd  marched  through  the  Settlement  to  the  Jap- 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  153 


anese  Naval  Landing  Force  headquarters  in  Hongkew,  smashing 
windows  and  beating  up  Chinese  on  the  way.4 

The  Japanese  naval  commander,  Rear  Admiral  Shiozawa,  was 
quick  to  act.  On  the  2 2d  he  presented  Mayor  Wu  of  Shanghai 
with  the  following  demands :  1 )  an  official  apology  for  the  assault 
on  the  five  monks;  2)  arrest  and  punishment  of  their  assailants; 
3 )  payment  of  compensation  and  medical  expenses ;  and  4 )  sup- 
pression of  all  anti- Jap  anese  activities  and  organizations.  Arrival 
the  next  day  of  reinforcements  consisting  of  an  aircraft  carrier, 
a  cruiser,  four  destroyers,  and  500  men  of  the  Special  Naval 
Landing  Force  indicated  that  Shiozawa  meant  business.5 

This  was  the  situation  facing  the  4th  Marines  at  the  end  of 
January.  The  Japanese  had  seized  Manchuria  and  were  threat- 
ening military  action  at  Shanghai.  Our  government's  policy 
was  to  oppose  Japanese  aggression  against  China,  but  our  gar- 
rison at  Shanghai  (the  4th  Marines)  was  a  partner  of  the  Japa- 
nese and  other  powers  in  a  plan  to  defend  the  International 
Settlement  against  the  Chinese. 

This  International  Defense  Scheme,  intended  to  protect  the 
Settlement  against  Chinese  attack,  had  been  drawn  up  the  pre- 
ceding May  by  the  commanders  of  the  British,  American,  and 
Japanese  garrisons  at  Shanghai.  It  provided  for  the  division  of 
the  Settlement  into  four  sectors — each  one  made  the  responsibility 
of  one  of  the  garrison  forces.  Sector  "A"  was  assigned  to  the 
Japanese,  "B"  to  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps,  "C"  to  the 
Americans,  and  "D"  to  the  British.  As  in  1927,  two  extra- 
Settlement  areas  were  included  within  the  defenses.  These  were 
the  "tongue,55  a  narrow  strip  extending  north  along  North  Sze- 
chuan  Road  in  Sector  "A55,  and  the  territory  stretching  west  to 


*  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  2ijan32,  Foreign  Relations, 
1932,  v.  Ill,  p.  41. 

6  Ambassador  in  Japan  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  22jan32,  Foreign  Relations, 
1932,  v.  IV,  p.  46;  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  25jan32, 
Foreign  Relations,  1932,  v.  Ill,  p.  58. 


154       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  Shanghai-Ningpo-Hangchow  Railway.  This  Western  Area 
comprised  all  of  Sector  "D".   (See  Map  10. ) 

Direction  of  Settlement  defense  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
Defense  Committee,  made  up  of  the  garrison  commanders,  the 
police  commissioner,  and  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps  com- 
mander. Brigadier  Fleming,  the  British  commander,  was  elected 
chairman,  but  his  only  function  was  to  preside  at  meetings. 
Under  this  committee  system,  there  was  no  supreme  commander 
over  all  Settlement  defenses.  Each  commander  was  supreme  in 
his  own  sector — so  complete  was  his  authority  that,  under  terms 
of  the  Defense  Scheme,  armed  units  of  other  defense  forces  could 
not  enter  his  sector  without  his  permission.  All  agreed  to  come 
to  the  aid  of  any  of  the  others  upon  request.  Any  problem 
involving  the  defense  of  the  Settlement  as  a  whole  had  to  be 
settled  by  mutual  agreement  among  the  Defense  Committee 
members.6 

There  was  no  provision  for  dealing  with  a  situation  where  one 
of  the  partners  to  the  agreement  attacked  the  Chinese,  but  that 
question  was  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  the  Settiement  authori- 
ties and  defense  force  commanders  during  negotiations  over  the 
Defense  Scheme.  At  a  meeting  on  27  November  1931,  called 
specifically  to  discuss  what  action  should  be  taken  if  the  Sino- 
Japanese  fighting  should  spill  over  from  Manchuria,  Baron  Shi- 
beyama,  then  commander  of  the  Japanese  Special  Naval  Landing 
Force  at  Shanghai,  stated  that  he  would  abide  by  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Defense  Scheme,  subject  to  the  approval  of  his 
government.7 

This  proved  to  be  the  last  discussion  the  Defense  Committee 
was  to  have  with  the  Japanese  on  the  subject.    Tokyo's  answer 

6  No  copy  of  the  "International  Defense  Scheme"  is  available,  but  its 
main  provisions  are  set  forth  in  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd 
3Feb32,  Foreign  Relations,  1932,  v.  Ill,  pp.  187-188;  and  Dept  of  State 
memo  to  Navy  Dept,  dtd  3Sep32,  Foreign  Relations,  1932,  v.  IV,  p.  224. 

7  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  3Feb32,  Foreign  Relations, 
i932>v.  Ill,  pp.  187-188. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  155 


156       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


was  delivered  on  the  night  of  28  January  when  troops  of  the  Spe- 
cial Naval  Landing  Force  attacked  Chinese  forces  in  Chapei. 
The  attack  was  unexpected,  for  at  1600  Mayor  Wu's  reply  to  the 
Japanese  demands  had  been  accepted  by  Consul  General  Murai. 
Apparentiy,  the  threat  of  military  action  had  been  averted,  but 
the  Japanese  Navy  commander  felt  no  compunction  to  abide  by 
the  decisions  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Even  as  Murai  was  assuring 
his  opposite  numbers  that  the  crisis  was  over,  Shiozawa  was  pre- 
paring to  seize  Chapei.  From  the  outset,  his  actions  compro- 
mised the  neutrality  of  the  International  Settlement.  Taking 
advantage  of  a  declaration  of  a  state  of  emergency  by  the  Munic- 
ipal Council  at  1600,  Shiozawa  moved  his  assault  units  into 
jump-off  positions  in  the  "tongue" — action  he  disguised  as  a 
normal  defensive  deployment  under  the  terms  of  the  Interna- 
tional Defense  Scheme.8 

The  Japanese  admiral  made  one  serious  miscalculation.  He 
underestimated  his  enemy.  Chapei  proved  to  be  no  Manchuria 
for  the  bluejackets  of  the  Japanese  Special  Naval  Landing  Force, 
who  ran  into  a  hail  of  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  and  were  re- 
pulsed with  heavy  losses.  The  tough  young  soldiers  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Route  Army  made  up  in  morale  what  they  lacked  in 
equipment.  Burrowed  into  the  maze  of  shacks  and  alleys  making 
up  the  Chinese  quarter,  they  refused  to  budge. 

Thanks  to  the  declaration  of  emergency,  the  4th  Marines  were 
already  occupying  their  defensive  positions  when  the  Japanese 
attack  started.  Sector  "C" — assigned  to  the  regiment  under  the 
International  Defense  Scheme — comprised  the  western  third  of 
the  Settlement  and  was  an  enlargement  of  the  area  occupied  by 
the  3d  Battalion,  4th  Marines  in  1927.  It  included  about  76 
city  blocks.    Three  and  one-half  miles  of  Soochow  Creek  sep- 

8  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  2gjan32,  Foreign  Relations, 
1932,  v.  Ill,  pp.  89-90;  Hallett  Abend,  My  Life  in  China  (New  York:  Har- 
court,  Brace  and  Company,  1943),  pp.  186-187;  4tn  Mar  R-2  rept,  2 8 Jan 
32  (MarCorps  Units  in  China,  1927-1938  File,  HistBr,  HQMC,  hereafter 
China  File) . 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  157 


arated  Sector  "C"  from  Chinese  territory,  and  the  Marines'  front 
lines  were  on  the  south  bank  of  the  creek.  Major  William  C. 
Powers'  3d  Battalion  occupied  the  right  half  of  the  sector  and 
Major  George  H.  Osterhout's  1st  Battalion  the  left.9  (See  Map 
11.) 

The  4th  Marines  were  now  in  a  delicate  position.  They  were 
right  next  door  to  a  shooting  war  with  orders  to  protect  American 
lives  and  property  within  a  specified  area.  Obviously,  this  as- 
signment would  become  impossible  if  the  shooting  were  to  spread 
into  the  Marine  defense  sector.  It  was  essential,  therefore,  to 
maintain  neutrality  there.  The  nonpartisanship  of  the  Settle- 
ment as  a  whole  had  already  been  hopelessly  compromised  by  the 
Japanese  who  had  landed  their  troops  within  the  Settlement 
boundaries;  had  moved  them  to  the  line  of  departure  through 
the  Settlement;  and  had  jumped  off  in  the  attack  from  North 
Szechuan  Road,  which,  though  not  within  the  boundaries,  was 
under  Settlement  control.  The  Japanese  Sector  "A",  therefore, 
had  to  be  excluded,  for  practical  purposes,  from  the  Settlement 
defenses.  Of  vital  concern  to  the  4th  Marines,  and  to  their 
British  and  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps  allies,  was  to  preserve 
the  neutrality  of  the  remainder. 

There  was  little  reason  to  fear  a  violation  of  the  International 
Settlement  by  the  Chinese.  They  had  already  appealed  to  the 
League  of  Nations  and  to  the  United  States  for  help  in  stopping 
Japanese  aggression  and  could  not  afford  to  offend  the  Western 
Powers  at  Shanghai.  The  Japanese,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
already  displayed  their  contempt  for  international  opinion  by  in- 
vading Manchuria  and  ignoring  the  pleas  of  the  League.  For 
the  Japanese  there  were,  in  addition,  sound  tactical  reasons  for 
violating  the  neutrality  of  the  International  Settlement.  From  a 
line  of  departure  along  North  Szechuan  Road,  the  Japanese  at- 
tack moved  parallel  to  the  Settlement  defenses  along  Soochow 

°GO  4th  Mar  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  26Mar32  (2385-30/9-4,  Central  Files, 
HQMC). 


158       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  159 


Greek.  As  the  Chinese  right  flank  rested  on  these  defenses,  the 
Japanese  were  tempted  to  take  advantage  of  their  membership 
in  the  Settlement  defense  scheme  by  passing  troops  through  the 
American  and  British  zones,  thereby  outflanking  the  Chinese  in 
Chapei. 

During  the  first  week  of  the  conflict  the  Japanese  seemed  to 
be  attempting  such  an  end-run  through  the  American  and  British 
sectors.  A  force  of  about  500  Special  Naval  Landing  Force 
troops  occupied  the  Japanese-owned  cotton  mills  in  Sector  "C" 
along  Soochow  Creek.  Here  they  emplaced  a  number  of  machine 
guns  aimed  at  the  Chinese  positions  on  the  opposite  bank.  Jap- 
anese motor  and  foot  patrols  were  active  throughout  the  area, 
terrorizing  the  Chinese  population  and  committing  a  number  of 
atrocities.  At  least  three  Chinese  were  reported  shot  by  the 
Japanese  and  two  others  were  bayoneted. 

Because  of  orders  to  avoid  a  fight  with  regular  Japanese  troops, 
the  Marines  could  do  nothing  but  protest.  They  could,  however, 
do  something  about  armed  Japanese  civilians — the  so-called 
ronin,  or  rowdies,  who  invaded  Sector  "C"  on  30  January.  That 
night  two  such  groups  were  arrested.  The  first  incident  occurred 
at  the  corner  of  Singapore  and  Haiphong  Roads.  The  Marine 
sentry  posted  there  heard  two  shots  and  saw  two  groups  of 
Japanese  civilians  running  down  the  street.  Halting  the  larger 
party,  he  took  them  to  regimental  headquarters,  where  they  were 
found  to  be  armed  with  a  rifle,  a  Luger  pistol,  a  tomahawk,  and 
a  heavy  iron  bar.  The  prisoners  stated  they  had  been  ordered 
by  Japanese  naval  authorities  to  occupy  one  of  the  Japanese  mills 
in  the  American  sector.  A  second  group  of  six  armed  Japanese 
civilians  was  arrested  the  same  night  by  a  Marine  patrol  on 
Gordon  Road.10 


10  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  3Feb32,  Foreign  Relations, 
1932,  v.  Ill,  pp.  187-188;  CO  4th  Mar  msg  to  CinCAF,  3oJan32  (1975- 
7°/5-3j  Central  Files,  HQMC);  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd 
22Feb32,  Foreign  Relations,  1932,  v.  Ill,  p.  414. 


160       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


At  a  meeting  of  the  Defense  Committee  the  next  morning, 
Colonel  Richard  S.  Hooker,  the  4th  Marines  commander,  told 
Baron  Sambijima,  commander  of  the  Japanese  Special  Naval 
Landing  Force,  that  Marines  would  shoot  armed  civilians  in 
Sector  "C"  on  sight.  The  Japanese  then  promised  to  withdraw 
the  ronirij  but  declined  to  remove  the  regular  troops  without 
orders  from  higher  authority.  The  following  day,  Hooker  and 
Fleming  met  with  Sambijima  again  in  an  effort  to  bring  about 
the  withdrawal  of  Japanese  troops  from  the  American  and  Brit- 
ish sectors.  Hooker  accused  the  Japanese  officer  of  preparing 
to  attack  the  Chinese  from  the  American  sector  under  the  guise 
of  protecting  Japanese  property  there.  Sambijima  promised  to 
withdraw  all  except  small  security  detachments  in  the  Japanese 
cotton  mills. 

This  agreement  was  kept,  but  a  Marine  patrol  on  the  morn- 
ing of  3  February  discovered  the  security  guard  in  one  of  the 
Japanese  mills  using  panels  to  signal  aircraft  attacking  Chinese 
positions  across  Soochow  Creek.  When  he  learned  of  this,  Colo- 
nel Hooker  again  protested  to  the  Japanese  commander  and  in- 
sisted on  the  withdrawal  of  all  Japanese  troops  from  the  American 
sector.  U.S.  Marines  were  to  take  over  the  guarding  of  all 
Japanese  property  in  the  American  sector.  The  Japanese  agreed 
and  by  4  February  had  completed  the  withdrawal.11 

"This  greatly  eases  the  situation,"  reported  Admiral  Mont- 
gomery M.  Taylor,  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet.  "This 
gives  control  of  mills  and  prevents  their  use  to  display  panels 
for  aircraft,  and  eliminates  danger  which  Chinese  feared  of 
flank  attack.5' 12 


n  CO  4th  Mar  msg  to  CinCAF,  dtd  2Feb32  (1975-70/5-3,  Central  Files, 
HQMC)  ;  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  3Feb32,  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, 1932,  v.  Ill,  p.  191;  Minister  in  China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  22Feb32, 
Foreign  Relations,  1932,  v.  Ill,  p.  414;  CO  4th  Mar  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  i2Feb 
32  (Subj  File:  China,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

"CinCAF  msg  to  OpNav,  dtd  4Feb32  (1975-70/5-3,  Central  Files, 
HQMC). 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  161 


The  departure  of  Japanese  troops  from  the  regimental  zone 
eased  the  tension  considerably,  but  the  reinforcements  which 
arrived  from  the  Philippines  aboard  the  Chaumont  and  the 
cruiser  Houston  on  4  and  5  February  were  still  gladly  received. 
A  total  of  572  Marines,  including  the  newly  arrived  normal 
replacements  for  the  Asiatic  Station  and  the  Marine  detachment 
of  the  Houston,  reported  for  duty.  These  new  arrivals  brought 
the  strength  of  the  regiment  up  to  1,625  officers  and  men.  An 
additional  reinforcement  arriving  aboard  the  Chaumont  was 
the  31st  Infantry,  U.S.  Army.  This  unit,  totaling  about  1,100, 
took  over  Sector  "B"  from  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps.  The 
International  Defense  Forces  then  numbered  approximately 
7,800  as  follows:  13 


The  reinforced  4th  Marines  now  turned  to  and  strengthened 
the  defenses  along  Soochow  Creek.  By  7  February,  the  entire 
three  and  one-half  miles  of  front  lines  had  been  completely  barb- 
wired;  51  sandbagged  strong  points  had  been  constructed;  and 
16  machine  guns  had  been  emplaced.  Manning  these  defenses 
was  a  forward  echelon  of  about  550  officers  and  men,  supported 
by  a  rear  echelon  of  about  500.  Rotation  from  front  to  rear 
took  place  about  every  two  days.  The  remainder  of  the  regiment, 
about  550,  remained  in  billets  to  provide  for  internal  security 
within  the  regimental  sector.14 


13 4th  Mar  figures  from  CO  4th  Mar  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  26Mar32  (2385- 
30/9-4,  Central  Files,  HQMC ) ;  all  others  from  H.  G.  W.  Woodhead,  ed., 
The  China  Year  Book,  1932  (Shanghai:  The  North  China  Daily  News  and 
Herald,  n.d.),  p.  592. 

u  CO  4th  Mar  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  26Mar32  (2385-30/9-4,  Central  Files, 
HQMC);  4th  Mar  R-i  rept,  i5-29Feb32  ( 1975-70/5-3,  Central  Files, 
HQMC). 


British  Brigade 
4th  Marines 
31st  Infantry 


3,  600 
1,625 


1,  100 
1,500 


SVC 


162       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


After  the  departure  of  Japanese  troops  from  the  regimental 
area  on  4  February,  neither  they  nor  the  Chinese  attempted  to 
encroach  on  neutral  territory.  Nor  did  the  riots  within  the 
Settlement,  so  confidently  predicted  by  old  China  hands,  material- 
ize. As  a  result,  security  duty  became  pretty  much  a  matter  of 
routine  for  the  4th  Marines.  But  from  their  front  lines  they  had 
grandstand  seats  for  the  war.  For  the  first  two  weeks  of  February, 
Japanese  Special  Naval  Landing  Forces,  supported  by  naval 
aircraft  and  naval  gunfire,  battered  against  the  lines  of  the 
Chinese  Nineteenth  Route  Army  in  Chapei  with  little  success. 
Repeated  Japanese  infantry  assaults  were  thrown  back  by  the 
detemiined  Chinese  defenders.  Air  attack  was  no  more  success- 
ful. Following  the  failure  of  the  initial  ground  assault,  Admiral 
Shiozawa  ordered  his  naval  aircraft  to  bomb  Chapei.  This  raid 
and  those  that  followed  resulted  in  great  destruction  of  buildings 
and  loss  of  civilian  life,  but  they  had  a  negligible  effect  on  the 
ground  battle.  The  Chinese  troops  burrowed  into  the  rubble 
and  fought  back  as  tenaciously  as  before. 

There  were  times  when  the  Marines  felt  a  little  too  close  to 
this  battle  for  comfort.  Their  positions  followed  Soochow  Creek 
where  it  looped  to  the  north  behind  the  Chinese  lines  and  were 
thus  directly  beyond  the  targets  of  Japanese  artillery  located  in 
Hongkew  Park.  "Overs"  from  these  guns  fell  regularly  within 
the  Marine  sector  whenever  the  fighting  flared  up.  Japanese 
bombardiers  and  pilots  were  no  more  accurate  than  the  artillery- 
men, with  the  result  that  bombs  intended  for  Chinese  frequently 
landed  on  the  Marine  side  of  the  creek.  Chinese  antiaircraft 
guns  firing  on  the  attacking  planes  used  an  obsolete  type  of 
ammunition  which  burst  only  on  contact.  As  the  Chinese  gun- 
ners seldom  scored  a  hit  on  a  plane,  most  of  these  shells  did  net 
explode  until  they  hit  the  ground.  A  good  many  of  the  pro- 
jectiles fell  in  the  regimental  sector.  It  was  remarkable  that  no 
Marine  was  hit  by  any  of  these  misdirected  bombs  or  shells, 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  163 


although  there  were  a  good  many  near-misses,  and  men  on  front- 
line duty  learned  to  take  cover.15 

By  the  middle  of  February  the  Japanese  Navy's  offensive  had 
stalled  completely.  The  Army  then  took  over,  launching  an 
attack  on  20  February  north  of  Shanghai  at  the  Chinese  left 
flank.  At  first,  the  Japanese  made  some  limited  advances,  but 
the  Chinese  stiffened,  and  by  the  23d  the  advance  had  been 
stopped.  The  Japanese  now  attempted  a  much  wider  flanking 
movement,  landing  a  division  at  Liuho  farther  upstream  on 
the  Yangtze.  With  these  reinforcements  ashore  they  renewed 
the  attack  on  1  March.  This  time  they  succeeded,  for  the 
Chinese  were  hopelessly  outflanked.  On  2  March  they  evacu- 
ated Chapei,  retreating  to  prepared  positions  12  miles  to  the 
west. 

On  3  March,  the  Japanese  commander  announced  that  he 
had  ordered  his  forces  to  cease  fighting  and  to  hold  their  posi- 
tions. The  Chinese  commander  announced  a  similar  action 
later  in  the  day.  For  the  next  three  months  a  special  League 
of  Nations  Committee  worked  to  arrange  a  peace  settlement, 
and  on  5  May  achieved  success.  By  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
of  that  date,  the  Japanese  withdrew  to  positions  occupied  before 
28  January.  The  Chinese  forces  remained  where  they  were 
and  agreed  to  come  no  closer  to  the  city,  creating,  in  effect,  a 
neutral  zone.16 

On  13  June  the  Municipal  Council  ended  the  state  of  emer- 
gency. The  4th  Marines  and  other  defense  forces  abandoned 
their  defense  positions  and  stopped  their  internal  security  patrol- 
ling. From  the  Commandant,  Major  General  Ben  H.  Fuller, 
came  a  "well-done."  "The  nature  of  the  operations  was  such 
as  to  call  for  the  highest  discipline  and  forbearance  on  the  part 

15 Fourth  Marines  Annual,  1 931-1932  (Shanghai:  The  Mercury  Press, 
n.d.),  pp.  29-46. 

16  "Reports  of  the  League  of  Nations  Shanghai  Committee,"  and  "Shang- 
hai Peace  Agreement,"  quoted  in  The  China  Year  Book,  op.  cit.,  pp.  670-674. 


164       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


of  the  rank  and  file  and  sound  judgment  on  the  part  of  the 
commander,"  he  wrote  in  his  Annual  Report  for  1932.  "The 
highest  traditions  of  the  Marine  Corps  were  upheld  during  the 
operations  at  Shanghai."  17 

THE  YEARS  BETWEEN 

With  the  end  of  the  state  of  emergency  on  13  June,  the  4th 
Marines  resumed  the  normal  garrison  routine.  A  progressive 
training  program  in  basic  military  subjects  was  put  into  effect. 
Each  week  the  regiment  held  a  parade  at  the  race  course,  and 
once  a  month  there  was  a  drill  in  the  Sector  "C"  defense  plan. 
Extra-curricular  activities  were  taken  up  again  and  came  to 
play  an  important  part  in  the  lives  of  the  Marines  and  of  the 
civilian  community.  These  included  an  active  sports  program, 
band  concerts  and  broadcasts,  and  the  regimental  church 
services. 

An  extra  duty  was  added  on  25  November  1933  when  the 
regiment  was  given  the  responsibility  for  guarding  vessels  of  the 
Yangtze  Rapid  Steamship  Company  on  their  voyages  up  the 
river.  Because  of  the  vastness  of  the  Chinese  hinterland  and 
the  inability  of  the  Nationalist  government  to  give  effective  police 
protection  everywhere,  ships  plying  the  river  were  at  times  at- 
tacked by  pirates.  The  greatest  danger  of  attack  was  in  the 
"middle  river" — the  stretch  from  Hankow  to  the  gorges — where 
the  stream  was  shallow  and  constantly  shifted  its  channel.  In 
this  stretch,  vessels  often  ran  aground  and  were  attacked  while 
helplessly  immobilized  on  a  mud  bank.  But  the  pirates  were 
not  distinguished  for  bravery,  and  the  presence  of  four  to  six 
Marines  under  an  officer  was  sufficient  to  deter  attack.  The 
Marines  assigned  to  armed  guard  duty  aboard  river  vessels  were 
never  called  upon  to  repel  boarders,  but  they  had  an  unexcelled 

17  CMC,  Report  .  .  in  Annual  Reports  of  the  Navy  Department  for  the 
Fiscal  Year  IQ32  (Washington:  Navy  Dept,  1933). 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  165 


opportunity  to  see  the  interior  of  China  away  from  the  treaty 
ports.  After  i  July  1935  armed  guards  were  withdrawn  from 
the  river  steamers.18 

In  spite  of  the  return  of  normal  conditions,  no  one  in  the  regi- 
ment believed  that  peace  would  be  permanent.  The  Japanese 
had  suffered  a  reverse,  but  there  was  no  reason  to  believe  they 
had  abandoned  their  plans  for  conquest.  To  guard  against  a 
new  emergency,  Colonel  Hooker  was  "strongly  of  the  opinion 
that  the  sector  assigned  to  the  4th  Marines  be  maintained  in  the 
future.  American  prestige  in  Shanghai  has  been  greatly  raised 
by  having  our  troops  defending  lives  and  property  in  the  front 
lines."  19 

A  strength  of  about  1,600,  the  peak  size  attained  during  the 
1932  crisis,  was,  in  Hooker's  opinion,  adequate  for  the  security 
of  the  regimental  sector.  Authorized  strength,  however,  was  only 
1,145,  and  the  speedy  build-up  to  the  higher  figure  in  1932  had 
only  been  possible  because  the  Chaumont  had  just  arrived  in 
Manila  with  replacements,  and  Marine  Barracks,  Cavite,  had 
been  somewhat  overstrength.  Hooker  preferred  not  to  rely  on 
such  a  fortuitous  combination  of  circumstances  for  reinforcements 
in  a  future  emergency,  so  he  requested  that  his  regiment  be  built 
up  to  1 ,600  by  the  addition  of  a  third  battalion.20 

General  Fuller  approved  the  increase  on  1 3  June,  but  not  until 
1 8  September  were  sufficient  personnel  available.  On  that  date, 
the  2d  Battalion  was  organized — made  up  of  the  10th,  29th,  and 
31st  Rifle  Companies,  and  the  32d  Machine  Gun  Company.  Its 
commander  was  Major  Lyle  H.  Miller.  Strength  of  the  regiment 
then  stood  at  about  1,800,  but  personnel  shortages  within  the 


18  4th  Mar  AnnRepts  1934  &  1935  (2 295- 10- 10/9-4,  Central  Files, 
HQMC);  Annual  Fourth  Marines,  7935  (Shanghai:  The  Mercury  Press, 
n.d.). 

19  GO  4th  Mar  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  26Mar32  (2385-30/9-4,  Central  Files, 
HQMC). 

20  Ibid. 

519667—60  13 


166       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Marine  Corps  did  not  permit  the  maintenance  of  the  regiment  at 
this  level  for  long.  On  19  December  1934,  the  3d  Battalion  and 
Companies  C  and  G  were  disbanded — a  reduction  to  1,073  officers 
and  men.21 

JAPANESE  AGGRESSION  IN  NORTH  CHINA 

The  reduction  in  strength  of  the  4th  Marines  was  not  related 
to  any  easing  of  tensions  in  China.  At  the  beginning  of  1933  the 
Japanese  seized  Jehol,  the  Chinese  province  bordering  Man- 
churia, and  secured  withdrawal  of  all  Chinese  forces  from  the 
area  north  of  the  Great  Wall.  Still  not  satisfied,  the  Japanese 
obtained,  in  July  1933,  control  of  the  police  in  this  region.  Two 
years  later,  they  tightenend  their  grip  over  this  area  under  the 
Ho-Umetsu  Agreement.  Under  its  terms  the  Chinese  gave  way 
to  the  following  Japanese  demands :  1 )  the  removal  of  objection- 
able officials;  2)  the  virtual  elimination  of  the  authority  of  the 
Central  Government  from  the  area  of  Japanese  interest;  and  3) 
the  suppression  of  anti- Japanese  activities  in  the  area. 

Not  satisfied  with  control  of  China  north  of  Peiping  and  Tient- 
sin, the  Japanese  attempted  to  extend  their  influence  over  all 
North  China.  In  1935  they  announced  that,  by  popular  demand, 
the  five  northern  provinces  (Hopei,  Chahar,  Suiyuan,  Shansi,  and 
Shantung)  would  establish  a  government  autonomous  of  Nan- 
king. But  the  hoped  for  popular  support  did  not  materialize. 
All  that  resulted  was  an  autonomous  regime  in  east  Hopei — the 
area  around  Tientsin. 

By  these  encroachments  on  Chinese  sovereignty,  the  Japanese 
had  revealed  their  design  for  making  North  China  a  puppet  state 

21  Numerical  designations  for  companies  had  been  replaced  by  letters  on  i 
January  1933.  The  25th  Company  became  Company  A;  the  26th  Company 
B;  the  27th  Company  C;  the  28th  Company  D;  the  10th  Company  E;  the 
29th  Company  F;  the  31st  Company  G;  the  32d  Company  H;  the  19th 
Company  I;  the  21st  Company  K;  the  22d  Company  L;  and  the  24th  Com- 
pany M.   4th  Mar  MRolls,  iSep32-3iDec34. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  167 


similar  to  Manchukuo.  But  Chinese  determination  to  resist  this 
nibbling  process  upset  the  Japanese  plans,  and  after  1935  China 
refused  to  accede  to  further  demands.  Any  further  subjugation 
of  China  would  have  to  be  by  force  of  arms. 

On  7  July  1937  Chinese  and  Japanese  troops  clashed  at  the 
Marco  Polo  Bridge  outside  Peiping.  Thus  began  a  war  of  con- 
quest that  ended  only  with  the  defeat  of  Japan  by  the  United 
Nations  in  August  1945.22 

THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  SHANGHAI23 

Fighting  broke  out  at  Shanghai  on  13  August.  Ever  since 
the  Marco  Polo  Bridge  incident,  tension  between  Chinese  and 
Japanese  residents  had  been  mounting.  A  sign  of  anticipated 
trouble  was  the  exodus  of  Chinese  from  Chapei  and  neighboring 
districts  by  the  thousands  into  the  sanctuary  of  the  International 
Settlement  and  the  French  Concession.  By  late  July  both  sides 
were  building  up  their  military  forces:  the  Japanese  by  rein- 
forcing the  Special  Naval  Landing  Force  in  the  city;  the  Chinese 
by  moving  up  units  of  their  German-trained  Central  Army  to 
positions  between  Shanghai  and  Woosung.  From  these  move- 
ments it  was  evident  that  the  Chinese  intended  to  make  their 
main  defensive  effort  in  the  Yangtze  Valley. 

On  9  August  two  members  of  the  Japanese  Naval  Landing 
Party  were  shot  and  killed  by  the  Chinese  Peace  Preservation 
Corps  (a  local  militia)  near  Hungjao  Airfield  on  the  western 
outskirts  of  town.  Shanghai  Mayor  O.  K.  Yui  met  with  the 
Japanese  naval  and  diplomatic  authorities  and  agreed  to  settle 
the  dispute  through  diplomatic  channels.  The  local  residents 
were  not  reassured.  The  exodus  from  Chapei  was  renewed, 
and  thousands  of  Chinese  again  streamed  south  across  Soochow 


22  Vinacke,  op.  cit.,  pp.  539-571- 

23  Unless  otherwise  cited  this  section  is  based  on  CO  4th  Mar  AnnRept 
1938  (2295/9-4,  Central  Files,  HQMC). 


168       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Creek.  On  the  nth,  nine  more  Japanese  warships  arrived, 
bringing  the  Japanese  naval  strength  in  the  Whangpoo  to  27 
vessels.  Naval  landing  parties  disembarked  to  reinforce  the 
troops  already  ashore.  The  next  day  troops  of  the  Chinese  88th 
Division  moved  into  Chapei  and  occupied  sandbagged  barricades 
and  emplacements  erected  during  the  night. 

By  evening  of  12  August,  two  hostile  forces  glared  at  each 
other  over  sandbags  and  through  barb  wire.  The  Japanese  had 
evacuated  all  their  nationals  from  the  area,  and  the  Chinese  were 
fleeing  to  sanctuary  across  the  creek  as  fast  as  they  could.  Al- 
though the  Japanese  authorities  had  agreed  to  settle  the  incident 
of  9  x\ugust  through  diplomatic  channels,  they  became  more 
belligerent  with  arrival  of  each  reinforcement,  leading  to  the 
belief  that  offensive  action  on  their  part  had  already  been  decided 
upon.24 

Members  of  the  4th  Marines  had  been  closely  following  the 
worsening  crisis  across  the  creek.  It  came  as  no  surprise,  there- 
fore, when  liberty  was  restricted  to  50  per  cent  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  1 2th  and  suspended  altogether  at  2200.  Colonel  Charles 
F.  B.  Price,  the  regimental  commander,  spent  much  of  the  day 
in  conference  with  the  American  consul  general,  Clarence  Gauss, 
and  with  Brigadier  A.  P.  D.  Telfer-Smollett,  commander  of  the 
British  Shanghai  Area  Force.  When  the  Municipal  Council 
mobilized  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps  and  requested  assistance 
of  the  British  and  American  garrisons,  Gauss  suggested  that 
outposts  supporting  the  Municipal  Police  along  Soochow  Creek 
might  be  all  that  was  necessary.  Because  fighting  had  not  yet 
broken  out,  his  plan  was  put  into  effect.25 

At  0130,  13  August,  the  4th  Marines  occupied  positions  in 


2*  George  Bruce,  Shanghai's  Undeclared  War  (Shanghai:  Mercury  Press, 
I937)>  PP-  7-12?  4tn  Mar  Weekly  Intel  Summaries,  dtd  28Jul,  4Aug, 
nAug37  (China  File). 

25  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  12 Aug  37,  Foreign  Relations, 
1937,  v.  Ill,  p.  389;  4th  Mar  R-2  rept,  i3Aug37  (China  File). 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  169 


Sector  "C"  in  support  of  the  Municipal  Police,  who  had  already 
closed  gates  across  roads  leading  into  the  Settlement  from  the 
north  and  were  controlling  all  movement  into  the  Settlement. 
The  Marines  were  to  leave  to  the  police  the  control  of  refugees 
and  other  civilians,  but  they  were  ordered  to  prevent  the  entry 
of  armed  members  of  the  Chinese  forces.  Japanese  troops  under 
arms  were  to  be  afforded  gentler  treatment.  If  encountered, 
their  presence  was  to  be  reported  to  regimental  headquarters  at 
once.  Under  no  circumstances  were  Marines  to  fight  the 
Japanese.26    (See  Map  12.) 

About  0900  shots  were  exchanged  by  Chinese  and  Japanese 
outposts  along  the  Shanghai-Woosung  Railway.  The  second 
battle  for  Shanghai  had  begun.  As  the  Japanese  worked  their 
way  cautiously  into  Chapei's  maze  of  alleys,  the  Marines  rushed 
defensive  preparations.  In  anticipation  of  orders  to  execute  Plan 
"A" — defense  of  Sector  "C"  from  outside  attack — they  busied 
themselves  filling  sandbags  and  assembling  barbwire  for  the  con- 
struction of  defensive  emplacements  along  Soochow  Creek. 

Of  great  concern  to  Colonel  Price  and  Consul  General  Gauss 
was  whether  the  belligerents  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  the 
International  Settlement.  In  1932  an  attempted  end  run  by  the 
Japanese  through  the  American  and  British  sectors  had  only  been 
stopped  by  refusal  of  the  American  and  British  commanders  to 
permit  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  their  zones.  At  Gauss' 
suggestion,  the  State  Department  directed  Ambassador  Nelson 
Johnson  to  request  of  the  Chinese  government  that  its  field  com- 
manders be  instructed  to  respect  those  areas  of  the  Settlement 
patrolled  by  neutral  forces.  Johnson  took  up  the  matter  with 
Chiang  Kai-shek  and  was  assured  that  our  wishes  would  be  re- 
spected, provided  that  Japanese  did  not  use  the  neutral  area  as  a 
base  for  attacks  on  Chinese  forces  outside.  "Neutral  forces  .  .  . 
should  exclude  fighting  forces  of  both  sides,"  concluded  Johnson, 


4th  Mar  OpO  No.  5,  dtd  i3Aug37  (China  File). 


170       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  171 


"and  I  have  no  doubt  that  neutrality  of  [the]  area  will  be 
respected."  27 

While  the  State  Department  was  sounding  out  the  Chinese, 
officers  of  the  4th  Marines  were  making  similar  approaches  to  the 
Japanese  naval  authorities  in  Shanghai.  Captain  Ronald  A. 
Boone,  the  regimental  intelligence  officer,  was  informed  by  Com- 
mander Takeda  of  the  Japanese  Special  Naval  Landing  Force 
that  his  government  had  no  intention  of  passing  troops  through 
the  American  sector  to  attack  the  Chinese.  He  said  that  the 
Japanese  forces  then  guarding  Japanese  cotton  mills  in  Sector 
"C"  would  be  withdrawn  or  reduced,  but  not  increased,  and 
asked  for  American  protection  of  Japanese  lives  and  property. 
On  the  14th  the  Japanese  withdrew  all  their  troops  from  the 
American  sector  and  were  assured  by  Colonel  Price  that  the  Ma- 
rines would  extend  to  the  Japanese  the  same  protection  accorded 
all  Sector  "C"  residents.28 

Thus  by  the  end  of  the  second  day  of  fighting  both  belligerents 
had  given  assurances  that  they  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  the 
Marine  sector.  Whether  they  would  live  up  to  their  guarantees 
only  time  would  tell. 

The  second  day  of  the  war  saw  a  step-up  in  the  action  as  both 
sides  exchanged  air  raids.  The  Chinese  led  off  about  1000  with 
a  dive-bombing  attack  on  the  ancient  cruiser  Idzumo  and  the 
Japanese  consulate.  Neither  target  was  hit,  but  one  bomb  struck 
the  American-owned  Shanghai  Power  Company,  wounding  one 
American  employee.  The  Marine  guard  of  the  gunboat  Sacra- 
mento was  rushed  ashore  to  protect  the  electric  installation. 
Japanese  float  planes  struck  back  early  in  the  afternoon  at  Hung- 
jao  Airfield,  their  bombs  hitting  the  field  but  doing  little  damage. 
Consul  General  Gauss  ordered  all  Americans  to  evacuate  the 


"Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  i3Aug37;  Ambassador  in 
China  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  i3Aug37  (both  Foreign  Relations,  1937,  v.  Ill, 
pp.  392,405). 

^thMarR-Q  repts,  13,  i4Aug37  (China  File). 


172       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


areas  north  of  the  creek,  and  the  4th  Marines  sent  three  trucks 
and  an  ambulance  to  help  out.  Colonel  Price,  Brigadier  Telfer- 
Smollett,  and  Colonel  F.  R.  W.  Gordon,  British  officer  command- 
ing the  SVC,  met  to  consider  defense  measures  and  decided  to 
hold  all  of  the  International  Defense  areas  under  their  control, 
including  that  part  of  Area  "B"  north  of  the  creek.    (See  Map 

.0.) 

In  mid-afternoon  the  cruiser  Augusta,  flagship  of  the  Asiatic 
Fleet,  steamed  up  the  Whangpoo  after  a  fast  trip  from  Tsingtao. 
Aboard  was  the  Asiatic  Fleet  commander,  Admiral  Harry  E. 
Yarnell.  He  immediately  went  into  conference  with  Colonel 
Price,  and  at  1600  ordered  the  4th  Marines'  commander  to 
execute  Plan  "A".  All  previously  selected  positions  along  Soo- 
chow  Creek  were  occupied,  and  hasty  sandbag  emplacements  and 
protective  wire  entanglements  were  thrown  up. 

Admiral  Yarnell  issued  the  following  order  to  the  regimental 
commander : 

Armed  Chinese  and  Japanese  troops  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  enter  the  American  Sector  of  the  International 
Settlement  ....  Every  effort  must  be  made  to  prevent 
the  entry  of  armed  combatants  by  means  other  than  rifle 
fire,  such  as  tear  gas.  As  a  last  resort,  to  prevent  the  actual 
entry,  fire  may  be  opened'.29 

Unarmed  Chinese  soldiers  would  be  permitted  to  enter  and 
would  be  segregated  under  guard. 

While  the  Marines  were  moving  out  from  their  billets  to  man 
the  Soochow  Creek  defenses,  tragedy  struck  the  International 
Settlement  and  French  Concession.  Four  Chinese  bombers, 
aiming  for  the  Idzumo,  dropped  two  bombs  in  Nanking  Road 
near  the  Bund.  Two  other  bombs  fell  in  the  intersection  of 
Avenue  Edward  VII  and  Boulevard  de  Montigny  in  the  French 
Concession,  jammed  with  innocent  people  watching  the  air 
attack.    The  carnage  was  terrible. 


29  Quoted  in  4th  Mar  AnnRept,  1938. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  173 


Under  Plan  "A"  the  4th  Marines  sector  was  divided  into 
two  battalion  subsectors  along  Medhurst  Road.  Lieutenant 
Colonel  William  H.  Rupertus5  1st  Battalion  was  on  the  left; 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Roswell  Winans' 30  2d  Battalion  was  on  the 
right.  The  entire  7,200-yard  main  line  of  resistance  (MLR) 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  creek  was  protected  by  a  continuous 
band  of  wire.  There  were  58  sandbagged  strong  points,  all 
providing  frontal  and  overhead  cover.  Twenty-nine  heavy  ma- 
chine guns  were  emplaced  to  give  interlocking  bands  of  fire  in 
front  of  the  MLR,  and  both  battalion  and  regimental  reserve 
lines  were  designated  for  occupation  if  necessary. 

Shortages  of  personnel  seriously  handicapped  the  execution  of 
the  defensive  plan.  On  12  August  the  4th  Marines  totalled 
59  officers  and  1,013  enlisted  men,  organized  into  regimental 
Headquarters,  Service,  and  Motor  Transport  Companies,  and 
two  battalions  of  two  rifle  and  one  machine  gun  companies  each. 
Company  E  lacked  one  platoon,  and  Company  B  lost  its  3d 
Platoon  by  redesignation  as  regimental  military  police  platoon. 
Both  losses  were  made  up  by  attaching  the  regimental  bandsmen 
to  the  rifle  companies.  Battalion  reserves  consisted  of  the 
howitzer  platoons  of  the  machine  gun  companies.  Emplace- 
ments for  the  37mm  howitzers  were  reconnoitered  and  staked  out 
but  were  not  occupied.  In  the  absence  of  a  third  battalion,  the 
regimental  reserve  consisted  of  the  MP  platoon  and  a  provisional 
platoon  drawn  from  Headquarters,  Service,  and  Motor  Transport 
Companies. 

The  personnel  shortage  was  alleviated  somewhat  by  the  land- 
ing of  the  Augusta's  party  of  50  Marines  and  57  bluejackets  to 
reinforce  the  regimental  reserve.  On  the  19th  a  rifle  company 
of  2  officers  and  102  enlisted  men  arrived  from  Cavite  and  was 
added  to  the  1st  Battalion  as  Company  C.    And  on  26  August, 

30  Winans,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  won  the  Medal  of  Honor  while  serving 
as  1st  Sergeant  of  the  28th  Company,  4th  Regiment,  in  the  attack  on  Guay- 
acanas,  Santo  Domingo,  3  July  19 16.  He  had  been  commissioned  in  19 17 
and  had  served  with  distinction  in  France  during  WW  I.    (See  Chapter  II). 


174       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


another  rifle  company  of  the  same  strength  from  Cavite  joined 
the  2d  Battalion  as  Company  G.  In  addition  to  his  own  regi- 
ment, Colonel  Price  had  available  a  battalion  of  the  SVC  as  a 
police  reserve  for  handling  internal  disturbances  within  Sector 
"C",  and  an  additional  bluejacket  force  of  13  officers  and  200 
men  ready  to  land  from  the  Augusta. 

An  additional  duty  for  the  4th  Marines  was  to  help  in  the 
evacuation  of  American  nationals.  At  a  conference  on  the  1 5th, 
Colonel  Price,  Admiral  Yarnell,  and  Consul  General  Gauss  de- 
cided that  American  women  and  children  should  be  urged  to 
leave,  but  that  no  general  evacuation  order  would  be  issued.  The 
first  group  left  for  Manila  aboard  the  liner  President  Jefferson 
on  the  1 7th,  and  the  evacuation  continued  throughout  the  month 
as  other  vessels  arrived.  Because  of  the  fighting,  these  ships  did 
not  enter  the  Whangpoo  but  anchored  off  Woosung,  their  passen- 
gers being  ferried  down  to  them  on  lighters.  Marine  guards  were 
placed  on  board  each  of  the  small  craft.  There  were  no  incidents 
on  any  of  these  trips,  but  furnishing  the  guards  imposed  an  extra 
burden  on  the  regiment. 

North  of  Soochow  Creek  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  were 
locked  in  combat.  Badly  outnumbered,  the  Japanese  Special 
Naval  Landing  Force  was  pushed  back  into  a  pocket  in  the  east- 
ern part  of  the  Settlement,  their  backs  to  the  Whangpoo.  Only 
naval  gunfire  saved  them  from  being  pushed  into  the  river.  On 
24  August  the  tide  of  battle  turned  in  favor  of  the  Japanese,  when 
army  troops  swarmed  ashore  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Yangtze 
in  an  amphibious  operation.  Their  beachhead  stretched  from 
Woosung  to  Liuho,  a  distance  of  about  1 5  miles.  In  fierce  fight- 
ing, the  Japanese  pushed  inland,  and  by  29  August  had  pene- 
trated about  seven  miles.  The  front  lines  then  stretched  from 
the  North  Station  in  Chapei  northwest  to  the  Yangtze  bank  just 
beyond  Liuho.  Here  the  Chinese  stiffened  and  held.  In  spite  of 
heavy  attacks,  the  Japanese  could  advance  no  farther.  The 
fighting  had  stalemated. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  175 


With  the  extension  of  the  front  to  the  northwest,  fighting  in 
Shanghai  slacked  off.  There  were  occasional  infantry  fights,  but 
most  of  the  activity  consisted  of  air  and  artillery  bombardments. 
And,  as  in  1932,  stray  shells  and  bombs  occasionally  fell  in  the 
4th  Marines'  sector.  There  was  one  casualty.  Pharmacist's  Mate 
Floyd  Arnold  was  wounded  by  an  antiaircraft  machine-gun  bul- 
let while  on  duty  at  the  regimental  hospital  on  1 7  August. 

Welcome  reinforcements  for  the  hard-pressed  4th  Marines 
arrived  on  19  September,  when  the  Chaumont  made  port  with 
the  Headquarters  2d  Marine  Brigade,  Brigade  Troops,  and  the 
6th  Marines  aboard.  These  reinforcements  had  been  requested 
by  Yarnell  and  Gauss  about  a  month  before.31  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral John  C.  Beaumont,  Commanding  General,  2d  Marine 
Brigade,  after  conferring  with  Colonel  Price  and  inspecting  the 
defenses  of  Sector  "C",  decided  to  relieve  the  4th  Marines  on 
the  MLR  with  the  6th  Marines.  On  23  September  the  4th 
Marines,  after  40  days  of  continuous  duty  on  the  front  lines, 
passed  into  Brigade  reserve. 

After  ten  days  rest  the  4th  Marines  returned  to  the  front  lines 
on  4  October.  Sector  "C"  was  now  reorganized  on  a  brigade 
basis  into  two  regimental  subsectors  divided  along  Medhurst 
Road.  The  4th  Marines  took  over  the  right  subsector,  while 
the  6th  Marines  retained  control  of  the  left.  With  only  half 
the  territory  to  cover,  Colonel  Price  was  now  able  to  deploy  one 
battalion  on  the  MLR  and  hold  the  other  in  reserve.  An  addi- 
tional duty  for  the  4th  Marines — performed  by  Company  E — was 
to  take  over  the  guard  of  the  Shanghai  Power  Company  from 
the  Sacramento  detachment.32 

Duty  conditions  during  October  were  much  as  they  had  been 
in  August  and  September.    On  the  15th  the  regiment  suffered 


31  4th  Mar  R-2  rept,  i5Aug37  {China  File);  Adviser  on  Political  Rela- 
tions memo  to  SecState,  dtd  i6Aug37,  Foreign  Relations,  1937,  v.  Ill,  p.  420. 

32  4th  Mar  OpO  No.  20,  dtd  20ct37  (China  File). 


176       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


its  second  casualty — Private  Milton  O.  Hiatt  of  Company  D, 
slightly  wounded  by  a  .25  caliber  bullet.33 

On  the  fighting  front  a  Japanese  offensive,  launched  on  23  Oc- 
tober, finally  succeeded  in  breaching  the  Chinese  line,  necessitating 
a  general  withdrawal  of  a  few  miles,  including  the  evacuation 
of  Chapei.  For  the  first  time  since  13  August  the  4th  Marines 
were  no  longer  looking  straight  into  the  front  lines  on  the  other 
side  of  Soochow  Creek.  Following  up  their  success,  the  Jap- 
anese, on  5  November,  landed  two  divisions  in  Flangchow  Bay 
to  the  south.  Pushing  rapidly  inland,  the  Japanese  landing 
force  imperiled  the  entire  Chinese  position  in  the  lower  Yangtze 
Valley.  And  the  capture  of  the  communications  center  of 
Sunkiang  on  the  9th  forced  a  general  withdrawal  towards 
Nanking.34   ( See  Map  13.) 

With  the  cessation  of  hostilities  in  Shanghai,  the  front  line 
strength  of  the  4th  Marines  was  reduced,  on  9  November,  to 
one  rifle  company  and  one  machine  gun  platoon.  The  mission 
was  to  maintain  outposts  at  the  southern  end  of  Wuchen,  Stone, 
and  Markham  Road  Bridges,  and  to  maintain  observation  of 
the  Settlement  perimeter  along  Soochow  Creek  at  all  times  by 
patrols.35 

UNDER  THE  SHADOW  OF  NIPPON 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Chinese  armies  from  Shanghai  left  the 
International  Settlement  and  the  French  Concession  as  two  tiny 
islands  of  Western  authority  in  a  hostile  Japanese  sea.  On  every 
street  and  bridge  of  importance  leading  from  the  foreign-con- 
trolled areas  there  was  a  barricade  or  blockhouse  manned  by 

33  4th  Mar  R-2  Rept,  I50ct37  (China  File). 

34  Chinese  Ministry  of  Information,  China  Handbook,  1937-1943  (New 
York:  The  Macmillan  Company,  1943),  pp.  352-353;  HQ,  USSAFE  and 
Eighth  Army  (Rear),  "Japanese  Monograph  No.  179 — Central  China  Area 
Operations  Record,  1937-1941,"  pp.  13-20  (OCMH). 

35  CO  4th  Mar  msg  to  COs  1/4  and  2/4,  dtd  9N0V37  {China  File). 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  177 


178       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Japanese  sentries.  Backing  up  those  sentries  was  a  field  army 
of  from  300,000  to  500,000  men,  a  formidable  navy  in  complete 
control  of  the  Yangtze  and  its  approaches,  and  a  strong  air  force. 
A  Chinese  puppet  government,  put  into  office  by  the  Japanese 
and  completely  subservient  to  them,  stood  ready  to  do  its  master's 
bidding. 

For  the  Japanese  the  International  Settlement  and  the  French 
Concession  were  a  constant  source  of  irritation — reminders  of 
the  power  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States.  Worse 
still,  they  were  invaluable  to  Chiang  Kai-shek  in  carrying  on 
China's  struggle  for  existence.  Since  the  three  Western  Powers 
all  recognized  Chiang's  Nationalist  regime  as  the  legal  govern- 
ment of  China,  they  refused  to  permit  the  Japanese  to  interfere 
in  any  way  with  official  or  other  Chinese  activities  inside  the 
foreign-controlled  area.  The  Japanese  had  to  watch  in  helpless 
rage  while  rich  cargoes  unloaded  at  the  Bund  and  paid  duty  into 
Chiang's  custom  house.  The  Chinese  post  office,  radio  and  tele- 
graph offices,  and  central  bank  all  continued  to  operate  within 
the  Settlement  and  the  Concession.  The  Japanese  were  furious 
because  they  could  not  direct  the  policies  of  these  institutions  nor 
lay  their  hands  on  the  rich  revenues.36 

The  military  forces  of  the  foreign  areas  were  never  strong 
enough  to  resist  a  determined  Japanese  attack.  After  the  de- 
parture of  the  6th  Marines  and  2d  Brigade  troops  on  17  Feb- 
ruary 1938,  the  4th  Marines  became  again  the  only  American 
troop  unit  in  Shanghai.  Its  strength  never  exceeded  1,200  and 
averaged  about  1,000  officers  and  men.  The  British  main- 
tained a  garrison  which  never  exceeded  2,500  and  was  withdrawn 
altogether  on  26  August  1940.  The  French  garrisoned  their 
Concession  with  about  4,000  troops  but  they  were  of  negligible 
value  after  the  collapse  of  France  in  the  summer  of  1940.  And 
the  750  Italian  troops,  because  of  the  alliance  of  their  government 


39  Abend,  op.  cit.,  p.  286. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  179 


with  Japan,  were  of  dubious  value  in  preserving  the  neutrality  of 
the  foreign-controlled  areas.37 

The  Japanese  were  not  restrained  from  seizing  the  Concession 
and  the  Settlement  by  the  strength  of  the  foreign  garrisons.  But 
the  Tokyo  government  did  not  wish  to  antagonize  unduly  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States.  Efforts  at  a  take-over 
were,  therefore,  limited  to  various  forms  of  subtle  pressure  de- 
signed to  undermine  the  position  of  the  Western  Powers,  to  in- 
filtrate the  municipal  government,  and  to  subvert  it.  To  resist 
these  pressures  became  the  primary  duty  of  the  4th  Marines  in 
carrying  out  its  mission — a  mission  which  continued  to  be  the 
preservation  of  the  neutrality  of  Sector  "C". 

There  was,  of  course,  always  the  danger  that  a  hotheaded 
Japanese  militarist  might  launch  an  attack  on  his  own  authority 
at  the  slightest  provocation  or  no  provocation  at  all.  Before  all 
the  Marines,  from  the  commanding  officer  on  down,  stood  the 
exacting  task  of  sustaining  their  position  without  offering  the 
Japanese  an  excuse  for  aggression. 

An  example  of  the  irresponsible  and  often  irrational  behavior 
of  some  Japanese  army  officers  occurred  in  the  International 
Settlement  on  3  December  1937.  Over  the  protests  of  Settlement 
authorities,  the  Japanese  army  staged  a  victory  parade  through 
the  Settlement.  Although  the  Municipal  Police  cleared  all 
Chinese  from  the  route  of  march,  about  1230  one  man  got  close 
enough  to  lob  a  hand  grenade  from  a  side  street  into  the  passing 
Japanese  column  on  Nanking  Road  just  north  of  the  Race 
Course.  Three  soldiers  and  three  municipal  policemen  were 
wounded.  The  assassin  was  immediately  shot  down  and  killed 
by  a  Chinese  constable  of  the  Municipal  Police,  and  the  Japanese 
resumed  their  march,  leaving  a  36-man  gendarme  (military  po- 
lice) detachment  to  investigate. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Yuki  Fukabori  was  the  officer  in  charge 

37  Strength  figures  from  4th  Regt  MRolls,  iFeb38-3oNov4i ;  Abend,  op. 
cit.,p.  287. 


180       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


of  the  press  section  on  the  staff  of  General  Iwane  Matsui,  com- 
mander of  the  Central  China  Area  Army.  He  rode  in  a  staff 
car  at  the  head  of  the  column  and  did  not  learn  of  the  bombing 
until  he  reached  the  end  of  the  march  in  Hongkew.  He  then 
rushed  back  to  the  scene,  made  a  brief  investigation,  and  re- 
turned to  Japanese  Army  headquarters  in  Hongkew.  He  gave 
a  highly-colored  account  to  a  major  general  on  Matsufs  staff, 
the  officer  who  had  persuaded  his  reluctant  chief  to  stage  the 
march  in  the  first  place.  The  major  general  told  Fukabori  to 
go  back  to  the  scene  of  the  incident  and  take  charge  and  promised 
that  a  battalion  would  be  sent  to  reinforce  him. 

When  he  reached  there  about  1500,  Fukabori  took  command 
of  the  36  gendarmes  and  ordered  them  west  along  Nanking  Road 
and  south  along  Yu  Ya  Ching  Road.  "We  will  extend  our  line 
of  sentries  south  through  the  French  Concession  and  make  con- 
tact with  our  forces  in  Nantao,"  Fukabori  is  reported  to  have 
said. 

"May  I  point  out,  colonel,  that  the  line  you  speak  of  is  3,000 
yards  in  length  and  we  have  only  36  men,"  remonstrated  the 
gendarmerie  officer.    "What  you  propose  is  impossible." 

"Nothing  is  impossible,"  replied  Fukabori.  "Napoleon  said 
so."  This  last  remark  was  greeted  with  laughter  from  the  by- 
standers. And  Fukabori  thought  better  of  it.  He  decided  to 
wait  for  reinforcements. 

Meanwhile,  the  gendarmes  ordered  west  had  unknowingly 
entered  the  American  sector  and  had  placed  portable  barbwire 
barricades  across  Bubbling  Well  Road.  x\bout  1630  Colonel 
Price  and  Captain  Boone  arrived  on  the  scene.  By  this  time  the 
Japanese  reinforcements  were  about  an  hour  overdue,  having 
been  detained  by  the  intervention  of  Major  General  Harada,  one 
of  the  "moderates"  in  the  Japanese  command. 

Fukabori,  realizing  that  his  faction  had  been  thwarted  in  their 
efforts  to  use  the  bombing  as  an  excuse  to  seize  some  or  all  of 
the  foreign-held  territory,  complied  with  Price's  request  to  with- 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  181 


draw  from  the  American  sector.  And  by  2030  all  Japanese  had 
returned  to  their  own  sector.38 

Fukabori  and  the  Japanese  Army  hot-heads  he  represented 
lost  out  at  Shanghai  on  3  December.  But  a  tragic  instance  of 
what  such  men  were  capable  of  occurred  nine  days  later.  On  1 2 
December,  Japanese  naval  aircraft  attacked  and  sank  the  Ameri- 
can gunboat  Panay  on  the  Yangtze  above  Nanking.  Later  in- 
vestigation revealed  that  the  attack  was  no  accident  but  had  been 
deliberately  ordered  by  the  responsible  Japanese  commander.39 

Colonel  Price  cautioned  his  subordinates  to  be  on  the  alert 
against  further  Japanese  aggression.  "Any  incident,  such  as 
the  recent  bombing  on  Nanking  Road  in  Sector  "B",  which  re- 
sults in  the  movement  of  Japanese  military  personnel  into  the 
International  Settlement  within  the  present  perimeter  south  of 
Soochow  Creek,  is  of  vital  importance  to  this  Headquarters,"  he 
informed  his  battalion  commanders.  "Such  incidents  may 
rapidly  develop  to  the  point  that  the  Japanese  armed  forces  will 
attempt  to  enter,  take  control  of  and  patrol  areas  including  part 
or  all  of  Sector  'C.  Any  movement  into  the  International 
Settlement  or  increased  or  abnormal  activity  therein  by  Japanese 
armed  forces,"  he  directed  his  subordinates,  "will  be  reported 
immediately  to  this  Headquarters  .  .  .  ."  40 

A  series  of  Japanese  violations  of  Sector  "C"  confronted  the 
4th  Marines  during  February  1938.  Beginning  about  the  12th, 
Japanese  Army  patrols  attempted  to  enter  the  American  zone. 
When  detected,  they  were  turned  back  by  Marine  patrols;  and, 
on  the  1 6th,  Colonel  Price  reminded  the  Japanese  authorities 
that,  under  the  International  Defense  Agreement,  each  force  was 
responsible  for  its  assigned  sector.    The  Marines,  said  Price, 

38BriIntelO  msg  to  CG  2d  MarBrig,  dtd  7Dec37  (War  Plans  Sec  Files, 
Misc,  HistBr,  HQMC) ;  2d  MarBrig  B-2  Rept,  4Dec37  {China  File).  Fuka- 
bori's  remarks  were  repeated  to  Capt  Boone  by  a  bystander. 

39  Morison.  Rising  Sun  in  the  Pacific,  pp.  16-18. 

40  4th  Mar  field  msg  to  CO's  1st  and  2d  Bns,  dtd  4May38.  "China-Radio- 
grams, 3iOct24-6Dec39"  (War  Plans  Sec  Files,  Misc,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

519667 — 60  14 


182       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


could  keep  order  in  their  area.  The  Japanese,  in  a  conference 
with  Marine  officers  the  next  day,  said  that  the  patrols  were  to 
supervise  members  of  their  military  forces  who  might  enter  the 
American  sector  "informally."  Even  as  negotiations  were  in 
progress,  Marines  were  turning  back  a  13-man  Japanese  army 
patrol  at  the  sector  boundary.  Faced  with  the  Marine  refusal 
to  yield  on  the  issue  of  patrolling,  the  Japanese  backed  down,  and, 
on  the  1 8th,  Price  was  able  to  announce  an  agreement  by  the 
Japanese  to  keep  their  forces  out  of  Sector  "C".41 

This  agreement  did  not  put  an  end  to  incidents.  Another 
annoying  habit  of  the  Japanese  Army  was  to  run  vehicles  through 
Sector  "C"  without  seeking  permission  of  the  4th  Marines.  This 
traffic  became  so  heavy  that  Colonel  Price  protested  to  Japanese 
Army  Headquarters,  securing  an  agreement  on  24  March  that 
traffic  would  be  limited  to  30  trucks  a  day.  Within  a  week,  the 
agreement  had  been  violated  by  the  Japanese,  who  stepped  up 
their  truck  movements  through  the  American  sector  until  as 
many  as  260  were  counted  in  one  day.  Price  made  repeated 
protests  and  got  some  improvement,  but  incidents  continued.42 

A  violation  of  Sector  "C"  neutrality,  leading  to  the  arrest  of 
three  Japanese  soldiers,  occurred  on  13  August — the  first  anni- 
versary of  the  outbreak  of  Chinese- Japanese  hostilities  at  Shang- 
hai. Early  that  morning  Gunnery  Sergeant  Milton  C.  "Slug" 
Marvin,43  the  regimental  boxing  coach  and  a  hard-charging  non- 
com  with  a  reputation  for  aggressiveness  both  in  and  out  of  the 
ring,  was  leading  a  street  patrol  from  Company  H.  At  about 
0600  the  Marines  came  upon  a  Japanese  Army  car  parked  in 

41  The  New  York  Times,  i5-i8Feb38. 

42  Consul  Gen  Shanghai  msg  to  SecState,  dtd  2  7May38,  Foreign  Relations, 
1938,  v.  Ill,  p.  188. 

43  Marvin  was  typical  of  the  many  fine  professional  noncommissioned  offi- 
cers whom  the  Marine  Corps  bred  during  the  years  of  peace,  and  who  served 
with  distinction  in  commissioned  status  in  World  War  II.  As  a  member  of 
the  3d  Marine  Division  he  was  mortally  wounded  on  the  Asan-Adelup  beaches 
during  the  recapture  of  Guam  in  July  1 944.  He  was  posthumously  awarded 
the  Navy  Cross. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  183 


front  of  a  Chinese  home  on  Robinson  Road.  One  Japanese  was 
forcing  the  Chinese  home  owner  to  lower  and  hand  over  the 
Chinese  Nationalist  flag  at  the  point  of  a  pistol.  Marvin  and 
his  Marines  rushed  up  and  ordered  the  Japanese  and  three  others 
sitting  in  the  car  to  turn  over  their  arms.  One  refused  and  had 
to  be  persuaded  by  a  rifle  butt  stroke  to  the  head. 

Colonel  Price,  accompanied  by  some  other  officers,  arrived  at 
this  moment  and  ordered  the  Japanese  taken  to  the  Municipal 
Police  Station.  He  then  notified  the  chief  of  the  Japanese  Army 
Special  Service  Section,44  to  which  the  prisoners  belonged,  that 
his  men  had  been  picked  up  in  Sector  "C"  and  charged  with 
disturbing  the  peace  and  unlawful  possession  of  arms.  A  Jap- 
anese officer  called  at  the  police  station  and  signed  a  receipt  for  the 
prisoners,  who  were  then  released  in  his  custody.  With  this  ac- 
tion, the  incident  was  closed.45 

An  increase  in  acts  of  terrorism  within  the  International  Set- 
tlement— most  of  them  directed  at  Chinese  puppets  of  the 
Japanese — began  about  i  January  1939.  In  response,  the  Jap- 
anese authorities  demanded  of  the  Municipal  Council  the  right 
to  send  their  own  gendarme  patrols  into  the  Settlement  to  "main- 
tain order."  Acting  under  orders  from  Admiral  Yarnell,  Colonel 
Joseph  C.  Fegan,  who  had  relieved  Price  as  Commanding  Officer, 
4th  Marines,  on  24  October  1938,  appeared  before  the  Municipal 
Council  on  25  February  to  protest  any  agreement  allowing  Jap- 
anese forces  to  operate  in  Sector  "C".  The  next  day  the  council 
rejected  the  demands  but  agreed  to  cooperate  with  the  Japanese 
in  suppressing  terrorism  in  the  International  Settlement — the  de- 
tails to  be  worked  out  by  the  Commissioner  of  the  Municipal 
Police  and  the  commanding  officer  of  the  gendarmerie. 

Within  a  few  weeks  the  Japanese  interpretation  of  "coopera- 


44  The  Special  Service  Section  was  the  secret  police  organization  of  the 
Japanese  Army. 

45  The  New  York  Times,  i3~i4Aug38;  CinCAF  AnnRept,  fiscal  1939,  dtd 
iJul39(NA). 


184       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


tion"  was  clearly  revealed.  On  12  March,  Colonel  Fegan  was 
notified  by  the  Commissioner  of  the  Municipal  Police  that  the 
gendarmerie  had  established  an  office  in  the  Shanghai  Hotel, 
within  the  Settlement.  Acting  in  his  capacity  as  Senior  Garrison 
Commander,  Colonel  Fegan  called  a  meeting  on  the  13th  of  all 
concerned  at  the  office  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Municipal  Coun- 
cil. It  was  agreed  that  the  British  commander,  in  whose  sector 
the  Shanghai  Hotel  was  located,  would  write  a  letter  of  protest 
to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Japanese  gendarmerie. 

That  same  day  two  gendarmes  were  apprehended  in  the  Ameri- 
can Sector  attempting  to  arrest  a  Chinese.  Fegan  wrote  the 
gendarmerie  commander  protesting  this  unauthorized  invasion, 
but  no  reply  had  been  received  when,  on  20  March,  a  similar 
incident  took  place.  Three  gendarmes  entered  Sector  "C"  and 
arrested  four  Chinese  employees  of  a  business  concern  located 
there.  Before  a  letter  could  be  sent  protesting  this  action,  the 
Japanese  gendarmerie  commander  called  on  Colonel  Fegan  on 
22  March  and  apologized  for  the  incidents  of  the  13th  and  20th, 
stating  that  they  would  not  happen  again.  The  Japanese  was 
as  good  as  his  word,  and  the  incidents  stopped.46 

As  war  clouds  darkened  European  skies  during  the  summer 
of  1939,  Shanghai's  foreign  residents  worried  about  what  a  Euro- 
pean war  would  mean  for  them.  Rumors  were  plentiful  that 
the  Japanese  would  take  advantage  of  the  preoccupation  of  the 
colonial  powers  with  the  struggle  in  Europe  to  seize  the  Settle- 
ment and  the  Concession.  Reflecting  the  atmosphere  of  un- 
easiness, the  Assistant  U.S.  Naval  Attache,  Major  James  M. 
McHugh,  USMC,  cabled  to  the  Navy  Department  on  23  August 
that  he  had  "reliable  information  that  representatives  of  the 
orange  [Japanese]  army,  navy,  and  consular  service  of  this  area 
are  now  in  the  fatherland  with  detailed  plans  to  blockade  the  local 
concessions  ...  all  the  river  traffic  to  be  stopped  at  Woo- 
sung  ....    The  military  people,"  he  continued,  "estimate  that 

^CinCAF  AnnRept,  fiscal  1939  (CNO  Files,  RG  38,  NA). 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  185 


sufficient  troops  can  be  gathered  together  in  24  hours  to  effec- 
tively cut  off  the  Settlements  ....  Two  thousand  Nips  arrived 
Shanghai  via  railroad  from  Nanking  during  the  last  48  hours. 
French  have  reports  total  eight  transports  due  here  next  few 
days."  47 

It  was  with  a  vast  sigh  of  relief,  therefore,  that  Shanghai's 
foreign  population  greeted  the  outcome  of  a  defense  force  com- 
manders' meeting  on  14  September.  Instead  of  the  drastic 
measures  that  had  been  feared,  the  Japanese  proposed  only  to 
revise  the  International  Defense  Scheme.  This  document,  first 
drawn  up  in  1931  and  revised  in  1934,  had  been  rendered  obso- 
lete by  the  Japanese  conquest  of  Central  China.  But  the  pro- 
posed changes  were  totally  unacceptable  to  the  British  and 
Americans.  Calling  for  the  abandonment  by  the  British  of  the 
extra-Settlement  Western  Area  (Sector  "D"),  the  turning  over 
to  the  Italians  of  the  portion  of  Sector  "B"  north  of  Soochow 
Creek,  and  the  disbanding  of  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps, 
the  Japanese  proposals  were  nothing  more  than  a  thinly-veiled 
attack  on  the  integrity  of  the  Settlement.  The  adamant  opposi- 
tion of  the  British  and  American  defense  force  commanders  led 
the  Japanese  to  drop  their  plans.  No  changes  were  made  in  the 
International  Defense  Scheme.48 

Another  form  of  pressure  on  the  International  Settlement  was 
exerted  by  the  Shanghai  Special  City  Government  Municipal 
Police.  During  September  this  Japanese-dominated  native  con- 
stabulary began  patrolling  the  extra-Settlement  Western  Area 
in  detachments  numbering  as  many  as  25  men,  interfering  with 
the  International  Settlement  Municipal  Police  and  attempting 
to  usurp  their  authority  over  the  municipal  roads  outside  the 
Settlement.    The  4th  Marines  feared  that  the  Japanese  puppet 


*7Asst  ALUSNA  Shanghai  msg  to  OpNav,  dtd  23Aug39  (War  Plans  Sec 
Files,  Misc,  HistBr,  HQMC ) . 

^CinCAF  AnnRept,  fiscal  1940,  dtd  3oJun40  (2295-20-10  Central  Files, 
HQMC) ;  The  New  York  Times,  i4Sep39. 


186       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


police,  if  given  the  opportunity,  would  attempt  a  take-over  of 
law  enforcement  within  the  Settlement.  Any  of  its  members  ap- 
prehended in  uniform  within  Sector  "C"  were,  therefore,  taken 
into  custody  by  the  Marines  and  escorted  out  of  the  Sector.  This 
action  brought  forth  many  complaints  from  the  commanders  of 
the  puppet  police,  but  Colonel  Fegan  refused  to  meet  with  them 
or  to  listen  to  their  complaints.49 

To  the  problems  created  by  Japanese  pressure  on  the  Inter- 
national Settiement  was  added  another  when  Italy  entered  World 
War  II  on  the  side  of  Germany  in  June  1941.  The  Italians  and 
British,  now  enemies,  had  adjacent  defense  sectors,  and  their 
street  patrols  passed  within  a  few  yards  of  each  other.  Fearing 
trouble,  Colonel  DeWitt  Peck,  who  had  taken  command  of  the 
4th  Marines  on  3  January  1940,  hastened  to  call  separately  on 
the  Italian  and  British  commanders  to  urge  them  to  respect  the 
international  character  of  the  Settlement.  Both  readily  agreed 
in  principle  but  could  not  come  to  terms  regarding  policing  of 
liberty  areas  frequented  by  both  nationalities.  As  the  most  popu- 
lar recreation  spots  were  in  the  American  Sector,  Peck  finally 
secured  approval  for  joint  patrols  of  American,  British,  and 
Italians  under  American  command  in  the  areas  in  question  during 
liberty  hours.50 

There  were  no  serious  intrusions  on  the  neutrality  of  the 
American  Sector  by  the  Japanese  during  the  winter  and  spring 
of  1940,  but  this  new-found  policy  of  noninterference  was  rudely 
shattered  on  7  July.  This  was  the  anniversary  of  the  outbreak 
of  the  Sino- Japanese  war,  and,  as  usual  on  such  occasions,  special 
security  regulations  were  in  effect  throughout  the  International 
Settlement.  On  this  particular  anniversary  General  Juzo  Nishio, 
commander  of  Japanese  forces  in  Central  China,  chose  to  make 
a  tour  of  inspection  through  the  Settlement. 

49CinCAF  AnnRept,  fiscal  1940  (2295-20-10,  Central  Files,  HQMG). 
50  MajGen  DeWitt  Peck  ltr  to  ACofS,  G-3,  HQMG,  dtd  23J1U158  (Mono- 
graph &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC ) . 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  187 


Colonel  Peck  did  not  learn  of  Nishio's  presence  until  the  Jap- 
anese commander  had  arrived  at  a  reception  in  his  honor  at  the 
Palace  Hotel  in  the  American  Sector.  Peck  immediately  detailed 
a  heavy  escort  of  Marines  under  an  officer  to  accompany  the 
Japanese  commander  during  the  rest  of  his  inspection. 

Shortly  after  ordering  the  escort  for  General  Nishio,  Peck  re- 
ceived a  request  from  the  Shanghai  Municipal  Police  for  assist- 
ance in  arresting  a  number  of  Japanese  loitering  suspiciously  along 
Bubbling  Well  Road.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Eugene  F.  Collier  and 
25  Marines  of  his  1st  Battalion  responded  to  the  call  for  help  and 
picked  up  1 6  armed  Japanese.  Some  refused  to  surrender  their 
arms;  others  resisted  arrest  and  had  to  be  lifted  bodily  into  a 
truck  for  transportation  to  Marine  headquarters.  At  headquar- 
ters, the  men  were  identified  as  Japanese  gendarmes  assigned  to 
guard  Nishio's  route  of  inspection.  Their  leader  was  permitted 
to  telephone  his  superiors,  and  a  Japanese  gendarme  major  called 
at  4th  Marines'  headquarters  to  talk  with  the  prisoners.  He  was 
told  the  men  would  be  freed  whenever  a  responsible  officer  signed 
a  receipt  for  them.  He  refused  to  sign,  saying  he  did  not  have  the 
authority.  About  1500  Major  General  Saburo  Miura,  the  gen- 
darmerie commander,  called  on  Colonel  Peck  to  express  his  regret 
over  the  incident,  saying  it  was  all  a  mistake  and  would  not  hap- 
pen again.  The  prisoners  were  released  and  the  incident  appeared 
to  be  closed.51 

The  next  day  the  Japanese  Army  press  spokesman  delivered 
the  most  bitterly  anti-American  statement  issued  at  Shanghai 
since  the  beginning  of  hostilities  three  years  before.  He  accused 
the  4th  Marines  of  an  "unfriendly  act,"  and  with  "insulting  the 
honor  of  the  Japanese  gendarmes  and  the  Japanese  Army." 
According  to  the  spokesman,  "the  arrested  men  were  .  .  .  forced 
to  squat  while  the  Marines  covered  them  with  loaded  rifles,  the 

51  Ibid.;  CO  1/4  memo  for  ExO  4th  Mar,  dtd  18J11I40  (Subj  File:  China, 
HistBr,  HQMC) ;  CO  4th  Mar  ltr  to  MajGen  Saburo  Miura,  dtd  22JUI40, 
Foreign  Relations,  Japan  1931-1941 ,  v.  II,  pp.  101-104. 


188       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


gendarmes  being  treated  like  condemned  criminals  sentenced  to 
death.  The  arrested  men  were  also  struck  brutally  in  the  face 
when  they  asked  to  use  the  lavatory."  52 

Letters  from  General  Miura  and  Rear  Admiral  Moriji  Takeda, 
Special  Naval  Landing  Force  commander,  repeated,  practically 
word  for  word,  the  charges  made  by  the  army  spokesman.  And 
on  the  night  of  the  i  ith  a  Japanese  mass-meeting  heard  speakers 
denounce  America  and  the  Marines  and  demand  an  official 
apology  for  the  insult.53 

By  the  next  day,  calmer  heads  had  evidently  prevailed  among 
the  Japanese.  Colonel  Peck  wrote  Miura  stating  that  he  had 
conducted  an  exhaustive  investigation  and  that  the  Marines  were 
innocent  of  all  the  cruelties  charged.  The  statement  was  ac- 
cepted by  the  Japanese,  and  the  incident  was  closed.54 

A  new  threat  to  the  neutrality  of  the  International  Settlement 
came  up  on  i  o  August,  when  the  British  government  announced 
the  withdrawal  of  all  their  forces  from  Shanghai  and  North 
China.  On  the  15th  the  Defense  Committee  met  to  reallocate 
the  British  defense  sectors.  Rear  Admiral  Takeda  proposed  that 
his  forces  take  over  both  British  sectors,  and  Colonel  Peck 
countered  by  suggesting  that  both  sectors  be  given  to  the  4th 
Marines.  Failure  to  reach  an  agreement  led  to  a  temporary 
solution  on  20  August,  when  the  Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps 
took  over  Sector  "B" — the  heart  of  the  city.  Sector  "D"  was  not 
provided  for,  and  the  Japanese  gendarmerie  took  over  by  default. 
On  26  August  the  last  British  troops  departed,  leaving  the  4th 
Marines  and  the  Italians  as  the  only  foreign  garrisons  in  the 
International  Settlement.55 

About  a  week  after  the  British  troops  left,  the  Japanese  made 

52  Quoted  in  The  New  York  Times,  9J11I40. 
63  The  New  York  Times,  1 1 J11I40. 

54  The  New  York  Times,  12J11I40  ;  CO  4th  Mar  ltr  to  MajGen  Miura,  22 
JUI40,  Foreign  Relations,  Japan,  1Q31-IQ41 ,  v.  II,  p.  10 1. 

55  CinCAF  AnnRept  fiscal  1941,  dtd  nSep4i  (2295-20-10,  Central  Files, 
HQMC). 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  189 


another  challenge  to  the  Marine  position.  General  Miura  invited 
Peck  to  his  office  and,  as  senior  defense  force  commander,  ordered 
the  Marine  commander  to  abolish  one  of  the  posts  maintained  at 
the  American  end  of  a  bridge  over  Soochow  Creek.  Peck  re- 
fused, on  the  ground  that,  under  the  International  Defense 
Scheme,  Miura  lacked  the  authority  to  issue  him  orders.  Peck 
suggested  a  meeting  of  the  Defense  Committee  to  discuss  the 
matter,  but  no  meeting  was  ever  called.  It  was  Peck's  opinion 
that  the  Japanese  were  merely  feeling  him  out  to  see  how  far  the 
Americans  could  be  pushed,  now  that  they  no  longer  had  the 
support  of  British  forces.56 

WITHDRAWAL  FROM  SHANGHAI 

By  the  end  of  1940,  Admiral  Thomas  C.  Hart,  who  had  re- 
lieved Yarnell  as  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet  on  25  July 
1939,  was  convinced  that  war  with  Japan  was  inevitable.  In 
preparation  for  hostilities,  he  began  withdrawal  of  his  command 
from  their  dangerously  exposed  positions  along  the  China  coast. 
All  but  the  4th  Marines  and  the  Yangtze  River  Patrol  gunboats 
had  departed  by  early  1941.  Hart  had  suggested  withdrawal  of 
the  4th  Marines  at  the  same  time,  but  without  success.  By  the 
end  of  July,  "entirely  convinced  that  war  was  coming,"  he  dis- 
patched an  official  "appreciation"  urging  withdrawal  "in  the 
near  future."  57 

Hart's  convictions  were  well-founded.  On  26  July  President 
Roosevelt  froze  Japanese  assets  in  the  United  States,  thereby 
choking  off  trade  between  the  two  countries,  particularly  the 
essential  Japanese  imports  of  oil.    With  a  domestic  production 

36  MajGen  DeWitt  Peck  ltr  to  ACofS,  G-3,  HQMG,  dtd  23JU1158  (Mono- 
graph &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC) . 

87Adm  Thomas  G.  Hart,  Narrative  of  Events,  AsFlt,  Leading  up  to  War 
and  From  8Dec4i  to  i5Feb42,  written  before  njun42  (NavHistDiv) ;  and 
Hart  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  ioOct56  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr, 
HQMG). 


190       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


amounting  to  only  12  per  cent  of  her  annual  peacetime  needs, 
Japan  had  either  to  give  up  her  conquests  and  renounce  her 
plans  for  future  aggression,  or  accept  war  with  the  United  States 
and  seize  the  sources  of  oil  in  Southeast  Asia.  The  freezing  of 
Japanese  assets  was  the  last  of  a  series  of  moves  by  the  United 
States  to  halt  Japanese  expansion  in  Asia  by  steps  short  of  war. 
A  first  step  had  been  the  moral  embargo  on  the  export  of  aircraft 
to  Japan — declared  by  Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Hull  on  1  July 
1938  as  a  result  of  bombings  of  American  and  Chinese  civilians 
and  repeated  outrages  against  American  lives  and  property  in 
China.  The  shift  of  Japanese  conquest  to  the  southward,  begin- 
ning in  April  1939  with  the  seizure  of  Hainan  Island,  combined 
with  repeated  bombings  and  other  atrocities  against  civilians  in 
China,  had  led  to  the  move  of  the  United  States  Fleet  from  the 
West  Coast  to  Pearl  Harbor  in  May  of  1940.  Two  months  later, 
shipments  of  war  material  had  been  stopped. 

Japanese  occupation  of  northern  Indochina  in  August  and 
her  alliance  with  Germany  and  Japan  in  the  Tripartite  Pact, 
on  27  September  had  resulted  in  stepped-up  war  materials  re- 
strictions and  to  strategic  conversations  among  the  Americans, 
British,  and  Dutch  concerning  Pacific  defense.  When  the  Jap- 
anese completed  their  Indochina  occupation  in  July  1941, 
President  Roosevelt  countered  by  his  order  freezing  Japanese 
assets.58 

In  Shanghai,  the  4th  Marines  had  been  making  every  possible 
preparation  for  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  Colonel  Peck  had 
been  advised  by  Hart  as  early  as  November  1940  that  he  would 
withdraw  the  regiment  as  soon  as  possible.  To  clear  the  decks 
for  departure,  Peck  ordered  the  members  of  the  regiment  to  send 
their  families  home  in  December. 

After  departure  of  the  dependents,  Peck  prepared  a  desperate 
escape  plan,  to  be  put  into  effect  if  the  Japanese  attacked  the 
International  Settlement.    Mounted  in  all  available  motor  ve- 


Morison,  Rising  Sun  in  the  Pacific,  pp.  35-65. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  191 


hides,  the  4th  Marines  was  to  break  through  the  road  blocks 
on  the  Settlement  boundary  and  drive  west  towards  territory 
controlled  by  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

One  Japanese  division  was  known  to  be  astride  the  axis  of 
this  proposed  movement,  some  40  miles  west  of  Shanghai.  Peck 
intended  to  keep  the  4th  Marines  together  as  a  military  force  as 
long  as  possible.  But,  "when  the  regiment  hit  something  it 
couldn't  crack,"  the  men  were  to  be  instructed  to  break  up  into 
small  groups  and  attempt  to  make  their  way  as  best  they  could 
to  the  nearest  Nationalist-held  territory  and  then  to  Chungking, 
some  900  miles  away.  This  plan  was  never  put  in  writing,  but 
both  Admiral  Hart  and  the  battalion  commanders  were  told 
about  it — a  desperate  plan  to  be  sure  but  much  preferable  to 
laying  down  their  arms,  or  remaining  in  Shanghai  to  be 
pulverized  by  overwhelming  Japanese  military  strength.59 

January  and  February  passed  without  any  extraordinary  inci- 
dents. There  were  a  few  minor  episodes  involving  Marine  and 
Japanese  sentries  at  the  Soochow  Creek  bridges,  but  they  were 
all  settled  peacefully.  There  was  one  instance  of  the  seizure  of 
two  municipal  policemen  by  Japanese  in  the  American  sector. 
The  incident  was  settled  by  negotiation  and  the  men  released. 

In  March  the  regiment  faced  a  new  problem — this  time  in- 
volving the  security  of  Chinese  Nationalist  government  banks 
rather  than  the  integrity  of  the  International  Settlement.  These 
banks  had  continued  to  function  within  the  sanctuary  of  the  In- 
ternational Settlement  and  the  French  Concession,  much  to  the 
annoyance  of  the  Japanese.  On  24  March,  bombs  exploded 
simultaneously  in  the  Central  Bank  of  China  buildings  in  Sector 
"C"  and  the  French  Concession.  At  the  request  of  the  Municipal 
Police,  a  Marine  guard  was  posted  over  the  wreckage  in  the 
American  Sector.  On  1  April  the  bank  reopened  under  Marine 
guard.    Three  weeks  later,  attacks  were  made  on  judges  of  the 

58  MajGen  DeWitt  Peck  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  9J11I58  (Mono- 
graph &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC) . 


192       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Chinese  court  located  in  the  American  Sector.  As  a  result,  special 
Marine  outposts  were  established  in  support  of  the  Municipal 
Police  at  key  barrier  points  on  the  Sector  boundary.60 

The  summer  months  passed,  and  still  there  were  no  with- 
drawal orders.  In  September,  Colonel  Samuel  L.  Howard,  since 
14  May  1 94 1  the  commanding  officer  of  the  4th  Marines,  joined 
Rear  Admiral  William  A.  Glassford,  commander  of  the  Yangtze 
River  Patrol,  and  Consul  General  Frank  B.  Lockhart  in  urging 
upon  Admiral  Hart  an  immediate  withdrawal.  Hart  naturally 
concurred  and  proposed  to  the  Navy  Department  that  the  troops 
depart  on  the  Henderson,  due  to  make  a  routine  call  at  China 
ports  in  September.  But  approval  was  not  forthcoming,  the  De- 
partment replying  that  a  meeting  with  the  State  Department  was 
to  be  held  in  about  two  weeks  to  consider  the  problem.  Hart 
repeated  his  recommendation  for  withdrawal,  stating  that  "it  was 
not  a  question  that  could  be  delayed  for  weeks  but  must  be  acted 
on  immediately."  61  Finally,  on  10  November,  permission  was 
granted,  and  the  liners  President  Harrison  and  President  Madi- 
son were  chartered  for  the  purpose. 

Colonel  Howard  planned  to  embark  half  his  command  in  the 
Madison  on  the  27th,  and  the  remainder  in  the  Harrison  on  the 
30th.  The  2d  Battalion,  one  half  of  Headquarters  and  Service 
Company,  and  half  of  the  regimental  hospital  went  aboard  the 
Madison  on  the  27th  as  scheduled  and  departed  that  afternoon 
for  the  Philippines. 

At  about  1 000  that  day  Howard  received  orders  from  Hart  to 
speed  up  the  evacuation.  Howard,  Glassford,  and  the  captain 
of  the  Harrison  met  and  decided  to  load  the  remaining  Marines 
and  supplies  the  next  day  and  to  sail  not  later  than  that  afternoon. 

60CinCAF  AnnRept  fiscal  1941,  dtd  nSep4i  (2295-20-10,  Central  Files, 
HQMG ) . 

61  Quoted  in  BriGen  Samuel  L.  Howard,  Rept  on  the  Operation,  Employ- 
ment and  Supply  of  the  old  4th  Mar  from  Sep4i  to  the  surrender  of  Cor- 
regidor,  6May42,  made  from  memory  and  notes,  dtd  26Sep45  (Philippines 
Area  Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC ) ,  hereafter  Howard  Rept. 


JAPAN  GOES  TO  TOWN  193 


Major  Reginald  H.  Ridgely,  Jr.,  the  regimental  quartermaster, 
began  loading  at  once,  giving  priority  as  follows :  i )  ammunition ; 
2 )  field  equipment ;  3 )  medical  supplies ;  4 )  rations ;  5 )  motor 
transport;  6)  clothing;  7)  miscellaneous;  and  8)  household 
effects.  All  these  supplies  had  to  be  transported  to  the  dock, 
loaded  on  lighters  and  taken  out  to  the  ship  anchored  a  mile 
downstream.  The  Japanese  attempted  to  delay  the  loading  op- 
erations as  much  as  possible  without  actually  using  force.  During 
the  afternoon  they  closed  Garden  Bridge  over  Soochow  Creek 
to  traffic,  holding  up  the  Marine  trucks  for  over  an  hour  until 
Colonel  Howard  could  contact  the  Japanese  commander  and 
get  the  bridge  reopened.  Customs  officials,  evidently  acting  under 
instructions  from  the  Japanese,  insisted  that  all  the  supplies  pass 
through  customs.  Ridgely  and  his  men  ignored  these  instructions 
and  loaded  the  gear  directly  aboard  lighters.  During  the  night, 
the  Japanese  instigated  three  strikes  among  the  stevedores.  In 
spite  of  this  interference  more  than  500  tons  of  supplies  were 
aboard  the  Harrison  by  1 300  on  28  November. 

About  0900,  the  remainder  of  the  4th  Marines  formed  outside 
the  1  st  Battalion  billet  and  marched  down  Bubbling  Well  and 
Nanking  Roads  to  the  President  Line  dock  on  the  Bund.  Thou- 
sands of  cheering  people  waving  American  and  Chinese  flags 
lined  the  streets  to  see  the  regiment,  which  had  played  such  an 
intimate  part  in  community  life  for  over  1 4  years,  parade  through 
the  Settlement  for  the  last  time.  At  the  dock,  members  of  the 
Municipal  Council,  the  foreign  consuls  and  diplomatic  represen- 
tatives, the  commanding  officers  of  all  military  units,  including 
the  Japanese,  and  the  heads  of  many  civic  organizations  were 
gathered  to  bid  the  Marines  farewell. 

All  hands  boarded  a  power  lighter  and  were  ferried  down- 
stream to  the  waiting  President  Harrison.  At  1400,  on  28  No- 
vember, the  ship  dropped  her  mooring  and  headed  down  the 
Whangpoo,  bound  for  the  Philippines. 


CHAPTER  VII 


Defense  of  the  Philippines 


The  4th  Marines'  first  campaign  of  World  War  II  ended  in 
defeat  and  captivity.  Committed  to  the  defense  of  Corregidor 
and  Bataan  in  the  Philippines,  the  regiment,  along  with  the  other 
American  and  Filipino  forces,  finally  surrendered  to  overwhelm- 
ing Japanese  strength  on  6  May  1942.  But  the  four  months  of 
stubborn  resistance  slowed  the  Japanese  timetable  of  conquest 
and  won  time  for  the  mobilization  of  American  industry  and  man- 
power. As  a  stimulant  to  sagging  morale,  the  Philippine  cam- 
paign was  equally  important.  Not  since  the  Alamo  had  such  in- 
spiration been  drawn  from  a  battle  lost.  Though  defeated,  the 
American  soldiers,  sailors,  and  Marines,  by  their  heroic  defense 
against  overwhelming  odds,  inspired  their  comrades  in  arms  and 
the  civilians  back  home  to  redouble  their  efforts  for  final  victory.1 

FIRST  DAYS  IN  THE  PHILIPPINES 

The  4th  Marines  arrived  in  the  Philippines  just  a  week  before 
the  outbreak  of  war — on  30  November  and  1  December  when 
the  first  and  second  echelons  debarked  from  the  President  Madi- 

1  Unless  otherwise  noted  this  chapter  is  based  on  LtCol  Frank  O.  Hough, 
Maj  Verle  E.  Ludwig,  and  Henry  I.  Shaw,  Jr.,  Pearl  Harbor  to  Guadalcanal — 
History  of  U.S.  Marine  Corps  Operations  in  World  War  II,  v.  I  (Washington: 
HistBr,  HQMC,  1958),  pp.  155-202;  Louis  Morton,  The  Fall  of  the  Philip- 
pines— The  War  in  the  Pacific — United  States  Army  in  World  War  II 
(Washington:  OCMH,  Dept  of  the  Army,  1953),  hereafter  Morton,  Fall  of 
the  Philippines;  Howard  Rept. 

195 


196       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


son  and  President  Harrison  at  Olongapo.  At  this  naval  station 
on  Subic  Bay,  work  was  still  in  progress  on  hastily  constructed 
housing  for  the  regiment.  About  half  the  Marines  moved  into 
the  incompleted  buildings;  the  remainder  went  under  canvas  on 
the  station  rifle  range. 

The  regiment  was  assigned  its  mission  on  3  December  when 
Colonel  Howard  reported  to  Admiral  Hart  in  Manila.  The  4th 
Marines  was  to  defend  the  Olongapo  Naval  Station  and  the  Mari- 
veles  Naval  Section  Base,  at  the  mouth  of  Manila  Bay  on  Bataan, 
the  peninsula  forming  the  Bay's  northern  side.  (See  Map  14.) 
The  defensive  missions  would  be  performed  under  the  direction 
of  Rear  Admiral  Francis  W.  Rockwell,  Commandant  16th  Nava) 
District,  who,  on  5  December,  directed  Howard  to  transfer  a 
battalion  to  Mariveles  on  the  8th.  Preparations  for  quartering 
and  rationing  these  troops  were  made  by  the  4th  Marines'  com- 
mander on  6  December  during  a  personal  reconnaissance  of  the 
Mariveles  area. 

The  4th  Marines  was  ill-prepared  for  combat  operations  when 
it  arrived  in  the  Philippines.  It  was  only  a  skeleton  unit,  the 
result  of  Admiral  Hart's  policy  of  holding  back  replacements  to 
Shanghai,  where  capture  by  the  Japanese  was  a  danger.  Total 
strength  of  the  regiment  was  only  44  officers  and  772  enlisted 
men,  organized  into  Headquarters  and  Service  Companies  and 
two  battalions,  each  including  a  machine  gun  and  two  rifle  com- 
panies which  lacked  their  third  platoons.  Howard  planned  to 
increase  regimental  strength  by  adding  Marines  of  the  Olongapo 
guard  detachment,  but  he  delayed  making  these  transfers  because 
of  the  possibility  that  the  4th  Marines  might  be  ordered  to  move 
out  on  a  new  mission.  According  to  rumors,  which  Colonel 
Howard  was  unable  to  confirm  or  disprove,  the  U.S.  Army  com- 
mand in  the  Philippines  wanted  the  regiment  for  guard  duty  at 
its  Manila  headquarters  or  to  train  Filipino  troops.  In  either 
event  a  security  force  would  have  to  be  left  behind  for  the 
Olongapo  installation. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  197 


198       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


In  addition  to  the  two  naval  installations  guarded  by  the 
4th  Marines,  there  was  one  other  in  the  Manila  Bay  area.  Situ- 
ated at  Cavite  on  Manila  Bay  a  few  miles  from  the  capital, 
it  was  the  major  base  for  the  Asiatic  Fleet.  Guarding  Cavite 
was  the  1st  Separate  Marine  Battalion,  a  unique  organization 
trained  to  function  either  as  infantry  or  antiaircraft  artillery. 
The  unit  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  John  P.  Adams 
and  numbered  about  400  officers  and  men. 

The  U.S.  Asiatic  Fleet,  which  based  on  these  shore  stations, 
was  responsible  for  the  naval  defense  of  the  Philippines.  But 
its  strength  of  only  3  cruisers,  13  destroyers,  29  submarines, 
miscellaneous  auxiliary  vessels,  and  32  PBY  patrol  aircraft  was 
obviously  no  match  for  the  Japanese  naval  power  which  could 
be  sent  against  the  islands.  Admiral  Hart,  therefore,  was  au- 
thorized to  shift  his  base  of  operations  south  to  a  British  or  Dutch 
port  at  his  discretion,  leaving  the  ground  and  air  forces  to  defend 
the  Philippines  with  very  little  in  the  way  of  naval  support. 

General  Douglas  MacArthur's  United  States  Army  Forces  in 
the  Far  East  (USAFFE)  included  31,000  U.S.  Army  troops 
and  approximately  120,000  officers  and  men  of  the  Philippine 
National  Army.  The  military  value  of  the  latter  component 
was  dubious  in  view  of  the  fact  that  most  of  its  men  were  un- 
trained and  poorly  equipped,  particularly  in  supporting  arms. 
In  the  air,  Mac  Arthur  could  muster  a  force  of  35  modern  heavy 
bombers  and  107  fighters.  With  these  forces  the  USAFFE  com- 
mander planned  to  defend  every  inch  of  Philippine  soil.  His 
plan,  put  into  effect  during  the  summer  and  fall  of  1941,  was 
far  more  optimistic  than  the  previous  concept  of  defending  only 
Bataan. 

WAR  COMES 

Even  as  Colonel  Howard  and  the  4th  Marines  were  busy  with 
plans  and  preparations  for  war,  time  was  rapidly  running  out. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  199 


Already  the  Japanese  carrier  force  was  preparing  to  launch  the 
attack  which  was  to  cripple  the  U.S.  Pacific  Fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor. 
And  at  0350  on  8  December2  the  radio  operator  at  Olongapo 
picked  up  this  message  from  Admiral  Hart  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet: 
"Japan  started  hostilities,  govern  yourselves  accordingly."  3 

A  few  moments  later  the  shrill  sound  of  the  naval  station 
power  plant  whistle  roused  the  Marines  from  their  early  morning 
slumbers.  The  Marine  sentry  at  the  main  gate  started  pounding 
the  ship's  bell  of  the  old  USS  Fulton,  and  the  bugler  sounded 
"Call  to  Arms."  As  the  men  mustered  in  front  of  their  barracks 
and  tents  they  were  put  to  work  digging  foxholes  and  setting  up 
machine  guns  for  antiaircraft  defense.  In  the  midst  of  the  con- 
fusion, Lieutenant  Colonel  Curtis  T.  Beecher's  1st  Battalion 
departed  aboard  the  naval  tug  Vaga  for  Mariveles.  Next  day 
the  regiment  established  a  bivouac  area  two  miles  from  Olongapo 
for  use  if  enemy  air  attacks  should  make  the  naval  station  un- 
tenable. Impressing  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  on  all  hands 
was  the  transfer  of  the  band  to  the  2d  Battalion  for  duty  as  a 
rifle  platoon.4 

Air  raid  alarms  came  at  frequent  intervals  during  the  first  few 
days  of  hostilities.  All  proved  to  be  false  until  12  December, 
when  a  flight  of  carrier-based  Zeroes  followed  a  Navy  PBY  flight 
into  its  anchorage  off  the  naval  station.  The  Japanese  pilots 
caught  the  flying  boats  at  their  moorings  and  destroyed  them 
all.  Turning  inland,  the  enemy  fliers  strafed  the  naval  station. 
Marines  on  the  ground  opened  up  with  what  they  had — .30  cali- 
ber machine  guns  and  rifles.  Two  Marines  on  top  of  the  water 
tower  enjoyed  themselves  firing  at  low-flying  planes  with  BARs 

2  All  times  are  local  time.  Because  of  the  international  dateline,  7  Decem- 
ber in  Hawaii  was  8  December  in  the  Philippines. 

3  4th  Mar  Rec  of  Events,  8Dec4i.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  all  official 
documents  are  in  Philippine  Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMG. 

4  This  transfer  made  such  an  impression  on  the  sergeant  who  kept  the 
regimental  Record  of  Events  that  he  entered  the  fact  with  an  exclamation 
point. 


200       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


until  one  of  the  Japanese  located  them.  A  game  of  hide-and- 
seek  around  the  tower  followed  as  the  Marines  tried  to  keep  it 
between  themselves  and  the  enemy.  The  Japanese  pilots  were 
unsuccessful,  and  only  succeeded  in  making  a  sieve  of  the  water 
tank. 

The  enemy  was  back  the  next  day — this  time  with  27  bomb- 
ers flying  above  the  range  of  the  Marines'  .30  caliber  machine 
guns.  The  only  bomb  damage  was  in  the  town  of  Olongapo, 
where  several  houses  were  set  afire  and  the  church  was  hit.  The 
naval  station  escaped  damage  altogether,  but  the  Marine  hospital, 
located  in  Gordon's  Riverside  Cabaret  on  the  north  side  of 
town,  was  straddled  by  bombs  and  had  to  be  moved  to  a  more 
secure  location  about  a  mile  farther  out  on  the  Manila  road. 
Two  Marines  were  wounded.  One,  Colonel  Howard's  chauf- 
feur, leapt  from  his  car  and  was  running  for  shelter  when  the 
concussion  from  an  exploding  bomb  blew  him  through  a  bamboo 
fence.  The  Filipino  civilians  were  not  so  fortunate.  One  bomb 
hit  into  a  crowd  who  were  standing  under  a  tree  watching  the 
raid,  killing  22  persons  and  wounding  many  more.  The  Jap- 
anese returned  on  the  20th  and  attacked  Fort  Wint,  a  harbor 
defense  post  on  an  island  in  Subic  Bay.  Marksmanship  was 
poor,  and  all  bombs  fell  in  the  bay.5 

Defense  of  the  Olongapo  area  from  Japanese  landing  over 
nearby  beaches  or  advancing  from  the  north  was  one  of  Colonel 
Howard's  chief  worries.  News  that  the  Japanese  had  landed 
on  northern  Luzon  on  10  December  spurred  the  Marines  to 
hasten  defensive  preparations  covering  both  approaches.  The 
expected  enemy  attack  appeared  imminent  on  22  December 
when,  at  0130,  Hart  alerted  the  4th  Marines  to  prepare  for 
action  under  USAFFE  command  against  a  major  Japanese 
landing  attempt  expected  momentarily  at  Lingayen  Gulf.  The 
regiment  was  also  alerted  for  a  secondary  Japanese  landing  at 

5  CWO  Charles  R.  Jackson  ltr  to  CMC,  ioOct56  (Monograph  &  Comment 
File,  HistBr,  HQMC) . 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  201 


Subic  Bay  or  at  Bagac  some  20  miles  to  the  south  on  the  west 
coast  of  Bataan.6  By  daybreak  the  regiment  was  ready  to  move 
out,  but,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  came  ashore  at 
Lingayen  as  expected,  no  orders  committing  the  4th  Marines 
came  from  MacArthur's  headquarters.  The  Japanese  secondary 
landings  failed  to  materialize. 

The  4th  Marines  was  transferred  from  Navy  to  Army  control 
on  22  December  after  repeated  requests  from  MacArthur's  head- 
quarters. The  first  request  had  been  made  on  13  December  to 
Lieutenant  Colonel  William  T.  Clement,  Fleet  Marine  Officer, 
Asiatic  Fleet,  when  he  visited  USAFFE  headquarters.  On  that 
occasion,  Mac  Arthur  had  been  most  flattering  in  his  praise  of 
Marines.  He  said  he  knew  Marines  wanted  to  be  in  the  thick 
of  it  and  that  he  had  just  the  job  for  them  as  guards  for  his 
headquarters.  Clement  replied  that  all  available  Marines  were 
still  engaged  in  naval  assignments  but  that  he  was  sure  that 
Admiral  Hart  would  want  them  used  to  the  best  advantage  when, 
and  if,  they  were  released  from  naval  duties.  After  he  left  Gen- 
eral MacArthur's  office,  Clement  discussed  the  employment  of 
Marines  with  Brigadier  General  Richard  K.  Sutherland, 
USAFFE  Chief  of  Staff,  who  listed  three  possible  missions :  1 )  as 
guards  for  MacArthur's  headquarters ;  2 )  defense  of  the  Bataan 
Peninsula  south  of  the  Limay-Bagac  Road;  and  3)  defense  of 
the  beaches  of  Corregidor,  a  fortified  island  at  the  mouth  of 
Manila  Bay.  This  was  the  first  time  Corregidor  had  been 
mentioned  as  a  Marine  mission. 

The  next  day  Sutherland  called  on  Admiral  Hart  to  discuss 
Marine  employment,  and  on  the  following  day,  the  1 5th,  General 
MacArthur  brought  up  the  subject  again.  At  this  time  Admiral 
Hart  said  he  would  release  the  Marines  to  the  tactical  control 
of  USAFFE  when  no  longer  needed  for  naval  duties.  But  he 
insisted  that  the  Marines  serve  in  a  combat  mission  and  preserve 

6CinCAF  msg  to  CO  4th  Mar,  0130  22Dec41,  copy  in  4th  Mar  Rec  of 
Events,  22Dec41. 


202       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


their  identity  as  the  4th  Marines.  In  addition,  all  other  naval 
personnel  released  to  the  Army,  both  sailors  and  Marines,  were 
to  be  assigned  to  the  regiment.  On  the  20th,  MacArthur  for- 
mally requested  that  the  4th  Marines  be  placed  at  his  disposal  as 
soon  as  they  could  be  spared.  And  on  the  2 2d,  when  the  Jap- 
anese successfully  landed  in  force  at  Lingayen  Gulf,  Admiral 
Hart  released  the  regiment  to  Army  control. 

Colonel  Howard  reported  to  Manila  for  instructions  on  the 
24th.  He  called  first  at  Asiatic  Fleet  headquarters  in  the  Mars- 
man  building,  where  Hart,  who  was  preparing  to  leave  Manila 
the  following  day,  assigned  him  the  1st  Separate  Battalion  and 
told  him  to  report  to  General  MacArthur  for  orders. 

Howard,  accompanied  by  Clement,  then  went  to  USAFFE 
headquarters  where  he  found  everything  in  confusion,  as  the  head- 
quarters personnel  were  packing  for  departure  to  Corregidor. 
MacArthur  greeted  the  two  Marines  with  his  usual  cordiality 
but  cut  the  interview  short.  General  Sutherland  then  took  over 
and  painted  a  gloomy  picture  of  the  military  situation.  The 
Japanese  had  landed  in  force  in  northern  and  southern  Luzon, 
had  pushed  back  the  American  and  Filipino  defenders,  and  were 
converging  on  Manila  from  three  directions. 

The  city  was  even  then  being  evacuated  by  the  military  forces, 
and  MacArthur  had  ordered  a  withdrawal  into  Bataan  for  a 
last-ditch  stand.  Originally  USAFFE  hoped  to  employ  the  4th 
Marines  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  Philippine  Army  from 
the  Lingayen  area.  But  the  enemy  advance  had  been  too  swift 
to  permit  an  employment  of  the  Marines  in  a  blocking  position. 
Sutherland  ordered  Howard  to  withdraw  all  Marines  to  Mari- 
veles  and  then  to  Corregidor  for  defense  of  the  beaches.7 

Howard  then  returned  to  Asiatic  Fleet  headquarters  and  in- 
formed Hart  of  the  orders  from  USAFFE  to  withdraw  the  4th 
Marines  to  Corregidor.   As  he  was  leaving  Hart's  office,  the  4th 


7  FltMarO,  USAsFlt  rept  to  CMC,  dtd  6Apr42. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  203 


Marines  commander  met  Admiral  Rockwell  who  ordered  the 
immediate  destruction  of  the  Olongapo  Naval  Station. 

Returning  to  Olongapo,  Howard  set  in  motion  the  withdrawal 
of  the  4th  Marines  to  Mariveles.  About  2200  the  advance  eche- 
lon, a  platoon  each  of  Companies  F  and  H  and  a  detachment  of 
regimental  headquarters,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Col- 
onel Donald  Curtis,  departed  by  truck  for  the  new  station.  And 
the  next  day,  Christmas,  all  but  a  demolition  party  and  a  small 
rear  guard  moved  to  Mariveles. 

No  better  man  could  have  been  found  to  demolish  the  naval 
station  than  Captain  Francis  H.  "Joe"  Williams.  Years  before, 
as  a  young  2d  lieutenant  at  Philadelphia,  Williams  had  lost 
several  days  quarters'  allowance  through  a  legal  technicality.  He 
jokingly  claimed  that  his  demolition  assignment  was  his  chance 
to  get  even  with  Uncle  Sam,  but  he  went  about  the  job  so  thor- 
oughly that  his  fellow  officers  thought  he  might  have  been  half- 
serious.  Using  demolition  charges  improvised  from  300-pound 
submarine  mines,  Williams  and  his  crew  set  about  "erasing  the 
naval  station  from  the  face  of  the  globe."  8  What  they  did  not 
blow  up  they  burned  down,  leaving  only  the  Marine  barracks 
standing  because  it  was  too  close  to  the  town  of  Olongapo  to  be 
burned  without  danger  to  civilian  property.  The  final  act  of 
destruction  was  the  sinking  of  the  old  armored  cruiser  Rochester 
to  block  the  channel — an  attempt  which  failed  when  she  drifted 
at  the  last  moment. 

The  last  Marines  left  the  smoking  ruins  of  the  Olongapo  Naval 
Station  after  dark  on  Christmas  night  to  join  the  main  body  of 
the  regiment  at  Mariveles.  The  bivouac  site  there  was  at  an  old 
Army  rest  area  called  "Camp  Carefree" — a  somewhat  ironic 
designation  in  view  of  the  situation.  The  1st  Battalion  had  been 
there  since  7  December  and  had  been  joined  on  the  23d  by  the 
forward  echelon  of  the  1st  Separate  Battalion  from  Cavite.  The 

8  Capt  Frank  W.  Ferguson,  Personal  Experiences,  8Dec41  to  6May42,  with 
the  4th  Marines,  hereafter  Ferguson  Rept. 


204       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


remainder  of  this  unit  arrived  on  the  25th  and  26th.  Already 
the  1  st  Battalion,  4th  Marines  had  suffered  casualties  of  two  men 
killed  and  three  wounded  when  the  merchant  ship  they  were 
guarding  at  Mariveles  had  been  bombed  by  the  Japanese  on  the 
24th. 

THE  MOVE  TO  CORREGIDOR 

The  movement  to  Corregidor  began  on  the  night  of  26  Decem- 
ber, when  14  officers  and  397  men  of  the  1st  Separate  Battalion 
were  ferried  across  the  seven  and  a  half  miles  of  water  separating 
the  island  from  the  Bataan  shore.  On  the  next  night  the  re- 
mainder of  the  1st  Separate  Battalion,  the  2d  Battalion  (less 
Company  F ) ,  and  an  advance  echelon  of  regimental  head- 
quarters crossed.  On  the  28th  all  remaining  troops  of  the  regi- 
ment, except  a  detachment  of  Sendee  Company,  and  Batteries 
A  and  C,  1st  Separate  Battalion  displaced  to  Corregidor. 

The  Marines  moved  from  the  dock  by  narrow-gauge  electric 
railway  to  their  new  quarters  in  Middleside  Barracks,  a  modern 
concrete,  and  supposedly  bombproof,  structure.  In  addition  to 
the  troops,  rations  for  2,000  men  for  six  months,  10  units  of  fire 
for  all  weapons,  two  years'  supply  of  summer  khaki,  and  medicines 
and  equipment  for  a  100-bed  hospital  were  brought  along. 

The  transfer  to  the  island  fortress  was  greeted  with  enthusiasm 
by  all  hands.  Although  none  of  the  Marines  had  ever  been  there 
before,  they  talked  knowingly  of  impregnable  defenses,  barracks 
buried  deep  underground,  and  passages  leading  direct  to  gun 
positions.  From  Mariveles  Japanese  bombers  had  been  seen  ma- 
neuvering out  of  range  of  the  island  fortress'  antiaircraft  batteries, 
leading  to  the  belief  that  the  Japanese  did  not  dare  bomb  it.9 

The  illusion  was  quickly  shattered.  Shortly  before  noon  on  29 
December  air-raid  sirens  wailed,  but  no  one  paid  much  attention 


B  LtCol  Robert  F.  Jenkins,  Jr.,  informal  rept  of  defense  of  Corregidor,  n.d., 
hereafter  Jenkins  Rept. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  205 


because  Corregidor  had  never  been  bombed  before.  A  few 
minutes  later  all  hell  broke  loose.  There  was  the  roar  of  planes, 
bombs  screaming  down  and  exploding  with  a  crash,  the  crack 
of  antiaircraft  guns,  and  the  neat  "plop  plop"  of  their  shells 
bursting  all  over  the  sky.  "There  we  were,"  reported  one  offi- 
cer, "the  whole  regiment  flat  on  our  bellies  on  the  lower  deck  of 
Middleside  Barracks."  10  An  Army  officer  came  into  the  room 
and  said  not  to  worry  because  the  roof  was  bombproof.  No 
sooner  had  he  spoken  than  a  bomb  hit  and  penetrated  the  roof  at 
the  other  end  of  the  building  but  failed  to  explode.  When  the 
Japanese  aircraft  finally  withdrew  at  a  little  after  1400,  the 
building  was  a  shambles  from  the  concussion  of  near  misses,  but 
Marine  casualties  were  remarkably  low — only  one  killed  and  four 
wounded. 

CORREGIDOR  AND  ITS  DEFENSES 

By  the  time  the  last  Japanese  bomber  withdrew,  most  of  the 
myth  of  Corregidor  as  a  Gibraltar  of  the  Far  East  had  gone  up 
in  smoke.  In  actual  fact,  Corregidor  was  far  from  an  impreg- 
nable fortress  in  December  1 94 1 .  Originally  intended  to  defend 
the  entrance  of  Manila  Bay,  its  fortifications,  as  completed  in 
1 9 14,  were  designed  to  withstand  attack  by  the  most  powerful 
naval  vessels  then  in  existence.  The  advent  of  the  military  air- 
plane greatly  weakened  this  elaborate  system  of  fortification,  and, 
under  the  terms  of  the  Washington  Naval  Treaty  of  1922,  addi- 
tional defenses  or  a  modernization  of  those  already  built  was 
prohibited.  An  elaborate  tunnel  system  under  Malinta  Hill, 
ostensibly  for  storage  of  supplies,  was  the  only  major  construction 
undertaken  after  1922.  When  the  Japanese  attacked  in  Decem- 
ber 1 94 1,  the  defenses  were  practically  the  same  as  they  had 
been  20  years  before. 

Corregidor  is  a  tadpole-shaped  island  three  and  a  half  miles 


Ferguson  Rept. 


206       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


long  and  one  and  a  half  miles  across  at  its  widest  point.  Situ- 
ated in  the  mouth  of  Manila  Bay,  it  lies  about  two  and  a  half 
miles  from  Bataan  and  about  eight  and  a  half  miles  from  the 
opposite  shore.  The  broad  western  end  of  the  island  constitutes 
the  tadpole's  head.  Rising  about  500  feet  above  the  water,  it 
is  named  Topside.  Here  were  located  the  headquarters,  some 
barracks,  and  officers'  quarters.  To  the  east  of  Topside  is  a 
lower  plateau  called  Middleside.  The  hospital,  service  club,  and 
additional  barracks  were  located  here,  and  it  was  in  Middleside 
barracks  that  the  4th  Marines  was  quartered  upon  arrival  on 
Corregidor.  East  of  Middleside  the  island  narrows  sharply  to 
form  the  tadpole's  tail.  At  the  base  of  the  tail  were  the  docks, 
shops,  warehouses,  power  plant,  and  cold  storage  buildings  in  an 
area  known  as  Bottomside.  East  of  Bottomside  is  Malinta  Hill, 
containing  a  maze  of  tunnels.  Beyond  the  hill  the  island  trails 
off  to  a  point,  with  Kindley  Field,  a  light  plane  strip,  located 
near  the  end  of  the  tail. 

The  seacoast  defenses  of  the  fortified  islands  were  formidable. 
On  Corregidor  no  fewer  than  56  guns,  ranging  in  size  from 
3-  to  12-inch  caliber,  bristled  to  seaward.  On  the  lesser  islands 
were  an  additional  39  seacoast  weapons  of  calibers  from  3-  to 
14-inches.  For  antiaircraft  defense  Corregidor  boasted  28  3-inch 
guns  and  48  .50  caliber  machine  guns.  On  the  other  islands 
were  ten  3 -inch  guns. 

The  weakness  in  Corregidor's  defenses  became  all  too  obvious 
to  the  Marines  when  they  took  over  the  island's  beach  defenses 
on  29  December.  Colonel  Howard  had  reported  early  that 
morning  to  Major  General  George  F.  Moore,  USA,  command- 
ing the  harbor  defenses  of  Manila  Bay,  and  had  been  appointed 
beach  defense  commander  of  Corregidor,  relieving  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Delbert  Ausmus,  USA.  Accompanied  by  Colonel  Sam- 
uel McCullough,  USA,  Moore's  intelligence  officer,  Howard  had 
made  a  reconnaissance  of  the  island  and  had  just  completed  it 
when  the  Japanese  bombers  struck  at  noon. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  207 


As  soon  as  the  "all  clear"  sounded,  Howard  assigned  defense 
sectors  to  his  battalions,  and  before  dark  the  troops  moved  out 
to  the  new  bivouac  areas.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Curtis  T.  Beech- 
er's  i  st  Battalion  took  over  the  East  Sector — the  area  from  Malinta 
Hill  (inclusive)  to  the  tail  of  the  island.  The  ist  Separate  Bat- 
talion, which  was  redesignated  3/4  on  1  January,  occupied  the 
Middle  Sector,  including  the  beaches  of  Bottomside  and  most 
of  Middleside  up  to  a  line  including  Morrison  Hill  and  Govern- 
ment Ravine.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Herman  R.  Anderson's 
2d  Battalion  became  responsible  for  the  West  Sector,  embracing 
the  remainder  of  the  island.  A  regimental  reserve  from  Head- 
quarters and  Service  Companies  under  Major  Stuart  W.  King 
bivouacked  in  Government  Ravine. 

In  addition  to  the  beach  defense  mission  at  Corregidor,  the 
4th  Marines  was  assigned  similar  duties  at  Forts  Hughes  and 
Drum  and  antiaircraft  missions  on  Bataan  and  Corregidor. 
Between  30  December  and  5  January  two  machine  gun  platoons 
from  3/4,  one  .50  and  the  other  .30  caliber,  and  a  ten-man 
detachment  from  2/4  with  four  more  .30's  were  assigned  to 
bolster  the  defenses  of  Fort  Hughes.  To  Fort  Drum,  3/4  dis- 
patched a  section  of  14  men  equipped  with  two  .50's.  A  .50 
caliber  machine  gun  platoon  of  3/4  added  six  antiaircraft  weap- 
ons to  Battery  I,  60th  Coast  Artillery  (AA)  on  Corregidor,  while 
two  additional  antiaircraft  units  of  3/4,  which  had  been  left  at 
Mariveles,  bolstered  the  defenses  of  Bataan.  These  were  Battery 
C  (65  officers  and  men)  manning  3-inch  guns,  and  Battery  A 
(64  officers  and  men)  manning  .50  caliber  machine  guns. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  POINTS 

The  Marines  of  Batteries  A  and  C  were  the  first  of  the  4th 
Marines  to  meet  Japanese  ground  troops  in  combat.  As  mem- 
bers of  the  naval  battalion,  which  had  been  organized  to  defend 
the  Mariveles  Naval  Section  Base,  they  attacked  an  enemy  land- 


208       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 

ing  force  attempting  to  outflank  the  American  battle  line  across 
Bataan.11  When  MacArthur  had  withdrawn  into  Bataan  he 
organized  his  forces  into  three  commands — I  and  II  Corps,  man- 
ning the  line,  and  Service  Command,  including  all  Bataan  south 
of  the  corps  rear  boundaries  except  for  the  Mariveles  Naval  Reser- 
vation. To  defend  Service  Command's  more  than  40  miles  of 
extremely  rugged  coast  line  there  was  only  a  hodgepodge  of 
Philippine  army  and  constabulary  troops  and  five  grounded  U.S. 
Army  pursuit  squadrons. 

The  Navy  Section  Base  at  Mariveles  was  not  included  in  the 
Service  Command  but  remained  under  naval  control.  For  de- 
fense, a  naval  battalion  was  formed  under  Commander  Francis 
J.  Bridget,  the  senior  naval  aviator  in  the  Philippines.  Beached 
and  grounded  sailors  constituted  most  of  Bridget's  battalion. 
Numbering  about  480  in  all,  the  bluejackets  included  150  from 
Air,  Asiatic  Fleet,  130  from  the  submarine  tender  Canopus,  80 
from  the  Cavite  Naval  Ammunition  Depot,  and  120  general  duty 
men  from  Cavite  and  Mariveles.  Giving  a  much  needed  leaven 
of  infantry  experience  to  the  naval  battalion  were  the  some  120 
Marines  of  Batteries  A  and  C. 

First  Lieutenant  Willard  C.  Holdredge's  Battery  C  set  up  its 
3-inch  antiaircraft  guns  in  a  rice  paddy  between  the  section  base 
and  the  town  of  Mariveles.  Battery  A,  commanded  by  1st  Lieu- 
tenant William  F.  Hogaboom,  which  had  been  ordered  to  aban- 
don its  3 -inch  guns  at  Cavite,  was  held  at  Camp  Carefree  as 
replacements  for  Battery  C.  But  a  new  mission  was  assigned  to 
Hogaboom's  Marines  on  5  January  when  they  were  ordered  to 
guard  USAFFE's  advance  headquarters  on  Bataan.    This  mis- 

u  In  addition  to  the  sources  already  cited  in  footnote  i,  this  section  is  based 
on  istLt  William  F.  Hogaboom,  rept  of  ops  in  the  Philippines,  i40ct4i-6May 
42 ;  Cdr  Francis  J.  Bridget  Rept,  Action  at  Longoskawayan  Point,  dtd  gFeb42 
(NHD) ;  GySgt  Harold  M.  Ferrell  rept,  Temporary  Duty  of  Mortar  Platoon, 
vicinity  of  Mariveles,  Bataan,  Philippine  Islands,  25~3oJan42,  dtd  3ijan42; 
2dLt  Michael  E.  Peshek,  Rept  of  ops  of  Marine  Detachment  sent  to  Bataan 
on  25jan42 ;  CO  Btry  C,  Narrative  of  Events,  2Feb42. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  209 


sion  lasted  just  long  enough  for  Battery  A  to  become  comfortably 
settled  in  their  new  bivouac  when,  on  the  1 4th,  orders  from  Brid- 
get bought  the  unit  back  to  Mariveles  to  man  nine  .50  caliber 
antiaircraft  machine  guns  and  to  assist  in  organizing  and  train- 
ing the  naval  battalion.  A  detachment  of  2  officers  and  47  men 
from  2 /4  took  over  the  Hq  USAFFE  guard. 

The  serious  business  of  training  the  bluejackets  of  the  naval 
battalion  got  under  way  on  16  January  when  a  naval  aviator, 
Lieutenant  (j.g.)  Leslie  A.  Pew  and  the  first  of  about  65  blue- 
jackets joined  Battery  A.  The  remainder  joined  the  next  day, 
and  an  additional  officer,  Ensign  Grundels,  and  about  40  sailors 
were  attached  to  Battery  C  on  the  18th  and  19th.  In  both 
Marine  units  the  Navy  personnel  were  organized  into  rifle  pla- 
toons with  Marine  NCOs  as  instructors  and  squad  leaders. 
Marine  and  Navy  officers  served  as  platoon  leaders.  Owing  to 
the  necessity  for  manning  antiaircraft  weapons,  few  Marines  were 
available  for  infantry  duty.  As  reorganized,  Battery  A  included 
three  platoons — one  of  Marines  manning  the  antiaircraft  .50 
caliber  machine  guns  and  two  rifle  platoons  of  sailors  with 
Marine  NCOs  under  Hogaboom  and  Pew.  A  similar  organiza- 
tion was  put  into  effect  in  Battery  G,  where  Holdredge  and 
Grundels  were  the  two  rifle  platoon  leaders.  Training  of  this 
force  of  grounded  airmen  and  beached  sailors  in  the  ways  of  the 
combat  infantrymen  now  proceeded  in  a  desperate  race  against 
time,  for  a  Japanese  attack  was  only  a  few  days  away. 

By  7  January,  MacArthur's  forces  on  Luzon  had  withdrawn 
into  Bataan  and  had  dug  in  on  their  main  battle  position — a 
line  running  across  the  peninsula  from  Mauban  to  Mabatang. 
A  weakness  of  this  defensive  line  was  that  the  two  corps — Major 
General  Jonathan  M.  Wainwright's  I  Corps  on  the  left  and  Major 
General  George  M.  Parker's  II  Corps  on  the  right — were  not  in 
contact.  They  were  separated  in  the  center  by  the  4,2 2 2 -foot 
mass  of  Mt.  Natib.  On  9  January,  Lieutenant  General  Masa- 
haru  Homma,  the  Japanese  commander  in  the  Philippines,  began 


210       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


operations  designed  to  seize  Bataan  and  destroy  the  American 
and  Filipino  forces  under  Mac  Arthur's  command.  Following 
two  days  of  artillery  bombardment,  the  Japanese  assault  troops 
jumped  off  in  the  attack,  and,  after  ten  days  of  heavy  fighting, 
succeeded  in  turning  the  exposed  interior  flanks  of  both  I  and  II 
Corps.  When  all  but  one  regiment  of  the  reserves  had  been  com- 
mitted, MacArthur  had  no  recourse  but  to  order  a  withdrawal  on 
22  January  to  the  rear  (and  final)  battle  position — a  line  stretch- 
ing from  Bagac  to  Orion.   ( See  Map  15.) 

Before  the  American  withdrawal  to  the  rear  battle  position, 
the  Japanese  were  planning  an  amphibious  end  run  designed  to 
outflank  Wainwright's  I  Corps.  By  2 1  January  the  3d  Battalion, 
20th  Infantry  had  established  itself  on  the  west  road  behind 
Wainwright's  main  line  of  resistance.  To  Major  General  Naoki 
Kimura,  the  enemy  commander  in  western  Bataan,  the  road 
seemed  clear  south  to  Bagac,  from  where  he  could  move  east  to 
take  II  Corps  in  the  rear.  To  prevent  a  possible  American 
reaction  south  of  Bagac  and  to  protect  his  right  flank  once  he 
started  to  move  east  across  the  peninsula,  Kimura  decided  to  land 
a  force  at  Caibobo  Point,  five  miles  south  of  Bagac. 

On  the  night  of  22  January  some  900  officers  and  men  of 
the  2d  Battalion,  20th  Infantry  Regiment  embarked  at  Moron  in 
landing  craft  and  set  out  along  the  coast  for  Bagac.  Things 
went  wrong  from  the  first.  Available  maps  were  totally  inade- 
quate; the  Bataan  shore  line  merged  into  the  looming  silhouette 
of  the  Mariveles  Mountains,  making  identification  of  a  particular 
cove  or  headland  impossible;  tides  and  currents  were  treacher- 
ous; and  a  U.S.  Navy  PT  Boat — Number  34,  Lieutenant  John  D. 
Bulkeley  commanding — intercepted  and  sank  two  of  the  troop- 
laden  landing  craft.  As  a  result,  the  Japanese  landing  force  was 
soon  lost  and  split  into  two  groups.  Not  a  single  enemy  soldier 
reached  Caibobo  Point.  One  group  came  ashore  at  Quinauan 
Point;  the  other  landed  at  Longoskawayan  Point,  a  finger-like 
promontory  only  2,000  yards  west  of  Mariveles.    This  latter 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  211 


ELEVATIONS  IN  FEET 


Miles 


212       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


group  of  7  officers  and  294  men  moved  along  the  jungle-matted 
cliffs  to  Lapiay  Point,  the  next  promontory  to  the  north,  and 
advanced  inland  to  the  slopes  of  Mt.  Pucot  before  they  were 
discovered.    (See  Map  16.) 

Mt.  Pucot,  617  feet  high,  dominates  Mariveles  and  the  west 
road  leading  from  the  harbor  north  to  the  main  battie  line. 
Realizing  the  importance  of  the  height,  Commander  Bridget  had 
posted  a  24-hour  lookout  on  the  summit.  Hostile  machine-gun 
fire  directed  at  the  small  group  of  Marines  manning  this  lookout 
post  was  the  first  evidence  that  Japanese  forces  were  in  the 
vicinity. 

Commander  Bridget  received  word  of  the  presence  of  the 
enemy  at  0840  on  23  January  from  his  Mt.  Pucot  lookout  just  be- 
fore it  pulled  back  to  Mariveles.  Calling  Hogaboom  and  Hold- 
redge,  Bridget  ordered  his  Marine  battery  commanders  to  send  out 
strong  patrols.  In  response  to  this  order,  five  platoons  took  the 
field.  Bluejacket  platoons  under  Grundels  (Battery  C)  and  Pew 
(Battery  A)  moved  out  immediately  to  secure  Mt.  Pucot  itself. 
A  bluejacket  platoon  commanded  by  Hogaboom  followed  soon 
after  to  sweep  the  ridge  south  of  Pucot;  and  two  others,  blue- 
jackets under  Holdredge  and  Marines  from  the  3-inch  gun  crews 
of  Battery  C  under  1st  Lieutenant  Carter  B.  Simpson,  pushed 
through  to  investigate  Longoskawayan  and  Naicklek  Points. 

Pew's  platoon  moved  rapidly  to  Mt.  Pucot,  deployed  as  it 
neared  the  top,  and  attacked.  Machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  greeted 
Pew's  men  as  they  neared  the  observation  post,  but  the  Japanese 
quickly  withdrew  as  the  Americans  pressed  their  attack.  Grun- 
dels' platoon  ran  into  stiff er  opposition.  Moving  down  Pucot's 
southeast  slope  early  in  the  afternoon  it  ran  head-on  into  a  small 
Japanese  patrol  on  the  trail.  The  sailors  deployed,  hit  the  deck, 
and  opened  fire  on  the  Japanese  who  fired  a  few  rounds  in  return,, 
then  vanished  into  the  jungle. 

Hogaboom's  patrol,  meanwhile,  had  climbed  the  heights  im- 
mediately behind  the  naval  station  and  had  swept  along  the  ridge 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  213 


214       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


towards  Mt.  Pucot.  There  was  no  sign  of  the  enemy  until  the 
platoon  approached  this  dominant  peak,  when  the  sound  of  rifle 
fire  sent  Hogaboom  and  his  sailors  down  the  slope  towards  the 
firing.  They  came  upon  Grundels'  sailors  deployed  and  firing 
at  random  into  the  bushes.  Learning  from  Grundels,  who  had 
been  wounded,  what  had  happened,  Hogaboom's  platoon  ad- 
vanced farther  along  the  trail,  but  the  Japanese  had  disappeared. 
Simpson's  Marine  group  investigated  Point  Naicklek  without 
making  contact  with  the  enemy,  while  Holdredge  had  the  same 
experience  at  Longoskawayan. 

At  dusk  the  patrols  assembled  on  Mt.  Pucot  and  set  up  a  de- 
fense on  its  crest  and  along  the  ridges  to  the  south.  The  five 
officers  conferred  and  agreed  that  the  Japanese  had  landed  only 
a  small  harassing  patrol. 

Bridget,  meanwhile,  had  not  been  idle.  During  the  day  he 
had  rounded  up  about  30  sailors  of  Air,  Asiatic  Fleet,  and  the 
Naval  Ammunition  Depot  and  sent  them  up  the  hill  to  reinforce 
the  defenses.  Sailors  of  the  General  Detail  Company  were  held 
in  reserve  on  the  West  Road.  Additional  reinforcements  were 
provided  by  USAFFE's  Service  Command.  In  response  to  a 
request  from  Bridget,  Brigadier  General  Allan  C.  McBride  made 
available  men  of  the  grounded  3d  Pursuit  Squadron,  60  men  of 
the  301st  Chemical  Company,  and  a  2.95-inch  mountain  pack 
howitzer  and  crew  from  the  71st  Philippine  Army  Division. 

The  defensive  position  on  the  night  of  23-24  January  was 
as  follows :  Battery  C,  and  the  Air,  Asiatic  Fleet,  and  Naval  Am- 
munition Depot  Companies  along  the  ridges  southeast  of  Mt. 
Pucot;  Battery  A  on  Mt.  Pucot;  the  301st  Chemical  Company 
detail  on  the  north  slope  of  the  mountain;  and  the  3d  Pursuit 
Squadron  extending  the  line  north  to  the  coast  at  Biaan  Point. 
The  pack  howitzer  was  emplaced  on  the  saddle  southeast  of  Mt. 
Pucot. 

When  the  sun  rose  the  next  morning  the  Americans  looked 
down  from  their  positions  along  the  ridge  at  jungle-clad  slopes 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  215 


falling  away  to  the  shore  of  the  South  China  Sea.  Jutting  out 
from  the  shore  line  were  two  points — the  blunt  and  wide  Lapiay 
immediately  below  Mt.  Pucot,  and  narrow  finger-like  Longoska- 
wayan  Point  to  the  southeast. 

The  attack  plan  was  to  sweep  down  the  slope  and  drive  the 
Japanese  into  the  sea.  To  Battery  G  was  assigned  the  clearing  of 
Longoskawayan,  while  Battery  A  was  to  take  care  of  Lapiay. 
For  the  day's  operations  the  sailors  of  Air,  Asiatic  Fleet,  and  the 
Naval  Ammunition  Depot  were  organized  into  a  platoon  under 
Platoon  Sergeant  Robert  A.  Clements  and  attached  to  Battery  C. 

Hogaboom's  Marines  and  sailors  jumped  off  shortly  after  dawn. 
Descending  the  trail  they  flushed  a  couple  of  Japanese  but 
reached  the  shore  north  of  their  objective  without  further  inci- 
dent. They  worked  their  way  along  the  shore  to  the  base  of 
Lapiay  Point,  deployed,  and  attacked,  only  to  be  pinned  down  by 
a  machine  gun  concealed  by  a  dense  mat  of  jungle  vines  and 
undergrowth.  Hogaboom  and  Corporal  Raymond  H.  Collins 
worked  their  way  around  into  a  draw  behind  this  gun,  but  the 
jungle  growth  was  so  thick  that  hand  grenades  could  not  be 
thrown  through  it.  Hogaboom  dispatched  a  runner  for  help, 
and  Pew  and  Simpson  soon  arrived  on  the  scene  with  their  pla- 
toons, but,  even  with  these  reinforcements,  advance  was  not  pos- 
sible. A  second  Japanese  machine  gun  opened  up,  then  mortar 
and  howitzer  rounds  fired  from  Longoskawayan  Point  began  to 
drop  in  among  the  sailors  and  Marines.  As  dusk  was  fast  ap- 
proaching, Hogaboom  ordered  a  withdrawal  to  the  jump-off 
position  on  Mt.  Pucot. 

Holdredge's  unit  had  no  better  luck  on  Longoskawayan.  A 
BAR  man  and  rifleman  serving  as  the  point  started  the  action 
when  they  surprised  a  Japanese  howitzer  crew  setting  up  their 
weapon.  The  two  Americans  hit  the  deck  and  opened  fire, 
dropping  several  of  the  Japanese.  The  enemy  reaction  was 
swift,  and  Holdredge  was  forced  to  withdraw,  fighting  a  rear 
guard  action  off  the  point,  then  pulling  back  to  the  defense  line 


216       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


on  Mt.  Pucot.  When  the  two  Marine  battery  commanders  con- 
ferred that  night  they  concluded  that  there  were  at  least  200 
Japanese  on  the  two  points  and  that  it  would  take  a  full-strength 
infantry  battalion  with  supporting  weapons  to  dislodge  them. 

Part  of  this  requirement  was  fulfilled  on  the  25th,  when  2d 
Lieutenant  Michael  E.  Peshek  brought  over  from  Corregidor 
a  heavy  machine  gun  platoon  of  Company  H  and  the  mortar 
platoon  of  3/4.  Arriving  at  Mariveles  shortly  after  noon,  Peshek 
and  his  Marines  moved  forward,  emplaced  the  two  8 1  mm  mortars 
on  the  saddle  north  of  Mt.  Pucot,  and  opened  fire  on  both  Longo- 
skawayan  and  Lapiay  Points. 

Under  cover  of  the  mortar  fire,  the  rifle  platoons  of  the  naval 
battalion  moved  down  from  the  ridge  into  positions  opposite  the 
two  points.  When  the  fire  lifted,  the  attack  jumped  off.  Hoga- 
boom's  unit  moved  onto  Lapiay  to  find  that  the  Japanese  had 
withdrawn.  On  Longoskawayan,  Holdredge's  force,  made  up 
of  several  platoons,  ran  into  heavy  Japanese  fire,  was  badly  cut 
up,  and  had  to  pull  back  to  the  ridge.  Holdredge  himself  was 
among  the  wounded. 

Failure  of  the  attack  on  25  January  led  USAFFE  to  reorganize 
the  command  set-up  in  the  rear  service  area  of  Bataan  and  to 
bring  up  additional  fire  support.  The  two  corps  commanders 
took  over  the  defense  of  the  Service  Command  Area — each  as- 
suming responsibility  for  the  zone  behind  his  own  corps.  One 
result  of  this  command  change  was  the  assignment  by  General 
Wainwright  of  a  75mm  gun  battery  of  the  88th  Field  Artillery 
Philippine  Scouts  ( PS )  to  support  the  naval  battalion.  An  ad- 
ditional, and  most  impressive,  source  of  fire  support  came  from 
the  1 2 -inch  mortars  of  Battery  Geary  on  Corregidor.  Shortly 
after  midnight  on  the  26th  the  giant  weapons  laid  several  rounds 
on  Longoskawayan  Point.  Four  of  these  shots  were  seen  to  hit 
the  shore  line  by  observers  on  Mt.  Pucot ;  the  others  landed  in  the 
water.    The  26th  was  given  up  to  artillery  "softening  up"  of 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  217 


Longoskawayan  preparatory  to  an  all-out  assault  the  next  day. 
Infantry  action  was  limited  to  patrolling. 

At  0700  on  27  January,  the  4th  Marines'  81  mm  mortars,  the 
2.95-inch  mountain  howitzer,  the  88th  Field  Artillery's  75mm 
guns,  and  the  12 -inch  mortars  of  Battery  Geary  all  opened  up 
in  a  preparatory  bombardment  of  Longoskawayan  Point.  About 
0800  the  infantry — a  conglomerate  force  of  about  200  men,  of 
whom  only  60  to  75  were  Marines — moved  out  in  the  attack. 
The  Marines  were  scattered  among  the  bluejackets  all  along  the 
line.  The  plan  of  attack  was  to  base  the  advance  on  the  progress 
of  the  center  in  taking  the  series  of  knobs  forming  the  central 
spine  of  Longoskawayan  Point. 

On  the  left  and  right  flanks  the  Marine-sailor  skirmish  line 
moved  steadily  ahead,  but  in  the  center  there  was  little  progress 
in  spite  of  complete  silence  from  the  Japanese.  About  an  hour 
after  the  jump-off,  Hogaboom  went  forward  to  investigate.  He 
found  that  the  failure  to  advance  was  not  due  to  enemy  action 
but  to  lack  of  leadership.  No  commissioned  officer  was  present, 
and  the  NCOs  appointed  as  squad  leaders  were  not  acting  as 
such.  The  men  were  under  cover  waiting  for  orders.  Two 
Marine  sergeants,  Albert  J.  Morgan  and  Leslie  D.  Sawyer  were 
put  in  command,  and,  under  their  leadership,  the  center  of  the 
line  moved  forward. 

The  first  hill  of  the  central  spine  was  occupied  with  no  opposi- 
tion, and  the  attack  pushed  on.  Supporting  mortar  fire  had 
now  ceased,  allowing  the  Japanese  to  reoccupy  defensive  posi- 
tions. As  Sergeant  Morgan  led  the  point  up  the  forward  slope 
of  the  next  hill,  enemy  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  began  to 
sweep  the  military  crest  and  reverse  slope  of  the  hill  just  captured. 
Efforts  to  build  up  fire  superiority  failed  because  all  favorable 
weapons  positions  were  being  swept  by  enemy  fire.  There  was 
no  alternative  but  to  withdraw  out  of  range  of  the  Japanese  fire. 
The  Marines  and  sailors  fell  back  under  covering  mortar  fire 
behind  the  first  hill  and  dug  in. 


218       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


The  Japanese  then  counterattacked.  Mortar  rounds  strad- 
dled the  command  post,  but  timely  fire  from  Peshek's  tubes 
silenced  the  Japanese  before  they  could  score  a  hit.  Enemy  in- 
filtrators worked  their  way  through  the  gap  in  the  line  which 
had  opened  up  when  the  left  flank  had  advanced  ahead  of,  and 
out  of  contact  with,  the  center.  As  the  position  on  Longoska- 
wayan  was  becoming  untenable,  Bridget  approved  a  request  to 
withdraw  to  the  Mt.  Pucot  ridge  line.  Harassed  by  enemy 
machine-gun  and  rifle  fire,  the  Marines  and  sailors  pulled  back 
to  their  original  position.  Peshek's  mortars  did  yeoman  service 
by  laying  down  a  barrage  to  cover  the  withdrawal. 

At  the  end  of  five  days  of  fighting,  Bridget's  force  had  made 
little  progress  in  driving  the  Japanese  from  Longoskawayan  Point. 
Three  infantry  attacks  had  failed,  and  there  was  no  reason  to 
believe  that  another  would  succeed.  In  spite  of  high  morale 
the  naval  battalion  was  too  weak  in  numbers,  in  organic  fire- 
power, and  particularly  in  ground  combat  skill  to  make  much 
headway  against  a  well-trained  and  dug-in  enemy. 

MacArthur  realized  the  danger  in  allowing  the  Japanese  to 
maintain  a  beachhead  threatening  USAFFE's  communication 
lines  and  rear  areas.  Fearing  a  Japanese  effort  at  reinforcement, 
he  ordered  Wainwright  on  the  27th  to  eliminate  the  enemy  pockets 
as  soon  as  possible.  The  I  Corps  commander  responded  by 
ordering  two  Philippine  Scout  infantry  battalions  to  the  threat- 
ened areas.  During  the  night  of  the  27th  the  2d  Battalion,  57th 
Infantry  (PS),  relieved  the  naval  battalion  on  the  Mt.  Pucot 
ridges.  The  next  morning  the  Scouts  attacked  and,  two  days 
later,  the  evening  of  the  29th,  had  reached  the  tip  of  Longoska- 
wayan Point.  Only  isolated  Japanese  pockets  and  stragglers 
remained,  and  these  were  mopped  up  by  naval  battalion  patrols 
and  armored  launches  from  the  Canopus  operating  along  the 
shore.  By  13  February  the  last  Japanese  straggler  had  been 
killed  or  captured. 

The  3d  Battalion,  45th  Infantry  (PS),  and  other  troops  had 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  219 


meanwhile  wiped  out  the  Japanese  landing  force  on  Quinauan 
Point  after  bitter  fighting.  An  effort  by  the  Japanese  to  reinforce 
their  position  was  defeated  by  two  Philippine  Scout  battalions 
and  other  units. 

The  naval  battalion  suffered  37  casualties — 11  killed  and  26 
wounded — during  the  battle  for  the  points,  while  the  Scouts  lost 
1 1  killed  and  27  wounded.  The  Japanese  lost  their  entire  landing 
force  of  about  300  men. 

The  action  at  Longoskawayan  Point  illustrated  the  old  military 
lesson  that  combat-ready  troops  can  easily  achieve  what  men 
untrained  in  ground  operations,  no  matter  how  willing,  find 
difficult  or  impossible.  Nevertheless,  the  sailors  and  Marines  of 
the  naval  battalion,  by  prompt  action,  seized  and  held  the  vital 
heights  of  Mt.  Pucot  on  the  first  day  of  action  and  bottled  up 
the  Japanese  in  Longoskawayan  Point  until  trained  troops  could 
arrive. 

CORREGIDOR  UNDER  SIEGE 

Life  on  Corregidor,  meanwhile,  had  been  far  from  uneventful. 
While  their  comrades  were  fighting  the  Japanese  landing  force 
in  the  jungle  of  Longoskawayan,  the  main  body  of  the  regiment 
on  Corregidor  and  the  small  detachments  on  the  lesser  fortified 
islands  were  undergoing  intermittent  aerial  and  artillery  bom- 
bardment. The  attack  of  29  December  marked  the  beginning  of 
ten  days  of  air  attacks  by  planes  of  the  5th  Air  Group  (Army) 
and  nth  Air  Fleet  (Navy).  Damage  was  limited  almost  en- 
tirely to  above-ground  wooden  buildings  and  supplies  stored  in 
the  open  or  in  wooden  structures.  Concrete  buildings  suffered 
less,  and  most  of  the  supplies  in  them  could  be  salvaged.  Weap- 
ons suffered  only  minor  damage  and  were  quickly  repaired.  No 
over-all  record  of  total  casualties  was  kept,  but  at  least  36  men 
were  killed  and  another  140  wounded  on  the  first  two  days  of 
the  attack  alone.    Cessation  of  the  bombings  on  that  date  was 


220       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


dictated  by  necessity  rather  than  by  choice,  because  the  $th  Air 
Group  was  reassigned  to  Thailand,  leaving  Homma  with  only  a 
few  planes  which  he  could  not  afford  to  risk  against  Corregidor. 

The  end  of  the  first  aerial  bombardment  gave  the  defenders  of 
the  fortified  islands  only  a  brief  respite,  for,  on  5  February, 
Japanese  artillery  opened  up  from  the  Gavite  shore.  These  were 
the  four  105mm  and  four  155mm  guns  of  the  Kondo  Detach- 
ment— named  Japanese-style  after  the  commanding  officer, 
Major  Toshinoro  Kondo.  Fires  from  Kondo's  weapons  were 
mostly  harassment  for  the  defenders  of  the  islands  in  the  bay. 
The  only  serious  damage  was  to  the  power  plant  on  Corregidor 
and  to  several  observation  posts  on  Fort  Hughes. 

By  the  end  of  February  the  Kondo  fires  had  slacked  off  to 
occasional  harassing  rounds,  but  the  Japanese  were  not  abandon- 
ing bombardment  of  the  fortified  islands  from  the  Cavite  shore. 
They  were,  rather,  strengthening  their  artillery  for  a  greater 
effort.  Reinforcements,  consisting  of  the  1st  Heavy  Artillery 
Regiment  and  the  2d  Independent  Heavy  Artillery  Battery,  ar- 
rived early  in  March.  The  strengthened  unit,  now  named  the 
Hayakawa  Detachment  after  Colonel  Masoyoshi  Hayakawa,  its 
commanding  officer,  opened  up  on  15  March  with  a  volley  of 
240mm  fire  and  continued  until  the  2 2d  when  Hayakawa  and 
his  detachment  were  recalled  to  Bataan.  Damage  was  much 
greater  than  that  inflicted  by  the  Kondo  Detachment.  Forts 
Drum  and  Frank,  nearest  to  the  Cavite  shore,  suffered  most.  Two 
antiaircraft  guns  on  Frank  were  destroyed,  and  the  seacoast  guns 
were  heavily  damaged. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Hayakawa  Detachment  from  Cavite 
on  22  March  provided  only  a  two-day  respite  from  bombard- 
ment for  the  Americans  and  Filipinos  on  the  "Rock."  On  the 
24th  a  second  and  far  heavier  air  assault  was  launched  by  the 
heavy  bombers  of  the  60th  and  6sd  Bombardment  Regiments 
(Army)  and  by  two  land-based  and  one  carrier-based  squadrons 
of  navy  bombers.    From  their  base  at  Clark  Field  near  Manila 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  221 


and  from  the  carrier  deck  the  Japanese  aircraft  rose  to  batter 
Corregidor.  During  the  last  week  in  March  there  were  no 
fewer  than  60  air-raid  alarms  lasting  for  a  total  of  74  hours. 

In  spite  of  the  intensity  of  the  attack,  damage  on  Corregidor 
was  not  extensive.  Profiting  from  earlier  attacks,  the  members 
of  the  "Rock's"  garrison  had  dug  themselves  in.  Supplies  and 
vital  installations  had  also  been  sandbagged  or  otherwise  bomb- 
proofed.  Most  of  the  buildings  remaining  above  ground  were 
demolished,  the  few  supplies  still  stored  in  the  open  were  de- 
stroyed, and  a  few  ammunition  dumps  went  up.  But  the  de- 
fenses of  the  island  remained  intact. 

The  4th  Marines  on  Corregidor  did  not  suffer  heavily  from 
all  these  Japanese  aerial  and  artillery  attacks  since  29  December. 
Through  9  April,  the  day  when  the  fall  of  Bataan  gave  the 
enemy  greatly  superior  artillery  positions  from  which  to  pound 
the  island  fortress,  Marine  casualties  amounted  to  only  5  killed 
and  55  wounded.12 

STRENGTHENING  THE  BEACH  DEFENSES 

By  the  end  of  March  the  heavy  aerial  assault  on  Corregidor 
was  over.  Homma  then  shifted  the  bulk  of  his  aircraft  to  sup- 
port the  all-out  drive  on  Bataan.  The  war  was  then  nearly  four 
months  old,  and  for  three  of  those  months,  the  Japanese  had 
been  battering  Corregidor  from  land  and  air.  In  spite  of  these 
attacks,  the  defenses  of  the  "Rock"  were  actually  stronger  at 
the  end  of  March  than  they  had  been  at  the  end  of  December. 

When  the  4th  Marines  took  over  the  defense  sectors  on  29  De- 
cember there  was  much  to  be  done  before  the  beach  defenses 
could  hope  to  turn  back  a  Japanese  landing  attack.  The  West 
and  Central  Sectors,  with  a  few  pillboxes  set  deep  in  the  ravines 
leading  to  Topside  and  Middleside,  were  better  prepared  than 

13  Casualty  figures  from  PersAccountingSec,  HQMC,  Final  WW  II  casualty 
tabulation,  dtd  26Aug52  (copy  in  HistBr,  HQMC). 


222       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  East  Sector,  where  practically  nothing  had  been  done  except 
to  prepare  a  final  defense  line  on  the  east  side  of  Malinta  Hill. 

There  was  more  than  enough  work  for  all  hands  to  prepare 
adequate  positions  covering  the  likely  landing  beaches,  and  short- 
ages of  personnel  and  equipment  added  to  the  difficulties  of  the 
task.  In  early  January  1942,  the  4th  Marines  totalled  about 
1,600  officers  and  men,  of  whom  only  about  1,250  were  available 
for  Corregidor  beach  defense.  The  remainder  were  on  Bataan 
and  at  Forts  Hughes  and  Drum.  Of  the  1,250  assigned  to 
defend  the  beaches,  375  were  assigned  to  1/4  in  the  East  Sector, 
350  to  3/4  in  the  Middle  Sector,  360  to  2/4  in  the  West  Sector, 
and  145  to  Headquarters  and  Service  Companies  in  reserve. 
(See  Map  17.) 

After  a  thorough  reconnaissance  of  the  island  and  consulta- 
tions with  his  staff,  Colonel  Howard  decided  upon  a  "positive" 
beach  defense.  This  plan,  approved  by  General  Moore,  com- 
mitted the  4th  Marines  to  turn  back  a  Japanese  landing  attempt 
at  the  beaches.  Accordingly,  all  hands  turned  to  digging 
trenches  and  weapons  emplacements  and  to  stringing  wire  close 
to  the  water's  edge  wherever  the  terrain  was  favorable  for  a 
landing. 

The  most  vulnerable  area  was  the  East  Sector,  where  there 
were  long  stretches  of  open  beaches  with  only  a  slight  rise  in 
elevation  blocking  movement  inland.  The  best  landing  areas 
were  on  the  north  side  from  the  eastern  tip  of  the  island  to  a 
line  across  the  island  from  Monkey  Point  to  Infantry  Point. 
The  convex  curve  of  the  shore  line  minimized  the  defensive  fire- 
power which  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  any  given  spot.  To 
the  west,  the  shore  became  steep  and  indented,  providing  the 
defenders  with  dominating  positions  for  enfilade  fire  against  an 
attacker  landing  on  the  beaches.  From  the  attacker's  point  of 
view,  however,  there  was  one  serious  disadvantage  to  landing  on 
eastern  Corregidor — the  mass  of  Malinta  Hill  blocked  egress 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  223 


224       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


from  the  narrow  tail  to  the  broad  tadpole  head  represented  by 
Middleside  and  Topside. 

The  Middle  and  West  Sectors  offered  little  encouragement  to 
the  amphibious  attacker.  Bottomside,  though  flat,  was  domi- 
nated by  high  ground  on  either  side.  Middleside  and  Topside, 
which  rose  steeply  from  the  sea,  were  nearly  inaccessible  from 
the  water.  The  best  approaches  were  through  three  ravines — 
James  and  Cheney  on  the  west  and  Ramsay  on  the  south. 

January,  February,  and  March  slipped  by.  Each  day  was 
much  like  another  for  the  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment.  They 
worked  continually  on  the  defenses,  digging  weapons  emplace- 
ments, trenches,  foxholes,  and  tank  traps,  and  stringing  barbed 
wire  along  the  rocky  beaches.  Marines  did  all  the  digging  with 
picks  and  shovels,  and  they  cared  for  their  tools  "like  precious 
gems"  13  because  the  rocky  ground  was  hard  on  the  irreplaceable 
tools.  Sandbags  were  in  short  supply,  so  powder  cans  of  all 
sizes,  from  3  to  12  inches,  were  filled  with  dirt  and  used  as 
substitutes.  Working  under  these  handicaps,  without  proper 
tools  and  equipment,  the  4th  Marines  nevertheless  completed  an 
impressive  amount  of  engineering  work.  By  the  end  of  March 
over  20  miles  of  barbed  wire  had  been  strung  in  the  East  Sector 
alone.  Anti-boat  cables  had  been  put  in  place  across  both  the 
north  and  south  harbors.  Mines  improvised  from  aerial  bombs 
were  laid  along  the  beach  in  South  Harbor  from  South  Dock 
to  a  point  375  yards  west,  in  front  of  the  tank  barrier  on 
Cavalry  Point  Beach,  and  behind  the  tank  barrier  on  Camp 
Point.  Trenches  and  observation  posts  had  been  dug  and  sand- 
bagged. In  addition,  the  Army  engineers  had  built  concrete 
splinter-proof  roofs  over  some  of  the  75mm  gun  emplacements. 

Firepower  of  the  beach  defenses  was  impressive.  By  the  end 
of  March  the  4th  Marines,  by  diligent  search  and  exploitation 
of  all  possible  sources  on  Corregidor,  possessed  a  total  of  225 
machine  guns — 167  .30  caliber  watercooled,  49  .50  caliber,  and 

13  Jenkins  Rept. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  225 


9  Lewis  .30  caliber.  There  were,  in  addition,  20  37mm  guns, 
some  of  which  had  formerly  been  mounted  on  the  tubes  of 
Corregidor's  heavy  guns  for  use  in  subcaliber  practice  firing. 
Dismounted  from  the  gun  tubes,  they  were  repositioned  as  anti- 
boat  guns  in  the  beach  defense.  Reinforcing  the  organic  fire- 
power of  the  4th  Marines  was  the  Beach  Defense  Artillery, 
Colonel  Delbert  Ausmus,  USA,  commanding.  It  included  one 
155mm,  23  75mm,  and  2  3-inch  naval  guns — a  total  of  26 
weapons.  Finally,  many  of  the  heavy  seacoast  weapons  could 
be  brought  to  bear  on  the  waters  separating  Corregidor  from 
Luzon. 

The  some  1,250  Marines  assigned  to  the  beach  defenses  of 
Corregidor  on  29  December  were  far  too  few  to  provide  an 
effective  beach  defense  for  the  island.  Typical  of  how  spread- 
thin  the  Marines  were  was  the  East  Sector,  where  1  /4  with  only 
375  men  was  responsible  for  approximately  9,000  yards  of  beach. 
The  other  sectors  were  no  better.  On  3  January  a  modest  rein- 
forcement, in  the  form  of  128  retired  Filipino  Navy  mess  men 
recalled  to  active  duty  from  the  Fleet  Reserve,  reported  in  and 
were  assigned  to  the  defense  sectors.  About  six  weeks  later, 
on  1 7  February,  an  additional  reinforcement  arrived  from  Bataan. 
Included  were  731  Philippine  Air  Force  cadets  and  9  Navy 
officers  and  327  sailors  from  Mariveles.14 

The  Filipinos  gave  many  of  the  Marines  their  first  idea  of 
how  rugged  the  fighting  was  on  Bataan.  The  cadets,  who  were 
mostly  young  boys,  had  been  used  as  infantry  since  they  had  no 
planes.  Many  of  them  were  weak  from  lack  of  food  and  fatigue. 
Some  were  sick  from  malaria  and  dysentery.  Although  they 
had  been  serving  as  infantry  and  were  equipped  with  old  Enfield 
rifles,  few  of  them  had  any  knowledge  of  infantry  tactics.  Most 
of  them  had  never  even  been  trained  in  rifle  marksmanship. 

On  1 9  February,  Hogaboom's  Battery  A  was  withdrawn  from 
Mariveles,  disbanded,  and  its  personnel  reassigned  to  Headquar- 


14  4th  Mar  Rec  of  Events,  3jan,  i7Feb42. 


226       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


ters  Company,  4th  Marines,  to  strengthen  the  reserve.  Since 
the  arrival  of  the  regiment  on  the  "Rock"  all  personnel  of  Head- 
quarters and  Service  Companies  not  assigned  to  the  battalions 
had  been  formed  into  a  Regimental  Reserve  Company.  Its 
members  continued  to  perform  specialist  functions  but  were  ready 
to  act  as  infantry  if  necessary.  With  the  assignment  of  the 
Marines  from  Battery  A,  some  Filipinos  from  the  Fleet  Reserve, 
and  a  few  Philippine  Air  Force  men,  the  regimental  reserve  was 
reorganized  as  a  two-company  battalion.  Major  Max  Schaeffer 
became  battalion  commander  on  19  February,  relieving  Major 
King.  Captain  Robert  Chambers  took  command  of  Company 
O  and  Hogaboom  of  Company  P.15 

From  the  end  of  December  to  the  beginning  of  April  the  de- 
fenders of  Corregidor  had  worked  to  strengthen  their  defenses 
in  spite  of  Japanese  shelling  and  air  attack.  For  three  months 
they  had  been  striving  to  make  every  possible  preparation  for 
the  expected  Japanese  landing  attack.  On  9  April  the  final 
collapse  of  American  and  Filipino  resistance  on  Bataan  was  to 
precipitate  the  ultimate  test  for  the  defenders  of  the  "Rock." 

THE  FALL  OF  BATAAN 

Since  the  failure  of  the  Japanese  to  crack  MacArthur's  main 
battle  position  in  January  and  February,  Homma  had  been  mak- 
ing ready  for  another  try.  His  depleted  units  had  been  rebuilt 
with  replacements  from  the  homeland,  and  fresh  troops,  con- 
sisting of  a  division,  a  strongly  reinforced  infantry  regiment,  two 
heavy  bomber  regiments,  and  additional  240mm  howitzers,  had 
been  added.  While  the  Japanese  grew  stronger,  the  Americans 
and  Filipinos  were  becoming  weaker.  On  half  rations  since  5 
January,  the  food  allowance  was  further  cut  to  %  ration  on  2 
March.  The  USAFFE  Surgeon  General  had  estimated  that  the 
defenders  of  Bataan  were  only  55  per  cent  combat  efficient  in 


13  4th  Mar  Rec  of  Events,  igFeb42. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  227 


mid-February  as  a  result  of  the  ravages  of  malaria,  dysentery, 
and  general  malnutrition.  A  month  later,  General  Wainwright 
recalled  after  the  war,  the  troops  wanted  to  fight  but  "with  not 
enough  food  in  their  bellies  to  sustain  a  dog."  16 

Changes  in  the  top-level  American  command  had  taken  place 
during  March.  On  the  i  ith  MacArthur,  on  orders  from  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt,  left  the  Philippines  to  take  over  the  new  Allied 
command  in  the  Southwest  Pacific.  To  replace  USAFFE  the 
War  Department  created  a  new  command  entitled,  United  States 
Forces  in  the  Philippines  (USFIP) .  Wainwright,  now  promoted 
to  lieutenant  general,  became  USFIP  commander.  Major  Gen- 
eral Edward  P.  King,  Jr.,  took  over  as  commander  of  Luzon 
Force — the  American  and  Filipino  troops  on  Bataan. 

The  Japanese  attack  jumped  off  on  3  April  and  was  successful 
from  the  start.  The  half-starved,  disease-ridden  Americans  and 
Filipinos  were  unable  to  stop  the  enemy  assault.  By  the  7th  the 
last  reserves  had  been  committed  but  to  no  avail,  for  the  Japa- 
nese had  broken  through  King's  defenses  and  were  pushing 
steadily  ahead  towards  Mariveles  at  the  tip  of  the  peninsula. 
Under  the  circumstances,  King  had  no  choice  but  to  surrender, 
so  he  ordered  the  destruction  of  all  ammunition  and  other  stores 
which  could  not  be  moved  to  Corregidor,  and  the  evacuation  of 
nurses  and  antiaircraft  batteries  and  the  45th  Infantry  (PS)  to 
the  "Rock."  This  done,  he  went  forward  under  a  white  flag  to 
seek  terms  from  General  Homma. 

About  midnight  of  the  8th,  Marines  on  Corregidor  were  jolted 
by  violent  explosions  on  Bataan  as  the  ammunition  stores  at 
Mariveles  were  set  off.  According  to  one  observer,  "the  southern 
end  of  Bataan  was  a  huge  conflagration  which  resembled  more 
than  anything  else  a  volcano  in  violent  eruption  .  .  .  ."  17 

10  Gen  Jonathan  G.  Wainwright,  General  Wainwright's  Story,  Robert 
Gonsidine,  ed.  (Garden  City,  N.Y.:  Doubleday  and  Company,  Inc.,  1946), 
p.  76. 

17  LCdr  T.  C.  Parker,  "The  Epic  of  Corregidor-Bataan,  December  24,  1941- 
May  4,  1942,"  United  States  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  v.  69,  no.  1 
(Jan43),  p.  18. 


228       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Through  a  lethal  rain  of  falling  fragments  and  debris,  frantic 
refugees  jammed  aboard  everything  that  would  float  and  shoved 
of!  for  Corregidor.  The  next  morning  an  observer  on  Corregidor 
could  plainly  see  "several  small  launches  in  the  North  Channel, 
loaded  with  men  escaping  from  Bataan  ....  As  we  watched, 
Jap  artillery  .  .  .  opened  fire  on  them.  The  first  shots  were 
misses,  but  soon  we  could  see  shells  hitting  and  completely  pierc- 
ing the  hulls,  leaving  large  ragged  holes.  People  jumped  over- 
board and  swam  toward  Corregidor;  some  made  it,  but  many 
did  not."  18 

Of  the  4th  Marines  stationed  on  Bataan,  only  the  2  officers 
and  64  enlisted  men  of  Battery  C  escaped  to  Corregidor.  Miss- 
ing and  presumed  to  be  prisoners  of  war  were  6  officers  and  7 1 
enlisted  men.19 

Most  of  the  troops  who  escaped  from  Bataan  were  attached 
to  the  4th  Marines  to  bolster  the  beach  defense.  Regimental 
strength  was  thus  greatly  reinforced  by  the  addition  of  about 
1,200  officers  and  men  of  the  U.S.  Navy,  Army,  and  the  Philip- 
pine armed  services.  But  their  contribution  to  beach  defense  was 
far  less  than  the  numbers  would  indicate.  The  Bataan  survivors 
were  weakened  by  disease  and  malnutrition.  "I  had  never  seen 
men  in  such  poor  physical  condition,"  reported  1st  Lieutenant 
Robert  F.  Jenkins,  commander  of  1/4's  reserve.  "Their  clothing 
was  ragged  and  stained  from  perspiration  and  dirt.  Their  gaunt, 
unshaven  faces  were  strained  and  emaciated.  Some  of  them  were 
already  suffering  from  beri-beri  as  a  result  of  a  starvation  diet  of 
rice  for  weeks."  20 

The  4th  Marines,  as  finally  constituted,  was  undoubtedly  the 
strangest  Marine  regiment  in  history.  No  fewer  than  142  organ- 
izations, representing  all  U.S.  and  Philippine  armed  services, 
were  included.    Total  strength  was  3,891  officers  and  men  on  1 

18  Jenkins  Rept. 

19  4th  Mar  Rec  of  Events,  9Apr42. 

20  Jenkins  Rept. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  229 


May,  but  only  1,440  were  Marines.  This  strength  was  distributed 
as  follows:  21 


I  St 

2d 

3d 

4th 

Kes. 

Bn. 

Bn. 

Bn. 

Bn. 

Bn. 

Total 

3OO 

O  O  T 

33 1 

oil 

u 

1  uu 

t    /i  a  rt 
I,  44O 

USN 

125 

170 

210 

286 

50 

84I 

USA 

312 

117 

173 

1 1 

2 

615 

JTllllllJUlXlC  ixdvy 

^9 

T  T 
1  1 

4 

A  A 

44 

Philippine  Army 

22 

46 

80 

148 

Philippine  Air  Force 

224 

206 

201 

89 

720 

Philippine  Constabulary 

2 

12 

5 

19 

Philippine  Scouts 

33 

13 

18 

64 

Total 

1,078 

924 

1,275 

3°3 

3" 

3,  891 

In  addition  to  the  American  and  Filipino  personnel  distributed 
among  the  three  regular  battalions  and  the  reserve  battalion,  a 
4th  Battalion  was  made  up  of  sailors  from  Mariveles  on  9  April. 
Major  Francis  H.  Williams  and  five  NCOs  were  the  only 
Marines  in  the  battalion.  A  group  of  9  Army  and  18  Navy 
officers  filled  the  staff  positions  and  provided  the  company  com- 
manders and  platoon  leaders.  Four  rifle  companies,  designated 
Q,  R,  S,  and  T,  formed  the  battalion  and  were  the  highest  any 
Marine  had  ever  heard  of.  Another  boast  of  the  4th  Battalion 
men  was  that  they  were  the  highest-paid  battalion  in  the  world, 
since  most  of  the  men  were  petty  officers  of  the  higher  grades. 

To  make  of  4/4  a  battalion  in  more  than  name  was  a  formida- 
ble task.  Few  if  any  of  the  sailors  had  any  knowledge  of  infantry 
tactics ;  most  of  them  had  not  even  fired  a  rifle  since  their  days  in 
Navy  boot  camp.  Training  was  all  but  impossible,  for  the  inten- 
sity of  the  Japanese  bombardment  kept  the  men  huddled  in  the 
foxholes  along  the  trail  between  Geary  Point  and  Government 
Ravine.  Whenever  the  fire  let  up,  small  groups  of  men  gathered 
around  the  Army  officers  and  Marine  NCOs  for  training  in 
weapons  and  infantry  tactics.   At  night,  when  the  Japanese  artil- 


21  4th  Mar  Rec  of  Events,  iMay42. 
519667—60  17 


230       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


lery  was  limited  to  harassing  and  interdictory  fire,  the  sailors 
listened  attentively  to  the  Army  veterans  of  Bataan  expound  on 
enemy  tactics. 

The  mission  of  4/4  was  to  reinforce  the  reserve  of  the  beach 
defense — a  task  ordinarily  assigned  to  a  highly  trained  and  well- 
equipped  combat  unit.  The  4th  Battalion  was  neither  well- 
equipped  nor  well-trained.  Rifles  and  hand  grenades  constituted 
the  only  weapons,  and  the  incessant  enemy  bombardment  pre- 
vented the  drilling  of  the  men  in  tactical  exercises.  If  it  became 
necessary  to  commit  the  reserve  to  repulse  the  long-expected 
Japanese  landing  attack,  the  poorly  trained  and  equipped  sailors 
of  4/4  would  have  to  move  out  from  their  bivouac  area  under 
heavy  shellflre  and  probably  in  darkness.  They  would  have  to 
deploy  and  attack  under  these  difficult  conditions,  with  constant 
danger  that  the  units  would  become  separated  or  that  the  attack 
would  stall.  But  Colonel  Howard,  having  committed  his  regular 
battalions  to  the  beach  defense  lines,  had  no  recourse  except  to 
use  the  remaining  troops  assigned  to  him  for  his  reserve.  What 
the  men  of  4/4  lacked  in  skill  and  firepower  they  would  have  to 
make  up  in  courage. 

JAPANESE  PREPARATIONS 

On  9  April  the  victorious  Japanese  on  the  tip  of  Bataan  could 
look  across  the  two-mile  wide  North  Channel  at  their  final  target 
of  the  Philippine  campaign — Corregidor.  The  enemy  attack 
plan  called  for  a  two-pronged  assault  at  opposite  ends  of  the 
island.  The  4th  Division,  reinforced,  was  designated  as  the  land- 
ing force.  In  the  first  stage  the  two-battalion  61st  Infantry 
Regiment  was  to  land  in  successive  waves,  battalions  abreast 
between  Cavalry  and  Infantry  Points  on  the  north  coast  of  the 
East  Sector.  Once  ashore,  the  landing  force  was  to  split — a 
smaller  force  cutting  straight  across  the  island,  and  the  larger 
group  driving  against  Malinta  Hill.    The  landing  was  scheduled 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  231 


for  the  night  of  5  May,  and  by  dawn  Malinta  Hill  was  to  be 
taken.  Twenty-four  hours  after  the  first  landing,  the  main 
body  of  the  4th  Division  (four  heavily  reinforced  infantry  bat- 
talions) was  to  come  ashore  on  the  north  coast  of  Topside  and 
Middleside  between  Rock  Point  and  Battery  Point,  with  the  main 
effort  between  Morrison  and  Battery  Points.  In  addition,  a 
tank  force  was  to  land  in  Corregidor  Bay. 

Preparations  for  landing  began  but  an  immediate  assault  was 
not  possible,  owing  to  the  necessity  for  assembling  landing  craft 
in  Manila  Bay.  Three  weeks  were  required  for  this  concentra- 
tion because  the  guns  of  Corregidor  limited  movement  to  small 
groups  under  cover  of  darkness. 

The  Japanese,  meanwhile,  took  advantage  of  commanding 
positions  on  Bataan  to  emplace  an  overwhelming  force  of  artil- 
lery with  which  to  batter  the  defenses  of  Corregidor.  At  least 
37  batteries,  with  weapons  ranging  from  75  to  240mm  were 
employed.22  Enemy  artillerists  on  Bataan,  aided  by  aerial  spot- 
ting, had  every  inch  of  the  island  under  observation,  and  they 
took  advantage  of  it  to  blanket  the  "Rock"  with  artillery  fire. 
As  the  American  antiaircraft  guns  were  knocked  out,  Japanese 
pilots  became  increasingly  bold,  swooping  ever  lower  to  pinpoint 
their  targets  for  bombing  attacks.  The  shelling  and  bombing 
never  really  stopped.  So  many  were  the  weapons  available  to 
them  that  the  Japanese  were  able  to  maintain  fire  almost  con- 
tinuously. The  once  dense  vegetation  was  stripped  away,  and 
movement  above  ground  became  practically  impossible  in 
daylight. 

Japanese  air  and  artillery  attacks  during  April  reached  a 
climax  on  the  29th — Emperor  Hirohito's  birthday.  That  day, 
according  to  one  observer,  even  "the  kitchen  sink  came  over."  23 
But  the  month  of  May  opened  with  an  even  heavier  bombard- 

23  This  is  the  figure  given  in  HistSec,  G-2,  GHQ,  FEC,  Japanese  Studies 
in  WW  II  No.  1,  14th  Army  Ops,  187  (OCMH). 

28  Parker,  "The  Epic  of  Corregidor-Bataan,"  op.  ext.,  p.  18. 


232       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 

ment.  Homma's  forces  were  now  poised  for  the  assault.  Jap- 
anese artillery  and  aircraft  opened  the  final  pre-assault 
bombardment,  intended,  according  to  Homma's  orders,  to  crush 
the  defenses  and  exterminate  the  defenders.  For  four  days  Jap- 
anese aircraft  and  artillery  pounded  Corregidor  incessantly.  On 
4  May  the  bombardment  reached  its  climax  with  an  estimated 
16,000  shells  of  all  calibers  striking  the  island  in  a  24-hour 
period. 

By  the  evening  of  5  May  the  great  batteries  of  Corregidor 
were  silenced.  Of  the  seacoast  artillery  only  three  155mm  guns 
remained  in  action.  The  1 4-inch  guns  of  Forts  Frank  and  Drum 
were  still  firing  but  were  not  effective  against  the  Japanese 
batteries  on  Bataan  because  of  the  extreme  range.  All  wire 
communication  was  gone,  making  central  command  all  but 
impossible. 

The  beach  defenses  had  suffered  heavily  but  were  not  totally 
destroyed.  Defense  installations  suffered  most.  Wire  entangle- 
ments, tank  traps,  mine  fields,  wire  communications,  and  weap- 
ons emplacements  had  been  practically  all  destroyed.  The 
weapons  themselves  had  not  suffered  so  badly.  Of  the  25  beach 
defense  artillery  pieces,  only  9  had  been  destroyed  by  enemy 
action  by  the  time  Corregidor  surrendered.  Four  of  the  nine 
weapons  in  the  east  sector  had  been  knocked  out.24 

No  record  exists  of  how  many  of  the  machine  guns  assigned 
to  the  beach  defense  had  been  knocked  out  by  enemy  fire  before 
the  landing.  But  that  some  of  them  were  still  operative  is  at- 
tested by  the  fact  that  they  opened  up  on  the  Japanese  landing 
craft.  The  commander  of  the  two-gun  battery  at  Hooker  Point, 
for  instance,  reported  that  the  continuous  stream  of  tracer  bullets 

21  MajGen  George  F.  Moore,  Rept  on  GA  Command  and  the  Harbor  De- 
fense of  Manila  and  Subic  Bays,  i4Feb4i-6May42,  Exhibit  G,  Beach  Defense 
Artillery  Tabulation  (OCMH),  hereafter  Moore  Rept.  This  tabulation  was 
made  by  Col  Delbert  Ausmus,  USA,  the  Beach  Defense  Artillery  Commander 
who  personally  inspected  all  the  gun  positions  immediately  after  the 
surrender. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  233 


from  the  shore  gave  enough  light  to  iUuminate  the  enemy  craft 
in  the  water. 

Casualties  within  the  regiment  were  not  excessive  prior  to  the 
landing.  Available  figures  indicate  that  20  Marines  were  killed, 
and  75  wounded  between  9  April  and  2  May.25  No  figures  are 
available  to  show  casualties  among  the  attached  personnel  of 
other  services.  Losses  among  unit  leaders,  who  exposed  them- 
selves to  check  defenses,  were  disproportionately  high.  In  the 
1  st  Battalion  alone,  two  company  commanders  and  five  other 
officers  were  casualties. 

THE  JAPANESE  LANDING 

The  intensity  of  the  bombardment  during  the  first  five  days  of 
May  indicated  to  Corregidor's  defenders  that  a  Japanese  landing 
was  imminent.  It  was  no  surprise,  therefore,  when  about  2100 
on  5  May  the  delicate  sound  locators  of  the  antiaircraft  command 
picked  up  the  noise  of  many  landing  craft  motors  off  the  Bataan 
shore.  About  an  hour  later,  landing  craft  were  sighted  approach- 
ing the  tail  of  the  island,  and  at  2230  the  order  was  issued  to 
"prepare  for  probable  landing  attack."  26 

The  men  of  the  1st  Battalion,  4th  Marines,  were  eating  their 
evening  meal  when  the  invasion  alarm  was  sounded.  At  about 
2130  there  had  been  a  lull  in  the  bombardment,  and  hot  food 
was  being  delivered  to  the  men,  who  had  not  eaten  since  morn- 
ing, at  their  positions.  Deployed  along  the  north  shore  were 
three  units:  the  Reserve  Company  (1st  Lieutenant  Robert  F. 
Jenkins)  on  the  slopes  of  Malinta  Hill;  a  rifle  platoon  formed 
from  Headquarters  Company  (Captain  Lewis  H.  Pickup)  from 
Engineer  to  Infantry  Points ;  and  Company  A  ( also  commanded 
by  Pickup  since  the  death  of  Major  Harry  C.  Lang)  manning 
the  rest  of  the  north  shore. 

25  PersAccountingSec,  HQMC,  Final   WW  II  casualty  tabulation,  dtd 
26Aug52  (HistBr,  HQMC). 
28  Moore  Rept.,  p.  71. 


234       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


The  Company  A  sector  was  further  broken  down  into  three 
platoon  sub-sectors  as  follows:  ist  Lieutenant  William  F.  Harris' 
i st  Platoon,  Infantry  to  Cavalry  Points;  Master  Gunnery  Sergeant 
John  Mercurio's  2d  Platoon,  Cavalry  to  North  Points;  and  ist 
Sergeant  Noble  W.  Well's  3d  Platoon,  North  Point  to  the  tip  of 
the  island.  Company  B  (ist  Lieutenant  Alan  S.  Manning) 
manned  the  entire  south  shore  of  the  East  Sector,  and  the  heavy 
machine  guns  of  Captain  Noel  O.  Castle's  Company  D  were 
emplaced  to  support  the  beach  defenses  on  both  sides  of  the 
island.  The  company's  few  mortars  were  emplaced  near  Malinta 
Hill.  (See  Map  18.) 

The  heavy  Japanese  preliminary  bombardment  had  practically 
destroyed  the  coordinated  and  cohesive  defenses  of  the  Eastern 
Sector.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Beecher,  from  his  command  post  in 
Malinta  Tunnel,  could  communicate  with  his  subordinates  only 
by  runner,  as  all  wire  communications  had  been  destroyed.  And 
the  intense  enemy  shellfire  made  the  use  of  runners  hazardous 
and  uncertain.  By  the  evening  of  5  May,  1/4's  sector  had  been 
reduced  to  isolated  strong  points. 

Soon  after  the  invasion  alert  was  sounded,  the  Japanese  re- 
sumed their  bombardment,  laying  down  the  heaviest  barrage  yet 
delivered.  These  fires  fell  on  the  beaches  defended  by  Harris' 
ist  Platoon  of  Company  A — the  area  selected  by  the  enemy  for 
the  landing  of  Colonel  Sato's  61st  Infantry  Regiment.  Shortly 
after  2300  these  fires  shifted  west  from  the  beaches  to  seal  off 
the  tail  of  the  island.  Sato's  assault  waves  failed  to  land  as 
planned.  Carried  eastward  by  a  strong  and  unexpected  current, 
the  Japanese  landing  craft  of  the  ist  Battalion  headed  in  toward 
the  North  Point  beaches  manned  by  Mercurio's  2d  Platoon. 

When  the  defenders  ashore  sighted  the  landing  craft  heading 
in  towards  the  beaches,  they  opened  up  with  every  available 
weapon.  The  two-gun  75mm  battery  near  the  tail  of  the  island 
and  a  few  37mm  guns  opened  up  at  a  range  of  about  300  yards. 
Machine  guns  and  rifles  added  to  the  fire.  At  point-blank  range 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  235 


236       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


they  sank  a  number  of  landing  craft  and  caused  heavy  casualties. 
The  2d  Battalion,  6ist  Infantry  was  carried  farther  out  of  posi- 
tion than  the  ist  Battalion  and  began  to  land  about  midnight. 
Under  the  light  of  the  moon,  which  had  now  risen,  the  Japanese 
were  clearly  visible  to  the  beach  defenders.  There  was  now 
enough  light  for  heavy  artillery  fire,  and  all  the  remaining  weap- 
ons on  Corregidor  and  Fort  Hughes  opened  up,  churning  the 
waters  of  the  channel  into  a  froth.  To  the  Japanese  soldiers  in 
the  boats  it  seemed  as  though  "a  hundred  guns  rained  hot  steel 
on  them."  27 

The  Japanese,  who  had  expected  to  land  unscathed,  suffered 
heavily.  Estimates  by  enemy  officers  of  casualties  in  the  ist 
Battalion  ranged  from  50  to  75  per  cent,  while  losses  in  the  2d 
Battalion  were  believed  to  be  higher,  one  officer  placing  the 
number  of  drowned  alone  above  50  per  cent.  Total  casualties 
numbered  in  the  hundreds,  but  Sato  landed  enough  of  his  troops 
to  overcome  the  beach  defense  and  push  inland  towards  his 
objectives. 

One  force  pushed  south  across  the  island,  reaching  Monkey 
Point  on  the  opposite  shore  by  0100  and  cutting  off  the  troops 
on  the  eastern  tip.  Sato's  main  body,  meanwhile,  advanced 
west  along  the  spine  of  the  island  towards  Malinta  Hill.  By 
0130  the  Japanese  were  in  possession  of  the  position  formerly 
occupied  by  Denver  Battery  on  the  ridge  south  of  Cavalry  Point. 

Marine  Gunner  Harold  M.  Ferrell  of  Company  D  was  the 
first  Marine  to  discover  that  Denver  Battery  was  in  enemy  hands. 
Going  up  to  establish  contact  with  the  defenders,  he  found  the 
place  swarming  with  enemy  soldiers.  Ferrell  ran  back  to  his 
defense  position  and  brought  up  some  men  to  form  a  line  "to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  coming  down  on  the  backs  of  the  men 
on  the  beaches."  28    Pickup,  informed  by  Ferrell  of  what  was 

27  Kazumaro  Uno,  Corregidor:  Isle  of  Delusion  (Shanghai:  Press  Bureau, 
Imperial  Japanese  Army,  China,  1942),  quoted  in  Morton,  Fall  of  the 
Philippines,  p.  556. 

28  WO  Harold  M.  Ferrell,  Informal  Rept.,  Corregidor,  5~6May42. 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  237 


going  on,  at  first  considered  pulling  Harris'  platoon  off  the 
beaches  to  counterattack  the  Japanese  on  Denver.  But  he  de- 
cided against  it  because  the  withdrawal  would  leave  several 
hundred  yards  of  beach  undefended.  All  the  men  who  could  be 
spared  were  sent  from  the  beach  defenses  to  reinforce  the  line 
astride  the  ridge  line  just  west  of  Denver,  but  it  was  clear  that 
the  Japanese  were  stronger  than  the  force  trying  to  contain 
them.  Before  long,  snipers  and  infiltrating  groups  began  to 
show  up  in  the  rear  of  the  Company  A  position. 

COMMITMENT  OF  THE  RESERVE 

Colonel  Howard  at  his  command  post  in  Malinta  Tunnel  was 
informed  by  runner  of  the  situation  at  Denver.  About  0200  he 
committed  the  first  element  of  his  reserve — Major  Schaeffer's 
Reserve  Battalion.  This  unit  was  standing  by  in  Malinta 
Tunnel,  having  been  ordered  to  move  up  from  bivouac  posi- 
tions in  Government  Ravine  shortly  after  the  Japanese  landed. 
Schaeffer's  Marines  started  out  of  the  tunnel  along  the  deeply 
cratered  road  to  Denver  Battery.  Hogaboom's  company  in  the 
lead  followed  the  left  fork  of  the  road  under  the  guidance  of 
Captain  Golland  L.  Clark,  Jr.,  adjutant  of  1/4.  Once  clear 
of  the  tunnel,  Hogaboom  deployed  his  men  as  skirmishers  and 
advanced  towards  the  Denver  position.  Reaching  the  1st  Bat- 
talion's defense  line,  he  tied  in  on  the  left  with  the  remnants 
of  Harris'  platoon.  But  Hogaboom's  right  flank  was  open. 
Captain  Chambers'  Company  O,  which  had  followed  Company 
P  out  of  the  tunnel,  had  been  caught  by  heavy  Japanese  artillery 
fire.  Only  Quartermaster  Clerk  Frank  W.  Ferguson's  1st 
Platoon  came  through  in  condition  to  fight.  Of  the  other  two 
platoons  only  about  a  dozen  men  reached  the  firing  line  opposite 
Denver  Battery. 

Major  Schaeffer  took  command  of  the  line  facing  Denver 
and  launched  three  separate  counterattacks.    All  failed.  The 


238       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


skillfully  emplaced  Japanese  automatic  weapons  defied  every 
effort  of  the  American  and  Filipino  riflemen  to  jar  them  loose. 
Mortars  were  urgently  needed  but  were  not  available.  Casual- 
ties were  so  heavy  that  SchaefTer's  command  was  rapidly  becom- 
ing ineffective,  and  the  Japanese  automatic  weapons  fire  seemed 
as  strong  as  ever. 

At  0430  Howard  threw  in  his  last  reserves.  He  ordered 
Major  Williams  to  move  his  battalion  up  to  reinforce  the  Denver 
defense  line,  and  the  sailors  of  4/4  moved  out  of  the  tunnel 
shortly  before  dawn.  A  heavy  barrage  which  caught  them 
about  500  yards  east  of  the  exit  scattered  the  column  and  caused 
many  casualties.  Regrouping,  Williams'  men  pushed  on  in  line 
of  skirmishers  to  join  the  firing  line.  Companies  Q  and  R,  com- 
manded by  Army  Captains  Paul  C.  Moore  and  Harold  E. 
Dalness,  reinforced  the  remnants  of  Companies  A  and  P  on  the 
left  flank;  Navy  Lieutenant  Bethel  B.  Otter's  Company  T  took 
position  in  the  center  opposite  Denver  Battery  itself;  and  two 
platoons  of  Company  S  filled  in  the  gaps  on  the  right. 

By  mutual  consent  Williams  took  over  command  from  SchaefTer 
(who  was  senior)  and  set  the  attack  hour  for  0615.  Every 
officer  and  man  still  able  to  stand  took  part  in  the  attack;  there 
was  no  reserve  left.  Moore  and  Dalness  on  the  left  drove  the 
Japanese  back  about  200-300  yards  but  failure  of  the  rest  of  the 
line  to  advance  forced  Williams  to  hold  up  the  attack  on  the 
left.  Japanese  machine  guns  and  mortars  in  the  Denver  bat- 
tery position  had  stalled  the  attack  along  the  rest  of  the  line. 
In  a  desperate  attempt  to  knock  out  one  Japanese  heavy  machine 
gun  which  was  particularly  bothersome,  Lieutenant  Otter  and 
five  volunteers  armed  with  hand  grenades  worked  their  way  to 
within  30  yards  of  the  gun  positions.  They  hurled  grenades 
among  the  enemy  gun  crew,  temporarily  silencing  the  weapon, 
but  other  Japanese  took  over  and  opened  fire  again,  killing  Otter 
and  four  others. 

An  attempt  was  made  to  bring  the  obsolete  3-inch  Stokes 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  239 


mortars  of  1/4  into  action  to  knock  out  the  Japanese  in  Denver 
Battery,  but  these  weapons  had  no  sights  and  were  so  inac- 
curate that  Williams  had  to  order  them  to  cease  fire  when  stray 
rounds  fell  among  his  own  men.  The  attack  had  stalled  com- 
pletely, casualties  were  mounting,  and  Japanese  were  beginning 
to  infiltrate  along  the  beaches  into  the  rear  areas.  About  0800, 
Howard  committed  an  additional  reserve — Captain  Herman 
Hauck,  USA,  and  60  men  of  the  59th  Coast  Artillery,  just  made 
available  by  General  Moore.  Williams  put  Hauck's  unit  into 
the  line  on  the  left  flank  to  stop  enemy  infiltration  along  the 
beaches. 

But  Williams'  position  was  still  desperate.  Unable  to  advance, 
his  last  reserves  committed,  with  casualties  steadily  mounting, 
and  with  the  enemy  build-up  continuing,  there  was  little  hope 
of  success.  The  final  blow  came  about  0930  when  three  Jap- 
anese tanks  landed  and  went  into  action.  The  men  in  front 
of  Denver  Battery  spotted  them  and  began  to  fall  back  just  as 
Japanese  artillery  delivered  a  heavy  barrage.  Williams  and  his 
surviving  leaders  tried  to  stop  the  withdrawal  but  were  prevented 
by  the  enemy  shellfire  from  regaining  control. 

At  1030  Williams  ordered  a  general  withdrawal  to  the  ruins 
of  a  concrete  trench  a  few  yards  forward  of  the  entrance  to 
Malinta  tunnel.  Through  a  barrage  which  rolled  back  and 
forth  between  Denver  and  the  tunnel  entrance  the  remnants  of 
Williams'  command  made  their  way  back  to  the  trench.  It 
was  a  pitiful  handful  who  finally  made  it — about  150  officers 
and  men,  many  of  them  wounded.  About  1 130  Williams,  who 
was  wounded  tamself,  went  into  the  tunnel  to  ask  Howard  for 
anti-tank  guns  and  reinforcements.  But  it  was  all  over :  General 
Wainwright  had  decided  to  surrender. 

SURRENDER 

The  landing  of  the  Japanese  tanks  had  been  the  deciding 
factor  in  Wainwright's  decision  to  surrender.    Realizing  that 


240       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  defenses  outside  Malinta  tunnel  could  not  hold  out  much 
longer  and  expecting  further  Japanese  landings  that  night, 
Wainwright  decided  to  sacrifice  one  day  of  freedom  in  exchange 
for  several  thousand  lives.  He  was  particularly  fearful  of  what 
would  happen  were  the  Japanese  to  capture  the  tunnel  where 
lay  1,000  helpless  wounded  men.  Orders  were  issued  for  the 
destruction  of  all  weapons  larger  than  .45  caliber.  The  veterans 
of  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  who  had  been  forced  to  stand  idly 
by  while  their  comrades  were  engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle 
at  the  eastern  end  of  the  island,  bitterly  smashed  their  rifles 
against  the  rocks.  Colonel  Howard  burned  the  regimental  and 
national  colors  to  prevent  their  capture  by  the  enemy.  About 
1300,  Captain  Golland  L.  Clark  and  Lieutenant  Alan  S.  Man- 
ning, accompanied  by  an  interpreter  and  a  field  music,  went 
forward  with  a  white  flag  to  carry  Wainwright's  surrender 
message  to  the  Japanese. 

The  survivors  of  the  regiment  were  quickly  rounded  up  by 
the  victorious  Japanese.  Casualties  of  the  Marines  for  the  entire 
Philippines  campaign  totalled  331  killed  in  action,  died  of 
wounds,  and  missing  and  presumed  dead,  and  357  wounded  in 
action.29  With  the  surrender,  the  regiment  ceased  to  exist,  but 
the  spirit  of  the  4th  lived  on  among  those  Marines  who  had 
served  in  it  in  happier  days.  That  a  new  4th  would  be  created 
to  carry  on  the  traditions  of  the  old  and  to  redeem  its  honor  in 
total  victory  over  the  Japanese,  was  practically  a  certainty  from 
the  dark  moment  on  6  May  when  Colonel  Howard  burned  the 
regimental  colors  and  led  his  Marines  into  captivity. 

29  PersAccountingSec,  HQMG,  Final  WW  II  casualty  tabulation,  dtd 
26Aug52  (HistBr,  HQMC). 


CHAPTER  VIII 


Emirau  and  Guam 


REBIRTH  OF  THE  REGIMENT 

On  i  February  1944,  one  year  and  nine  months  after  the  sur- 
render of  Corregidor,  the  4th  Marines  was  reactivated  on 
Guadalcanal.  Forming  the  nucleus  of  the  new  4th  Regiment 
were  the  Marine  raiders,  some  of  the  Corps'  most  colorful  and 
battle-hardened  units.  Organized  to  carry  out  hit-and-run  tactics 
against  enemy  rear  areas  and  communications  lines,  the  raiders 
had  distinguished  themselves  both  in  their  original  role  and  in 
regular  infantry  missions. 

The  1  st  Raider  Battalion  had  participated  in  the  seizure  of 
Tulagi  Island  in  the  Solomons  on  7-8  August  1942.  After  cap- 
ture of  the  island  had  been  completed,  the  battalion  moved  across 
to  Guadalcanal,  where  it  participated  in  several  patrols  behind 
enemy  lines,  and  held  a  key  sector  of  the  1st  Marine  Division  per- 
imeter during  the  Japanese  attack  of  12-14  September  1942. 

Two  companies  of  the  2d  Raider  Battalion  landed  on  17  Au- 
gust 1942  from  submarines  on  Makin  Island  in  the  Gilberts  to 
destroy  enemy  installations.  The  whole  battalion  then  moved  to 
Guadalcanal  where  it  arrived  in  time  to  join  in  the  final  opera- 
tions which  drove  the  Japanese  from  the  island. 

With  the  activation  of  the  3d  and  4th  Battalions,  the  four 
raider  units  were  consolidated  on  15  March  1943  into  the  1st 
Raider  Regiment.  A  part  of  this  regiment  took  part  in  the  New 
Georgia  operation  during  July  and  August  1943;  then  in  Sep- 
tember the  2d  and  3d  Battalions  were  detached  to  form  the  2d 

241 


242       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 

Raider  Regiment  (Provisional) .  Attached  to  the  3d  Marine  Di- 
vision, this  raider  regiment  participated  in  the  Bougainville 
operation.1 

By  the  end  of  1943  the  need  for  hit-and-run  tactics  was  no 
longer  sufficient  to  justify  units  specially  organized  for  the  pur- 
pose. At  the  same  time,  the  recently  authorized  expansion  to 
six  divisions  would  require  every  available  Marine.  General 
Holcomb  decided,  therefore,  to  disband  the  raiders  and  to  use 
the  personnel  thus  released  to  organize  an  additional  regular 
infantry  regiment. 

Selection  of  the  4th  Marines  as  the  new  unit  was  proposed  by 
Lieutenant  General  Alexander  A.  Vandegrift,  who  had  arrived 
in  Washington  to  succeed  General  Holcomb  as  Commandant. 
The  traditions  and  battle  honors  would  thereby  be  preserved, 
and,  too,  the  stigma  of  defeat  and  capture  would  be  partially 
removed.  Rebirth  of  the  4th  Marines  would  symbolize  the  turn- 
ing tide  of  the  war  from  defeat  to  victory.2 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Alan  Shapley  became  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  newly  reactivated  4th  Marines.  A  former  Naval 
Academy  football  star,  Shapley  had  commanded  in  turn  the  2d 
Raider  Battalion,  the  2d  Raider  Regiment  (Provisional),  and 
the  1  st  Raider  Regiment.  He  had  been  decorated  for  bravery 
on  the  first  day  of  the  war,  when,  as  commander  of  the  Marine 
Detachment  on  board  the  battleship  Arizona,  he  had  been  blown 
from  the  mainmast  control  station  during  the  Japanese  raid  on 
Pearl  Harbor.  Though  stunned,  he  had  rescued  another  man 
from  drowning,  thereby  winning  the  Silver  Star.3 

^oel  D.  Thacker,  "The  Marine  Raiders  in  World  War  II,"  MS,  n.d. 
(HistBr,  HQMC). 

2  Ibid.;  Gen  Ray  A.  Robinson  and  MajGen  DeWitt  Peck  ltrs  to  ACofS, 
G-3,  HQMC,  dtd  22  and  14N0V58  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 

3  Bevan  G.  Cass,  ed.,  History  of  the  6th  Marine  Division  (Washington: 
Infantry  Journal  Press,  1948),  p.  6;  2dLt  Ernest  B.  Furgurson,  Jr.,  "The 
4th  Marines:  A  History,"  MS,  dtd  i5Mar55  (HistBr,  HQMC),  p.  91,  here- 
after Furgurson,  "The  4th  Marines." 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  243 


Shapley's  new  command  was  new  to  him  in  name  only,  since 
the  personnel  of  his  ist  Raider  Regiment  had  been  absorbed  by 
the  new  4th  Marines.  The  raiders'  Headquarters  and  Service 
Company,  the  ist,  3d,  and  4th  Battalions  became  Headquarters 
and  Service  Company,  and  ist,  2d,  and  3d  Battalions,  4th 
Marines. 

From  the  raiders  the  4th  Marines  inherited  its  famous  regi- 
mental motto:  "Hold  High  the  Torch."  Adapted  by  Shapley 
from  a  line  of  John  McCrae's  familiar  World  War  I  poem,  "In 
Flanders  Fields,"  the  motto  was  painted  on  a  huge  billboard  put 
up  at  the  edge  of  the  4th  Marines'  camp  area  at  Tassafaronga, 
on  Guadalcanal.4 

The  first  job  for  the  new  4th's  commander  was  to  adapt  the 
raider  units  to  the  organization  of  an  infantry  regiment.  Because 
their  mission  was  to  operate  against  enemy  rear  areas  and  lines 
of  communications,  raider  units  sacrificed  firepower  for  mobility. 
At  regimental  level,  raiders  lacked  the  75mm  self-propelled  and 
the  37mm  antitank  guns  of  the  weapons  company  of  an  infantry 
regiment ;  and  at  battalion  level  they  were  not  equipped  with  the 
8 1  mm  mortars  found  in  an  infantry  battalion  weapons  company. 
The  change-over  from  raider  to  regular  infantry  organization 
was  made  by  absorbing  personnel  of  the  disbanded  2d  Raider 
Battalion  to  form  a  regimental  weapons  company  and  by  con- 
verting the  fourth  rifle  company  of  each  of  the  other  former  raider 
battalions  to  weapons  companies  for  the  infantry  battalions  of 
the  4th  Marines.5 

An  additional  organizational  change  came  on  22  February 
when  the  Commandant  directed  Major  General  Roy  S.  Geiger, 
Commanding  General,  I  Marine  Amphibious  Corps  (IMAC),  to 
build  up  the  4th  Marines  to  the  strength  of  a  reinforced  infantry 


*  MajGen  Alan  Shapley  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  7Apr59  (Mono- 
graph &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

6 4th  Mar  MRolls,  i-2gFeb44;  MarCorps  T/O's  E-10,  i5Apr43,  and 
E-310,  igOct43. 


244       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


regiment.  For  this  purpose,  plans  were  made  to  add  a  75mm 
pack  howitzer  battalion;  engineer,  pioneer,  medical,  tank,  and 
motor  transport  companies;  and  service  and  supply,  war  dog, 
reconnaissance,  and  ordnance  platoons.6 

The  purpose  of  these  additions  was  to  equip  the  regiment  for 
independent  operations,  but,  before  the  reinforcing  process  could 
be  completed,  the  newly  reactivated  4th  Marines  was  assigned 
its  first  combat  mission. 

EMIRAU 

Emirau  Island  was  the  target.  A  part  of  the  St.  Mathias 
Group,  about  230  miles  northwest  of  Rabaul,  Emirau  was  in- 
tended to  be  the  last  link  in  a  chain  of  Allied  air  and  sea  bases 
forged  around  that  Japanese  Southwest  Pacific  bastion.  Rabaul, 
with  its  excellent  harbor,  five  first-class  airfields,  and  an  elab- 
orate system  of  base  facilities  and  supply  installations,  was  the 
key  to  Japanese  positions  in  the  Bismarcks  Barrier.  This  chain 
of  islands,  skillfully  fortified  by  the  Japanese,  effectively  blocked 
the  northward  movement  of  Allied  forces  from  Australia.  Until 
the  Bismarcks  Barrier  was  broken,  the  Allied  forces  of  General 
MacArthur  and  Admiral  William  F.  Halsey  were  unable  to 
advance  north  toward  the  Philippines  and  the  home  islands  of 
Japan.7 

The  first  Allied  offensive  moves  in  the  South  and  Southwest 
Pacific  had  taken  place  in  the  late  summer  and  fall  of  1942. 

9  CMC  ltr  to  CG  IMAC,  22Feb44  (003A53445,  S&C  Files,  HQMC) ; 
MarCorps  T/O  E-330:  InfRegt,  Reinf,  i5Apr43- 

7  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based  on  Samuel  E.  Morison,  Break- 
ing the  Bismarcks  Barrier — History  of  United  States  Naval  Operations  in 
World  War  II,  v.  VI  (Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Company,  1950),  hereafter 
Morison,  Breaking  the  Bismarcks  Barrier;  Maj  John  N.  Rentz,  Bougainville 
and  the  Northern  Solomons  (Washington:  HistSec,  Div  of  Information, 
HQMC,  1948)  ;  CTF-31  AR,  Seizure  &  Occupation  of  Emirau  Is,  2oMar- 
7Apr44,  dtd  i6Apr44,  hereafter  CTF-31  AR;  CG  Emirau  LdgFor  rept,  Ops 
of  the  Emirau  LdgFor,  i5Mar~9Apr44,  dtd  2oApr44  (both  documents  in 
Emirau  Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  245 


In  August  the  ist  Marine  Division  had  landed  on  Guadalcanal 
and  Tulagi,  and  the  following  month  the  U.S.  Army's  32d  Divi- 
sion had  begun  operations  to  drive  the  Japanese  from  Buna  and 
Gona  on  the  northeast  coast  of  New  Guinea.  Successful 
completion  of  these  operations  by  mid-February  1943  had 
opened  the  way  for  further  advances.  Under  Admiral  Halsey, 
forces  of  the  South  Pacific  Area  had  pushed  up  the  Solomons 
chain,  until,  by  Christmas  day,  they  had  built  a  bomber  strip 
within  a  perimeter  seized  at  Cape  Torokina  on  Bougainville, 
the  northernmost  island  of  the  group.  Flying  distance  to  Rabaul 
from  this  field  was  only  210  miles.  The  Southwest  Pacific 
Forces  of  MacArthur,  meanwhile,  had  leapfrogged  west  along 
the  northern  shore  of  New  Guinea,  and  had  seized  Cape  Glouces- 
ter at  the  western  tip  of  New  Britain,  thus  securing  passage 
through  the  Bismarcks  Barrier  by  the  Vitiaz  and  Dampier 
Straits.    (See  Map  19.) 

All  that  remained  to  complete  the  isolation  of  Rabaul  was 
to  establish  a  base  to  the  north.  The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
(JCS)  had  originally  designated  Kavieng  on  New  Ireland  for 
this  purpose,  but,  when  intelligence  studies  disclosed  that  Kavieng 
was  heavily  fortified,  Halsey  began  to  consider  bypassing  it  in 
favor  of  one  of  the  St.  Mathias  Group.  Late  in  December  he 
directed  Rear  Admiral  Theodore  S.  Wilkinson,  commander  of 
South  Pacific  amphibious  forces,  to  "prepare  plans  for  the 
seizure  and  occupation  of  Emirau  island  and  the  construction  of 
airfields  thereon."  8 

Planning  for  Emirau  had  just  begun  when  it  was  set  aside  in 
order  to  prepare  for  the  still-scheduled  Kavieng  operation  set 
for  1  April.  But  Emirau  was  substituted  by  the  JCS  on  12 
March  as  a  result  of  the  intervention  of  Halsey  and  Admiral 
Chester  W.  Nimitz.  The  South  Pacific  commander  had 
pointed  out  the  dangers  of  an  invasion  of  Kavieng  to  Admiral 

8FAdm  William  F.  Halsey  ltr  to  RAdm  Theodore  S.  Wilkinson,  dtd 
22Dec43,  quoted  in  Rentz,  op.  cit.}  p.  115. 
519667—60  IS 


246       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


150° 


3 


r 


,-0 
I** 


MAP  19  . 
THE  WESTERN 

PACIFIC 


200 

400 

600 

600 

20°  xv\  >  ^ — — t—f—T-r 

EQUATOR — J — 1 — 

IWO  JIMA 


1 
•  — 

C9 


STATUTE  MILES 


4 


MARS//.. 

ENIWETOK*       *  4 
KWAJALEIN*, 


CAROLINES 


EMIRAU 


gOadalcana^ 


160" 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  247 


Ernest  J.  King  during  a  visit  to  Washington  in  January,  and 
Admiral  Nimitz  had  followed  up  by  pointing  out  that  air  action 
from  Bougainville  against  Rabaul  made  the  seizure  of  Kavieng 
unnecessary.9 

Early  in  the  morning  of  15  March  a  dispatch  order  from 
Halsey  to  "seize  and  occupy  Emirau  at  the  earliest  practical 
date,  not  later  than  20  March,"  10  arrived  at  Wilkinson's  head- 
quarters on  Guadalcanal.  The  South  Pacific  Commander 
recommended  the  employment  of  the  4th  Marines  to  make  the 
landing.  With  D-Day  only  five  days  away,  speed  was  essential. 
Fortunately  the  headquarters  of  III  Amphibious  Force,  I  MAC, 
and  the  4th  Marines  were  all  in  the  same  area,  so  Wilkinson 
was  able  to  summon  their  commanders  to  a  conference  in  the 
small  hours  of  the  morning  of  15  March.  Wilkinson,  Com- 
modore Lawrence  F.  Reifsnider  of  the  Transport  Group,  III 
Amphibious  Force,  General  Geiger,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Shapley  dusted  off  the  previous  plans  for  an  Emirau  landing 
and  quickly  came  up  with  a  scheme  for  the  amphibious  phase. 
Halsey  approved  it  on  his  arrival  at  Guadalcanal  that  afternoon. 

The  Emirau  Attack  Group,  under  Reifsnider's  command,  was 
organized  to  conduct  the  operation.  It  included  the  landing 
force,  two  transport  sections  with  destroyer  escorts,  and  a  salvage 
unit.  Backing  up  Reifsnider's  command  were  a  carrier  unit  of 
two  flat  tops  and  a  force  of  three  cruisers  and  screening 
destroyers. 

The  landing  force,11  under  command  of  Brigadier  General  Al- 
fred H.  Noble,  included  a  staff  recruited  from  IMAC  and  the  3d 
Marine  Division,  a  signal  detachment,  an  air  command  detach- 
ment, a  naval  advance  base  unit,  and  the  4th  Marines,  reinforced. 
Of  the  regiment's  reinforcing  units  called  for  by  the  Comman- 

9  FAdm  William  F.  Halsey  and  LCdr  J.  Bryan,  III,  Admiral  Halsey1 's  Story 
(New  York:  Whittlesey  House,  1947),  pp.  186-188. 

10GomSoPac  msg  to  GTF-31,  dtd  i4Mar44,  quoted  in  CTF-31  AR. 

11  The  term  "landing  force,"  as  used  in  this  operation,  included  elements 
normally  listed  as  part  of  the  base  development  or  garrison  forces. 


248       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


dant  in  his  letter  of  23  February,  only  the  tank  and  medical  com- 
panies had  been  added  by  the  sailing  date  of  1 7  March.  Other 
reinforcing  elements,  including  amphibious  tractor  and  pioneer 
companies,  a  composite  automatic  weapons  battery  of  the  14th 
Defense  Battalion,  and  motor  transport  and  ordnance  platoons, 
were  attached  for  the  Emirau  operation.  Total  strength  of  the 
landing  force  was  4, 8 50. 12 

Colonel  Shapley,  as  commander  of  the  assault  element  of  the 
landing  force,  was  responsible  for  the  detailed  planning  and  ex- 
ecution of  the  landing.  Allied  intelligence  reported  Emirau  to 
be  eight  miles  long.  Coral  reefs  surrounded  the  island  except  for 
one  clear  beach  at  the  eastern  tip  within  a  small  harbor  sheltered 
by  the  adjacent  islet  of  Elomusad.  By  Shapley's  operation  order, 
two  battalions  were  to  land  simultaneously  on  separate  beaches. 
On  Beach  Red,  within  the  harbor  sheltered  by  Elomusad,  1/4 
would  go  ashore,  while  2/4  would  land  about  1,000  yards  to  the 
west  on  Beach  Green.  A  detachment  of  1/4  was  also  to  occupy 
Elomusad,  and  3/4  was  to  remain  boated  in  position  to  support 
either  landing.  Although  intelligence  reports  indicated  there  were 
uo  Japanese  on  the  island,  the  Marines  were  to  land  in  assault 
formation.  Naval  gunfire  by  supporting  destroyers  was  to  be 
delivered  only  if  the  enemy  opened  fire  on  the  ships  or  landing 
craft.13    (See  Map  20.) 

When  Shapley  returned  to  his  command  post  at  Tassafaronga 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  he  immediately  started  prepa- 
rations for  loading  supplies  and  equipment  on  board  ship.  The 
troops  and  their  gear  were  already  on  the  beach  ready  to  load 
out  for  Kavieng,  but  changes  in  the  shipping  assigned  meant 
that  every  item  had  to  be  resorted  and  redistributed.  The  work 
went  on  all  day  and  throughout  the  next  night.  Loading  began 
on  the  morning  of  the  1 6th  and  was  completed  the  following  day. 


12  4th  Mar  MRolls,  iMar-3oApr44. 

13  4th  Mar  OpO  1-44,  dtd  i7Mar44  (Emirau  Area-OpFile,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  249 


250       HOLD  HSGH  THE  TORCH 


On  1 7  March  the  Emirau  Task  Group  sortied  from  Guadal- 
canal and  two  days  later  arrived  off  the  target  island.  Under 
a  continuous  air  cover  from  the  carriers,  the  4th  Marines  landed 
on  20  March  according  to  plan  and  without  opposition.  Na- 
tives who  met  the  attacking  troops  on  the  beaches  reported  that 
the  last  Japanese  had  left  Emirau  two  months  before.  By  night- 
fall the  eastern  end  of  the  island  had  been  occupied,  tanks  had 
scouted  the  rest  of  the  island,  the  ships  had  been  unloaded,  supply 
dumps  established,  antiaircraft  defenses  set  up,  and  reconnais- 
sance for  airfield  sites  begun.  At  1530  Noble  opened  his  com- 
mand post  ashore  and  issued  his  first  operation  order,  setting  up 
the  Emirau  defenses.14 

The  next  day  Noble's  command  occupied  the  remainder  of 
Emirau,  and  completed  the  organization  of  the  island  for  de- 
fense. Because  of  Allied  naval  and  air  superiority  the  Japanese 
made  no  attempts  to  attack.  The  main  job  for  all  hands  became 
the  preparation  of  beaches  to  make  them  suitable  for  unloading 
the  supplies  and  equipment  of  the  second  echelon,  scheduled  to 
arrive  on  25  March.  In  addition,  service  troops  attached  to  the 
4th  Marines  operated  the  dumps  and  distributed  all  supplies. 
After  the  25th  Army  and  Navy  service  organizations  began  to 
take  over,  and  on  11  April  a  garrison  force,  the  147th  Infantry, 
relieved  the  4th  Marines  of  its  defensive  duties. 

GUAM— STRATEGIC  PLANS  AND  PREPARATIONS 

Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  returned  to  Tassafaronga  on 
Guadalcanal  in  mid-April  to  begin  a  new  mission  in  a  new 
organization.  On  the  19th  the  regiment  was  assigned  to  the 
1  st  Marine  Provisional  Brigade  to  take  part  in  the  reconquest 
of  Guam.    Thus  the  regiment  was  given  a  chance  to  participate 

"Emirau  LdgFor,  Jnl.,  1530,  2oMar44;  Emirau  LdgFor  OpO  1-44,  dtd 
9Mar44  (both  Emirau  Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC), 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  251 


in  the  decisive  campaign  of  the  Pacific  war  and  to  share  in  the 
recapture  of  the  first  American  territory  rewon  from  the  Japanese. 

Guam,  along  with  Saipan  and  Tinian,  its  sisters  in  the  Mari- 
anas island  group,  occupied  a  central  position  dominating  the 
Western  Pacific.  Capture  of  these  key  positions  in  the  Japanese 
inner  defense  ring  would  enable  U.S.  forces  to  cut  enemy  com- 
munications with  the  conquered  territories  to  the  south,  and  to 
strike  at  the  Japanese  home  islands  themselves. 

These  advantages  had  been  apparent  to  many  American  offi- 
cers for  some  time.  Admiral  King,  as  early  as  the  fall  of  1942, 
had  urged  his  colleagues  on  the  JCS  to  approve  an  offensive 
drive  across  the  Central  Pacific  leading  to  the  capture  of  the 
Marianas.  General  MacArthur,  however,  with  his  base  of  opera- 
tions in  Australia,  favored  a  drive  north  along  the  New  Guinea 
coast,  through  the  Bismarcks  Barrier  to  the  Philippines.  Ad- 
vances along  both  roads  to  Japan — MacArthur's  from  the  south 
and  Nimitz'  from  the  east — were  approved  by  the  JCS  in  the 
spring  of  I943-15 

But  only  a  start  along  the  two  roads  was  approved.  No  de- 
cision was  reached  regarding  the  course  to  be  taken  farther  along 
the  route.  King  and  Nimitz  hoped  to  push  straight  on  across 
the  Pacific  to  the  Marianas.  MacArthur,  with  his  own  problems 
in  mind,  wanted  the  Central  Pacific  road  to  veer  south  through 
the  Carolines  and  Palaus  toward  the  Philippines. 

A  decision  by  the  JCS  in  favor  of  the  Marianas  came  in 
December  1943,  and  it  was  General  Henry  H.  Arnold  of  the 

15  Unless  otherwise  cited  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  based  on  Samuel 
E.  Morison,  New  Guinea  and  the  Marianas — History  of  United  States  Naval 
Operations  in  World  War  II,  v.  VIII  (Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Company, 
*953) ;  MaJ*  O.  R.  Lodge,  The  Recapture  of  Guam  (Washington:  Historical 
Branch,  G-3  Division,  Headquarters,  U.S.  Marine  Corps,  1954),  hereafter 
Lodge,  Recapture  of  Guam;  Philip  A.  Crowl,  Campaign  in  the  Marianas — 
The  War  in  the  Pacific — United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington: 
OCMH,  Dept  of  the  Army,  i960) ;  1st  ProvMarBrig  SAR,  Guam,  dtd  19 Aug 
44,  hereafter  1st  ProvMarBrig  SAR  (Guam  Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


252       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


U.S.  Army  Air  Forces  whose  arguments  were  decisive.  With  the 
B-29  strategic  long-range  bombers  coming  into  operational  use, 
bases  within  range  of  Japan  were  essential.  Locations  in  China 
had  proved  too  vulnerable  to  capture;  the  Marianas  were  the 
answer. 

With  the  go-ahead  from  the  JCS,  preliminary  planning  for  the 
seizure  of  the  Marianas  began.  Admiral  Nimitz  at  Pearl  Harbor 
issued  plan  GRANITE,  a  schedule  of  Central  Pacific  operations 
for  1 944  listing  the  seizure  of  Saipan  and  Tinian  for  1  November 
and  of  Guam  for  1 5  December.  Unexpectedly  swift  conquest  of 
the  Marshall  Islands  led  to  a  speed-up  in  operations,  and,  by  a 
directive  of  1 2  March,  the  JCS  set  the  target  date  for  the  seizure 
of  the  Marianas,  operation  FORAGER,  for  15  June.  On  28 
March,  Nimitz  issued  an  order  allocating  forces  and  directing  the 
preparation  of  operation  plans. 

Admiral  Raymond  A.  Spruance,  Commander  Fifth  Fleet,  was 
named  over-all  commander  of  FORAGER.  Under  Spruance 
was  Vice  Admiral  Richmond  K.  Turner  in  command  of  the 
Joint  Expeditionary  Force,  which  in  turn  was  divided  into  North- 
ern and  Southern  Attack  Forces.  The  Northern  Attack  Force, 
which  was  to  seize  Saipan  and  Tinian,  was  also  commanded  by 
Turner  and  included  Lieutenant  General  Holland  M.  Smith's 
V  Amphibious  Corps  (VAC).  The  Southern  Attack  Force 
(Rear  Admiral  Richard  L.  Conolly)  included  Major  General 
Roy  S.  Geiger's  III  Amphibious  Corps  (IIIAC),  and  was  to  take 
Guam.16  The  3d  Marine  Division  and  the  1st  Provisional  Marine 
Brigade  made  up  the  III  Amphibious  Corps.  In  addition,  the 
Army's  27th  and  77th  Divisions  were  designated  Expeditionary 
Troops  Reserve  and  Area  Reserve  respectively.  In  addition  to 
VAC,  General  Smith  commanded  all  ground  forces  under  the 
title,  Commanding  General,  Expeditionary  Troops. 


IMAC  had  been  redesignated  IIIAC  on  i5Apr44. 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  253 


1ST  PROVISIONAL  MARINE  BRIGADE 
ORGANIZATION 

The  i st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade,  activated  at  Pearl  Harbor 
on  21  March  1944,  included  the  4th  and  2 2d  Marines,  Rein- 
forced, and  Brigade  Signal,  Military  Police,  and  Headquarters 
Companies.  Absence  of  many  of  a  Marine  brigade's  normal 
supporting  units  reflected  the  fact  that  both  infantry  regiments 
were  heavily  reinforced  by  organizations  of  this  type,  thereby 
making  duplication  of  them  at  the  higher  level  unnecessary. 

Soon  after  returning  from  Emirau,  the  4th  Marines  added 
the  remainder  of  the  reinforcing  elements  originally  authorized 
and  was  further  strengthened  for  the  Guam  operation  by  trans- 
formation into  a  regimental  combat  team  (RCT).  These  last 
additions,  made  in  accordance  with  the  standard  procedure  for 
amphibious  operations,  included  platoons  from  the  brigade's 
military  police  and  signal  companies,  as  well  as  the  4th  Platoon, 
2d  Ammunition  Company,  and  a  detachment  of  the  5th  Field 
Depot. 

The  pack  howitzer  battalion  was  detached  from  the  regiment 
and  joined  with  the  similar  unit  of  the  2 2d  Marines  in  a  brigade 
artillery  group — a  move  made  to  give  central  fire  control  and 
direction.  Additional  reinforcements  at  brigade  level  were  an 
antiaircraft  group,  the  53d  Naval  Construction  Battalion,  and 
Medical  Battalion,  IIIAC. 

Commanding  the  1st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade  was  Briga- 
dier General  Lemuel  C.  Shepherd,  Jr.,  a  veteran  of  the  4th 
Marines  who  had  served  as  regimental  adjutant  in  Shanghai  in 
1928  and  1929. 

IIIAC  PLANNING  AND  PREPARATIONS 

Admiral  Conolly  and  General  Geiger  and  their  staffs  and  sub- 
ordinate commanders  began  work  on  Guam  invasion  plans  late 
in  March.  By  the  end  of  May  detailed  plans  had  been  com- 
pleted on  all  levels. 


254       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Guam,  the  target  for  the  men,  ships,  and  planes  of  the  South- 
ern Attack  Force,  is  an  irregularly  shaped  island  about  30  miles 
long  and  about  9  miles  wide  at  its  broadest  point.  Divided  by  a 
rugged  and  swampy  lowland  belt  into  roughly  equal  northern 
and  southern  parts,  the  island  is  heavily  jungled.  In  the  north 
an  irregular  coral  limestone  plateau  underlies  the  dense  growth, 
and  to  the  south  is  an  extensive  mountain  range.  Apra  Harbor, 
formed  by  Orote  Peninsula  and  Cabras  Island,  lies  on  the  west 
coast  just  below  the  waist.  A  coral  reef,  varying  in  width  from 
20  to  700  yards,  fringes  almost  the  entire  island;  high  cliffs  rise 
from  just  behind  the  narrow  beaches  to  rim  the  northern  shore- 
line. In  the  south  the  coast  is  less  rugged,  but  cliffs  effectively 
block  egress  from  the  beaches  in  many  places.  Heavy  surf, 
thrown  up  by  the  prevailing  trade  winds,  rules  out  the  south  and 
southeast  coasts  for  landing  operations.    ( See  Map  21.) 

Marine  and  Navy  planners  were,  therefore,  restricted  in  their 
choice  to  a  few  beaches  on  the  west  coast.  They  selected  two 
landing  areas — the  beaches  south  of  Orote  Peninsula  between 
the  town  of  Agat  and  Bangi  Point,  assigned  to  the  1st  Provisional 
Marine  Brigade;  and  the  beaches  north  of  Apra  Harbor  between 
Adelup  and  Asan  Points,  assigned  to  the  3d  Marine  Division. 
W-Day  (the  landing  date)  was  set  for  18  June,  three  days  after 
the  Northern  Attack  Force  was  scheduled  to  hit  the  beaches  of 
Saipan. 

For  General  Shepherd  and  the  1st  Provisional  Brigade  Staff, 
serious  planning  began  on  27  April  with  the  receipt  of  a  staff 
memorandum  from  Admiral  Turner  directing  the  preparation 
of  detailed  plans  for  the  FORAGER  operation.  About  one 
month  later,  on  22  May,  Operation  Plan  Number  1  was  com- 
pleted. It  provided  for  a  landing  by  two  RCTs  abreast  to  seize 
a  beachhead  between  the  town  of  Agat  and  Bangi  Point,  and 
then  for  a  drive  north  and  west  to  capture  Orote  Peninsula. 

After  landing  on  the  right  flank  White  Beaches,  RCT-4  would 
advance  inland  a  distance  of  about  2,700  yards.    Hill  40,  just 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  255 


MAP  21 


256       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


behind  the  beach  on  the  right  of  the  regimental  zone,  and  Mt. 
Alifan,  an  820-foot  peak  about  1,700  yards  inland,  were  the  crit- 
ical terrain  features  in  the  4th's  zone.  RCT-22  would  land  to 
the  left  of  RCT-4  over  the  Yellow  Beaches  to  seize  Agat,  and 
then  would  wheel  left  and  advance  on  Orote  Peninsula.17 

On  Guam  the  IIIAC  would  face  a  relatively  weak  Japanese 
garrison  in  view  of  the  considerable  area  to  be  defended.  Lieu- 
tenant General  Takeshi  Takashina's  defending  force  numbered 
only  about  18,500  men  in  mid- July  on  the  eve  of  the  U.S.  attack. 
Two  battalions  of  the  38th  Infantry,  reinforced  by  a  company 
of  the  gth  Tank  Regiment,  defended  the  landing  beaches  assigned 
to  the  1  st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade,  while  the  54th  Naval 
Guard  Force  was  dug  in  on  Orote,  ready  to  repel  the  invader. 

Training  for  the  4th  Marines  and  for  other  troops  of  the  IIIAC 
proceeded  simultaneously  with  the  preparation  of  invasion  plans. 
At  Tassafaronga  the  4th  Marines,  after  two  weeks  of  rest  and 
rehabilitation  following  their  return  from  Emirau,  began  a  unit 
training  program  on  27  April.  Tank-infantry  teamwork  came 
in  for  special  attention,  and,  in  spite  of  crowded  training  areas, 
the  work  proceeded  apace.  On  14  May,  the  amphibious  phase 
of  preparation  started  when  the  regiment  embarked  in  vessels  of 
the  Southern  Transport  Group.  Two  days,  the  16th  and  17th, 
were  spent  in  combat  team  landing  exercises,  followed  on  the 
1 8th  by  a  brigade  landing.  In  addition  to  polishing  ship-to- 
shore  techniques,  Marines  of  RCT-4  got  a  chance  to  become 
acquainted  with  the  sailors  of  the  transport  division  and  to  perfect 
the  teamwork  so  necessary  in  amphibious  operations. 

Final  rehearsals  for  the  Guam  landing  came  on  25  May.  On 
a  beach  at  Cape  Esperance,  the  northwest  tip  of  Guadalcanal, 
the  Marines  and  sailors  executed  the  Guam  assault  plan  as 
closely  as  possible.  There  was  no  fringing  reef,  but  realism  was 
preserved  by  transferring  troops  from  boats  to  tractors  at  an 


17  1  st  ProvMarBrig  OPlan  No.  1,  3oMay44  (Guam  Area-Op  File,  HistBr, 
HQMG ) . 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  257 


arbitrary  point  simulating  the  edge  of  the  reef.  Ashore  the 
men  maneuvered  according  to  the  operation  plan.  Only  token 
amounts  of  supplies  and  equipment  were  landed,  but  shore  party 
personnel  had  their  chance  to  practice  the  next  day  during 
unloading  exercises  back  at  Tassafaronga.18 

MOVEMENT  TO  THE  OBJECTIVE 

The  first  elements  of  the  4th  Marines  sailed  for  Guam  on 
31  May,  only  five  days  after  rehearsals  had  been  completed. 
The  assault  battalions,  Major  Bernard  W.  Green's  1/4  and 
Major  John  S.  Messer's  2/4  boarded  LSTs  19  in  company  with 
the  other  assault  units  of  the  I II AC  and  sailed  for  the  staging 
area  at  Kwajalein.  On  4  June  the  remainder  of  the  regiment, 
including  Major  Hamilton  M.  Hoyler's  3/4,  supporting  units, 
and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Shapley's  regimental  headquarters,  sailed 
in  transports  of  the  Southern  Transport  Group.  Shapley  opened 
his  command  post  on  board  the  transport  Zeilin,  flagship  of  the 
Southern  Attack  Force.  By  8  June  the  LSTs  and  transports 
had  arrived  at  the  staging  area  at  Kwajalein,  where  they  took  on 
fuel,  water,  and  provisions.  The  first  LSTs  cleared  the  atoll  on 
the  9th,  and  by  12  June  all  ships  were  on  their  way  to  Guam.20 

Guam  had  first  come  under  attack  the  previous  day  when 
carrier  planes  from  Vice  Admiral  Marc  Mitscher's  Task  Force  58 
raided  the  island.  Japanese  fighters  rose  to  beat  off  the  attack, 
and  in  the  ensuing  battle  about  150  enemy  aircraft  were  de- 
stroyed in  the  air  and  on  the  ground.  For  the  next  four  days 
Mitscher's  fliers  smashed  at  runways,  aircraft  facilities, 
antiaircraft,  and  coast  defense  guns. 

18  1  st  ProvMarBrig  WarD,  iApr-3oMay44  (Unit  Hist  Rept  File,  HistBr, 
HQMG ) . 

M  The  LST,  a  tank  landing  ship,  was  a  workhorse  of  World  War  II,  but  its 
conspicuous  size  and  speed  led  to  it  being  nicknamed  by  Marines  as  a  "large, 
slow  target." 

20  1  st  ProvMarBrig  WarD,  1-30,^44  (Unit  Hist  Rept  File,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 


258       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Invasion  of  the  Marianas  began  on  schedule  on  15  June  when 
Marines  of  VAC  hit  the  Saipan  beaches.  In  a  dispatch  to 
Conolly  that  evening,  Spruance  confirmed  W-Day  for  Guam  as 
1 8  June,  but  this  landing  date  was  postponed  indefinitely  almost 
as  soon  as  it  was  issued.  The  Japanese  Combined  Fleet,  in 
keeping  with  a  decision  of  the  naval  high  command  in  Tokyo, 
had  sortied  from  Philippine  bases  seeking  a  decisive  engagement 
with  the  United  States  task  force  concentrated  in  the  Marianas. 
When  submarines  detected  the  advancing  Japanese  ships, 
Spruance  postponed  the  Guam  landing  and  concentrated  his 
strength  for  the  expected  engagement  with  the  Japanese  fleet. 
In  the  Battle  of  the  Philippine  Sea,  fought  on  19-20  June,  the 
Japanese  were  repulsed  with  heavy  losses. 

Removal  of  the  threat  of  naval  attack  did  not  lead  to  an  im- 
mediate invasion  of  Guam.  Heavy  resistance  on  Saipan  had 
forced  the  commitment  of  the  27th  Infantry  Division  from  Ex- 
peditionary Troops  Reserve  on  1 6  June,  and  the  IIIAC  was  held 
afloat  in  case  added  reinforcements  were  needed.  Not  until  the 
30th  was  the  1st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade  released  from  this 
stand-by  reserve  and  ordered  to  Eniwetok  in  the  Marshalls. 

On  the  sandy  beaches  of  this  coral  atoll,  Marines  of  RCT-4 
were  able  to  stretch  their  legs  for  the  first  time  in  more  than  a 
month.  Small  unit  tactical  exercises  and  athletics  were  the  order 
of  the  day.  In  spite  of  exercise  ashore,  life  at  Eniwetok  was  far 
from  comfortable.  Men  of  the  assault  battalions  rigged  shelter 
halves,  tents,  and  tarpaulins  over  the  LST  decks  in  an  effort  to 
make  some  shade.  One  officer  compared  the  landing  ships  to  "a 
tenement  district  with  Marines'  bedding  strewn  everywhere  in  an 
effort  to  find  a  flat  place  to  lie  down."  21  But  living  on  the  LSTs 
was  better  than  existence  on  the  transports  where  the  hot  rays  of 
the  tropical  sun  turned  the  troop  spaces  into  infernos.  Added 

21  LtCol  Calvin  W.  Kunz,  Jr.,  ltr  to  Maj  O.  R.  Lodge,  dtd  27Feb52,  quoted 
in  Lodge,  Recapture  of  Guam,  p.  30. 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  259 


to  the  discomfort  was  the  monotony.  The  Marines  had  been 
briefed  so  often  on  the  Guam  landing  beaches  that,  according 
to  one  naval  officer,  they  spoke  of  them  "as  though  they  were 
Coney  Island,  Old  Orchard,  Daytona,  or  a  California  beach."  22 

It  was  a  combat-ready  regiment  of  Marines  which  departed 
Eniwetok  on  1 5  and  1 7  July.  Though  they  griped  at  the  discom- 
forts of  confinement  on  board  ship  for  so  long,  the  men  were  lucky 
that  the  original  landing  date  had  been  delayed.  Alarmed  by 
the  tenacious  resistance  of  the  Japanese  on  Saipan,  the  top  U.S. 
commanders  had  reinforced  the  IIIAC  by  assigning  the  77th  In- 
fantry Division  from  area  reserve  and  had  greatly  increased  the 
preliminary  naval  gunfire  and  air  bombardments.  Under  a  new 
tactical  plan,  the  305th  RCT  was  attached  to  the  1st  Provisional 
Brigade,  while  the  remainder  of  the  77th  Division  remained  afloat 
ready  to  reinforce  either  the  northern  or  southern  beaches.  If 
not  needed  to  strengthen  the  3d  Division  in  the  north,  the  77th 
Division  would  land  and  take  over  the  southern  beachhead  from 
the  1  st  Provisional  Brigade,  freeing  Shepherd's  Marines  for  an 
all-out  assault  on  the  Orote  Peninsula. 

Sporadic  carrier  air  attacks  hit  the  Japanese  on  Guam  during 
the  last  half  of  June,  and  on  4  July  intensive  bombardment  began. 
From  that  date  on,  ships  and  planes  moved  in  to  batter  the  island 
in  the  most  impressive  preliminary  bombardment  yet  delivered 
in  the  Pacific  war.  By  evening  of  20  July,  opinion  aboard  Conol- 
ly's  amphibious  force  flagship,  Appalachian,  was  that  not  one 
fixed  gun  larger  than  a  machine  gun  was  left  in  commission  on 
the  west  coast,  and  Geiger's  naval  gunfire  officer  reported  that 
the  assault  troops  would  meet  little  resistance.23  The  truth  of 
these  estimates  would  soon  be  tested. 


23  Cdr  H.  E.  Smith,  "I  Saw  the  Morning  Break,"  United  States  Naval  Insti- 
tute Proceedings,  v.  72,  no.  3  (Mar46),  p.  406. 

23  TF  53  Op  Rept,  Guam,  NGF  End,  ioAug44;  IIIAC  SAR,  Guam,  NGF 
End,  3Sep44  (both  Guam  Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC) . 


260       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


THE  LANDING  AND  SEIZURE  OF  THE  BEACHHEAD 

The  order  to  land  was  flashed  to  the  Southern  Attack  Force 
on  20  July.  W-Day  was  set  for  21  July;  H-Hour  was  0830. 
During  the  night  LSTs  and  transports  carrying  RGT-4  and 
other  1  st  Provisional  Brigade  troops  steamed  into  designated 
transport  areas  and  by  0600  reached  positions  preparatory  to 
launching  landing  craft.  At  0700  the  bows  of  the  LSTs  swung 
open  to  disgorge  the  LVTs  24  carrying  the  assault  troops  of  1  /4 
and  2/4.  With  LVT(A)s  in  the  lead,  the  assault  waves  headed 
for  the  beach.  Nine  LCI  gunboats  followed  closely,  bombard- 
ing the  beach  to  the  front  and  flanks  with  rockets  and  40mm 
fire.  Carrier  aircraft  dived  to  bomb  and  strafe  beach  defenses, 
while,  farther  to  seaward,  fire  support  ships  sent  heavy  caliber 
salvos  crashing  shoreward. 

In  spite  of  the  heavy  bombardment,  the  Japanese  were  still 
full  of  fight.  As  the  LVTs  crawled  onto  the  reef,  artillery  and 
heavy  automatic  weapons  opened  up  from  the  beach.  Particu- 
larly intense  fire  came  from  Bangi  and  Gaan  Points.  The  first 
wave  ground  ashore  at  0832  and  was  followed  at  five-minute 
intervals  by  subsequent  waves.  As  soon  as  LVTs  were  unloaded, 
they  returned  to  the  outer  edge  of  the  reef  to  transfer  troops  of 
later  waves  from  LC VPs.    ( See  Map  2 2 . ) 

Well-organized  beach  defenses,  consisting  of  concrete  pill- 
boxes built  into  coral  outcroppings,  an  elaborate  trench  system, 
concealed  machine-gun  emplacements,  and  tank  traps  impeded 
the  progress  of  the  4th  Marines.  On  the  left,  Messer's  2d  Bat- 
talion encountered  unexpected  resistance  from  a  low  mound 
within  100  yards  of  the  shore.  Japanese  dug  in  on  the  reverse 
slope  resisted  stubbornly,  but  by  noon  the  position  had  been  taken 


24  Amphibious  craft  and  vehicles  of  World  War  II  were  commonly  known  by 
abbreviations  made  up  of  the  initials  of  the  words  making  up  their  titles. 
Some  of  the  more  common  were:  LVT — landing  vehicle,  tracked;  LVT(A)  — 
armored  LVT;  LCI(G) — landing  craft  infantry  converted  to  a  gunboat; 
LCVP — landing  craft  vehicle,  personnel. 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  261 


519667—60  19 


262       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


and  the  Marines  pushed  on  across  the  open  fields  toward  Mt. 
Alifan. 

On  the  regimental  right  the  ist  Battalion  landed  with  two 
companies  in  assault.  First  Lieutenant  Frank  A.  Kemp's  Com- 
pany A  on  the  right  ran  into  stiff  resistance  from  enemy  pillboxes 
near  the  beach  but  quickly  silenced  the  opposition  and  moved 
inland.  On  the  left,  ist  Lieutenant  Thad  N.  Dodd's  Company 
B  met  only  token  resistance.  Both  companies  reached  their 
initial  objectives  at  a  distance  varying  between  iooo  and  2000 
yards  from  the  beach  by  1030. 

First  Lieutenant  Lawrence  S.  Banger's  Company  C  landed  in 
the  third  wave  and  swung  right  to  attack  Hill  40  on  the  extreme 
right  of  the  regimental  zone.  Deadly  fire  from  Japanese  machine 
guns  dug  in  on  this  height  hit  the  advancing  Marines,  halting  the 
attack.  Major  Green  ordered  up  two  tanks,  and  with  their  sup- 
port Hill  40  was  quickly  seized  by  early  afternoon.  Company  C 
was  then  relieved  to  rejoin  its  battalion  by  Company  K,  which, 
with  the  remainder  of  the  3d  Battalion,  had  landed  in  regimental 
reserve. 

At  1345,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Shapley  ordered  a  resumption  of 
the  attack  to  seize  an  objective  line  which  included  the  peak  of 
Mt.  Alifan.  Only  scattered  resistance  met  the  three  battalions 
as  they  jumped  off,  and  by  1730  the  regiment  had  reached  the 
slopes  of  the  mountain  when  orders  came  to  hold  up  and  dig  in. 
Casualties  for  the  day  totaled  67  killed  and  195  wounded.25 

The  regimental  position  for  the  night  was  anchored  on  the 
left  by  a  Company  B  roadblock  on  Harmon  Road  from  which 
the  Marines  could  see  men  of  the  2 2d  Marines  across  a  deep 
gully.  From  the  roadblock  the  4th  Marines'  line  bent  back 
around  the  lower  slopes  of  Mt.  Alifan  to  reach  the  beach  at 
Bangi  Point. 

This  line  was  too  long  to  be  solidly  manned,  but  strong  points 

25  Casualty  figures  from  PersAccountingSec,  HQMC,  Final  WW  II  casualty 
tabulation,  dtd  i2Dec52  (HistBr,  HQMC). 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  263 


were  located  along  it  so  as  to  cover  the  gaps  with  fire.  In  re- 
sponse to  orders  from  General  Shepherd,  all  hands  made  ready 
for  an  expected  Japanese  counterattack.  Harmon  Road,  leading 
from  the  village  of  Agat  into  the  interior,  was  the  most  critical 
area.  To  block  an  enemy  tank  thrust  down  this  favorable 
avenue  into  the  center  of  the  Marine  position,  five  tanks  of  the 
4th  Marines  tank  company  were  parked  in  a  hollow  just  off 
the  road.  Elsewhere  the  line  was  strengthened  by  the  Recon- 
naissance Platoon  and  an  engineer  detachment.  Company  G 
was  held  in  reserve  near  the  regimental  CP. 

Shortly  before  midnight  Japanese  began  probing  all  along  the 
Marine  front.  At  0100  a  platoon  of  Company  K  was  hit  hard 
and  driven  off  Hill  40.  A  counterattack  recaptured  the  hill,  but 
the  Marines  were  driven  off  again.  Reinforced  by  two  squads, 
the  platoon  fought  its  way  back  on  Hill  40,  this  time  to  stay. 
Company  K  was  hit  again  a  couple  of  hours  later,  and,  though 
most  of  the  enemy  were  thrown  back,  a  few  infiltrated  all  the 
way  back  to  the  artillery  positions. 

A  more  serious  attack  hit  the  Company  B  roadblock  on 
Harmon  Road  at  about  0230,  when  four  tanks  leading  truck- 
mounted  guns  and  infantry  attempted  to  break  through  to  Agat. 
Private  First  Class  Bruno  Oribiletti  knocked  out  the  first  two 
tanks  with  his  bazooka,  and  the  Marine  tanks  which  had  been 
stationed  off  the  road  earlier  in  the  night  took  care  of  the  rest. 
Deprived  of  their  armor,  the  enemy  infantry  withdrew  behind 
Mt.  Alifan. 

Another  enemy  attack  hit  Company  A  in  the  left-center  of 
the  regimental  front.  Under  cover  of  mortar  and  machine-gun 
fire,  shouting  Japanese,  led  by  an  officer  waving  a  flag  on  a 
bamboo  pole,  charged  the  Marine  lines.  Swinging  samurai 
swords  and  tossing  grenades,  some  of  the  enemy  soldiers  broke 
through  and  raced  all  the  way  to  the  artillery  positions  within 
400  yards  of  the  beach  before  being  stopped  by  the  gunners. 
The  next  morning  200  enemy  dead  were  counted  in  this  sector. 


264       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Elsewhere  in  the  brigade  zone,  the  Japanese  hit  the  2  2d 
Marines  and  the  305th  Infantry.  All  attacks  had  been  repulsed 
by  dawn,  and  the  Marines  and  soldiers  quickly  restored  their 
lines.  For  the  Japanese,  the  night's  attacks  had  been  extremely 
costly.  Not  only  had  they  failed  to  push  the  invading  Ameri- 
cans into  the  sea,  but  in  the  attempt  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions, 
38th  Infantry,  which  were  the  main  defensive  units  in  the  sector, 
had  been  destroyed  as  a  fighting  force. 

On  22  July  General  Shepherd  ordered  renewed  attacks  to 
complete  seizure  of  the  beachhead.  The  4th  Marines'  mission 
was  to  seize  Mt.  Alifan  and  then  extend  along  the  ridge  to  the 
south  to  the  vicinity  of  Mt.  Taene.  At  0900,  the  1st  and  3d 
Battalions  jumped  off  in  the  attack,  encountering  resistance 
from  Japanese  dug  in  on  the  reverse  slope  of  little  rounded  heights 
constituting  the  foothills  of  Mt.  Alifan.  Using  demolition 
charges  and  hand  grenades,  the  Marines  made  short  work  of 
the  enemy  positions.  Once  past  this  belt  of  fortifications,  ter- 
rain and  vegetation  became  the  principal  obstacles  to  advance. 
The  trails  led  up  near  vertical  cliffs,  and  a  thorny  undergrowth 
clung  to  the  slopes.  Large  entwined  vines  caught  on  packs 
and  equipment  as  the  Marines  struggled  upward.  Dropping 
excess  gear,  the  men  pushed  on.  Lieutenant  William  A.  Kerr's 
2d  Platoon  of  Company  G  finally  reached  the  summit,  where 
it  discovered  no  evidence  of  the  Japanese.  As  the  peak  did 
not  lend  itself  to  defense,  Kerr  led  his  platoon  back  to  the  base 
of  the  cliffs. 

While  this  platoon  was  reconnoitering  Mt.  Alifan,  the  main 
body  of  assault  troops  extended  along  the  ridges  to  the  south. 
By  nightfall  they  occupied  a  line  from  Mt.  Alifan  to  the  coast 
at  Magpo  Point — 1st  Battalion  on  the  left,  3d  Battalion  on  the 
right,  and  2d  Battalion  in  reserve.  Having  completed  seizure 
of  the  brigade  beachhead  in  their  zone  the  4th  Marines  held  up 
and  dug  in. 

To  the  north,  the  305th  Infantry  and  the  2 2d  Marines  con- 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  265 


tinued  the  attack  on  23  and  24  July  to  complete  seizure  of  the 
beachhead  in  their  zones.  The  soldiers,  in  the  brigade  center, 
completed  their  part  of  the  job  against  little  opposition  by  eve- 
ning of  the  23d.  But  the  22d  Marines,  after  a  relatively  easy 
advance  during  the  morning,  encountered  stiffening  resistance 
in  the  afternoon  when  the  regiment  attempted  to  swing  across 
the  neck  of  Orote  Peninsula.  Heavy  fighting  continued  the  rest 
of  the  day  and  throughout  the  24th  as  the  Marines  battled 
forward.  So  stubborn  was  enemy  opposition  that  2/4  had  to 
be  thrown  in  to  plug  a  gap  between  2/22  and  3/22. 

By  nightfall  of  24  July,  however,  the  Marines  had  pushed 
back  the  Japanese  and  had  sealed  off  the  peninsula.  The 
Southern  Landing  Force  beachhead  was  then  firmly  established, 
and  the  effective  enemy  troops  remaining  in  Southern  Guam 
were  bottled  up  on  Orote. 

SEIZURE  OF  OROTE  PENINSULA 

Preparation  for  seizure  of  this  enemy  stronghold  had  begun 
on  22  July  when  Geiger  ordered  the  remainder  of  the  77th  In- 
fantry Division  to  take  over  defense  of  the  beachhead,  releasing 
Shepherd's  brigade  for  the  assault  on  Orote.  Relief  of  the  4th 
Marines  by  the  306th  Infantry  Regiment  began  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  24th  and  was  completed  the  next  morning. 

On  the  evening  of  the  24th,  Geiger  issued  Shepherd  a  warn- 
ing order  calling  for  the  attack  on  Orote  to  begin  the  next  day. 
But  the  Marines  of  the  2 2d  Regiment  were  exhausted  after 
four  days  of  continuous  fighting,  and  the  4th  Marines,  having 
been  relieved  late,  were  not  in  attack  positions.  Shepherd  there- 
fore requested  and  was  granted  a  delay  of  the  attack  from  the 
25th  to  the  26th. 

The  extra  day  provided  little  relief  for  the  2 2d  Marines.  Its 
1  st  and  3d  Battalions,  attacking  to  shorten  and  straighten  the 
jump-off  line  across  Orote  Peninsula,  were  hard  hit  by  Japanese 


266       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


artillery,  machine  guns,  and  tanks.  The  objective,  a  nearly 
straight  line  across  the  narrow  neck  of  the  peninsula  from  Agat 
Bay  to  Apra  Harbor,  was  achieved  on  schedule,  but  losses  in 
1/22  were  so  heavy  that  1/4  was  brought  up  in  relief. 

Major  Green  deployed  Companies  B  and  G  and  a  platoon  of 
Company  A  for  defense  of  the  battalion  sector  which  was  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  brigade  line.  The  Marines  dug  in  and  prepared 
defenses  against  a  possible  enemy  counterattack.    ( See  Map  23. ) 

It  was  well  they  did.  The  Japanese  commander  on  Orote, 
Commander  Asaichi  Tamai,  IJN,  was  preparing  to  break  out 
of  the  trap  and  join  the  main  body  of  defenders  to  the  north. 
Bottled  up  in  the  eight  square  miles  were  about  2,500  enemy 
troops,  including  the  54th  Naval  Guard  Force,  remnants  of  the 
38th  Infantry,  two  antiaircraft  companies,  about  600  men  from 
aviation  squadrons,  and  a  few  naval  laborers.  Early  in  the 
afternoon  an  attempt  to  evacuate  a  part  of  this  force  by  barge 
across  Apra  Harbor  had  been  smashed  by  American  air  and 
artillery.  With  the  back  door  slammed  shut,  Tamai  gathered 
his  remaining  forces  for  a  desperate  effort  to  burst  through  the 
Marine  lines. 

Rain,  which  had  been  falling  intermittentiy  all  day,  became 
more  frequent  after  dark,  helping  to  cover  Japanese  attack 
preparations.  Marines  in  the  front  lines  could  hear  screams, 
shouts,  laughter,  and  the  breaking  of  bottles,  as  the  enemy 
soldiers  sought  alcoholic  fortification  for  the  coming  assault. 

About  midnight,  flag-waving,  sword-swinging  officers  led 
enemy  troops  from  the  cover  of  a  mangrove  swamp  opposite  the 
22d  Marines.  Clutching  pitchforks,  sticks,  and  pieces  of  broken 
bottles  as  well  as  their  regular  weapons,  the  sake-CTa.zt&  attackers 
rushed  the  Marine  line.  A  hail  of  fire  from  artillery,  mortars, 
machine  guns,  and  rifles  beat  back  the  enemy,  but  successive 
waves  kept  coming,  only  to  be  caught  in  the  deadly  cross  fire. 
Not  until  dawn  did  the  attack  finally  peter  out. 

Lieutenant  William  A.  Kerr's  platoon  from  Company  A,  on 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  267 


268       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  right  flank  of  the  4th  Marines  and  the  only  regimental  unit 
engaged,  had  a  turkey  shoot  with  the  Japanese  as  targets.  Kerr's 
Marines,  by  enfilade  fire,  killed  an  estimated  250  of  the  Japanese 
assaulting  the  lines  of  the  2 2d  Marines. 

On  26  July,  the  4th  Marines  jumped  off  as  scheduled  to  seize 
Orote  Peninsula.  Attacking  in  a  column  of  battalions,  the  1st 
in  the  lead  and  the  3d  mopping  up  behind,  the  regiment  made 
rapid  progress  against  little  or  no  opposition. 

The  speed  of  forward  movement  soon  opened  a  gap  between 
the  regiment  and  the  2 2d  Marines,  held  up  on  the  right  by 
Japanese  artillery  fire.  To  protect  the  exposed  right  flank, 
Shapley  requested  permission  to  take  over  part  of  the  22d 
Marines'  zone  and  to  continue  the  attack  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
old  Marine  rifle  range,  some  1,400  yards  ahead.  General  Shep- 
herd acceded  to  this  request  and  shifted  the  regimental  boundary 
to  the  Agat-Sumay  Road. 

Moving  ahead  in  its  zone  west  of  the  road,  the  regiment  made 
steady  progress  until  about  1700,  when  Company  G  ran  up 
against  a  pillbox-studded  position  along  a  low  ridge  to  its  front. 
The  Marines  were  hard  hit  by  enemy  fire  including  75mm,  and, 
after  losing  8  killed  and  18  wounded,  pulled  back  about  700 
yards.26 

Following  the  temporary  withdrawal,  the  4th  Marines  dug  in 
for  the  night  after  an  advance  during  the  day  of  about  1,400 
yards.  From  the  left  flank  resting  on  Agat  Bay  the  front  line 
ran  straight  across  the  peninsula  for  about  700  yards,  then  dipped 
back  around  a  marsh  to  join  the  2 2d  Marines  at  Road 
Junction  15. 

After  a  heavy  air  and  artillery  preparation,  the  regiment 
jumped  off  on  the  27th  with  the  1st  and  3d  Battalions  abreast. 
Major  Hoyler's  3/4,  which  had  moved  into  line  on  the  right 
next  to  the  road,  was  stopped  in  its  tracks  by  withering  fire  from 

26  1/4  WarD,  3oMay-9Sep44  (Unit  Hist  Rept  File,  HistBr,  HQMC),  here- 
after 1/4  WarD. 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  269 


the  camouflaged,  mutually  supporting  Japanese  positions  en- 
countered by  1/4  at  dusk  the  previous  day.  Medium  tanks  of 
the  regimental  tank  company  rumbled  forward  to  fire  at  point- 
blank  range,  smashing  the  enemy  dugouts  to  rubble.  Captain 
William  Stewart  and  his  Company  L  than  moved  forward  onto 
the  ridge,  using  white  phosphorous  grenades  and  BARs  to  mop 
up  the  smashed  enemy  positions.27 

On  the  left,  Company  I  moved  up  through  the  thick  brush, 
encountering  only  scattered  resistance  and  sniper  fire.  By  0900 
the  battalion  was  on  top  of  the  ridge  ready  to  move  forward. 
Ahead  was  a  coconut  grove  on  ground  sloping  up  to  a  second  and 
higher  ridge  some  500  yards  away.  Once  again,  Company  L  on 
the  right  flank  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  against  Japanese  in 
a  second  line  of  emplacements.  Tanks  could  not  get  forward 
owing  to  congestion  on  the  road.  Fighting  in  the  coconut  grove 
was  bitter  and  progress  was  slow,  but  by  1530  enemy  resistance 
in  the  grove  had  been  silenced. 

Breaking  clear  of  the  coconut  trees,  Hoyler's  men  came  under 
machine-gun  fire  from  Japanese  dug  in  on  the  next  ridge.  These 
positions,  well-constructed  concrete  emplacements,  were  the  last 
defenses  before  Orote  airfield.  By  1 700,  Companies  I  and  L  were 
within  250  yards  of  the  crest,  and  at  this  point  the  advance  was 
halted.  The  1st  Battalion,  which  had  encountered  relatively  little 
resistance  was  on  line  to  the  left,  with  the  2 2d  Marines  up  even  on 
the  right  after  a  day  of  hard  fighting. 

General  Shepherd's  orders  for  the  attack  of  28  July  readjusted 
regimental  sectors  to  assign  the  old  Marine  Barracks  and  the  town 
of  Sumay  to  the  22d  Marines,  while  the  rifle  range  and  airfield 
became  the  objectives  for  the  attack  of  the  4th  Marines.  An 
extremely  heavy  air,  naval  gunfire,  and  artillery  preparation  was 
delivered  to  blast  the  Japanese  from  their  defenses  in  front  of  the 
airfield  but  was  only  partially  successful. 

"Maj  Anthony  Walker,  "Advance  on  Orote  Peninsula,"  Marine  Corps 
Gazette,  v.  29,  no.  2  (Feb45),  p.  8. 


270       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Attacking  with  three  battalions  abreast,  the  regiment  made 
rapid  progress  at  first.  Advancing  Marines  overran  shattered 
enemy  emplacements  holding  as  many  as  i  o  to  15  dead  Japanese. 
Shortly  before  noon,  this  easy  advance  slowed  in  the  face  of  heavy 
automatic  weapons  fire  from  enemy  dug  in  and  concealed  by 
dense  underbrush. 

Progress  was  slowest  in  the  center  in  the  zone  of  2/4.  This 
battalion  was  unsupported  by  tanks  because  Major  Messer  had 
reported  the  terrain  unsuitable  for  armor.  But  when  his  battalion 
was  stopped  by  the  fire  of  the  dug-in  Japanese,  Messer  requested 
tank  support.  The  2d  Platoon  of  the  4th  Marines'  Tank  Com- 
pany moved  over  from  the  3d  Battalion  zone,  on  the  right,  but 
the  tankers  could  not  fire  without  endangering  the  1st  Battalion, 
which  had  advanced  on  the  left. 

Early  in  the  afternoon  General  Shepherd  went  forward  to  re- 
connoiter  his  front  lines.  Finding  the  4th  Marines'  attack  stalled, 
he  obtained  armored  reinforcements  from  the  77  th  Division,  con- 
sisting of  a  platoon  of  light  tanks  and  a  platoon  of  tank  destroyers. 
Shepherd  then  ordered  Shapley  to  employ  all  available  armor  to 
spearhead  the  infantry  in  an  effort  to  break  through  the  Japanese 
defenses. 

At  1530  the  attack  jumped  off  all  along  the  regimental  front. 
The  tanks  smashed  the  defensive  line,  which  by  later  count  was 
found  to  include  approximately  250  pillboxes  and  emplacements. 
Infantrymen  following  close  behind  the  armor  moved  rapidly 
forward  and  by  dusk  were  within  1 50  yards  of  the  airfield. 

During  the  day  the  2 2d  Marines  had  advanced  to  the  outskirts 
of  Sumay  against  light  resistance,  recapturing  the  wreckage  of  the 
Marine  barracks  surrendered  to  the  Japanese  three  years  before. 

Enemy  resistance  on  Orote  had  been  crushed  on  28  July,  and 
the  tank-led  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  jumped  off  on  the  29th 
after  a  prolonged  air,  naval  gunfire,  and  artillery  preparation  to 
encounter  only  light  resistance.  The  advance  was  rapid,  and 
by  1400  the  front  lines  were  150  yards  beyond  the  airfield.  At 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  271 


this  point  the  4th  Marines  took  over  the  entire  front,  relieving  the 
2  2d  Marines  for  mopping  up  duties.  At  1600  Colonel  Shapley 
dispatched  a  strong  tank-infantry  patrol  to  reconnoiter  to  the  tip 
of  the  peninsula.  Only  two  Japanese  soldiers  were  encountered 
during  the  reconnaissance.  General  Shepherd  then  declared 
Orote  Peninsula  secured.  Mopping  up  continued  the  next  day. 
Extensive  patrolling  by  the  4th  Marines  discovered  Japanese 
holed  up  in  caves  in  a  cliff  along  the  shore  1,000  yards  west  of 
Sumay.  The  cave  mouths  could  not  be  reached  from  the  land 
side,  but  an  LCI  gunboat  moved  in  and  blasted  them  shut  with 
40mm  fire. 

The  capture  of  Orote  Peninsula  secured  a  valuable  airfield 
and  freed  Apra  Harbor  for  use  as  a  naval  anchorage.  For  its 
part  in  the  four  days  of  heavy  fighting  on  the  peninsula,  the  4th 
Marines  shared  a  Navy  Unit  Commendation  with  the  remainder 
of  the  1  st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade.  But  the  victory  was  not 
without  a  price.  Seventy-two  Marines,  including  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Samuel  D.  Puller,  the  regimental  executive  officer,  were 
killed  in  action,  and  355  wounded.28 

ASSAULT  PHASE  COMPLETED 

By  30  July  the  1st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade  and  the  77th 
Infantry  Division  had  completed  the  seizure  of  the  southern 
beachhead  on  Guam.  To  the  north,  the  3d  Marine  Division  had 
achieved  a  comparable  success.  After  landing  on  2 1  July  on  the 
Asan  Beaches,  Marines  of  the  3d  fought  their  way  inland  against 
bitter  resistance  from  the  main  body  of  Lieutenant  General  Taka- 
shina's  defenders.  Unable  to  beat  back  the  Marine  attackers, 
the  Japanese  commander  attempted  to  crush  the  American  beach- 
head at  a  single  stroke  by  all-out  counterattack.  His  effort  failed. 
An  assault  on  the  night  of  25-26  July  was  no  more  successful 
against  the  3d  Marine  Division  than  the  similar  effort  by  the 

28  PersAccountingSec,  HQMG,  tabulation  of  i2Dec52  (HistBr,  HQMC). 


272       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Japanese  that  same  night  against  the  ist  Provisional  Marine 
Brigade  to  the  south. 

Unable  to  push  the  Americans  into  the  sea,  Takashina  with- 
drew the  remnants  of  his  forces  into  mountainous  jungle-clad 
northern  Guam.  An  initial  enemy  position  was  established  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  village  of  Dededo  and  along  the  southwest 
slopes  of  Mount  Barrigada;  a  second  defense  line  was  set  up  just 
below  the  village  of  Ipapao;  and  a  final  stand  was  to  be  made  on 
Mount  Santa  Rosa  near  the  northeast  coast. 

General  Geiger  was  aware  of  the  Japanese  withdrawal  route 
and  planned  accordingly.  Patrols  from  the  77  th  Division  had 
already  scouted  southern  Guam  without  locating  major  enemy 
units,  and  captured  documents  and  prisoners  of  war  indicated 
that  the  Japanese  were  retreating  to  the  north.  On  the  basis 
of  this  information,  Geiger  ordered  the  3d  Marine  and  77th 
Infantry  Divisions  to  cut  the  island  in  two,  then  swing  north  to 
locate  and  destroy  the  enemy.  General  Shepherd's  ist  Provisional 
Brigade  was  to  take  over  the  southern  beachhead  from  the  77th, 
to  protect  the  force  from  attack  from  the  south,  and  to  continue 
patrolling  to  make  sure  that  no  Japanese  remained  in  southern 
Guam. 

SOUTHERN  PATROLLING 

On  3 1  July  the  4th  Marines  moved  from  Orote  back  to  posi- 
tions south  of  Mt.  Alifan  to  carry  out  the  new  mission.  By 
brigade  order,  southern  Guam  was  divided  into  two  regimental 
patrol  areas  along  the  line  Gaan  Point — Port  Ajayan.  Both  the 
4th  and  22d  Marines  were  ordered  to  send  out  reinforced  platoon- 
size  patrols  prepared  to  operate  in  the  jungled  mountains  for  at 
least  two  days. 

The  next  day  Companies  A  and  F  began  patrol  activities  in 
the  regimental  zone  north  and  east  of  the  Gaan  Point — Port 
Ajayan  line.   The  Company  A  patrol,  covering  the  part  of  the 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  273 


area  north  of  the  Togcha  River,  was  uneventful  except  for  a 
skirmish  at  the  east  coast  town  of  Marajan  on  3  August  in  which 
six  Japanese  were  killed.  The  Company  F  patrol  went  to 
Agfayan  Point,  near  the  southern  tip  of  the  island,  without 
making  any  contact  with  the  enemy. 

The  negative  patrol  results  facilitated  the  next  employment  of 
the  4th  Marines  as  force  reserve.  A  warning  order  from  corps 
on  1  August  had  alerted  General  Shepherd  to  be  ready  to  make 
an  RGT  available  for  this  duty,  and  the  following  day  an  order 
followed  directing  the  4th  Marines  to  move  north  on  3  August 
on  the  new  mission. 

At  daylight  on  the  3d,  the  regiment  began  the  move  to  its  new 
assembly  area  at  Toto  on  northern  Guam,  leaving  the  two  patrol- 
ling companies  behind.  While  this  move  was  in  progress,  Geiger 
ordered  the  northward  movement  of  the  rest  of  the  brigade,  leav- 
ing a  small  garrison  force  consisting  of  1/22,  the  9th  Defense 
Battalion,  and  the  Army's  7th  AAA  (Automatic  Weapons)  Bat- 
talion to  continue  the  patrol  mission.  By  evening  of  4  August 
this  movement  had  been  completed. 

FINAL  DRIVE 

After  only  three  days  in  reserve  the  4th  Marines  was  again 
thrown  into  the  line  on  the  corps  left  flank  in  what  was  to  be  the 
final  drive  of  the  Guam  campaign.  The  3d  and  77th  Divisions 
had,  by  6  August,  broken  through  the  outer  lines  of  defense  and 
bottled  up  the  remaining  organized  Japanese  units  on  and  near 
Mount  Santa  Rosa.  In  a  drive  to  smash  this  final  bastion  and 
to  sweep  up  stragglers  and  isolated  pockets  of  resistance,  Geiger 
planned  to  use  all  his  major  combat  units.  To  the  77th  Infantry 
Division  fell  the  task  of  assaulting  Mount  Santa  Rosa;  the  3d 
Division  was  to  drive  north  in  the  center  of  the  island;  and  the 
1  st  Provisional  Brigade  was  to  attack  north  along  the  west  coast. 

General  Shepherd  received  the  corps  operations  plan  describ- 


274       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


ing  the  new  mission  on  5  August.  According  to  the  plan,  the 
brigade  was  to  pass  through  the  3d  Marines  and  attack  north 
along  the  west  coast  of  Guam,  then  clear  the  enemy  from  the 
northern  part  of  the  island  by  vigorous  patrolling.  The  Recon- 
naissance Platoon,  4th  Marines,  reconnoitered  assigned  assembly 
areas  near  the  village  of  Dededo  on  5  August,  and  the  next  day 
the  brigade  moved  north,  ready  to  attack  on  order.  The  corps 
order  calling  for  attack  at  0730  on  7  August  reached  General 
Shepherd  in  late  afternoon  of  the  6th.  He  designated  the  4th 
Marines  to  make  the  assault  along  an  improved  road  in  the 
center  of  the  sector. 

The  4th  Marines  attacked  on  schedule  on  7  August  with  two 
battalions  abreast — 1st  on  the  left  and  3d  on  the  right.  After 
passing  through  1/3  and  2/3,  the  two  4th  Marines'  battalions 
advanced  rapidly  without  opposition.29  By  10 15  they  had  reached 
the  initial  objective  and,  at  General  Shepherd's  order,  pushed 
ahead,  making  a  total  advance  during  the  day  of  about  5,500 
yards.    (See  Map  24.) 

A  new  scheme  of  attack  was  planned  for  8  August.  Because 
of  the  widening  of  the  island  at  its  northern  tip,  General  Shepherd 
ordered  the  2 2d  Marines  to  take  over  on  the  left  of  the  brigade 
zone.  The  impenetrable  jungle  in  his  sector  and  the  lack  of 
enemy  opposition  prompted  Shapley  to  direct  a  change  in  tactics. 
Instead  of  a  sweep  forward  on  a  broad  front,  the  4th  Marines' 
commander  ordered  an  advance  in  column  along  the  two  avail- 
able roads. 

Resuming  the  attack  at  0730  on  8  August,  the  4th  Marines 
moved  rapidly  forward  against  sporadic  resistance.  From  Road 
Junction  460  on  the  regimental  right  boundary,  3/4  and  2/4 
moved  northeast  along  a  road  to  Road  Junction  462.  Reaching 
their  objective  by  the  end  of  the  day,  they  set  up  defensive  perim- 
eters for  the  night  a  few  hundred  yards  beyond  the  road  junc- 

^IIIAC  liaison  officer  msgs  to  IIIAC,  0825  and  10 15,  7Aug44,  in  App  2 
( 1  st  ProvMarBrig  Jnl)  to  1st  ProvMarBrig  SAR. 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  275 


276       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


tion.  The  ist  Battalion,  after  relief  by  the  2  2d  Marines,  moved 
east  along  the  front  to  Road  Junction  460  to  take  the  northwest 
road  fork  to  Road  Junction  470.  No  Japanese  were  encountered 
and  by  noon  the  battalion  had  reached  its  objective,  having 
marched  diagonally  across  the  regimental  sector  to  its  northwest 
boundary.30 

Continuing  the  attack  on  9  August,  4th  Marines  patrols 
reached  the  north  coast  and  combed  the  regimental  zone,  en- 
countering only  small  scattered  groups  of  Japanese  who  were 
quickly  overcome.  At  1800  General  Shepherd  was  able  to  an- 
nounce that  all  organized  resistance  in  the  brigade  zone  had 
ceased,  but  he  ordered  aggressive  patrolling  the  next  day  to  de- 
stroy isolated  enemy  troops.  Absence  of  enemy  opposition 
elsewhere  on  the  island  permitted  General  Geiger  to  declare 
Guam  secured  on  the  evening  of  10  August. 

During  the  2 1  days  of  combat  on  Guam  between  2 1  July  and 
10  August,  190  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  lost  their  lives  in 
combat  with  the  enemy.  Another  724  were  wounded  in  action, 
and  4  were  listed  as  missing.31 

Although  the  island  had  been  declared  secured,  vigorous  pa- 
trolling to  mop  up  enemy  stragglers  continued.  The  4th  Marines 
operated  in  their  previously  assigned  zone  of  action  until  2 1  Au- 
gust when  the  regiment  took  over  all  patrolling  in  the  brigade 
zone,  relieving  the  2 2d  Marines  for  return  to  Guadalcanal.  On 
the  27th,  3/4  assumed  the  patrol  mission,  and  the  rest  of  the 
regiment  prepared  to  leave  the  island,  sailing  for  Guadalcanal 
on  28  August.  The  next  day,  3/4  was  relieved  of  all  patrol 
duties  by  the  21st  Marines,  and,  on  the  30th,  the  battalion  and 
remaining  regimental  units  departed  for  Guadalcanal. 

30  1/4  WarD. 

31  PersAccountingSec,  PersDept,  HQMC,  tabulation  of  i2Dec52  (HistBr, 
HQMC). 


USMC  Photo  86626 


Guam — Sheltering  themselves  from  the  tropic  sun  and  rain,  Marines  on  the 
deck  of  an  LST  move  towards  another  war-swept  island  beach,  below,  where 
there  was  little  shelter  but  a  man's  rifle  and  courage. 


USMC  Photo  88203 


U.S.  Navy  Photo  239019 


Assault  on  Mt.  Alifan — Above,  mortar  crew  men  spare  their  eardrums  as  a 
round  leaves  the  tube.  Below,  Marines  move  up  to  front-line  positions  in  the 
foothills. 

USMC  Photo  87239 


USMC  Photo  93428 


Action  on  Guam — Above,  tank-supported  infantry  attack  Japanese  positions 
on  Orote  Peninsula.  Below,  a  patrol  mops  up  isolated  enemy  survivors  after 
the  island  was  declared  secured. 


USMC  Photo  116436 


USMC  Photo  91380 


A  battle  leader  of  the  4th  Marines — LtCol  Alan  Shapley,  who  led  the  regi- 
ment on  Guam  and  Okinawa,  briefs  his  officers  for  the  attack  on  the  Orote 
Peninsula. 


Okinawa — Above,  assault  troops  in  LVTs  start  shoreward  under  cover  of 
naval  gunfire.  Below,  the  first  wounded  are  evacuated  from  the  beach,  but 
few  casualties  occurred  there. 


USMC  Photo  123455 


USMC  Photo  117248 


Rapid  advance — Above,  Marines  cross  the  island  12  days  ahead  of  schedule. 
Below,  Company  I  patrols  through  the  village  of  Ishikawa  on  the  east  coast. 


USMC  Photo  117251 


USMC  Photo  127805 


On  Motobu  Peninsula — Above,  rocky  hills  like  these  were  the  natural  ally  of 
the  Japanese,  who  employed  them  for  cave  warfare.  Below,  Marines  move  up 
to  a  hut,  where  eight  Japanese  were  killed. 


USMC  Photo  119093 


USMC  Photo  122488 


Advance  to  the  south — Above,  the  rain-soaked  command  post  of  1/4  on  Sugar 
Loaf.  Below,  rifle  squad  of  Company  L  probes  for  Japanese  in  drive  upon 
Naha. 

USMC  Photo  122300 


Oroku— Above,  Company  B  gets  a  break  at  Naha  Airport  before  moving  into 
front  lines,  just  yards  away.  Below,  Marines  move  up  amid  wreckage  of 
Japanese  planes. 


USMC  Photo  124032 


USMC  Photo  124251 


USMC  Photo  120308 


Above,  left,  men  of  1/4  advance  under  fire  near  village  of  Gushi  on  Oroku; 
right,  a  wounded  Marine  bids  Godspeed  to  a  patrol.  Below,  moving  up  to  the 
Kiyamu-Gusuku  Ridge,  the  last  battleground  of  WWII. 


USMC  Photo  128782 


USMC  Photo  134461 


Landing  in  Japan — Above,  Japanese  officials  surrender  the  Tateyama  Naval 
Air  Station  to  Maj  W.  L.  Crawford.  Below,  color  guard  welcomes  liberated 
Marines  of  the  "old  4th." 


USMC  Photo  133810 


USMC  Photo  133811 


Occupation  activity — Above,  Marines  of  the  "new  4th"  pass  in  review  before 
the  "old  4th"  at  Yokosuka  Naval  Base.  Below,  a  patrol,  observed  by  curious 
inhabitants,  sets  out  to  take  over  military  installations. 

USMC  Photo  A407859 


USMC  Photo  A181892 


Postwar  Japan — Above,  the  regiment  marches  up  Nara's  Sanjyo  Street.  Below, 
Col  F.  A.  Ramsey  and  Maj  L.  E.  Fribourg  greet  Japanese  before  Softball  game 
between  regimental  HQ  officers  and  Nara  city  fathers. 

USMC  Photo  Al  78752 


U3MC  Photo  A181893 


Above,  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  3/4  are  honored  at  sea  by  Chinese  Nation- 
alists during  the  Inchon-Formosa  repatriation,  January  1954.  Below,  the  regi- 
ment's new  home,  the  Marine  Corps  Air  Station,  Kaneohe. 


USMC  Photo  A25238 


-  ""„•.■  -  "   " !  -  *   ■<  -'- 

USMC  Photo  A150518 

Kaneohe — Above,  the  Shah  of  Iran  troops  the  line,  followed  by  LtGen  V.  E. 
Megee,  CG,  FMFPac,  and  BriGen  A.  R.  Kier,  CG,  ist  MarBrig.  Below,  air- 
ground  team  in  action — a  landing  on  Mokapu  Peninsula,  Oahu. 

USMC  Photo  A406157 

 Jl 


■life** 


EMIRAU  AND  GUAM  277 


CONCLUSION 

It  was  particularly  fitting  that  the  4th  Marines,  one  of  the 
isolated  units  captured  by  the  Japanese  early  in  the  war,  took 
part  in  the  reconquest  of  Guam — the  first  American  territory 
recaptured  from  the  Japanese. 

Even  more  important  than  the  recovery  of  a  lost  island  pos- 
session was  the  effect  of  U.S.  control  of  Guam  and  the  other 
Marianas  in  shortening  the  war.  From  the  newly-won  bases, 
American  ships  and  planes  could  effectively  cut  off  the  trickle 
of  supplies  reaching  the  bypassed  enemy  garrisons  in  the  South 
and  Central  Pacific.  Repair  and  supply  installations  on  the 
islands  helped  speed  up  attacks  against  the  Japanese  inner  de- 
fenses, and  hundreds  of  B-29  heavy  bombers  soon  flew  from 
Marianas  fields  to  batter  Japan  itself.  It  was  from  a  field  on 
Tinian  that  two  B-29S  rose  in  August  1945  to  carry  atomic 
death  and  destruction  to  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki. 


519667—60  21 


CHAPTER  IX 


Okinawa 


As  Marines  of  the  4th  Regiment  moved  toward  Okinawa 
beaches  on  the  morning  of  1  April  1945 — to  one  of  the  most 
ominous  landings  of  the  Pacific  war,  a  few  may  have  speculated 
when,  for  them,  the  battle  of  Okinawa  really  started.1 

Maybe  it  was  on  8  September  1944  when  the  4th  Marines 
joined  the  newly  activated  6th  Marine  Division,  the  successor 
to  the  1  st  Provisional  Brigade. 

The  change  took  place  while  the  regiment  was  at  sea,  en  route 
from  Guam  to  a  brief  pause  on  Guadalcanal.  On  9  September, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Alan  Shapley,2  with  the  1st  and  2d  Bat- 
talions and  other  elements  of  the  reinforced  regiment,  disem- 
barked from  the  Army  transport,  Pennant.  Other  ships  the 
same  month  lifted  the  rest  of  the  regiment. 

1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  chapter  is  based  on  the  following :  Maj 
Charles  S.  Nichols,  Jr.,  and  Henry  I.  Shaw,  Jr.,  Okinawa:  Victory  in  the 
Pacific  (Washington:  HistBr,  G-3  Div,  HQMC,  1955),  hereafter  Nichols  & 
Shaw,  Okinawa:  Victory  in  the  Pacific;  Roy  E.  Appleman,  et  al.,  Okinawa: 
The  Last  Battle — The  War  in  the  Pacific — U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II 
(Washington:  HistDiv,  DA,  1948),  hereafter  Appleman,  Okinawa:  The  Last 
Battle;  Jeter  A.  Isely  and  Philip  A.  Crowl,  The  U.S.  Marines  and  Amphibious 
War  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1951);  6th  MarDiv  SAR, 
Okinawa  Operation,  Phases  I  &  II,  dtd  3oApr45,  and  Phase  III,  dtd 
3oJun45,  hereafter  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  I  &  II,  and  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  III, 
respectively;  Annexes  A  (4th  Mar)  to  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  I  &  II  and  6th 
MarDiv  SAR,  III,  hereafter  4th  Mar  SAR,  I  &  II,  and  4th  Mar  SAR,  III, 
respectively.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  all  official  records  are  in  Okinawa  Area- 
Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC. 

2  Shapley  was  promoted  to  Colonel  in  November  1944. 

279 


280       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


By  1 1  September  all  unit  designations  had  been  revised,  and 
the  ist  Provisional  Marine  Brigade  lost  its  identity  to  the  6th 
Marine  Division.  Aligned  with  the  4th  and  the  2 2d  Marines, 
as  the  division's  third  infantry  regiment,  was  the  new  29th  Ma- 
rines, activated  at  Camp  Lejeune  in  May.  The  15th  Ma- 
rines (artillery)  was  formed  at  Guadalcanal  in  October  from 
the  pack  howitzer  battalions  attached  to  the  4th,  2 2d,  and  29th 
Regiments.  Division  Special  Troops,  such  as  the  engineer  and 
motor  transport  battalions,  were  drawn  from  the  reinforcing 
units  of  each  regiment  and  were  each  appropriately  numbered 
the  6th.  The  staff  was  practically  that  of  the  brigade. 
General  Shepherd  continued  in  command,  with  a  second  star 
added.3 

OPERATION  ICEBERG  EMERGES 

A  summer  of  strategic  uncertainty  was  ending.  The  months 
had  seen  a  reassessment  of  the  Allied  position  in  the  Pacific  and 
a  weighing  of  future  moves. 

President  Roosevelt  had  met  at  Pearl  Harbor  in  July  with 
Admiral  Nimitz,  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Ocean  Areas, 
and  General  MacArthur,  commanding  the  Southwest  Pacific 
Area.  Expressing  the  Navy's  preference,  Nimitz  suggested  that 
Formosa  be  the  next  target — bypassing  the  Philippines — a  view 
opposed  by  MacArthur.  There  were  several  arguments  against 
selecting  Formosa  first.  Chief  among  them  was  the  longing 
of  everyone  to  end  the  war,  by  stepping  up  the  drive  against 
Japan  itself.  Lieutenant  General  Simon  B.  Buckner,  Jr.,  com- 
mander of  the  Tenth  Army,  slated  for  the  proposed  Formosa 
campaign,  labeled  CAUSEWAY,  was  less  than  ardent  about 
that  operation.  When  requested  by  Nimitz  to  express  his  frank 
opinion,  he  said  that  he  considered  a  Formosa  landing  imprac- 
ticable, citing  troop  and  supply  shortages.    What  he  said  added 

3  4th  Mar  MRolls,  iAug-3iOct44. 


OKINAWA  281 


weight  to  MacArthur's  view  that  Formosa  could  be  neutralized 
once  Luzon  was  seized. 

Swayed  by  such  arguments  and  as  anxious  as  anyone  to  end 
the  costly  war,  Admiral  Nimitz  and  Fleet  Admiral  King,  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  U.S.  Fleet,  both  previous  advocates  of  For- 
mosa, turned  to  favor  Okinawa  instead.  Invasion  of  Luzon, 
Iwo  Jima,  and  the  Ryukyus — mainly  Okinawa — would  precede 
any  Formosa  campaign.  On  3  October  1944  a  directive  went 
out  to  American  forces  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  Areas,  informing 
them  of  prospective  invasion  of  the  Ryukyus,  and,  on  9  October, 
Admiral  Nimitz  issued  the  warning  order,  inserting  Okinawa 
before  Formosa. 

Capture  of  Okinawa  would  place  the  Allies  just  350  miles 
from  the  Japanese  home  islands,  far  closer  than  they  would  be 
on  Formosa.  The  size  of  Okinawa,  though  much  less  than 
Formosa,  would  permit  the  desired  naval  and  air  bases,  besides 
providing  elbow  room  for  a  staging  area.  The  island  is  60 
miles  long  and  measures  485  square  miles.  Shaped  like  a  lizard 
with  a  horny  back,  Okinawa  was  quite  different  from  the  other 
islands  taken  by  Marines.  It  was  much  larger,  it  was  rocky 
and  hilly,  and  it  was  not  tropical.  In  September  1 944,  months 
before  Marines  would  see  the  island,  B-29S  of  the  21st  Bomber 
Command  began  the  photographic  reconnaissance,  what 
amounted  to  the  first  step  of  Operation  ICEBERG. 

First  real  planning  for  Okinawa  dwelt  on  1  March  as  target 
date,  but  by  31  December  1944,  when  Admiral  Nimitz  issued 
the  operation  plan,  1  April  had  been  seen  to  be  more  suitable, 
considering  both  weather  and  logistics.  Capture  of  Iwo  Jima 
and  control  over  much  of  Luzon  were  expected  by  that  time. 
The  new  date  fell  on  Easter  Sunday,  and  it  was  designated 
LOVE-Day,  L-Day,  rather  than  the  usual  D-Day. 

Admiral  Nimitz  topped  the  command  pyramid  for  the  gi- 
gantic operation,  while  Admiral  Raymond  A.  Spruance,  Fifth 
Fleet  Commander,  received  over-all  leadership  of  ICEBERG. 


282       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Vice  Admiral  Richmond  K.  Turner,  Commander  of  Amphibious 
Forces,  Pacific  Fleet,  would  head  the  Joint  Expeditionary  Force 
(Task  Force  51).  Part  of  Task  Force  5 1  was  the  Expeditionary 
Troops  (Task  Force  56),  namely,  the  Tenth  Army,  commanded 
by  General  Buckner.  To  this  task  force  the  4th  Marines  was 
assigned. 

The  Marine  III  Amphibious  Corps  (IIIAC),  commanded  by 
Major  General  Geiger,  would  serve  as  the  landing  force  of  the 
Northern  Attack  Force.  The  XXIV  Corps  (Army),  under 
Major  General  John  R.  Hodge,  would  comprise  the  landing 
force  of  the  Southern  Attack  Force.  The  IIIAC  consisted  of 
the  1st  Marine  Division,  commanded  by  Major  General  Pedro 
A.  del  Valle,  and  the  6th  Marine  Division.  The  2d  Marine 
Division,  under  Major  General  Thomas  E.  Watson,  was  joined 
to  the  operation  as  a  demonstration  force.  In  the  XXIV  Corps 
were  the  77th,  7th,  and  96th  Divisions.  The  27th  Division  was 
in  floating  reserve  under  Buckner's  control,  while  the  81st  re- 
mained in  New  Caledonia  as  area  reserve,  directly  under  Admiral 
Nimitz.4 

The  6th  Marine  Division  preparations  for  Operation  ICE- 
BERG did  not  wait  upon  the  crystallizing  of  strategy.  The  4th 
Marines  entered  upon  a  strenuous  training  program  on  1  Octo- 
ber, and,  as  previously,  the  regiment  emphasized  small-unit 
training,  concentrating  upon  the  fire-team,  squad,  platoon,  and 
company. 

Each  regiment  was  assigned  a  section  of  the  Tassafaronga 
area  of  Guadalcanal,  where  typical  Japanese  defenses  were 
duplicated.  Practice  in  street  fighting  was  included  because 
of  numerous  villages  and  towns  on  Okinawa,  and  to  combat 
Japanese  cave  defenses  in  the  hills  of  the  island  the  flame 
thrower-demolition  teams  were  schooled  to  precise  efficiency. 

*Com  FifthFlt,  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd  3jan45;  GTF-51,  GenAR  on 
Okinawa  Gunto  Operation,  i7Feb-i7May45,  dtd  23J11I45,  hereafter  CTF-51 
Rept. 


OKINAWA  283 


The  open  terrain  of  Okinawa,  as  well  as  its  ridges,  was  taken 
into  account  by  tank-infantry  teams.  No  detail  was  overlooked. 
Extensive  ship-to-shore  practice  was  held,  and  the  training  was 
concluded  with  an  eight-day  maneuver,  climaxed  on  6  March 
by  a  dress  rehearsal  of  the  Okinawa  landings. 

STAGING  AT  ULITHI 

On  1 1— 1 2  March,  LSTs  carrying  part  of  the  assault  troops 
of  the  4th  Marines  left  Guadalcanal  for  the  staging  rendezvous 
at  Ulithi  Atoll  in  the  Western  Carolines.  Colonel  Shapley 
boarded  the  Mclntyre,  the  assault  transport  (APA)  which  was 
to  serve  as  command  post  for  the  4th  Marines'  landing  at  Oki- 
nawa. The  rest  of  the  4th  Marines  departed  on  15  March  in 
APAs  which  anchored  on  the  21st  at  Ulithi.  En  route  to  the 
staging  area,  all  troops  were  briefed  on  every  phase  of  the  forth- 
coming Operation  ICEBERG.5  They  were  warned  of  the  poison- 
ous snakes,  the  Asiatic  diseases,  and  the  insects  to  expect  on 
Okinawa — the  "things  besides  bullets  that  make  war  hell."  6 

At  Ulithi  the  men  could  comprehend  the  magnitude  of  the 
Okinawa  assault  plans.  Gathering  there  were  more  than  1,200 
ships  of  all  types,  350  more  than  at  the  first  North  African  land- 
ings. There  were,  in  fact,  more  large  vessels  there  than  served 
at  Normandy.  The  Army's  XXIV  Corps,  as  well  as  Marines, 
utilized  the  vast  staging  area  of  the  Ulithi  Atoll. 

The  strength  of  the  forces  assembled  for  the  attack  suggested 
the  resistance  to  be  expected.  Including  the  Tactical  Air  Force 
and  all  Army  and  Marine  ground  elements,  more  than  182,000 
troops  were  loaded  for  the  initial  assault.    The  IIIAC  totaled 


5  4th  Mar  MRolls,  i-3oSep44  and  i-3iMar45;  6th  MarDiv  OpO  (Trng), 
No.  14-45,  dtd  22Feb45;  6th  MarDiv  WarD,  i~3iMar45,  dtd  2Aug45;  6th 
MarDiv  OPlan  No.  1-45,  dtd  ioFeb45;  Annex  D  (15th  Mar)  to  6th  MarDiv 
SAR,  I  &  II. 

6  The  Washington  Daily  News,  igApr45. 


284       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


63,052,  of  which  the  6th  Marine  Division  accounted  for  24,356. 
The  4th  Marines  numbered  147  officers  and  3,128  enlisted  men. 

THE  VOYAGE  AND  THE  PLAN 

In  the  few  days  at  Ulithi  supplies  received  a  final  check.  As- 
sault troops  of  the  4th  Marines  were  assembled  on  six  LSTs,  and 
they  shoved  off  for  Okinawa  on  25  March,  due  for  a  rather  slow 
and  crowded  journey.  Two  days  later  the  rest  of  the  regiment 
sailed  in  four  assault  transports — the  Mclntyre,  Adair,  Noble, 
and  Gage — and  the  assault  cargo  ship  Morning  Light.  By  the 
evening  of  27  March  all  forces  of  the  giant  armada  were  again 
at  sea.  The  beaches  of  Okinawa  waited  1,200  miles  across  the 
water,  about  1 00  hours  to  go. 

The  eternal  detachment  of  the  sea  invited  some  men  to  forget 
what  lay  before  them.  The  commanders  and  staff  were  per- 
mitted no  such  luxury.  The  short  time  remaining  was  devoted 
to  a  review  of  plans. 

Intelligence  had  concluded  that  the  beaches  would  be  lightly 
defended,  that  the  enemy  would  concentrate  inland,  particularly 
in  the  southern  part  of  the  island,  using  mobile  reserves  else- 
where. There  existed,  however,  a  disturbing  degree  of  uncertainty 
on  enemy  troop  dispositions  and  defenses.  Most  of  the  intelli- 
gence had  been  necessarily  gained  from  aerial  photographs,  but 
such  reconnaissance  had  been  limited  by  the  flying  distance  to 
Okinawa — negotiable  only  by  B-29S  and  carrier  air,  by  the  size 
of  the  island,  and  especially  by  persistent  cloudy  weather.  In 
fact,  an  accurate  map,  drawn  from  aerial  photographs,  could 
not  be  finished  and  issued  until  after  the  Okinawa  landing. 

Tenth  Army  tactics  called  for  landing  on  the  Hagushi  beaches 
south  of  Zampa  Misaki  (Point)  on  the  west  coast  of  the  island. 
These  beaches  especially  suited  three  strategic  objectives :  ( 1 ) 
to  seize  desired  airfields ;  ( 2 )  to  gain  good  unloading  room ;  and 
(3)  to  split  the  enemy  forces,  north  and  south.    These  advan- 


OKINAWA  285 


tages  outweighed  the  difficulties  presented  to  a  landing.  Coral 
reefs,  impossible  for  LCMs  7  even  at  high  tide,  formed  a  fringe 
some  450  yards  from  the  narrow  sandy  shore  line  opening  upon 
a  hilly  plain. 

The  beachhead  was  to  extend  seven  miles,  with  the  Bishi  Gawa 
(River)  dividing  Marines  and  Army  troops.  North  of  the  village 
of  Hagushi  by  the  Bishi  Gawa,  the  III  Amphibious  Corps  would 
land  its  two  divisions,  the  1st  and  the  6th.  South  of  the  river,  the 
XXIV  Corps  would  land  the  96th  and  the  7th  Divisions.  Ma- 
rines would  push  across  the  island  to  the  east  coast,  then  move 
up  into  the  Ishikawa  Isthmus  to  isolate  northern  Okinawa,  while 
Army  troops  could  freely  turn  southward  without  worry  from 
their  rear.  Occupation  of  southern  Okinawa,  the  most  populated 
area,  had  been  designated  the  first  phase.    (See  Map  25.) 

In  the  zone  of  action  of  the  6th  Division,  the  4th  Marines  (less 
2/4  in  division  reserve)  was  assigned  to  secure  some  600  yards 
of  beach  on  the  right  flank  while  the  2 2d  Marines  landed  on  the 
left — the  Red  and  Green  Beaches,  respectively.  The  29th  Ma- 
rines would  be  held  in  corps  reserve.  Yontan  Airfield,  the  6th 
Division's  first  objective — in  fact,  the  "prime  initial  objective" 
of  the  Tenth  Army — lay  1,200  yards  inland,  just  ahead  of  the 
4th  Marines.8 

As  the  invasion  armada  moved  through  foreboding  weather 
on  the  last  days  of  March,  the  naval  and  air  bombardment  by 
Rear  Admiral  William  H.  P.  Blandy's  Amphibious  Support  Force 
rocked  the  gray  sky  over  Okinawa.  On  24  March,  even  before 
the  invasion  force  sailed,  mine  sweepers  and  underwater  demoli- 
tion teams  had  begun  to  clear  the  well-seeded  waters  off  the 
Hagushi  beaches.  Vice  Admiral  Marc  A.  Mitscher's  Fast  Carrier 
Force  and  a  British  carrier  force  stood  guard  against  any  Japa- 

7  Landing  craft,  medium,  used  primarily  for  tanks  and  other  mechanized 
equipment. 

8  U.S.  PacFlt  &  POA  Joint  Staff  Study,  ICEBERG  Operation,  250^44; 
Annex  A  to  IIIAC  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd  iFeb45;  CTF-51  Rept;  4th  Mar 
MRolls3  iMar-3oApr45. 


286      HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


MAP  25 
OKINAWA 

O  5  10   20 

NAUTICAL  MILES 


OKINAWA  287 


nese  attempt  to  reinforce  Okinawa,  already  a  fortress  with  more 
than  100,000  troops,9  while  Radio  Tokyo  warned  the  Japanese 
people  that  the  Empire  itself  depended  upon  holding  Okinawa. 
Japanese  suicide  pilots,  the  kamikaze  (divine  wind),  more  nu- 
merous than  ever  before,  and  men  in  suicide  boats,  bearing 
explosive  charges,  stood  ready  to  expend  themselves  in  tactics 
of  desperation,  which  would  cost  our  Navy  so  tragically.10 

Prospects  were  somber.  Ernie  Pyle,  the  popular  newspaper 
correspondent,  writing  as  the  ships  waited  in  the  East  China  Sea 
on  that  rainy  31  March,  could  find  little  to  detract  from  "the 
awful  image  of  tomorrow,"  except  that  "we  are  carrying 
marines  ....  They  are  a  rough,  unshaven,  competent  bunch 
of  Americans.  I  am  landing  with  them.  I  feel  I  am  in  good 
hands.5' 11 

QUESTION  MARKS  ON  THE  SAND 

Bright  moonlight  forecast  a  clear  day  as  at  0406  Admiral 
Turner  signalled  the  familiar  "land  the  landing  force,55  looking 
to  H-Hour  at  0830.  On  Transport  Group  Able  (TG  53.1) 
Commodore  Herbert  B.  Knowles  relayed  the  order  to  the  6th 
Marine  Division  he  was  carrying.  At  05 1 5,  APAs  started  putting 
boats  over  the  side.  By  0630,  all  LSTs  were  in  position,  ready 
to  launch  tractors. 

In  the  East  China  Sea,  Kipling's  "dawn  like  thunder55  became 
more  truth  than  poetry  when  at  0530,  50  minutes  before  sunrise, 

9  Documentary  evidence  of  enemy  strength  on  Okinawa  (basically  the 
Thirty-second  Army,  under  LtGen  Mitsuru  Ushijima)  was  lacking  at  the 
time.  Figures  had  to  be  based  on  aerial  photographs  and  standard  Japanese 
tables  of  organization.  Estimates  varied  from  55,000  in  January  1945  to 
65,000  by  the  latter  part  of  March. 

General  Shepherd  recalls  that  the  final  estimate  of  enemy  strength  while 
the  attack  force  was  at  sea  stood  at  82,000.  Gen.  Shepherd  ltr  to  ACofS, 
G-3,  dtd  i8Jan55  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

10  6th  MarDiv  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  ioFeb45;  CTF-51  Rept. 
a  The  Washington  Daily  News,  3Apr45. 


288       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  first  pre-landing  gunfire  issued  from  i  o  battleships,  9  cruisers, 
23  destroyers,  and  177  gunboats,  obscuring  some  response  from 
shore  artillery  and  mortars.  The  rocket  gunboats  moved  up  to 
the  very  edge  of  the  reefs. 

At  45  minutes  before  H-Hour,  carrier  aircraft  dropping  na- 
palm swept  across  the  beaches  with  a  broom  of  flame  as  Marines 
of  the  1  st  Armored  Amphibian  Battalion  maneuvered  their 
LVT(A)s  into  line  to  form  the  first  wave.  A  still  surf  favored 
the  landings,  to  be  made  at  last  in  untropical  air — less  than  75 
degrees.12 

Organized  as  RCT-4,  under  Colonel  Shapley,  with  the  2d 
Battalion  (Lieutenant  Colonel  Reynolds  H.  Hayden)  in  division 
reserve,  was  the  reinforced  4th  Regiment.13 

From  the  line  of  departure,  4,000  yards  offshore,  the  armored 
amphibians  started  forward  at  0800  behind  LCI  gunboats,  their 
escort  as  far  as  the  reefs.  The  LVT(A)s'  guns  were  running 
interference  in  a  grim  game  for  Colonel  Shapley,  former  All- 

12  Annex  B  to  6th  MarDiv  AdPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd  8Feb45;  Annex  A  to 
IIIAC  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd  iFeb45;  4th  Mar  MRolls,  i~3iMar45;  CTF- 
51  Rept. 

13  6th  MarDiv  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd  ioFeb45,  listed  the  following: 

4th  Marines  (less  2d  Bn  (less  E  Co) ) 

Co  A,  6th  Engineer  Bn  (less  2d  Plat) 

Co  A,  6th  Pioneer  Bn  (less  2d  Plat) 

Co  A,  6th  Motor  Transport  Bn  (less  2d  Plat) 

Co  A,  6th  Medical  Bn  (less  one  collecting  section) 

Det,  26th  and  33d  Replacement  Drafts 

1st  Plat,  MP  Co  (less  dets) 

1st  Plat,  Ordnance  Co  (less  dets) 

1  st  Plat,  Service  and  Supply  Co  (less  PX  sec  and  dets) 

Det,  58th  Naval  Construction  Bn 

Det,  1  ith  Special  Naval  Construction  Bn 

Det,  6th  Amphibious  Truck  Co. 

istBand  Sec  (less  dets) 

1st  Shore  Fire  Control  Party,  6th  JASCO  (less  dets) 

1st  Air  Ground  Liaison  Party,  6th  JASCO  (less  dets) 

1st  Shore  Party  Communication  Team,  6th  JASCO  (less  dets) 

1st  Sec,  3d  Plat,  1st  Bomb  Disposal  Co 


OKINAWA  289 


American  at  the  Naval  Academy.  As  LVTs  carrying  the  3d 
Battalion  (Lieutenant  Colonel  Bruno  A.  Hochmuth)  approached 
Red  Beach  1  and  those  of  the  1st  Battalion  (Major  Bernard  W. 
Green)  came  up  to  Red  Beaches  2  and  3,  support  fire  was  moved 
inland.  The  smoke  and  dust  lifted  upon  beaches  which  appeared 
deserted.    (See  Map  26.) 

But  now,  prepared  for  the  worst  yet,  the  4th  Marines  en- 
countered the  incredible  twist.  The  beaches  were  deserted. 
There  were  not  even  mines.  Assault  waves  landed  at  0837 
"against  practically  no  opposition,"  reported  Colonel  Shapley. 
"Several  mortar  rounds  falling  in  the  vicinity  of  the  beaches  and 
small-arms  fire  from  several  scattered  enemy  stragglers  were  all 
that  met  the  assault  waves."  14  Only  three  casualties  occurred 
in  the  4th  Regiment's  ranks.   No  LVT  was  lost  to  enemy  action. 

The  Marines  could  walk  in  standing  up.  Yet  "the  ridiculous 
ease  of  the  assault  landing  fooled  no  savvy  Marine,"  wrote  a 
Marine  combat  correspondent.15  The  moment  was  merely  seized 
in  happy  relief,  whatever  was  due.  Marines,  some  of  whom 
would  never  leave  Okinawa,  called  cheerfully  to  each  other, 
"Happy  Easter!" 

As  1/4  and  3/4  moved  rapidly  inland,  they  were  greeted  by 
mere  token  resistance,  mainly  from  Japanese  huddled  around 
light  machine  guns  in  cave  emplacements.  A  few  empty  caves 
were  found,  stocked  with  ammunition.  Sometimes  a  cave  would 
contain  bewildered  civilians. 

Yontan  Airfield  was  reached  by  1030,  way  ahead  of  schedule. 
Three  days  had  been  assigned  to  this  objective,  expected  to  be 
gained  at  a  heavy  price,  but  the  runways  and  revetments  were 
found  abandoned.  Marines  could  advance  across  the  ghost  field 
standing  up,  although  there  was  scattered  sniper  fire  from  nearby. 
In  what  certainly  appeared  as  a  tactical  blunder,  the  Japanese 


4th  MarSAR,I&II. 

"Tales  from  Okinawa,"  Leatherneck,  v.  XXVIII,  no.  9  (Sep45),  p.  26. 


290       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


OKINAWA  291 


were  allowing  a  prize  airfield  to  be  taken  almost  unopposed. 
By  nightfall  of  i  April,  the  4th  and  2 2d  Marines  were  well  east 
of  the  airfield,  dug  in  along  rugged  and  woody  high  ground, 
while  the  29th  Marines,  still  in  corps  reserve,  moved  up  to  take 
over  temporarily  the  responsibility  for  the  Yontan  area. 

Back  at  the  beaches  the  high  tide,  which  had  favored  the 
infantry  and  tank  landings,  receded  about  noon,  uncovering  the 
rough  floor  of  the  reef  which  slowed  the  landing  of  reserves  and 
supplies.  Because  of  the  unexpected  progress  inland,  2/4,  in 
division  reserve,  was  put  ashore  at  noon  and  reverted  to  regi- 
mental control.  The  battalion  moved  up  to  the  right  of  the 
22d  Marines.  By  1530  the  15th  Marines  (Colonel  Robert  B. 
Luckey)  was  entirely  ashore,  with  1/15,  under  Major  Robert  H. 
Armstrong,  already  in  direct  support  of  the  4th  Marines.  The 
shore  party,  landed  on  call,  set  up  for  business  under  the  same 
easy  going.  The  regimental  headquarters  and  the  Weapons 
Company  also  found  their  landing  more  like  a  maneuver  than 
like  war. 

The  same  lack  of  definite  resistance  encountered  by  the  4th 
Marines  was  reported  by  other  Marine  units  crossing  the  island 
and,  in  fact,  along  the  entire  seven-mile  front  of  the  Tenth  Army. 
Such  a  windfall  enabled  a  stepping-up  of  the  whole  landing 
schedule;  by  evening  of  1  April  more  than  60,000  troops  of  the 
Tenth  Army  were  ashore  on  Okinawa. 

Postwar  evidence  proved  what  on  that  odd  L-Day  could  be 
only  a  guess:  that  the  Japanese  were  taking  a  strategic  gamble 
on  the  most  precious  soil  yet  invaded  by  their  enemy.  They  had 
decided  in  early  1945  to  avoid  the  high  cost  of  defending  the 
beaches  against  a  Marine  amphibious  assault,  in  hope  of  success 
against  an  enemy  well  ashore.  The  Kamikaze  Corps  was 
expected  to  destroy  the  U.S.  Fleet  offshore. 

Lieutenant  General  Mitsuru  Ushijima,  who  commanded  the 
enemy  defenses,  had  received  intelligence  in  February  1945  that 
Okinawa  would  be  attacked  with  ovemhelming  force.  He 


292       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


planned  the  defense  of  Okinawa  from  a  realistic  viewpoint.  He 
concluded  that,  because  of  U.S.  naval  and  air  strength,  he  could 
not  hope  for  reinforcement  by  water.  In  light  of  what  he  knew 
could  be  brought  to  bear  against  him,  both  at  the  beaches  and 
inland,  he  looked  upon  a  strategy  of  offense  as  impractical  and 
favored  a  war  of  attrition — selecting  for  his  principal  stand  the 
populated  southern  section  of  Okinawa,  where  lay  all  the  air- 
fields, the  capital  city,  the  best  ports,  and  most  of  his  supplies.16 

SO  THIS  IS  OKINAWA 

In  their  1,200-yard  dash  to  Yontan  Airfield,  Marines  had 
passed  the  scenery  almost  too  quickly  to  see  it.  But  just  over 
the  beach  they  noticed  the  curious  ancestral  tombs,  where,  they 
had  been  informed,  a  quite  live  Japanese  could  lurk.  The  vaults 
were  ornate  stone  affairs,  whose  interiors  were  kept  brightly 
whitewashed.  Japanese  troops  found  them  handy  for  storage 
or  as  bomb  shelters. 

While  his  ancestors  slept  in  elegant  dignity,  a  poor  Okinawan 
and  especially  his  wife  labored  on  a  small  well-kept  farm,  usually 
working  a  plot  of  sugar  cane,  the  chief  export  of  the  Ryukyus. 
Just  inland  from  the  beach,  Marines  first  saw  these  bewildered 
and  docile  natives.  They  are  an  under-sized  people,  a  mixture 
of  Japanese,  Mongolian,  Malayan,  and  Ainu,  the  latter  the 
original  strain.  Marines  dubbed  them  "Okies"  and  won,  by 
kindness  and  often  by  treatment  of  their  physical  ills,  the  good- 
will of  a  people  taught  by  the  Japanese  to  fear  the  Americans. 

A  considerable  number  of  the  Okinawans  had  been  conscripted 
into  the  Japanese  Army,  most  of  them  unwillingly.  The  Japa- 
nese regarded  them  as  quite  inferior,  a  foreign  population  under 
the  Emperor's  rule  since  1879. 

16  Dr.  Philip  A.  Growl  memo  to  MajGen  A.  C.  Smith,  USA,  60ct54 
(Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC) ;  LtCol  Thomas  E.  Williams, 
"Jap  Tactics  on  Okinawa,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  29,  no.  10  (Oct45), 
p.  43. 


OKINAWA  293 


Two  military  government  detachments  had  been  joined  to 
the  6th  Marine  Division.  Okinawa  contained  some  435,000 
civilians.  It  presented,  therefore,  the  first  sizable  military  govern- 
ment problem  of  the  Pacific  war.  As  early  as  the  evening  of  1 
April,  wandering  Okinawans  began  to  enter  Marine  lines  and 
were  taken  into  custody  at  the  village  of  Toya,  set  aside  as  a 
civilian  compound.  A  few  objected  to  being  photographed,  for 
they  felt  that  the  process  removed  a  person's  soul. 

Not  so  superstitious  but  just  as  shell-shocked  were  the  numerous 
lost  goats  which,  by  the  end  of  the  first  day,  Marines  had  adopted 
as  pets.  The  expected  snakes  had  evidently  taken  cover  under 
the  bombardment.  They  never  became  a  problem.  "No  snake 
with  brains,"  said  a  Navy  doctor,  "is  going  to  stay  above  ground 
and  take  a  chance  on  catching  a  mortar  shell  or  a  grenade." 
Only  two  cases  of  many  expected  snake  bites  were  reported  in 
the  division  the  entire  first  month,  and  both  men  recovered.  But 
mosquitoes  and  fleas  were  indifferent  to  shell-fire,  though  cold 
nights  discouraged  mosquitoes.17 

Yet  life  on  Okinawa  was  surprisingly  tolerable.  The  temperate 
climate  was  invigorating  to  tropics-weary  Marines,  who  saw 
resemblance  to  the  Middle  West  or  to  the  South  in  Okinawa's 
landscape.  "Most  of  the  boys  say  they  would  like  Okinawa," 
wrote  a  correspondent,  "if  it  weren't  at  war  with  us,  and  if  the 
people  weren't  so  dirty.  .  .  .  The  worst  crosses  to  bear  are  the 
mosquitoes,  fleas  and  the  sight  of  the  pathetic  people."  18 

TO  THE  EAST  COAST 

The  4th  Marines  resumed  the  attack  towards  the  east  coast 
at  0730  on  2  April.  There  was  little  resistance  until  midday. 
Then,  upon  moving  down  a  draw,  the  2d  Platoon  of  Company  L, 

17  "Tales  from  Okinawa,"  op.  cit.,  p.  26.  Sgt  Harold  Heifer,  "The  Oki- 
nawan,"  Leatherneck,  v.  XXVIII,  no.  7  (Jul45),p.  38. 

18  The  Washington  Daily  News,  gApr45. 

519667—60  22 


294       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


3/4,  was  suddenly  pinned  down  by  fire  from  mutually  supporting 
cave  emplacements  on  each  side  of  the  ravine.  Twelve  wounded 
Marines,  including  Captain  Nelson  C.  Dale,  Jr.,  the  company 
commander,  were  trapped  in  the  draw  and  could  not  be  removed 
for  four  hours. 

Reduction  of  the  strong  point  had  to  be  gained  finally  by  a 
charge,  which  was  led  by  1st  Lieutenant  Marvin  D.  Perskie, 
executive  officer  of  Company  L,  taking  over  for  its  wounded 
commander.  One  platoon  entered  the  mouth  of  the  draw,  while 
another  came  down  one  side  of  the  two  noses  which  formed  the 
pocket. 

On  the  same  day  the  1st  Battalion  found  itself  obliged  to  reduce 
a  similar  strong  point.  Concealed  automatic  weapons,  command- 
ing all  approaches,  exacted  a  toll  of  Marines  and  cost  the  life 
of  1st  Lieutenant  Thad  N.  Dodds,  commander  of  Company  B. 
With  the  aid  of  a  platoon  of  tanks  the  position  was  destroyed. 
When  the  4th  Marines  halted  at  1830  they  were  still  far  ahead 
of  schedule.  The  two  battalions  had  encountered  the  ambush, 
Okinawa  style,  and  had  made  the  enemy  pay. 

The  third  day  of  the  advance  saw  mostly  spasmodic  light  re- 
sistance, enabling  the  4th  Marines  to  cover  some  3,500  yards 
over  rocky  terrain  and  claim  the  Yontan  hill  mass,  the  highest 
ridge  line  fencing  the  Ishikawa  Isthmus.  Again,  it  was  the 
landscape  which  was  the  chief  obstacle.  Roads  were  few,  a 
fact  which  delayed  supply,  and  tanks  supporting  the  advance 
had  to  operate  on  narrow  trails  along  the  scrubby  ridge  tops. 
In  some  of  the  ravines  cultivated  to  rice  the  ground  was  marshy. 
There  were  plenty  of  caves  met  through  the  day,  but  most  of 
them  were  vacant.  The  sparse  resistance  produced  a  toll  of 
but  60  Japanese  casualties.  Four  prisoners  were  taken.  The 
day's  statistics  included  also  72  civilians  interned.  By  orders 
of  the  day,  1/4  was  brought  back  to  regimental  reserve. 

The  end  of  that  day  saw  the  4th  Marines  only  3,000  yards 
from  the  east  coast  of  Okinawa.    During  the  night  an  airborne 


OKINAWA  295 


attack  warning  was  received,  but  no  incident  occurred.19  This 
night,  like  those  previous,  was  marked  only  by  scattered  fire  and 
feeble  infiltration  efforts. 

There  was  still  no  Japanese  front  line.  Enemy  forces  seemed 
unorganized,  fighting  indifferently  in  small  numbers,  from  caves 
and  dugouts.  They  often  tried  to  escape,  adding  to  their 
casualties,  which  already,  by  a  4th  Marines'  count,  had  mounted 
to  some  300  Japanese  in  the  regiment's  zone  of  action. 

On  4  April  the  regiment  jumped  off  and  advanced  rapidly. 
No  resistance  was  encountered,  although  the  area  was  honey- 
combed with  caves,  connected  by  an  intricate  system  of  tunnels. 
Flat  country,  thickly  strewn  with  rice  paddies,  appeared  as  the 
advancing  troops  approached  the  eastern  shore,  and,  at  1145, 
the  4th  Marines  reached  the  coast  of  Chimu  Wan  (Bay),  12 
days  ahead  of  schedule. 

Elsewhere  along  the  front  the  advance  was  equally  rapid. 
To  the  left  of  the  4th  Marines,  3/22  reached  the  shore  at  the 
town  of  Ishikawa.  The  1st  Marine  Division,  to  the  south,  closed 
the  east  coast  during  the  afternoon  and  took  up  defensive  posi- 
tions. Meanwhile,  on  the  Hagushi  beaches,  unloading  could  be 
speeded  up;  the  situation  even  permitted  night  unloading  under 
floodlights. 

NORTHWARD:  THE  ISHIKAWA  ISTHMUS 

A  new  mission  for  the  4th  Marines  began  the  next  morning, 
5  April,  when  Company  F,  reinforced  by  a  platoon  of  tanks 
and  four  self-propelled  105mm  howitzers,  patrolled  north  up 
the  east  coast  of  the  Ishikawa  Isthmus.    This  was  preliminary 


19  The  Japanese  made  only  one  known  attempt  to  land  airborne  troops  on 
Okinawa.  This  occurred  at  Yontan  Airfield  on  the  night  of  24  May  when 
five  Japanese  two-engine  bombers  ("Sally's")  raided  the  field.  Four  were 
shot  down,  but  the  fifth  landed  and  eight  Japanese  soldiers  emerged,  with 
grenades  and  incendiaries.    They  destroyed  7  planes  and  damaged  26. 


296       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


to  operations  of  the  4th  Marines  and  its  parent  6th  Division  to 
seize  all  of  northern  Okinawa. 

Originally  scheduled  for  the  second  phase,  to  follow  the  cap- 
ture of  southern  Okinawa,  the  seizure  of  the  north  had  been 
moved  ahead  by  General  Buckner  on  3  April.  Thus  the  IIIAG 
received  instructions  to  strike  the  enemy  above  the  Ishikawa 
Isthmus  while  the  XXIV  Corps  wheeled  south.  General  Geiger 
designated  the  6th  Marine  Division  for  the  northward  drive  and 
held  the  1st  Marine  Division  to  occupy  the  area  between  the 
Ishikawa  Isthmus  and  the  XXIV  Corps  zone. 

Several  reasons  dictated  the  change  of  plans.  It  would  fore- 
stall a  strengthening  of  northern  defenses  and  impede  the  or- 
ganization of  Okinawan  guerrillas  in  that  area.  There  also 
existed  the  possibility  of  counterlandings  on  northern  Okinawa, 
which  a  quick  seizure  could  prevent.  Radio  Tokyo  kept  bol- 
stering Japanese  troop  morale  by  promising  a  counterlanding 
force,  but  the  relief  never  arrived. 

After  the  unquiet  night  of  5  April  when  infiltrating  Japanese 
threw  grenades  into  the  regimental  command  post  killing  four 
men  and  wounding  six  others,  the  4th  Marines  started  up  the 
east  coast  road,  advancing  in  a  column  of  battalions,  2/4,  3/4, 
and  1/4,  with  a  platoon  of  tanks  behind  the  leading  battalion. 
By  early  afternoon  most  of  the  2d  Battalion  had  moved  off  the 
road  in  small  patrols,  and  the  3d  Battalion  passed  through  to 
take  the  lead,  following  a  plan  of  "leapfrogging"  battalions. 
The  day's  patrolling  verified  the  fact  that  several  hundred 
Japanese  had  already  fled  north  in  face  of  the  Marine  advance. 
An  organized  Japanese  stand  was  expected. 

In  their  retreat  up  the  Ishikawa  Isthmus,  the  Japanese  had 
destroyed  most  of  the  bridges  and  hastily  mined  the  roads.  To 
remove  such  mines,  to  clear  road  blocks,  and  to  build  bypasses 
around  demolished  bridges,  a  platoon  of  Company  A,  6th  Engi- 
neer Battalion,  was  put  well  forward  in  support  of  the  4th  Ma- 
rines assault  battalion.   The  remainder  of  the  company  followed 


OKINAWA  297 


close  behind,  repairing  or  replacing  bridges  and  widening  the 
narrow  road  where  possible  to  allow  two-way  traffic.  "The  en- 
emy made  small  use  of  land  mines,"  and  had  sown  no  mine  fields 
"in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word."  20  The  6th  Tank  Battalion 
reported  only  "a  few  poorly  disguised  mine  fields,"  21  which,  with 
a  number  of  blown  bridges,  comprised  the  only  antitank  defense 
at  that  time.   No  tank  was  then  lost  to  enemy  action. 

A  seven-mile  advance  the  first  day,  6  April,  brought  the  4th 
Marines  to  the  village  of  Hochiya  by  1600.  A  few  enemy  strag- 
glers turned  up.  Three  bridges  were  found  bombed  out  by  our 
air  attacks.  Civilians  wandering  south  were  met  on  the  road, 
and,  of  these,  a  few  men  of  military  age  were  sent  to  the  rear  for 
questioning.  The  rest  could  go  their  way,  to  be  rounded  up  later 
by  civil  affairs  personnel.  With  nightfall  the  regiment  assembled 
off  the  main  road,  in  the  order  of  3/4,  1/4,  and  2/4,  the  pattern 
of  advance  for  the  next  morning.  The  motorized  Weapons 
Company  had  been  left  behind  until  bridges  were  repaired. 

At  0700  on  7  April,  the  4th  Marines  resumed  their  advance 
up  the  east  coast  road,  in  a  column  of  battalions,  as  before,  and 
still  with  negligible  opposition,  chiefly  from  terrain  and  blown 
bridges.  After  the  hard  battles  of  the  Pacific  war,  the  easy  going 
of  the  advance  inspired  a  few  exuberant  Marines  to  break  into 
song,  such  as  that  reported  by  a  correspondent: 

Oh,  don't  you  worry,  Mother,  your  son  is  safe  out  here. 
No  Japs  on  Okinawa,  no  sake,  wine  or  beer  .  .  .  ,22 

The  pace  of  the  Marine  advance  was  rapid  on  both  coasts, 
but  supply  became  a  constant  problem.  Existing  roads  were 
narrow,  and  only  boats  and  *4-ton  trucks  could  be  used  for  supply 
of  the  battalions.  A  main  supply  dump  had  been  set  up  at  Yon- 
tan  and  one  at  Ishikawa. 

A  halt  to  the  4th  Marines'  advance  up  the  east  road  was  called 

20  Annex  F  (6th  EngBn)  to  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  I  &  II. 

21  Annex  E  (6th  TkBn)  to  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  I  &  II. 

22  "Tales  from  Okinawa,"  op.  cit.3  p.  26. 


298       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


at  the  town  of  Ora  on  the  evening  of  7  April,  with  all  of  the 
Ishikawa  Isthmus  in  the  regimental  zone  by  then  secured.  Most 
of  the  men  were  footsore  after  days  of  patrolling  in  the  rugged 
hills  of  the  interior,  and  all,  except  those  on  patrol  duty,  wel- 
comed the  next  few  days  of  rest  and  the  first  hot  rations — supple- 
menting the  individual  cold  rations  used  previously. 

Elsewhere  across  the  6th  Division  front  progress  had  been 
equally  rapid.  On  the  west  coast,  the  29th  Marines  reached 
the  town  of  Nago,  at  the  base  of  the  Motobu  Peninsula  on  7  April. 
A  spearhead  then  sealed  off  the  peninsula  by  driving  farther  north 
to  Taira.  On  Motobu  the  6th  Division  was  due  to  meet  its  first 
serious  organized  opposition.  Intelligence  confirmed  that  the 
enemy  had  chosen  to  stand  his  ground  in  that  mountainous  re- 
gion. The  29th  Marines  was,  therefore,  assigned  to  move  into 
the  peninsula,  probing  for  enemy  strength,  with  the  2 2d  Marines 
deployed  across  the  island,  covering  behind  them. 

The  4th  Marines  resumed  the  northward  advance  on  10  April, 
when  Company  K  set  out  to  patrol  along  the  east  coast  road.  In 
7  days  it  patrolled  28  miles  up  the  coast,  supplied  all  the  while  by 
LVTs  from  the  regimental  sendee  area.  No  enemy  force  larger 
than  eight  men  was  encountered.  On  13  April,  the  remainder 
of  3/4  was  ordered  to  Kawada  to  join  Company  K,  but  most 
prophetic  of  future  action  was  the  departure  on  the  same  day  of 
the  rest  of  the  regiment  for  the  west  coast,  to  positions  at  the  base 
of  the  Motobu  Peninsula. 

THE  HARD  HILLS  OF  MOTOBU 

The  reason  for  the  hum-  to  the  west  coast  was  to  reinforce 
the  29th  Marines,  which  had  encountered  heavy  enemy  resistance 
in  southwest  Motobu.  A  company  of  3/29  had  been  ambushed 
on  12  April  and  badly  mauled. 

Colonel  Takehiko  Udo  held  the  territory'  with  some  1,500 
Army  troops  of  the  44th  Independent  Mixed  Brigade,  and  some 


OKINAWA  299 


Okinawan  service  units23 — the  so-called  Udo  Force.  The 
colonel  defied  capture  of  his  mountain  fortress,  which  approxi- 
mated six  by  eight  miles,  about  the  same  area  as  Saipan.  The 
Motobu  heights,  ranging  to  1,500  feet,  well  favored  observation 
and  defense,  and  with  a  larger  force  the  enemy  could  have  asked 
an  even  greater  price.  The  terrain  challenged  invading  infan- 
try, not  to  say  equipment.  Supply  had  to  be  hand-carried  where 
jeeps  and  trailers  could  not  go. 

It  was  the  fringe  of  the  Japanese  stronghold  that  the  29th 
Marines  had  inadvertently  entered  and,  although  they  did  not 
know  it  then,  it  was  here  that  Colonel  Udo  himself  was  sitting 
pretty  in  elaborate  cave  headquarters,  commanding  the  defense 
of  Motobu  from  Mount  Yaetake.  This  mountain,  rising  to  1,500 
feet,  resembled  a  medieval  castle  where  the  windows  were  caves 
and  the  surrounding  moat  was  of  mines,  not  water. 

Colonel  Udo's  strategy  was  to  tie  down  and  wear  out  Ameri- 
can man  power,  detaining  it  from  proceeding  south.  He  had 
expected  the  attacks  would  come  from  the  Toguchi  area  near 
the  west  coast  of  Motobu,  but,  with  his  central  position,  direction 
made  little  difference.  Entrenched  behind  machine  guns, 
mortars,  and  artillery,  he  could  well  feel  able  to  throw  back 
assaults,  like  a  hill  keeps  water  from  climbing.  The  caves  on 
Motobu,  indeed  on  the  entire  island,  were  comparable  to  those 
on  Iwo,  as  centers  of  resistance.  They  were,  however,  more 
numerous  on  Okinawa  and  were  more  elaborately  planned. 

MOUNT  YAETAKE:  4TH  MARINES  CONQUEST 

Colonel  Shapley  and  his  4th  Marines  received  the  mission  to 
reduce  the  very  center  of  Japanese  resistance — Mount  Yaetake. 

23  These  were  members  of  a  local  militia,  or  home  guard  largely  draftees, 
on  Okinawa,  known  as  the  Boeitai.  They  numbered  around  20,000  and  were 
used  by  the  Japanese  mostly  as  labor  and  service  troops.  They  were  not  the 
same  as  the  Okinawan  conscripts  and  reservists  who  were  absorbed  into  the 
regular  Japanese  Army. 


300       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


As  reinforcements  for  this  task,  the  3d  Battalion  of  the  29th 
Marines  was  attached  to  Shapley's  command  and  took  up  a 
position  near  Toguchi,  where  it  could  press  the  enemy  from  the 
west.  Shapley's  3d  Battalion  still  remained  in  division  reserve 
on  the  east  coast.  To  the  other  two  battalions  of  the  29th 
General  Shepherd  had  assigned  the  job  of  barring  Japanese 
escape  northward,  by  seizing  the  high  hills  above  the  Itomi- 
Manna  Road,  and  then  exerting  pressure  on  Yaetake  from  a 
northeast  direction.  Behind  the  4th  Marines,  patrolling  ele- 
ments of  the  2 2d  Regiment  would  forestall  any  Japanese  threats 
to  the  rear.  Thus  the  4th  Marines  was  free  on  14  April  to 
make  a  start  on  their  hard  assignment  to  capture  Yaetake  over 
terrain  where  tank  support  would  be  practically  impossible.  ( See 
Map  27.) 

The  initial  step  toward  the  stronghold  involved  seizure  of  a 
700-foot  ridge  about  1,200  yards  inland  from  the  southwest  coast 
of  Motobu,  the  first  of  the  escort  of  hills  surrounding  Mount 
Yaetake  proper  and  dominating  the  coastal  road.  It  was  just 
behind  the  ridge  that  the  company  of  the  29th  Marines  had  been 
ambushed,  and  now  the  scrubby  crag  unloosed  intermittent 
machine-gun  fire  like  quills  of  a  cornered  porcupine. 

A  situation  which  occurred  here  "was  unique,"  said  a  regi- 
mental report,  for  the  4th  Marines  "was  driving  toward  the 
remaining  two  battalions  of  the  29th,  who  were  working  toward 
Yaetake  from  the  Itomi  area  at  the  central  part  of  the  peninsula, 
about  four  miles  away,  thus  making  careful  coordination  of 
artillery,  naval  gunfire  and  air  support  a  strict  necessity."  24  Yet 
a  heavy  bombardment  was  skillfully  laid. 

With  3/29  on  the  left — moved  up  from  the  vicinity  of  To- 
guchi— and  2/4  on  the  right,  the  attack  to  seize  the  ridge  jumped 
off  at  0830  on  14  April.  An  unexpectedly  poor  defense  was 
presented  by  the  enemy,  who  merely  harassed  the  attack  with 
scattered  machine-gun,  mortar,  and  light  artillery  fire.  The 

24  4th  Mar  SAR,  I  &  II. 


302       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


ridge  fell  by  1 1 15.  In  the  meantime,  1/4  had  been  brought  up 
the  coastal  road  from  regimental  reserve  and  moved  to  the  right 
rear  of  2/4  to  protect  the  right  flank.  At  1 100  Colonel  Shapley 
ordered  that  the  1st  Battalion  send  one  company  to  seize  a  ridge 
about  1,000  yards  to  the  right  front  of  2/4  and  to  contact  2/4 
at  that  point. 

Major  Green  assigned  Company  C,  under  the  command  of  1st 
Lieutenant  James  G.  Washburn  to  the  task.  Washburn's  men 
ran  into  machine-gun  and  mortar  fire,  and  Company  A  ( Captain 
Clinton  B.  Eastment)  was  shortly  committed  on  the  left  of 
Company  C.  The  ridge  was  taken,  and  1st  Lieutenant  Charles 
E.  Jones'  Company  B  moved  up  on  the  ridge  while  A  and  C 
pushed  on  to  secure  the  regiment's  flank.  Below  1/4's  position, 
2/4  and  3/29  moved  into  low  ground.  Awaiting  their  advance 
were  nests  of  machine  gunners,  well  under  cover  of  the  tangled 
rocky  terrain. 

"It  was  like  fighting  a  phantom  enemy,"  said  one  officer.25 
The  Japanese  would  permit  a  number  of  Marines  to  pass,  so 
that  they  could  fire  at  selected  individuals.  An  entire  platoon 
of  Marines  passed  one  point  on  a  trail  successfully,  the  enemy 
reserving  their  fire  for  the  company  commander  and  several  other 
officers.  Major  Green  was  killed  in  the  afternoon  of  14  April  by 
a  similar  trick.  The  Japanese  waited  silently  for  more  than  a  half 
hour  to  select  their  prey.  In  the  thick  vegetation  of  the  slopes 
and  ravines  they  would  strike  and  then  slip  away,  gone  before 
Marines  could  cut  through  to  them.  The  enemy's  employment 
of  small  mobile  fire  teams  on  the  approaches  to  Yaetake  illus- 
trated their  adaptation  to  mountain  defense.  They  made  use  of 
personal  camouflage  everywhere  on  Okinawa,  sometimes  paint- 
ing their  faces  green  and  wrapping  themselves  with  leaves.26 


25  Maj  Orville  V.  Bergren,  "School  Solutions  on  Motobu,"  Marine  Corps 
Gazette,  v.  29,  no.  12  (Dec45),  p.  3. 

26  istLt  Alan  Shilin,  "To  Yontan  and  Beyond,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette, 
v.  29,  no.  7  (Jul45),pp.  16-19. 


OKINAWA  303 


A  Marine  would  get  more  tired  of  the  Japanese  he  could  not 
see  than  of  those  he  could,  and  the  men  of  2/4  and  3/29  were 
glad  to  dig  in  on  the  regimental  objective  at  1630  on  14  April 
after  a  trying  advance.  With  the  bringing  up  of  1/4  to  the  right, 
there  were  now  three  battalions  on  the  line.  Meanwhile,  3/4 
had  moved  from  the  east  coast  near  Awa,  to  become  division 
reserve  on  Motobu.  The  regimental  Weapons  Company  was 
organized  as  a  rifle  company,  since  terrain  precluded  use  of  their 
heavy  weapons. 

The  morning  of  1 5  April  boded  a  hard  day.  Across  the  ground 
yet  intervening  before  Mount  Yaetake  lay  a  ridge  dominated  by 
two  highly-fortified  hills:  one  (Hill  200)  ahead  of  the  1st  and 
2d  Battalions — dominating  the  entire  right  flank,  the  other  (Hill 
210 — named  Green  Hill  for  the  fallen  1/4  commander)  block- 
ing the  advance  of  3/29  on  the  left.  Green  Hill  had  been 
pounded  for  two  days  by  naval  gunfire  and  artillery,  and  by  air 
strikes  using  500-pound  bombs  and  napalm  flame  bombs  to  burn 
off  camouflage.  Yet  "every  time  it  was  thought  reduced,"  said 
the  regimental  report,  "the  Japs  would  pop  out  of  their  caves 
again"  27  with  their  machine  guns,  mortars,  and  one  mountain 
gun  which  they  dragged  out  at  intervals. 

Hill  200  had  likewise  absorbed  intensive  air  attacks  and  pin- 
point bombardment  by  the  battleship  Colorado,  but  still  the 
Japanese  popped  out  from  the  recesses  of  their  caves,  deafened 
but  otherwise  untouched.  Such  attacks  upon  the  caves,  however 
accurate,  could  not  be  as  conclusive  as  what  General  Buckner 
termed  the  "blowtorch  and  corkscrew  method,"  the  flame 
thrower  being  the  blowtorch  and  demolitions  the  corkscrew. 

In  the  bitter  contest  on  15  April  for  the  final  ridge  before 
Yaetake  it  was  tough  going.  Company  G  of  2/4  encountered 
particularly  heavy  enemy  fire,  suffering  65  casualties,  including 
three  company  commanders.  Its  Captain  Archie  B.  Norford  was 
killed  in  action. 

27  4th  Mar  SAR,I&II. 


304       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Advancing  upon  Hill  200,  the  2d  Battalion  started  the  attack 
with  three  companies  abreast — E,  F,  and  G  (less  one  platoon  of 
Company  E  in  battalion  reserve).  Heavy  fire,  encountered  at 
once,  continued  unabating,  forcing  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hayden 
to  commit  the  meager  reserve. 

Company  G  pushed  three-fourths  of  the  way  up  a  hill  just  to 
the  right  of  Hill  200,  then  withdrew  to  a  more  practical  defense 
position  tied  in  to  Company  F.  The  vigorous  advance  by  Com- 
pany G  against  utmost  resistance  served  the  assault  by  Companies 
E  and  F  which  took  Hill  200  before  the  end  of  the  day.  The 
action  of  Company  G  also  aided  the  advance  of  1/4  on  the  right, 
where  Companies  A  and  C  secured  a  key  hill  mass  southwest  of 
Yaetake. 

When  the  attack  ceased  at  1630  the  two  battalions  of  the  4th 
Marines  were  on  their  objective,  while  3/29  had  fought  just  short 
of  reducing  Hill  210.  The  men  were  tired.  Many  Japanese  had 
been  cleared  out  of  camouflaged  emplacements,  and  a  number 
of  caves  were  sealed.  The  enemy  had  lost  not  only  1,120  counted 
dead  but  also  much  equipment — including  3  heavy  mortars,  27 
light  mortars,  14  machine  guns,  1  75mm  field  piece,  and  1  6-inch 
gun. 

On  the  morning  of  16  iVpril,  as  Mount  Yaetake  itself  became 
the  immediate  objective  of  the  4th  Marines,  the  3d  Battalion 
reverted  from  division  to  regimental  control,  making  the  4th  Ma- 
rines temporarily,  a  four-battalion  regiment.  Green  Hill  fell  to 
3/29  by  noon,  clearing  the  path  for  the  climactic  assault  of  Mount 
Yaetake.  The  1st  and  3d  Battalions  faced  north,  the  regimental 
Weapons  Company  patrolling  to  their  rear.  With  3/29  and  2/4 
both  now  on  high  ground  looking  east,  they  were  ordered  to  re- 
main in  position,  to  give  fire  support  to  1/4  and  3/4  advancing 
north  against  Mount  Yaetake.  On  the  right,  1/22  was  moving 
up  from  the  rear  but  was  delayed  by  terrain.  The  other  units  of 
the  29th  Marines,  moving  southwest  from  the  vicinity  of  Itomi, 


OKINAWA  305 


had  not  yet  arrived  in  a  position  from  which  they  could  protect 
the  4th  Regiment's  right  flank. 

Intelligence  of  enemy  whereabouts  indicated,  however,  that 
the  temporary  breaks  in  the  Marine  line  were  not  serious.  Colo- 
nel Shapley  decided,  therefore,  to  press  the  decisive  attack  against 
Mount  Yaetake,  whose  peak  lay  in  the  zone  of  the  1st  Battalion, 
now  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Fred  D.  Beans, 
formerly  regimental  executive  officer.  He  filled  in  here  until 
relieved  on  1  May  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  George  B.  Bell.28 

To  the  left,  Company  A  of  1/4,  led  by  Captain  Eastment, 
moved  frontally  up  the  steep  south  nose  of  Yaetake.  Company 
C  on  the  right,  under  1st  Lieutenant  William  H.  Carlson,29  who 
had  just  that  day  assumed  command,  started  up  a  draw  to  reach 
the  main  ridge.  Progress  was  slowed  more  by  the  terrain  than  by 
the  scattered  small-arms  fire. 

When  Marines  gained  the  crest,  however,  they  were  suddenly 
met  by  unrestrained  fire  which  had  been  withheld  until  they  were 
close.  Grenade  launchers  and  hand  grenades  added  to  the  resist- 
ance, the  intensity  of  which  forced  a  slight  withdrawal  to  a  ledge 
until  60mm  mortars  could  be  employed  and  hand  grenades 
lobbed  to  the  reverse  side  of  the  crest. 

In  this  close  violent  combat  the  2d  Battalion  on  the  left  fur- 
nished very  effective  supporting  fire.  From  Hill  200,  overlook- 
ing the  reverse  slope,  they  laid  down  a  barrage  of  mortar  and 
machine-gun  fire  and  picked  off  a  column  of  reinforcements 
moving  along  the  ridge.  Added  to  the  mortar  fire  of  the  1st  Bat- 
talion, such  support  kept  the  enemy  pinned  down,  permitting 
Companies  A  and  C  to  seize  the  crest  to  stay. 

The  foothold,  gained  by  1730,  remained  precarious,  however. 
Taking  the  hill  had  cost  the  two  companies  over  50  casualties  and 

28Shilin,  "To  Yontan  and  Beyond,"  op.  ext.,  pp.  16-19;  4th  Mar  MRolls, 
iApr-3iMay45. 

29  Lt  Carlson  took  over  for  Lt  Washburn,  wounded  in  action  on  15  April. 
Lt  Carlson  himself  was  later  twice  wounded,  on  23  and  27  May,  and  was 
killed  in  action  on  5  June. 


306       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


most  of  their  ammunition.  Moreover,  the  enemy  seemed  to  be 
rallying  what  strength  they  had  left  for  a  counterattack.  But 
the  continued  artillery  fire  of  the  1 5th  Marines  and  the  2d  Bat- 
talion's supporting  fire  stopped  the  Japanese  long  enough  for 
Marines  to  haul  ammunition  up  the  hill.  Every  available  officer 
and  man  turned  to  the  urgent  mission  of  saving  their  comrades 
and  the  hill  so  courageously  taken.  That  hill  "looked  like  Pike's 
Peak,"  said  one  officer,30  as  he  remembered  the  "tired  sweaty 
men"  carrying  ammunition  and  water  up  on  their  backs. 

Just  an  hour  after  Marines  had  seized  the  crest  the  expected 
counterattack  developed — a  desperate  charge  by  75  Japanese, 
who  were  almost  totally  destroyed.  In  the  repulse  of  the  charge, 
2/4  again  provided  a  model  example  of  supporting  fire.  Mount 
Yaetake  was  now  securely  in  the  hands  of  the  4th  Marines,  but 
the  long  line  of  stretcher-bearers  indicated  the  victory  had  not 
been  cheap. 

Corporal  Richard  E.  Bush  of  Company  C,  1/4,  had  symbolized 
the  courage  of  every  Marine.  Severely  wounded  while  leading 
the  first  squad  up  the  draw  to  Mount  Yaetake,  he  was  evacuated 
to  a  nearby  aid  station.  There,  when  an  enemy  grenade  fell 
among  the  wounded  men,  he  quickly  drew  it  to  his  body  to  save 
them.  He  was  most  fittingly  awarded  the  Medal  of  Honor.  His 
unhesitating  sacrifice  caused  additional  wounds  in  his  stomach 
and  face  and  the  loss  of  three  fingers. 

On  the  morning  of  1 7  April  the  attack  was  delayed  until  noon 
due  to  supply  problems.  Orders  to  the  4th  and  the  29th  Ma- 
rines were  to  seize  high  ground  overlooking  the  Toguchi-Itomi 
east- west  road.  The  advance,  once  resumed,  quickly  built  up 
momentum,  and  the  day  ended  with  both  regiments  on  the 
objective. 

Progress  was  a  breeze,  after  the  previous  hard  fighting,  and 
the  day  yielded  much  evidence  that,  by  taking  Mount  Yaetake, 
the  Marines  had  really  broken  the  back  of  Japanese  defenses. 

30  Bergren,  "School  Solutions  on  Motobu,"  op.  cit.,  p.  6. 


OKINAWA  307 


A  captured  map  showed  that  Yaetake  contained  the  only  or- 
ganized defense  zone  on  Motobu.  Caves,  material,  and  enemy 
dead  were  abandoned  in  the  collapse  of  resistance. 

With  the  6th  Marine  Division's  capture  of  Motobu  about 
complete,  3/29  was  detached  on  18  April  from  the  4th  Marines, 
where  it  had  served  so  well,  and  reverted  to  its  parent  regiment 
then  at  Itomi.  The  4th  Regiment  remained  in  position  that 
day,  with  1/4  and  3/4  patrolling  ahead  while  2/4  combed  the 
area  of  the  previous  day's  rapid  advance.  Mopping  up  was 
especially  imperative  on  Okinawa  with  its  cleverly  concealed 
defenses. 

Next  morning  the  4th  Marines  resumed  the  advance,  with 
the  29th  Marines  on  the  right.  The  immediate  objective  was 
the  high  ground  to  the  northeast,  on  which  possible  enemy  con- 
centrations were  suspected.  But  except  for  a  pocket  of  35 
Japanese,  cleaned  out  by  2/4,  there  were  no  signs  of  organized 
resistance  over  the  entire  3,000  yards  advanced  by  the  4th 
Regiment  during  the  day. 

The  high  ground  seized  on  19  April  was  the  only  remaining 
hill  mass  between  the  Toguchi-Itomi  Road  and  the  north  coast 
of  Motobu.31  "The  enemy  had  apparently  failed  to  occupy  the 
previously  prepared  position  in  strength,"  said  a  division  report, 
"although  a  considerable  number  of  dead  Japanese  were  found, 
presumably  killed  by  artillery  and  naval  gunfire."  32 

Some  occupants  of  the  position  may  have  escaped.  Division 
intelligence  judged  that  several  hundred  Japanese  had  fled 
Motobu  into  northern  Okinawa,  as  the  Udo  Force  degenerated 
into  a  collection  of  fleeing  stragglers.  Udo  himself  had  slipped 
out  of  his  cave  headquarters  at  Mount  Yaetake,  it  was  learned, 
to  organize  more  guerrillas,  nettlesome  like  the  fleas  on  Okinawa. 


81 4th  Mar  MRolls,  i-3oApr45;  MajGen  Lemuel  C.  Shepherd,  Jr.,  "The 
Battle  for  Motobu  Peninsula,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  29,  no.  8  (Aug45), 
pp.  8-1 1.    Bergren,  "School  Solutions  on  Motobu,"  op.  cit.,  p.  6. 

32  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  I  &  II. 


310       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


through,  and  the  size  of  the  Tenth  Army's  job  in  southern 
Okinawa  emerged  from  the  blueprint  of  gunsmoke.  The  cas- 
ualties of  19  April  emphasized  the  depressing  fact  that  many 
more  were  due  in  a  grinding  struggle  for  the  rest  of  this  island. 
To  get  through  the  deep  wide  complex  of  hill  and  ridge  defenses 
seemed  a  job  comparable  to  hacking  a  way  through  a  jungle  of 
steel  foliage. 

To  forestall  the  protracted  campaign  which  loomed  in  southern 
Okinawa,  General  Buckner  considered  amphibious  landings 
below  Shuri.  But  Tenth  Army  staff  officers  regarded  them  in- 
advisable. It  was  their  belief  that,  in  view  of  the  shortage  of 
shipping,  such  landings  could  not  be  well  supplied,  and,  moreover, 
could  not  be  properly  supported  by  artillery.  They  felt  that  the 
beaches  were  unsuitable  and  the  terrain  preponderantly  favorable 
to  a  strong  Japanese  defense.  Persuaded  by  the  staff  studies, 
General  Buckner  decided  against  new  landings.  In  this  decision, 
Admiral  Nimitz  concurred.34 

It  was  planned,  therefore,  to  bring  the  Marines  into  the  line 
above  Shuri,  moving  them  by  land.  In  a  conference  on  28  April 
at  General  Buckner's  headquarters  the  immediate  redeployment 
of  the  1  st  and  6th  Marine  Divisions  in  southern  Okinawa  was 
discussed.  It  was  decided  to  attach  the  1st  Marine  Division 
to  the  XXIV  Corps  on  30  April,  relieving  the  Army's  reserve 
27th  Division,  which  had  joined  the  corps'  attack  on  19  April. 
The  27th  would  assume  the  mopping  up  duty  of  the  6th  Marine 
Division  in  northern  Okinawa,  enabling  that  division  to  fight 
alongside  the  1st.  Upon  such  a  re-shuffling  and  the  employment 
of  Marines,  hopes  were  placed  for  renewing  the  attack  with 
decisive  vigor. 

34  In  a  press  interview,  Admiral  Nimitz  declared  that  "new  landings  would 
have  had  to  be  made  over  very  unsatisfactory  beaches  against  an  alerted 
enemy  defense.  They  would  have  involved  heavy  casualties  and  would  have 
created  unacceptable  supply  problems." — Washington  Evening  Star,  I7jun45. 


OKINAWA  311 


THE  4TH  MARINES  GO  SOUTH 

On  2  May  the  6th  Marine  Division  started  its  southward 
move,  as  engineers  and  service  troops  shoved  off  by  truck.  Two 
days  later  the  4th  Regiment  left  by  truck  convoy  for  an  assigned 
area  near  Deragawa,  34  miles  to  the  south  and  about  10  miles 
north  of  the  front  line  on  the  west,  there  to  bivouac  as  division 
reserve.35 

By  evening  of  6  May  all  major  elements  of  the  division  had 
reached  the  assembly  areas  around  Chibana.  A  week  of  heavy 
rain  began  on  the  7th,  forecasting  that,  wherever  the  4th  Marines 
went  next,  it  would  be  muddy  going. 

Orders  received  by  General  Shepherd  on  6  May  committed 
the  division  to  the  right  of  the  II I  AC  front,  and,  two  days  later, 
the  2 2d  Marines  were  moved  to  high  ground  north  of  the  Asa 
Kawa  (River)  to  relieve  the  7th  Marines  of  the  1st  Division. 
(See  Map  28.) 

This  relief  set  in  motion  the  first  mission  of  the  6th  Marine 
Division  in  southern  Okinawa:  "To  seize  Naha  and  the  line  of 
the  Kokuba  River  in  its  zone  of  action,  to  assist  the  1st  Marine 
Division  by  fire  and  maneuver,  and  to  protect  the  Corps  right 
(west)  flank."  36  The  mission  would  start  with  a  crossing  of  the 
Asa  Kawa.  The  push  became  termed  the  Battle  for  Naha,  but 
the  assignment  encompassed  far  more  than  seizure  of  the  capital. 
It  was  part  of  the  Tenth  Army's  drive  to  break  the  Shuri  line. 

THE  BITTERNESS  OF  SUGAR  LOAF 

Two  hills,  like  posts  holding  a  chain,  had  to  be  whittled  away 
before  the  central  strong  point  of  Shuri  could  be  taken.  One  was 
Conical  Hill,  facing  the  96th  Division,  the  other  was  Sugar  Loaf, 

35  Upon  movement  to  southern  Okinawa  the  task  organization  of  the  4th 
Mar  (Reinf)  was  as  follows:  4th  Mar,  Co  A  6th  MedBn,  Det  Co  A  6th 
MTBn,  1st  Plat  OrdCo,  1st  Plat  S&S  Co  (less  PX  Sec),  and  Det  6th  JASCO. 

36  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  III. 


312       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


OKINAWA  313 


confronting  the  6th  Marine  Division.  Sugar  Loaf  (so  nicknamed 
for  its  shape )  was  the  spearhead  of  a  triangle,  based  on  two  sup- 
porting strongholds:  Half  Moon  Hill — actually  a  cluster  of 
ridges — and  the  Horseshoe  depression,  both  hardly  less  fortified 
than  Sugar  Loaf.  Together,  dominating  the  approaches  to  the 
Shuri  Hill  mass  from  the  west,  they  formed  a  web  of  cave  and 
tunnel  defenses  of  immense  strength.  Sugar  Loaf  fell  to  troops 
of  the  2 2d  and  29th  Marines  on  18  May  after  five  days  of  bitter 
fighting. 

Seizure  of  this  key  enemy  position,  though  significant,  still  left 
stubborn  resistance  on  Half  Moon  Hill  and  the  Horseshoe.  Here 
the  4th  Marines  were  to  see  their  first  action  in  southern  Okinawa, 
when  they  relieved  the  29th  Marines  on  1 9  May.  As  2/4  and  3/ 4 
moved  up  they  had  to  practically  fight  their  way  into  the  lines, 
while  the  29th  fought  its  way  out.  Concealment  was  impossible, 
and  the  4th  Marines  suffered  over  70  casualties,  mostly  from 
mortar  and  artillery  fire,  before  the  relief  could  be  completed  at 
1430. 

In  the  re- alignment,  the  5th  Marines  was  on  the  left,  opposite 
Shuri  defenses — in  particular  the  perilous  Wana  Draw.  On  the 
right  was  the  2 2d  Marines,  with  a  static  front  line  along  the  lower 
reaches  of  the  Asato  Gawa  (River).  The  position  of  3/4  wove 
across  the  top  of  Sugar  Loaf,  Companies  K  and  L  relieving  2/29. 
Caves  on  the  north  slope  had  all  been  blasted  shut,  but  the  enemy 
on  the  reverse  slope  was  still  energetically  employing  grenade 
launchers.  Registered  on  top  of  the  hill,  this  fire  made  the  Ma- 
rine position  barely  tenable.  Around  Sugar  Loaf  wrecked  tanks 
and  LVTs  spoke  of  the  bitter  struggle  waged  in  the  area  and  still 
not  ended.37 

37  The  Japanese  used  horned  chemical  antitank  mines  in  the  Sugar  Loaf 
Hill  area,  and  mine  fields  were  covered  by  small-arms  and  antitank  fire. 
The  47mm  antitank  guns  were  usually  situated  in  pairs,  covering  likely  tank 
approaches  to  the  Japanese  strong  points.  Fire  was  usually  withheld  until 
tanks  were  within  300  yards  or  less  when  penetration  was  possible  on  a 
medium  tank. 


314       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Apart  from  Sugar  Loaf,  the  29th  Marines5  front  was  taken 
over  by  Companies  E  and  F  of  2/4.  Company  E  had  just  moved 
into  a  precarious  advance  foothold  on  Half  Moon  Hill  when  the 
Japanese  counterattacked,  supported  by  mortar  fire.  The  assault 
was  broken  up  after  a  two-hour  fire  fight,  with  65  enemy  killed, 
but  Captain  Leonard  W.  Alford  was  ordered  to  withdraw  the 
left  flank  of  Company  E  about  a  hundred  yards  to  make  physical 
contact  with  Company  F  and  to  tighten  the  line  for  defense 
through  the  night  hours  of  ceaseless  Japanese  fire. 

On  the  morning  of  20  May,  the  division's  movement  toward 
the  Asato  Gawa,  which  curved  through  part  of  Naha,  was  still 
held  up  by  resistance  in  the  Sugar  Loaf  area.  As  Companies  K 
and  L  of  3/4  moved  out  at  0800  from  their  positions  on  Sugar 
Loaf  they  both  met  immediate  fire  from  small  arms,  automatic 
weapons,  mortars,  and  artillery. 

Numerous  caves  were  blasted  out  by  the  "blowtorch  and 
corkscrew"  method  in  Company  K's  sector  during  the  morn- 
ing, and  early  that  afternoon  Company  I  joined  the  line  to  pre- 
serve contact.  Because  of  the  still  grim  struggle  in  the  Sugar 
Loaf  area,  Company  B  (regimental  reserve)  was  briefed  for 
possible  support  of  the  beleaguered  3d  Battalion.  The  com- 
pany's opportunity  occurred  that  night  when  the  Japanese  staged 
a  large  counterattack  against  3/4.  At  2130,  Company  K 
caught  the  brunt  of  the  assault  by  an  estimated  battalion,  pref- 
aced by  a  50mm  mortar  barrage  and  covered  by  smoke.  Before 
the  hand-to-hand  fighting  which  developed,  support  ships  helped 
outline  the  enemy  approach  with  star  shells,  permitting  detec- 
tion at  800  yards.    By  midnight  the  attack  was  broken  up. 

This  was  the  last  Japanese  attempt  to  repossess  Sugar  Loaf. 
But  Half  Moon  and  the  Horseshoe  resisted  complete  possession 
by  the  Marines,  a  fact  due  less  to  Japanese  strength  in  those 
areas  than  to  enemy  fire  delivered  from  outside  the  division  zone 
of  action,  from  the  Shuri  line  to  the  east. 

In  an  effort  to  outflank  the  enemy,  General  Shepherd  redi- 


OKINAWA  315 


rected  his  division's  effort,  to  side  slip  to  the  west  of  the  trouble- 
some strong  point  and  push  on  to  the  Asato  Gawa. 

Nevertheless,  the  Shuri  defense  complex  appeared  to  be 
everywhere,  and  casualties  continued  from  the  monotony  of 
seemingly  endless  ridges.  Underfoot,  the  mud  from  prolonged 
rain  gripped  the  advance.  But  General  Shepherd's  maneuver 
bypassed  the  worst  fire,  and  the  ist  and  3d  Battalions  now 
pressed  on  to  the  Asato,  to  complete  the  envelopment  of  the  west- 
ern anchor,  while  the  2d  Battalion  strove  to  end  the  argument 
on  Half  Moon  and  the  Horseshoe. 

ONE  MORE  RIVER  TO  CROSS 

Patrols  across  the  Asato  on  the  night  of  22-23  May  reported 
that  a  crossing  was  feasible  without  initial  tank  support,  which 
the  everlasting  mud  prevented.  So,  on  the  morning  of  23  May, 
assault  waves  of  the  4th  Marines,  the  forefront  of  two  battalions, 
began  wading  the  150-foot-wide  Asato  under  cover  of  smoke. 

A  correspondent  described  the  scene  as  the  crossing  progressed 
and  the  rains  deepened  the  river:  "Leathernecks  leaped  the 
four-foot  river  embankment  by  two's  and  three's  and  waded  over 
the  muddy  bottom  in  water  that  boiled  with  enemy  fire.  A 
lot  of  them  didn't  make  it."  38  In  the  chest-high  water  and  on 
the  slippery  underfooting,  it  required  up  to  12  stretcher-bearers 
to  remove  a  wounded  man. 

By  1 1 00  the  harassed  assault  companies  of  both  battalions 
were  across  the  river.  The  rest  of  the  regiment  crossed  during 
the  afternoon,  while  assault  troops  advanced  against  hard  re- 
sistance around  the  low  clay  hills  west  of  the  village  of  Machisi 
outside  Naha.  Engineers  were  able  to  get  two  foot-bridges  across 
the  Asato  by  midnight,  but  the  heat  of  enemy  artillery  fire  delayed 
bringing  up  a  Bailey  bridge. 


38  "Tales  from  Okinawa,"  op.  cit.}  p.  27. 


316       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


NAHA  AND  "TIME  OUT' 

A  Japanese  newspaper  took  note  of  the  approaching  Marines : 
"The  Sixth  Marine  Division  is  a  fresh  unit.  Among  the  badly- 
mauled  enemy  it  is  a  tiger's  cub  and  their  morale  is  high."  39 

Prior  to  landing  on  Okinawa,  Marines  had  pleasantly  an- 
ticipated Naha,  the  island's  capital,  as  a  kind  of  Paris  of  the 
Pacific,  scuttlebutt  crediting  it  even  with  streetcars.  But  now 
Naha  was  a  ruined  city,  a  charred  shell  of  itself,  battered  by 
artillery  and  air  bombardment. 

The  advance  upon  Naha  moved  through  soaking  wetness  and 
ceaseless  gunfire.  On  24  May,  3/4  was  relieved  by  2/4,  which 
joined  the  action  after  a  crossing  of  the  Asato,  leaving  the 
division's  left  flank  in  the  hands  of  3/22. 

As  the  4th  Marines  fought  into  the  outskirts  of  Naha,  the 
Division  Reconnaissance  Company  crossed  the  Asato  near  its 
mouth  and  patrolled  into  downtown  Naha.  Their  probing 
was  reinforced  when  General  Buckner  ordered  patrolling  stepped 
up  along  the  entire  Tenth  Army  fine,  aimed  at  checking  indica- 
tions of  a  wholesale  enemy  withdrawal.  The  4th  Marines 
probed  east  of  the  20-yard-wide  canal  which  cut  across  Naha 
from  the  Asato  to  the  Kokuba  Estuary.  Some  lingering  civilians 
reported  that  lately  they  had  seen  only  scattered  Japanese 
patrols,  and  what  they  said  proved  correct.  Naha,  with  a  peace- 
time population  of  65,000,  had  lost  value  to  the  Marines  except 
as  a  point  on  the  route  southward. 

Colonel  Shapley's  men,  having  fought  through  ten  hard  days 
to  Naha,  were  placed  in  division  reserve.  The  29th  Marines 
moved  in  to  relieve  them  on  the  morning  of  28  May.  The 
4th  Regiment  left  by  motor  and  marching  for  the  beach  areas 
vacated  by  the  29th  Regiment  north  of  Machinato  Airfield, 
there  to  gain  rest  and  replacements.  The  4th  Marines  were 
tired  but  could  be  proud.  They  had  helped  to  crack  the  western 
end  of  the  main  Japanese  defense  line  in  southern  Okinawa. 

39  Quoted  by  Shilin,  "6th  MarDiv  in  Southern  Okinawa,"  op.  ext.,  p.  23. 


OKINAWA  317 


The  ten  days  of  advance  against  incessant  fire  had  depleted 
the  4th  Regiment  of  men  and  endurance.  Almost  18  inches  of 
rain  had  kept  progress  a  miserable  slogging.  W eather — and  the 
closeness  of  the  fighting — often  prevented  air  support.  Weap- 
ons, like  everything  else,  felt  the  omnipresence  of  rain.  More- 
over, General  Buckner's  reconnaissance  seemed  to  show  that  the 
Japanese  had  no  plans  to  quit,  any  more  than  did  the  rain. 

In  the  preceding  ten  days,  especially  after  the  Asato  crossing, 
supply  had  become  most  arduous.  Mud  joined  up  with  the  Jap- 
anese to  strain  the  efforts  of  engineers  and  vehicles.  On  such 
days  the  LVT  was  a  godsend  for  supply  and  evacuation,  as  the 
only  type  of  vehicle  which  could  consistently  ride  the  sea  of  mud 
to  the  front  lines.40 

Momentarily  out  of  the  lines,  the  4th  Marines  now  had  time 
to  learn  what  was  happening  elsewhere  on  the  Tenth  Army 
front — and  to  hear  what  was  left  to  be  done  on  Okinawa  across 
the  six  miles  to  the  southern  tip. 

Two  of  the  three  successive  enemy  defense  lines  had  been 
broken  through  by  Marines  and  Army  troops.  First  had  been 
the  line  based  on  Kakazu  Ridge,  lying  two  miles  before  the 
main  defense  ring:  the  Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru.  By  the  end  of 
May  the  latter  fine  had  collapsed.  Capture  of  Sugar  Loaf  by 
the  6th  Marine  Division  had  decisively  unhinged  it  on  the  west, 
while  seizure  of  Conical  Hill,  above  Yonabaru  Airfield,  by  the 
7th  and  96th  Army  Divisions  had  destroyed  the  eastern  anchor. 
In  the  center,  pressure  by  the  1st  Marine  Division  and  the  Army's 
77th  had  hastened  evacuation  of  battered  ancient  Shuri  castle, 
Japanese  headquarters,  where  men  of  the  1st  Marines  raised  the 
Stars  and  Stripes. 

Remnants  of  the  Thirty-Second  Army  had  retired  to  the  third 
and  final  defense  line  to  the  south — Itoman  to  Gushichan — 
strung  along  the  backbone  of  the  Yuza  Dake  (hill  mass)  and 


40  "Drive  on  Naha,"  Leatherneck,  v.  XXVIII,  no.  8  (Aug45),  pp.  15-17. 


31  a       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Yaeju  Dake.  As  early  as  22  May,  General  Ushijima  had  begun 
a  silent  orderly  retreat  to  the  last  wall. 

CAPTURE  OF  THE  OROKU  PENINSULA 

In  addition  to  the  third  defense  line,  there  remained  a  strong- 
hold of  Japanese  resistance  on  the  Oroku  Peninsula,  across  the 
Kokuba  Estuary  from  Naha  and  the  site  of  Naha  Airfield,  biggest 
on  Okinawa.  It  was  against  Oroku  that  the  4th  Marines  were 
to  see  their  next  action,  and  this  time  in  Marine  style:  the 
amphibious  landing.    (See  Map  29.) 

On  Oroku  they  would  meet  Rear  Admiral  Minoru  Ota's 
Okinawa  Base  Force,  composed  of  naval  and  army  troops,  chiefly 
the  former,  and  numbering  far  above  the  original  1,200  to  1,500 
men  estimated  by  intelligence.  It  was  not  then  known  that, 
before  the  Marine  landing,  a  number  of  additional  naval  troops 
had  been  brought  into  the  peninsula,  along  with  Okinawan 
conscripts.  Ota's  regular  naval  force  was  known  to  number 
around  10,000  men,  and  its  elements  on  Oroku,  proving  well 
over  half  of  the  unit,  had  been  hastily  reorganized  into  a  ground 
combat  force  to  defend  the  peninsula. 

The  admiral  was  expecting  a  land  approach  at  the  base  of 
the  peninsula,  being  evidently  forgetful  of  the  Marine  Corps 
specialty,  and  he  concentrated  defenses  on  the  ridge  line  there. 
Still,  from  whatever  direction  the  Marines  came  they  would  en- 
counter hard  going  on  Oroku.  This  two-by-three-mile  peninsula, 
flat  only  at  the  airfield,  shared  the  irregular  terrain  of  Okinawa. 
Its  ridges  and  hills  were  lower — seldom  above  200  feet — but 
they  contained  the  usual  camouflaged  cave  emplacements,  hiding 
automatic  weapons,  of  which  the  enemy  possessed  an  incredible 
number  on  Oroku.  This  was  partly  because  the  Japanese  had 
stripped  the  wrecked  planes  on  Naha  Airfield  of  their  machine 
guns  and  20mm  cannon  and  adapted  them  for  ground  use.  The 
enemy  also  had  many  grenade  launchers  and  81  mm  mortars, 


OKINAWA  319 


320       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


which  some  of  the  converted  naval  troops  used  rather 
inefficiently. 

General  Shepherd,  assigned  on  short  notice  to  take  Oroku, 
weighed  the  suitable  approaches.  Reconnaissance  by  division 
scouts  showed  the  beaches  suitable  for  LVTs.  Defenses  just  in- 
land were  reported  light,  favorable  to  getting  ashore.  A  draw- 
back was  the  lack  of  sufficient  amphibious  vehicles.  Only  70 
LVTs  were  available,  and  many  of  these  were  the  worse  for 
wear.  General  Shepherd  decided,  therefore,  to  land  only  one 
regiment,  the  4th  Marines,  in  the  assault.  According  to  the 
operation  plan,  the  29th  Marines  would  follow  as  LVTs  became 
available.  The  2 2d  Marines,  in  corps  reserve,  was  to  keep  the 
door  closed  at  the  base  of  the  peninsula. 

It  was  1  June  when  the  4th  Marines  received  their  warning 
order,  projecting  the  landing  on  Oroku  three  days  later.  Colo- 
nel Shapley  designated  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions  to  make  the 
assault.  The  3d  Battalion  would  land  a  few  hours  later  in  reg- 
imental reserve.  The  91st  Chemical  Mortar  Company  (USA) 
and  the  5th  Provisional  Rocket  Detachment  were  attached  to 
the  regiment  to  support  the  attack,  while  1/15  was  designated 
to  furnish  artillery  support. 

The  chosen  Nishikoku  beaches,  Red  1  and  Red  2,  measured 
about  800  yards  wide,  protected  by  a  rough  coral  shelf  extending 
some  200  yards.  These  were  the  only  available  beaches;  a  sea- 
wall surrounded  the  rest  of  the  peninsula. 

Logistic  preparations  for  the  landing  were  fretted  by  unre- 
mitting rain.  So  impassable  were  the  muddy  roads  that  supplies 
had  to  be  brought  up  by  water.  Nevertheless,  by  3  June,  the  4th 
Marines  were  ready.  Battalion  commanders  received  the  land- 
ing orders.   K-Day  would  be  4  June,  with  H-Hour  set  at  0545. 

LVT(A)s  to  lead  the  assault  were  readied  by  the  3d  Armored 
Amphibian  Battalion  (Provisional).  The  6th  Tank  Battalion 
had  installed  fording  equipment  on  tanks  to  be  used  for  the  land- 
ing, and  1 1  of  these  would  move  to  the  beaches  in  the  5  LCTs  as- 


OKINAWA  321 


signed  to  the  battalion.  The  mission  of  landing  the  4th  Marines 
on  Oroku  went  to  the  Amphibian  Tractor  Group  of  the  6th  Divi- 
sion, made  up  of  the  4th  and  9th  Amphibian  Tractor  Battalions. 

For  two  days  the  guns  of  a  battleship,  two  heavy  cruisers,  and 
a  destroyer  pounded  the  Oroku  landing  area.  Planes  raked  the 
beaches  with  napalm  and  rocket  strikes.  On  the  morning  of  4 
June  the  naval  support  was  stepped  up  and  was  joined  by  the 
fire  of  15  artillery  battalions  in  a  half-hour  preparation  which 
seemed  to  shake  the  peninsula  from  its  hinges. 

The  line  of  departure  for  K-Day  was  fixed  1,200  yards  north 
of  the  beaches.  As  1/4  was  bivouacked  farthest  north,  near 
Machinato  Airfield,  it  was  the  first  to  start  on  the  morning  of 
K-Day.  By  0300  all  its  equipment  was  loaded,  and  personnel 
began  to  embark  in  the  LVTs.  At  0400  the  battalion  moved  out 
for  an  almost  two-hour  boat  ride. 

When  2/4  was  sighted  at  its  embarkation  area  the  two  units 
continued  abreast.  From  then  to  the  beaches  a  number  of  LVTs 
began  to  rebel  after  the  weeks  of  abuse  from  mud  and  gunfire. 
Nine  of  the  amphibian  tractors  failed  to  land  on  schedule. 

Delay  was  not  serious  this  time,  however.  When  the  first  wave 
of  Marines  hit  the  beach  at  0558  it  met  only  scattered  machine- 
gun  fire  and  bursts  from  a  20mm  gun.  Aside  from  such  enemy 
positions  covering  the  landing,  there  was  virtually  no  opposition 
on  the  beaches,  and  a  1,200-yard  foothold  could  be  quickly 
established. 

Unlike  the  Hagushi  beaches,  the  sands  were  thickly  mined,41 
and,  despite  the  vigilance  of  removal  teams,  one  tank  was  disabled 
by  an  undetected  mine.  By  0650,  however,  24  tanks,  along  with 
4  105mm  self-propelled  assault  guns  (M-7's)  of  the  regimental 
Weapons  Company,  were  well  ashore  and  moving  inland  to  sup- 
port the  attack.  The  movement  of  armor  was  confined  to  the 
roads,  however,  due  to  ten  days  of  rain. 


41  All  of  Oroku  proved  to  be  well-mined,  especially  likely  tank  approaches, 
such  as  roads  and  bridges. 


322       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Logistic  support  across  the  Kokuba  Estuary  was  simplified  by 
seizure  of  Ono  Yama,  a  small  island.  This  job  went  to  the  Divi- 
sion Reconnaissance  Company,  riding  vehicles  of  the  Army's 
708th  Amphibious  Tank  Battalion.  The  assault  was  made  on 
K-Day  against  some  resistance.  Engineers  then  replaced  a  dam- 
aged bridge  from  Naha  to  the  island  and  another  thence  across 
to  Oroku. 

A  unique  wire  communication  with  the  assault  troops  on  Oroku 
was  established  soon  after  the  landing.  The  Division  Signal 
Company  working  on  rubber  boats  strung  a  four-trunk  cable 
across  Naha  harbor,  using  the  mast  of  a  sunken  ship.42 

Five-hundred  yards  inland,  assault  troops  met  fire  from  grenade 
launchers  as  well  as  intense  machine-gun  fire.  A  strategy  of  in- 
land rather  than  beach  defense  had  again  been  adopted  by  the 
enemy — but  this  time  more  from  error  than  design.  The  first 
small  hills  rising  beyond  the  flat  shore  ground  were  not  defended. 
Marines  found  tunnels,  however,  with  firing  ports  on  all  sides — 
prophetic  of  tunnels  with  tenants  farther  inland. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Hochmuth's  3d  Battalion  was  landed  at 
0850,  the  advance  then  proceeding  with  three  battalions  on  the 
line.  As  the  operations  unfolded  according  to  plan,  the  2d  and 
3d  Battalions,  29th  Marines,  were  put  ashore  in  the  afternoon 
to  relieve  2/4  in  the  2o,th's  designated  zone  of  action.  The  bat- 
talion then  went  into  regimental  reserve  as  the  attack  for  the  day 
halted  at  1700.  By  that  hour  the  lines  were  1,500  yards  from 
the  shore  and  included  part  of  Naha  Airfield,  but  mines  and  after- 
noon rain  had  slowed  the  movement  of  supporting  weapons.  In 
the  first  days  on  Oroku  supply  was  carried  out  entirely  by  LVTs. 

Renewal  of  the  attack  at  0730  on  5  June  produced  sharp 
resistance  as  Marines  moved  into  the  more  hilly  terrain  where 
caves  bristled  with  machine  guns,  grenade  launchers,  and  a  few 


42  In  addition  to  the  basic  sources  already  cited,  this  section  is  based  upon 
Annexes  E  (6th  TkBn),  H  (1st  Armored  AmphBn),  I  (4th  AmphTracBn ) , 
D  ( 15th  Mar),  and  B  (22d  Mar)  to  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  III. 


OKINAWA  323 


heavy  mortars.  Something  new  had  been  added  by  the  Japanese, 
namely,  an  8-inch  rocket,  which  Marines  nicknamed  "Whistlin' 
Willie,"  whose  bark  proved  worse  than  its  bite.  The  "whistlin" 
was  followed  by  a  terrific  concussion,  but  accuracy  was  poor  and 
there  was  little  fragmentation. 

As  the  Japanese  reception  committee  increased,  so  close  was 
the  enemy  that  Marines  digging  in  for  the  night  could  hear  the 
detonation  of  grenade  launchers  when  they  were  fired.  A  satchel 
charge  was  thrown  into  1/4's  sick  bay  but  fortunately  failed  to 
explode. 

The  day  had  been  a  tiring  one  for  both  men  and  vehicles.  In- 
sufficient and  overworked  LVTs  labored  through  the  mud  on 
their  tasks  of  supply  and  evacuation.  Tanks  sank  into  the  mud 
on  roads  treacherous  with  craters  and  mines.  Nevertheless,  by 
nightfall  three-fourths  of  Naha  Airfield  was  under  Marine  con- 
trol, specifically  3/4's.  This  airfield,  once  the  best  on  Okinawa, 
now  presented  a  sad  state  of  neglect — swampy  and  overgrown 
with  grass.  Bombing  and  strafing  had  converted  several  planes 
into  useless  wreckage,  adding  to  the  scene  of  decay.  Yet  the  en- 
emy had  the  field  well  covered  with  fire,  and  they  exacted  a  price 
for  the  dilapidated  place,  which  by  6  June  fully  belonged  to  the 
Marines. 

That  same  third  day  on  Oroku  saw  1/4  stopped  short  by  a 
hail  of  fire  from  a  dominating  hill — "Little  Sugar  Loaf,"  the  Ma- 
rines named  it.  Tanks  and  howitzers,  stalled  in  the  perpetual 
mud,  could  not  be  brought  to  bear  until  dozers,  after  contending 
with  mines,  could  clear  the  way.  Until  such  direct  fire  support 
from  tanks  and  M-7's,  attempts  upon  the  hill  were  hopeless  and 
costly. 

By  1530,  covered  by  Company  C,  the  tanks  were  moveable; 
however,  by  the  time  the  high  ground  could  be  seized  it  would  be 
dark,  so  the  battalion  fell  back  to  the  line  occupied  that  morning. 
Company  A's  assault  platoon,  which  had  been  pinned  down  for 


324       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


six  hours  south  of  Little  Sugar  Loaf,  was  pulled  out  under  cover 
of  smoke. 

The  ist  Battalion  had  laid  the  groundwork,  but  actual  reduc- 
tion of  Little  Sugar  Loaf  was  turned  over  to  the  2d  Battalion  as 
1/4  went  into  regimental  reserve  the  next  morning,  7  June.  By 
now,  tanks,  M-7's,  and  37mm  guns  could  all  be  applied  on  Lit- 
tle Sugar  Loaf,  which  was  captured  at  1 100  by  Company  G,  in 
a  flanking  movement  from  the  west.  In  taking  an  adjoining 
hill,  Marines  of  Company  E,  2/4,  adopted  the  unusual  tactic  of 
moving  through  an  enemy  tunnel  instead  of  advancing  down  the 
fire-swept  reverse  slope.  A  fire  team  was  sent  through  first,  fol- 
lowed by  a  section  of  machine  guns.  This  maneuver  was  repeat- 
ed on  subsequent  occasions. 

Machine-gun  fire  seemed  to  come  from  everywhere.  More- 
over, 3/ 4  received  fire  from  Senaga  Shima,  a  small  rocky  island 
some  thousand  yards  off  the  coast.  But  this  was  silenced  by  air 
and  naval  gunfire — so  thoroughly,  in  fact,  that  when  the  island 
was  seized  on  14  June  by  the  Division  Reconnaissance  Company 
all  the  Japanese  there  were  dead. 

After  the  third  day  on  Oroku,  sun,  the  only  force  able  to  con- 
quer mud,  started  to  dry  the  land,  and  when  it  now  untrapped 
the  wheels  of  war  General  Shepherd  moved  swiftly  to  wrap  up 
the  Oroku  operation.  Action  could  now  be  resolved  into  encircle- 
ment of  enemy  strength,  by  compressing  it  against  the  waters 
of  the  Kokuba  Estuary  near  Tomigusuki  at  the  southeastern  tip 
of  the  peninsula.  To  this  end  General  Shepherd  deployed  his 
three  infantry  regiments — the  4th  and  the  29th  driving  east  and 
northeast,  and  the  2 2d  attacking  northwest. 

It  was  not  quite  the  original  plan,  but  tactics,  like  philosophy, 
adapt  to  facts.  As  first  mapped  out,  the  4th  and  the  29th  Marines 
were  to  drive  southeast  to  the  base  of  the  peninsula.  The  29th 
Marines,  however,  pushing  against  the  left,  had  become  stalled 
by  extreme  resistance  before  the  town  of  Oroku.  The  result  was 
that  the  4th  Regiment  swung  wide  around  Oroku  and  drove 


OKINAWA  325 


northeast  toward  the  center  of  Japanese  resistance.  The  2  2d  Ma- 
rines crossed  the  Kokuba  Gawa,  and  General  Shepherd's  new 
encirclement  plan  welded  a  shrinking  ring  around  Admiral  Ota. 

On  9  June,  the  4th  Marines  seized  a  key  position  beyond 
Chiwa,  while  patrols  cleaned  out  that  town  and  established 
contact  with  the  2 2d  Marines  to  the  east,  thus  sealing  off  escape 
from  the  peninsula.  Both  guns  and  flame  thrower  tanks,  known 
as  "Zippos"  (after  a  popular  cigarette  lighter),  suffered 
considerably  from  mines  and  antitank  weapons. 

The  next  day  of  concerted  pressure  brought  the  4th  Marines 
farther  northeastward  and  the  2 2d  Marines  toward  Tomigusuki, 
while  the  29th  Marines  moved  through  the  town  of  Oroku. 
The  division  advance  could  not  be  rapid,  in  view  of  resistance, 
but  it  was  steady.  Brigadier  General  William  T.  Clement,  as- 
sistant division  commander  and  a  veteran  of  the  Philippines, 
said  the  Oroku  Peninsula  was  "fifty  times  as  strong  as 
Corregidor."  43 

By  the  night  of  1  o  June,  enemy  territory  had  been  so  reduced 
that  local  counterattacks  exploded  along  the  entire  perimeter. 
The  next  morning  General  Shepherd  renewed  the  drive,  employ- 
ing most  of  his  infantry  battalions,  supported  by  tanks.  General 
Buckner's  humanitarian  message  to  Ushijima  to  surrender,  stop- 
ping useless  bloodshed,  had  been  ignored,  and  the  battle  was 
to  continue. 

Increasingly  desperate  enemy  resistance  met  the  division  at- 
tacks on  1 1  June,  but  substantial  gains  were  recorded.  The 
2 2d  Marines  captured  the  town  of  Tomigusuki  and  Hill  53, 
which  overlooked  both  the  Kokuba  Estuary  and  the  Oroku 
Peninsula  to  the  northwest  where  the  29th  Marines  were  pushing 
against  a  powerful  system  of  mutually  supporting  hill  defenses. 

Direction  of  the  4th  Marines'  attack  from  the  southwest  lay 
between  Hill  58  and  Tomigusuki,  leading  into  a  pocket  covered 

43  Quoted  by  istLt  Shilin,  "6th  MarDiv  in  Southern  Okinawa,"  op.  cit., 
P-  55- 

519667—60  24 


326       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


by  mutually  supporting  machine  guns  and  20mm  antiaircraft 
cannon.  Tanks  encountered  mine  fields  here,  well-covered  by 
automatic  weapons. 

On  the  nth  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions  remained  in  position 
while  3/4  passed  through  1/4.  From  its  vantage  point  on  high 
ground  to  the  left,  the  2d  Battalion  could  support  the  attack  of 
both  the  29th  Marines  and  3/4  by  the  fire  of  its  own  weapons 
and  regimental  M-7's.  The  1st  Battalion  likewise  covered  the 
attack  of  3/4  with  small-arms  and  60mm  fire. 

The  day's  experience  of  Company  I,  3/4  illustrated  the  pattern 
of  resistance.  Hardly  had  the  men  moved  out  than  they  ran  into 
a  rain  of  fire  from  a  low  red  clay  hill,  a  strongly  fortified  em- 
bankment— proving  to  be  "almost  another  Sugar  Loaf,"  said 
the  battalion  report.  The  approaches  were  so  seeded  with  mines 
that,  though  engineers  worked  under  constant  fire  to  remove 
them,  two  tanks  were  knocked  out. 

By  the  afternoon  of  1 1  June,  Marines  had  combed  the  Jap- 
anese off  the  surface  of  the  hill,  but  the  underground  still 
swarmed  with  them,  and  sniper  fire  had  already  cost  Company  I 
35  casualties.  Capture  of  the  hill  had  to  be  left  to  the  next  day. 
When  the  attack  was  then  resumed,  Company  I  advanced  fron- 
tally,  while  Company  K,  coming  through  the  2 2d  Marines'  zone 
of  action,  attacked  from  the  right.  At  1030,  Company  L  was 
committed  between  the  two  assault  companies  and  soon  found 
itself  involved  in  grenade  warfare  with  Japanese  in  a  maze  of 
trench  works,  known  as  spider  traps. 

Capture  of  the  hill  occurred  at  noon,  and,  from  then  on, 
Marines  could  plug  along  toward  the  estuary,  cleaning  up  the 
evaporating  resistance  and  sealing  caves.  By  the  evening  of 
12  June  the  Marine  front  lines  were  just  500  yards  from  the 
Kokuba  Estuary.  Those  Japanese  who  were  now  left  on  Oroku 
stood  practically  at  the  water's  edge,  with  no  ships  waiting  to 
rescue  them. 

The  next  day,  13  June,  as  the  enemy  were  forced  into  the 


OKINAWA  327 


open  on  the  flat  rice-paddy  land  along  the  estuary,  most  of  them 
lost  their  will  to  fight,  although  some  still  fanatically  resisted. 
"The  battle  soon  turned  into  a  rout.  Japs  jumped  out  of  their 
holes,  threw  down  their  weapons  and  ran.  Some  surrendered. 
Many  of  them  committed  suicide  by  blowing  themselves  up  with 
grenades."  44  Admiral  Ota  committed  hara-kiri,  along  with  his 
staff,  in  his  cave  headquarters  near  Tomigusuki. 

On  1 3  June,  General  Shepherd  could  report  the  end  of  organ- 
ized resistance  on  the  Oroku  Peninsula.  It  had  been  a  hard 
struggle.  In  ten  days  the  enemy  had  lost  an  estimated  5,000 
men  killed  and  nearly  200  as  prisoners.  Of  this  number  the  4th 
Marines  accounted  for  2,923  Japanese  killed  or  captured,  but 
themselves  suffered  89  killed  and  5 1 1  wounded,  part  of  the  Ma- 
rine toll  of  1,608  killed  and  wounded. 

The  reinforced  4th  Marines  had  captured  more  than  75  per 
cent  of  the  Oroku  Peninsula.  Now  the  men  went  into  assembly 
areas.  They  had  well  earned  a  Presidential  Unit  Citation,45  re- 
ceived for  the  regiment's  heroic  assault  of  the  Oroku  Peninsula. 

The  Oroku  landing  was  a  model  example  of  what  General 
Shepherd  called  "the  professional  character  which  Marines  pos- 
sess with  respect  to  landing  operations."  46  Other  landings  in 
Marine  Corps  history  were  bigger,  but  perhaps  none  was  prepared 
more  quickly,  or  conducted  more  successfully  under  harassing 
problems.  A  division  was  readied  for  a  complex  amphibious  op- 
eration in  approximately  36  hours.  Embarkation  took  place 
under  darkness,  the  approach  was  made  without  adequate  aids 
to  navigation,  and  there  was  no  opportunity  for  rehearsal  or  even 
a  detailed  briefing.  Just  the  same,  the  landing  was  effected  as 
planned. 

44  4th  Mar  SAR,  III. 

45  This  award  was  later  changed  to  include  the  entire  6th  Marine  Division, 
for  the  assault  and  capture  of  Okinawa. 

46  Gen  Lemuel  G.  Shepherd,  Jr.,  memo  to  Hd,  HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  2Mar55 
( Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMG ) . 


328       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


THE  LAST  WEARY  HILLS 

The  whole  Okinawa  campaign  was  just  a  week  from  the  end, 
but  the  4th  Marines  did  not  know  that  when  they  again  picked 
up  their  gear  to  move  south.  On  Ara  Saki  (Gape),  the  south- 
ern end  of  Okinawa,  the  Japanese  were  staging  their  last  fight. 
In  those  final  square  yards  of  Okinawa,  General  Buckner  was 
mortally  wounded  on  18  June  when  a  fragment  of  jagged  coral, 
kicked  up  by  enemy  artillery  fire,  tore  into  his  chest.  Death  was 
dealt  to  the  Tenth  Army  commander  not  by  a  Japanese  shell 
itself  but  by  the  rocky  earth  of  Okinawa,  which  had  so  consistently 
served  the  Japanese.  Leadership  of  the  Tenth  Army  devolved 
upon  General  Geiger  as  senior  troop  commander,  while  the  cam- 
paign approached  conclusion. 

The  eastern  part  of  the  enemy  defense  line,  the  Yaeju  Dake, 
had  been  penetrated  by  Army  troops.  But  the  western  section, 
the  Yuza  Dake  and  the  adjoining  Kunishi  Ridge,  still  resisted  the 
Army's  96th  Division  and  the  1st  Marine  Division. 

As  the  6th  Division  prepared  to  align  itself  with  the  1st,  the 
2 2d  Marines  led  the  column  of  regiments  south,  shoving  off  on 
17  June.  The  4th  Marines  moved  into  an  assembly  area  north 
of  Mezado  Ridge  on  19  June.  Meanwhile,  the  1st  Division,  on 
the  left,  shortened  its  lines  to  give  the  6th  elbow  room. 

Ahead  of  the  4th  Marines  stood  their  final  ridge  on  this  island, 
their  last  hills  of  World  War  II,  the  Kiyamu-Gusuku  mass.  As 
Colonel  Shapley's  battalions  reached  the  foot  of  it  on  20  June 
they  were  met  by  fire  from  caves  and  crevices  of  the  steep  incline. 
(See  Map  30.) 

Because  the  north  slope  was  particularly  steep,  the  weight  of 
attack  was  moved  around  to  the  reverse  side.  There,  too,  how- 
ever, the  deep  fissures  and  large  boulders  lent  cover  to  a  last-ditch 
defense.  Opposed  by  machine  guns  and  mortars,  Marines 
climbed  the  ridge,  to  lay  claim  to  it  on  the  morning  of  2 1  June. 

At  1027  of  that  day  General  Shepherd  could  report  the  end  of 


330       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


organized  resistance  in  the  division  zone  of  action.  Japanese  or- 
ganizations, as  such,  no  longer  existed.47 

When  the  enemy's  hold  on  Okinawa  slipped  from  their  trig- 
ger fingers,  the  mood  to  surrender  overtook  many  of  the  Em- 
peror's most  stubborn  soldiers.  More  than  700  officers  and 
men  gave  up  the  fight  in  its  last  hours.48  Thus  does  war  often 
end  suddenly  in  a  kind  of  collapse,  like  an  overwhelming 
weariness  with  the  boredom  and  carnage. 

OKINAWA  SECURED 

On  22  June,  General  Geiger  took  official  note  of  the  end  on 
Okinawa  during  a  flag-raising  ceremony  at  Tenth  Army  Head- 
quarters. General  Ushijima  met  defeat  in  the  most  noble  manner 
he  knew.  True  to  the  ancient  warrior  code,  he  and  his  chief  of 
staff,  General  Cho,  made  to  their  Emperor  the  supreme  apology. 
General  Cho's  last  words  blamed  the  defeat  on  "the  material 
strength  of  the  enemy."  49  It  had  counted,  but  there  was  much 
more,  for  battles  are  won  by  human  spirit  as  well  as  by  equipment. 

On  26  June  the  4th  Marines  started  for  its  assigned  rest  and 
rehabilitation  area  on  the  Oroku  Peninsula.  There,  on  ground 
where  they  had  lost  many  buddies,  the  men  awaited  shipment 
off  Okinawa.  On  8  July  the  regiment  sailed  for  Guam,  leaving 
to  memory  and  history  its  most  costly  campaign.  Five  hundred 
officers  and  men  of  the  4th  Marines  had  paid  with  their  lives  for 
the  victory  on  Okinawa.  More  than  2,400  others  bore  wounds 
from  the  battlefield.50 

47  Annex  B  (22d  Mar)  to  6th  MarDiv  SAR,  III. 

48  Few  officers  surrendered.  In  one  group  of  400  prisoners,  who  surren- 
dered en  masse,  only  one  was  an  officer — a  warrant  officer — and  he  was  "filled 
with  misgivings  about  his  conduct."   6th  MarDiv  SAR,  III. 

49  Quoted  in  Appleman,  Okinawa:  The  Last  Battle,  p.  470. 
60  See  Appendix  H,  Casualties. 


CHAPTER  X 


Occupation  of  Japan  and  China 


JAPAN  SURRENDERS 

On  Guam  the  4th  Marines  began  making  ready  for  what  was 
expected  to  be  the  toughest  operation  of  the  war — the  invasion 
of  Japan.1  They  moved  into  a  newly  constructed  tent  camp  on 
high  ground  overlooking  Pago  Bay.  Under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Fred  D.  Beans,  who  had  relieved  Colonel 
Shapley  on  4  July,  the  regiment  was  slated  to  begin  training  and 
preparing  for  invasion  of  the  enemy  homeland.  But  Japanese 
peace  overtures  caused  a  swift  revision  of  plans,  so  quickly,  in 
fact,  that  the  day  after  the  14  August  surrender  the  4th  Marines 
was  on  board  ship,  leaving  for  occupation  duty  on  Japanese 
soil.2 

The  surrender  of  Japan  had  followed  the  explosion  of  two 
atomic  bombs  over  her  soil.  Dropped  on  Hiroshima  on  6  August 

1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  the  section  on  the  occupation  of  Japan  is  based 
upon  the  following:  TG-31.3  AR,  Initial  Occupation  of  Yokosuka  Naval 
Base  Area,  Japan,  dtd  7Sep45;  and  TF-31  AR  Occupation  and  Securing  of 
the  Yokosuka  Naval  Base  and  Airfield,  dtd  8Sep45  (both  in  the  Japan 
Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC);  4th  Mar  WarD,  n-i3Aug  to  3iDec45; 
6th  MarDiv  WarD,  1  Jul-3  iOct45 ;  and  IIIAC  WarD,  iAug45~28Feb46  (all 
in  Unit  Hist-Rept  File,  HistBr,  HQMC) ;  Maj  James  M.  Jefferson,  Col  Louis 
Metzger,  Col  Orville  V.  Bergren,  and  BriGen  Fred  D.  Beans  interviews  by 
HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  i2-i4-i9jan59  and  i3Mar59,  respectively  (all  in 
Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC);  and  Bevan  G.  Cass,  ed., 
History  of  the  Sixth  Marine  Division  (Washington:  Infantry  Journal  Press, 
1948). 

2  4th  Mar  MRolls,  iJuly~3iAug45. 

331 


332       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


and  upon  Nagasaki  three  days  later,  the  nuclear  weapons  has- 
tened a  decision  which  had  long  been  in  the  making.  They 
provided  a  terrifying  illustration  of  what  was  meant  by  the  alter- 
native to  unconditional  surrender,  stated  by  the  Potsdam  ulti- 
matum of  26  July,  namely,  "utter  devastation  of  the  Japanese 
homeland."  Russia's  declaration  of  war  on  9  August  merely 
added  another  despair  to  Japan's  hopeless  prospect.  Surrender 
upon  the  Allied  terms  was  the  only  "path  of  reason,"  as  explained 
at  Potsdam,  and  Japan  took  it.3 

THE  4TH  IS  FIRST 

On  10  August,  Washington  received  word  of  Japan's  consent 
to  the  Potsdam  terms,  "with  the  understanding,"  said  the  mes- 
sage, that  Emperor  Hirohito  could  stay.  The  Allies  saw  no 
necessity  or  wisdom  for  denying  a  request  so  based  upon  Japan's 
historic  fabric,  but  a  proviso  was  made — that  the  Emperor's  au- 
thority must  become  subject  to  the  Allied  Supreme  Commander, 
a  task  which  devolved  upon  General  MacArthur.  On  1 4  August, 
President  Truman  received  Japan's  final  acceptance.4 

But  Japan's  message  of  10  August  was  plain  enough  writing 
on  the  wall.  On  that  day,  therefore,  Admiral  Nimitz  dispatched 
a  message  to  the  IIIAC,  advising  that  he  wanted  a  regimental 
combat  team  for  immediate  occupation  duty.  In  turn,  General 
Shepherd  was  directed  to  furnish  the  team,  which  would  be  the 
first  foreign  troops  ever  to  occupy  Japan's  own  soil.  There  was 
a  certain  Tightness  to  the  fact  that  the  4th  Marines  received  the 
honor.    Memories  of  Corregidor  gave  it  a  deep  meaning. 

But  the  regiment  due  for  this  honor  was  short  both  of  men 
and  equipment.  In  the  4th  Marines  which  suddenly  found  itself 
off  for  Japan,  half  of  the  men  were  new  to  the  regiment — re- 


3  Robert  J.  C.  Butow,  Japan's  Decision  to  Surrender  (Stanford:  Stanford 
University  Press,  1954),  pp.  231-232,  243-244. 
*  See  Butow,  op.  ext.,  Appendix. 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  333 


placements  hurriedly  assembled.  Most  of  the  weapons  stowed 
on  board  were  still  as  received  from  the  Field  Depot — cased  and 
heavily  cosmolined.  Men  had  been  marched  directly  from  the 
transient  center  to  the  ships,  with  the  result  that  numerous  stow- 
aways turned  up  after  several  days  at  sea.5  The  mounting  out, 
under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Beans,  had  followed  the  Marine  Corps 
tradition  of  making  ready  fast,  but  this  time  it  was  for  a  happier 
assignment  than  perhaps  ever  before. 

Reinforced,  and  with  its  attached  units,  the  4th  Marines  sailed 
for  Japan  as  the  major  element  of  Task  Group  Able,  activated  on 
1 1  August,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General  William  T. 
Clement,  assistant  commander  of  the  6th  Marine  Division.  He 
and  a  hastily  organized  staff  left  Guam  on  13  August  in  the 
Ozark,  a  vehicle  landing  ship  ( LS V ) .  They  reported  to  Admiral 
Halsey  on  board  the  battleship  Missouri  on  1 8  August  at  the  sea 
rendezvous  of  the  Third  Fleet,  some  350  miles  southeast  of  Tokyo. 
The  Third  Fleet  had  been  designated  to  furnish  the  Tokyo  Bay 
Occupation  Force.  Most  of  the  troops  and  supplies  of  Task 
Group  Able  were  by  then  well  under  way,  loaded  on  board  five 
troop  transports,  a  cargo  ship,  an  LST,  and  a  dock  landing  ship.6 

On  19  August  the  convoy  closed  the  Third  Fleet,  where  Task 
Group  Able  was  to  become  the  nucleus  of  the  newly  created  Task 

5  Col  Wilson  E.  Hunt  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  i8Mar59  (Monograph  &  Comment 
File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

6  Lieutenant  Colonel  Beans'  4th  Marines  (Reinforced)  stood  as  follows: 
4th  Marines;  1st  Battalion,  15th  Marines;  Company  C,  6th  Tank  Battalion; 
Tank  Maintenance  Section,  6th  Service  Battalion;  Company  A,  6th  Engineer 
Battalion;  Company  A,  6th  Medical  Battalion;  Company  A,  6th  Pioneer 
Battalion;  Truck  Company,  6th  Motor  Transport  Battalion;  1st  Platoon, 
Ordnance  Company;  Service  Platoon,  6th  Service  Battalion;  Supply  Platoon, 
6th  Service  Battalion;  Band  Section;  Shore  Party  Communications  Team, 
6th  Joint  Assault  Signal  Company  (JASCO)  ;  Shore  Fire  Control  Party,  6th 
JASCO ;  and  Air  Ground  Liaison  Team,  6th  JASCO.  Attached  to  General 
Clement's  command  were  Company  A,  4th  Amphibian  Tractor  Battalion  and 
Company  D,  6th  Medical  Battalion,  a  provisional  headquarters  detachment, 
and  a  platoon  of  the  6th  Military  Police  Company.  4th  Mar  MRolls,  1-31 
Aug45;  6th  MarDiv  OPlan,  No.  106-45,  dtd  i3Aug45  (Japan  Area-Op  File, 
HistBr,  HQMC). 


334       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Force  31 — the  Yokosuka  Occupation  Force,  commanded  by  Rear 
Admiral  Oscar  C.  Badger.  News  of  particular  interest  was  the 
fact  that  while  General  Clement  was  at  sea  his  command  had 
grown  like  Topsy.  He  learned  by  dispatch  from  Admiral  Halsey 
that  he  commanded  a  Fleet  Landing  Force  (Task  Group  31.3), 
almost  of  division  strength.  The  main  element  (and  the  spear- 
head of  the  landings)  was  still  RCT-4,  then  numbering  5,863  of- 
ficers and  men.  But  added  to  General  Clement's  Task  Group 
Able  was  a  Third  Fleet  Marine  Landing  Force,  which  consisted 
of  three  battalions  organized  from  seagoing  Marines  of  32  com- 
batant ships — the  largest  number,  107,  provided  by  the  battleship 
Wisconsin.  They  totaled  1,829  officers  and  men  and  were  trans- 
ferred at  sea  into  two  transports. 

The  second  addition  was  a  Third  Fleet  Naval  Landing  Force 
of  two  battalions,  totaling  850  bluejackets,  also  transferred  at  sea, 
and  five  provisional  battalions  organized  aboard  eight  of  the 
ships  of  the  Third  Fleet.  As  it  turned  out,  it  was  not  necessary 
to  land  these  reserve  units.  A  British  Landing  Force  of  450  men, 
including  250  Royal  Marines,  from  5  British  ships  also  came  un- 
der General  Clement's  command.  He  ended  up  with  a  landing 
force,  all  told,  of  more  than  1 1,000  men. 

The  mass  transfer  of  Marines  and  bluejackets  and  supplies  to 
transports  while  at  sea  was  a  unique  operation,  but  a  necessary 
one,  to  provide  for  their  organization  as  tactical  units.  It  was 
a  sight  to  remember  in  a  war  marked  by  American  ingenuity. 
Men  were  moved,  by  the  thousands,  from  one  ship  to  another 
by  breeches  buoy,  swinging  precariously  across  on  a  rope  stretched 
between  two  vessels.  Commanders  also  used  this  mode  of  transit 
to  attend  conferences  on  other  ships. 

Neither  the  Marines  of  the  fleet  nor  the  bluejackets  were  bal- 
anced tactical  units  or  combat-ready  for  land  operations.  More- 
over, they  were  short  of  equipment,  particularly  communication 
gear,  and  had  to  be  provided  essential  supplies  from  the  stocks 
of  the  4th  Marines.   They  were,  in  a  sense,  token  forces,  enabling 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  335 


the  Navy — like  the  British — to  share  the  final  landing  of  the  war. 
Their  over-all  commander,  General  Clement,  established  his 
command  post  along  with  the  4th  Marines'  headquarters,  in  the 
troop  transport  Grimes.  Admiral  Badger  shifted  his  flag  from 
the  battleship  Iowa  to  the  cruiser  San  Diego,  a  name  early 
associated  with  the  4th  Marines.7 

LANDING  PLANS 

General  Clement's  command  took  its  place  in  the  vast  Third 
Fleet  which  was  cruising  off  Tokyo  Bay.  Assignments  had  been 
spelled  out.  The  Third  Fleet,  with  impressive  carrier  air  cover, 
would  occupy  Tokyo  Bay  and  adjacent  coastal  waters,  support- 
ing the  landings.  Task  Force  31  was  assigned  to  occupy  and 
secure  the  great  Yokosuka  Naval  Base,  commanded  by  Vice  Ad- 
miral Michitura  Totsuka.  It  lay  some  30  miles  south  of  the 
capital,  on  Miura  Peninsula,  which  shelters  Tokyo  Bay  on  the 
west.  A  wartime  beehive,  the  base  had  built  and  supplied  much 
of  Japan's  navy,  most  of  which  could  be  enfolded  within  its 
capacious  harbor.  The  base  adjoined  Yokosuka,  a  city  then 
about  the  size  of  San  Diego.  The  Army's  nth  Airborne  and 
27th  Infantry  Divisions  were  to  seize  Yokohama  and  Tokyo, 
respectively.    ( See  Map  3 1 . ) 

The  4th  Marines  was  scheduled  to  land  in  assault.  Prior  to 
the  main  landings,  Major  Edgar  F.  Carney's  2d  Battalion  was 
to  execute  a  dawn  landing.  It  would  secure  Futtsu  Cape,  across 
the  Uraga  Strait — entrance  to  Tokyo  Bay — and  seven  miles  from 
the  naval  base.  On  the  cape  the  Marines  would  make  certain 
that  the  Japanese  had  rendered  powerless  those  coast  defense 
guns  and  mortars  which  stood  at  the  door  of  Tokyo  Bay.  The 
Marines  would  also  seize  a  small  fort  just  off  the  point  of  the 


7  6th  MarDiv  OpO,  No.  106-45,  dtd  i3Aug45;  CTF-31  msg  to  TF-31, 
dtd  5Sep45;  and  Third  Fit  OPlan,  No.  10-45,  dtd  J9Aug45  (both  in  Japan 
Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMG) ;  4th  Mar  MRolls,  i-3iAug45. 


336       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  337 


cape.  British  Marines  were  assigned  two  harbor  islets  containing 
stores  and  ammunition.  The  Marines  of  2/4,  their  mission 
accomplished,  would  reembark  in  landing  craft  as  regimental 
reserve,  ready  to  land  on  order.  To  1/4  (Lieutenant  Colonel 
George  B.  Bell)  went  the  task  of  seizing  the  naval  airfield  and  to 
3/4  (Major  Wilson  E.  Hunt)  the  responsibility  for  taking  over 
the  navy  yard.  These  two  battalions  would  land  simultaneously, 
set  up  defense  perimeters,  patrol  the  peninsula,  and  disarm 
Japanese  military  personnel. 

Duties  of  the  Third  Fleet  Marine  and  Naval  Landing  Forces 
were  to  be  chiefly  of  a  reinforcement  nature.  The  seagoing 
Marines  would  relieve  elements  of  RCT-4  in  occupation  of  the 
airfield  while  bluejackets  were  to  move  into  the  navy  yard,  once 
the  4th  Marines  had  secured  it  and  moved  on  to  the  perimeter. 
If  the  assault  landings  should  encounter  resistance,  both  these 
elements  were  available  to  support  the  4th  Marines. 

Originally,  it  had  been  planned  that  the  Marines  land  on  the 
southwest  coast  of  the  peninsula  and  then  drive  five  miles  over- 
land on  two  good  roads  to  the  naval  base.  Ships,  under  this 
plan,  would  unload  supplies  and  equipment  at  the  Yokosuka 
docks  and  beaches  once  the  assault  troops  had  secured  the 
objective. 

A  thrust  into  Tokyo  Bay,  the  world's  most  thoroughly  mined 
area  with  its  ring  of  coastal  defenses,  was  a  redoubtable  prospect. 
However,  this  direct  approach  was  settled  upon,  for  it  would  put 
the  Marines  right  on  their  objective — the  naval  base.  Moreover, 
the  roads  across  the  peninsula  went  through  numerous  tunnels, 
perfect  setups  for  ambushes.  The  Japanese  themselves  were  to 
remove  the  risks  of  the  adopted  plan  by  demilitarizing  Tokyo 
Bay  beforehand.8 

Although  the  Japanese  had  never  known  a  foreign  occupation, 

8  Third  Fit  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd  2oAug45;  TF-31  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd 
2oAug45;  and  TG-31.3  OPlan,  No.  1-45,  dtd  2oAug45  (all  in  Japan 
Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


338       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


there  were  signs  they  would  cooperate.  Emperor  Hirohito,  who 
had  opposed  the  war  in  1 94 1 ,  urged  the  Japanese  people  by  radio 
on  15  August  to  yield  to  "the  dictate  of  time  and  fate."  In  the 
Cabinet  debates  before  surrender  the  Emperor  courageously  op- 
posed the  diehards.  "The  time  has  come,"  he  said,  "when  we 
must  bear  the  unbearable."  The  Emperor's  opinion,  the  most  he 
could  legally  express,  was  endorsed  by  the  Cabinet.  It  was  there- 
upon handed  down  as  an  imperial  decision,  officially  binding  and 
compelling  upon  a  people  who  revered  the  Emperor  as  divine. 
The  new  prime  minister,  a  cousin  of  the  Emperor,  was  decidedly 
conciliatory,  and  the  first  American  talks  with  Japanese  officers 
prior  to  the  Yokosuka  landings  proved  very  friendly.9 

Peaceful  occupation  was  desired.  And  in  pursuance  of  that 
policy,  Marines  and  bluejackets  were  advised  that  it  would  no 
longer  be  correct  to  call  a  Japanese  a  "bastard."  Marine  vet- 
erans, however,  were  understandably  wary.  "We  expect  to  be 
greeted  by  some  Nips,"  said  a  battalion  commander  at  a  briefing. 
"Friendly  ones,  we've  been  told."  10 

On  Monday,  27  August,  ships  of  the  Third  Fleet  anchored  in 
Sagami  Bay,  just  south  of  Tokyo  Bay.  A  party  of  22  Japanese 
sailed  out  in  a  destroyer  and  boarded  the  Missouri  to  receive  oc- 
cupation orders,  issued  by  Rear  Admiral  Robert  B.  Carney,  Ad- 
miral Halsey's  Chief  of  Staff.  Tokyo  Bay,  still  a  trap  of  mines, 
some  of  which  were  controlled  from  the  shore,  was  to  be  cleared 
completely  by  the  Japanese  aided  by  American  mine  sweepers. 
The  forbidding  coastal  and  AA  defenses  were  to  be  disarmed  and 
marked  by  white  flags,  visible  four  miles  at  sea.  Thorough  de- 
militarization was  emphasized.  The  Yokosuka  Naval  Base  was 
to  be  evacuated  of  all  personnel  except  necessary  maintenance 
crews,  who  would  wear  white  armbands.    Officers  and  guides 


9  Masuo  Kato,  The  Lost  War  (New  York:  Alfred  A.  Knopf,  Inc.,  1946), 
pp.  246-247,  225-227;  Butow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1,  176,  232  and  Appendices. 

10  Sgts  Duane  Decker  and  Joseph  Purcell,  "Crazy  Beachhead,"  Leatherneck, 
v.  XXVIII,  no.  12  (Dec45),  pp.  38-39. 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  339 


were  to  meet  the  landing  forces.  The  next  day  Vice  Admiral 
Totsuka  and  his  staff  boarded  the  San  Diego.  They  came  bear- 
ing records,  charts,  and  agreeable  answers  to  demands.  They 
bowed,  and  they  bent  over  backward  to  cooperate. 

At  night  the  Third  Fleet  ships  were  illuminated,  for  the  first 
time  since  Pearl  Harbor,  and  the  colorful  ships'  flags  waved 
against  the  brightness  of  snow-shrouded  Mount  Fuji  in  the  back- 
ground. On  the  shore  were  the  village  lights  of  people  grateful 
that  the  war  was  over.  It  was  a  scene  which  was  stirring  and 
unforgettable  to  men  who  had  fought  so  long  to  get  here.  They 
could  relax,  more  completely  than  ever  before,  at  their  precious 
wartime  recreation — the  movies,  shown  topside. 

LANDING  AT  YOKOSUKA 

The  favorable  climate  of  the  talks  which  had  been  held  with 
the  Japanese  overlapped  into  blue  skies  on  30  August,  set  as 
L-Day.  At  0315  transports  of  Task  Force  31,  with  escorts  and 
guided  by  Japanese  pilots  and  navigation  lights,  started  moving 
from  Sagami  Bay,  rounding  the  20-mile  Miura  Peninsula,  and 
negotiating  the  2 -mile  width  of  Uraga  Strait  into  Tokyo  Bay. 
The  first  group  lifted  2/4,  the  second  the  bulk  of  the  landing 
forces,  and  the  third  the  British  Landing  Force  of  Marines  and 
naval  ratings.  Carriers  did  not  enter  Tokyo  Bay,  but  their  air- 
craft covered  the  landings. 

At  0558,  men  of  the  2d  Battalion,  4th  Marines  went  ashore  on 
Futtsu  Cape.  They  preceded,  by  some  ten  minutes,  the  first 
Army  troops  to  land  on  Japan's  home  soil — the  nth  Airborne, 
at  Atsugi  Airfield,  some  eight  miles  west  of  Yokohama. 

True  to  the  Japanese  promise,  the  guns  of  Futtsu  Cape  stood 
silent,  like  relics  of  a  forgotten  war.  White  flags  marked  all  the 
battery  positions.  There,  as  on  the  Miura  Peninsula,  white  flags 
covered  the  landscape,  like  wash  hung  out  to  dry. 

The  landing  on  Futtsu  Cape  interrupted  a  few  clam  diggers 


340       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


apparently  unconcerned  at  the  decline  of  the  Empire.  Two 
waiting  Japanese  officers,  with  their  interpreter,  met  the  Marines 
at  the  cape's  tunneled  and  vaulted  main  fort,  next  to  empty  beach 
bunkers  and  pillboxes.  The  place,  like  all  Tokyo  Bay,  would 
have  been  hell  to  wartime  invaders. 

Today  the  local  commander  performed  a  smart  salute  of  com- 
pliance when  ist  Lieutenant  George  B.  Lamberson,  of  Company 
G,  ordered  the  Japanese  garrison  marched  away.  They  left  their 
weapons  stacked  in  neat  rows.  Marines  made  certain  that  17 
guns  and  mortars  were  really  incapacitated,  while  a  detail  climbed 
a  weather  station  tower  to  unfurl  the  American  flag.  In  Fort 
No.  1,  at  the  tip  of  the  cape,  other  Marines  found  four  150mm 
guns,  more  ammunition,  and  a  few  more  Japanese,  likewise  will- 
ing to  surrender.  By  0845  Major  Carney's  Marines  had  wrapped 
up  their  mission  and  were  reembarking  in  landing  craft  to  become 
the  reserve  battalion.11  The  way  was  now  clear  for  the  main 
landing. 

The  1  st  and  3d  Battalions,  4th  Marines,  which  went  ashore  at 
0930,  met  no  resistance.  Moving  rapidly  upon  the  navy  yard 
and  the  airfield,  they  found  a  few  Japanese  around,  each  wear- 
ing the  required  white  armband  of  the  caretaker  crew  left  behind. 
Most  of  the  other  Japanese  were  already  on  their  way  home. 
The  only  "shooting"  on  shore  was  done  by  Japanese  press  pho- 
tographers, who  collected  next  to  the  U.S.  Navy  camera  men 
who  were  filming  the  landing.  An  English-speaking  Japanese 
Army  colonel  in  uniform  reported  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Beans 
as  liaison  officer,  and  to  each  unit  commander  a  Japanese  officer 
of  comparable  rank  reported  for  orders. 

In  front  of  each  building  which  contained  supplies  stood  an 
unarmed  Japanese  guard  with  a  key  and  bearing  a  methodical 
inventory,  in  Japanese.   The  exclamation  of  one  Marine,  looking 

11  4th  Mar  MRolls,  dtd  i-3iAug45;  Decker  &  Purcell,  "Crazy  Beachhead," 
op.  cit.,  pp.  39-40,  80;  The  New  York  Times,  2  7~28Aug45,  2Sep45;  Wash- 
ington Evening  Star,  3oAug45. 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  341 


into  a  building,  formed  a  brief  translation  of  all  the  detailed 
inventories:  "Christ,  there's  a  lot  of  gear  in  here !"  But  gasoline, 
a  basic  of  20th  century  warfare,  was  scarce.  On  the  airfield  a 
Japanese  captain  turned  over  108  planes,  90  per  cent  of  them 
yet  operational.  The  guns,  everywhere  at  Yokosuka,  had  been 
decommissioned,  as  ordered. 

If  the  well-equipped  naval  base  was  a  kind  of  mirage  of  Japan's 
true  strength  after  the  years  of  war,  there  lay  in  the  harbor  more 
tangible  evidence  of  the  Empire's  collapsed  war  power.  The 
damaged  battleship  Nagato,  a  remnant  of  Japan's  broken  navy, 
was  boarded  by  Marines  for  the  receipt  of  its  surrender. 

The  speed  of  the  4th  Marines'  landing  permitted  General 
Clement  to  move  his  command  post  ashore  from  the  Grimes  and 
to  the  Japanese  naval  headquarters  building,  where  at  1018  the 
American  flag  was  raised.  It  was  the  same  flag  unfurled  by  the 
6th  Marine  Division  on  Okinawa  after  the  northern  campaign 
and,  before  then,  on  Guam  by  the  1st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade. 

It  required  no  prodding  from  General  Clement  to  bring  Vice 
Admiral  Totsuka  down  to  the  dock  before  noon  to  meet  Admiral 
Badger  and  Admiral  Carney,  who  had  been  designated  to  receive 
surrender  of  the  naval  base.  Greeting  the  Americans  on  the  pier, 
between  lines  of  Marines,  short  and  stocky  Totsuka  handed  over 
a  plain  white  envelope,  enclosing  his  formal  surrender  of  the 
base.    A  few  Russian  officers  were  spectators  of  the  proceedings. 

By  afternoon,  the  2d  Battalion  and  regimental  supporting  units 
were  ashore.  The  relief  of  1/4,  whose  assault  mission  was  over, 
was  begun  by  the  Third  Fleet  Marine  Landing  Force,  which 
next  day  took  over  the  security  of  the  airfield.  This  enabled 
the  1  st  Battalion  to  join  2/4  at  setting  up  a  perimeter  defense 
around  the  naval  base  and  beginning  patrol  of  the  peninsula. 
In  the  navy  yard,  the  3d  Battalion  was  similarily  relieved  by  blue- 
jackets of  the  Naval  Landing  Force,  who  took  over  the  interior 
guard.  The  British  Landing  Force  occupied  the  area  between 
the  navy  yard  and  the  airfield.    Their  sector  had  little  tactical 

519667—60  25 


342       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


significance,  but  it  was  found  to  be  well-stocked  with  many 
"goodies"  including  spirits,  to  the  dismay  of  the  other  landing 
troops.  Among  the  various  findings  on  the  base  were  medical 
supplies  and  hospital  cots  donated  by  America  at  the  time  of  the 
great  Japanese  earthquake  in  1923. 

The  day  after  L-Day  the  Eighth  Army  requested  that  a  com- 
pany of  4th  Marines  reconnoiter  Tateyama  Naval  Air  Station, 
across  Uraga  Strait,  preliminary  to  the  landing  of  the  112th 
RCT  there  on  3  September.  Major  Wallace  L.  Crawford,  regi- 
mental intelligence  officer,  took  Company  L  over  to  make  a  recon- 
naissance in  force.  He  was  met  by  a  Japanese  surrender  party. 
The  Marines  remained  at  Tateyama  until  the  112th  took  over. 

General  Clement  witnessed  the  signing  of  the  surrender  on 
board  the  Missouri  on  2  September,  and  so  a  nation  which,  cen- 
turies ago,  had  proudly  rejected  all  foreigners,  received  occupa- 
tion troops,  with  a  grace  hardly  precedented  in  the  history  of 
war.12 

FREEDOM  AND  HOME  AT  LAST  FOR  MEN 
OF  THE  "OLD  4TH" 

The  shadow  of  war's  inhumanity  still  lay,  however,  on  the  thin 
faces  of  some  150  Marines  liberated  from  Japanese  prison  camps. 
Hardly  were  the  landings  over  before  men  of  the  regiment  went 
out  to  reclaim  their  own.  A  few  of  the  old  4th  were  already  free 
and  they  got  themselves  to  the  4th  Marines'  area. 

The  number  was  but  a  fraction  of  nearly  1,500  captured,  of 
whom  only  about  1,000  survived  to  come  home.  The  extreme 
hardships  of  life  in  the  Japanese  prison  camps  caused  around  250 
deaths.  An  additional  175  lost  their  lives  in  prison  ships  un- 
knowingly bombed  or  torpedoed  by  Allied  forces.13 

""Third  Fit  MarLdgFor  Rec  of  Events,"  dtd  6Sep45;  and  "Third  Fit 
NavLdg  For,  AR,"  dtd  5Sep45  (both  in  Japan  Area-Op  File,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 

13  Statistics  from  PersAccountingSec,  HQMC.  Their  figures  are  the  best 
available.    Owing  to  capture,  records  became  lost  or  incomplete. 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  343 


Now,  at  the  naval  base,  in  the  happy  reunion,  tears  were  felt 
even  if  they  did  not  appear.  Men  exchanged  recollections  over 
beer  and  food  at  the  former  Japanese  NCO  Club.  The  former 
prisoners  were  issued  new  clothing,  which  they  could  well  use,  but 
a  particularly  poignant  moment  to  them  was  the  receiving  of  new 
Marine  Corps  emblems,  their  cherished  identification.  The  men 
of  the  Old  4th  reviewed  the  New  4th  as  it  staged  a  formal  guard 
mount  in  their  honor.  They  looked  with  pride  at  its  new  colors, 
replacing  those  burned  by  Colonel  Howard  at  Corregidor;  and 
they  were  interested  in  the  new  weapons  introduced  since  1942. 
Some  of  them  wanted  to  reenlist  on  the  spot  so  they  could  serve 
in  their  old  regiment,  but  policy  was  against  it.  Soon  all  the 
former  prisoners  were  en  route  home  by  the  fastest  means  avail- 
able. The  occasion  had  caught,  as  perhaps  seldom  before,  the 
deep  sentiment  and  attachment  of  the  Marines  for  each  other  and 
their  Corps.14 

Meanwhile,  the  take-over  at  Yokosuka  progressed  so  well  that 
between  4  and  6  September  all  landing  forces  of  the  Third  Fleet, 
except  Task  Group  Able,  were  re-embarked  in  transports  for  re- 
turn to  their  parent  ships.  On  8  September,  Task  Force  31 
ceased  its  brief  existence.  Two  weeks  later,  on  the  21st,  Task 
Group  Able  was  likewise  disbanded.  General  Clement  rejoined 
the  6th  Marine  Division  at  Guam.  The  4th  Marines  continued 
to  be  administratively  attached  to  the  division  but  went  under 
operational  control  of  the  Eighth  Army,  which  received  directives 
from  General  MacArthur  at  Tokyo,  the  supreme  commander  of 
the  occupation  forces. 

YOKOSUKA  DUTY 

Command  at  Yokosuka  was  vested  in  the  Commander,  Fleet 
Shore  Activities,  but  security  was  left  to  the  4th  Marines.  Perim- 

14  Sgt  Harry  Polete,  "Post  of  the  Corps — Yokosuka/'  Leatherneck,  v.  XXX, 
no.  8  (Aug47),  p.  5. 


344       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


eter  defense,  interior  guard,  and  the  disarming  of  the  Japanese 
formed  the  mission  of  the  regiment.  The  ist  Battalion  stayed  on 
the  airfield,  the  2d  occupied  the  main  naval  station,  and  the  3d 
took  over  the  British  sector  which  included  the  Torpedo  School. 
Regimental  headquarters  was  set  up  in  the  former  Naval  Music 
School,  where  the  Japanese  had  left  a  grand  piano  and  stacks  of 
sheet  music.  Marines  enjoyed  the  piano  but  sent  the  unfamiliar 
music  to  the  Marine  Band  at  Washington. 

The  men  settled  into  evacuated  Japanese  barracks,  which  they 
cleaned  up.  The  buildings  then  presented  only  the  risk  of  knock- 
ing one's  head  against  the  heavy  iron  rods  which  the  Japanese 
used  to  sling  their  hammocks  navy  style,  when  they  bunked  300 
men  to  a  squad  room.  Marines  removed  the  rods,  the  only  ele- 
ments that  blocked  their  advance  at  Yokosuka,  and  put  40  men 
into  the  same  room.  The  Japanese  Government  furnished  cooks, 
mess  boys,  and  housekeeping  help,  so  combat  Marines  found  a 
new  ease  of  life,  strange  but  welcome. 

Outside  the  barracks  the  whirring  wartime  machinery  of  the 
naval  base  was  at  a  standstill.  The  small-arms  and  ammunition 
factory  looked  hit  by  a  depression.  Japanese  mechanics  at  the 
midget  submarine  assembly  plant  had  dropped  their  tools  and 
gone  home.  Technicians,  who  here  developed  the  Baka  bomb, 
manned  by  a  suicidal  pilot,  had  quit  the  devil's  laboratory.  Ma- 
rines found  a  number  of  Japanese  suicide  boats,  upon  which  they 
ventured  to  sail.  But  the  boats  cracked  like  egg  shells  if  they 
struck  even  a  small  piece  of  wood,  leaving  the  Marines  in  the 
water. 

The  steep  hills  surrounding  the  base  contained  underground 
shops  of  various  kinds  and  storage  centers,  carved  into  a  tunnel 
defense  system.  Caves  were  found  stocked  full  of  food,  drink, 
and  other  supplies  at  this  major  logistical  base  for  the  Imperial 
Navy. 

Patrols  were  sent  out  daily  into  the  countryside  during  the  first 
weeks  of  occupation.    This  system  avoided  the  use  of  small  de- 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  345 


tachments  scattered  among  the  native  population,  a  method  apt 
to  brew  trouble. 

Throughout  the  peninsula,  small  units  of  Japanese  waited  to 
surrender  their  arms  and  ammunition,  which  they  neatly  stacked 
and  marked  for  easy  collection.  The  Japanese  on  the  base  fur- 
nished the  Marines  with  English-speaking  guides  and  provided 
maps  pinpointing  the  location  of  installations.  Some  of  these 
were  so  cleverly  camouflaged  that  without  this  assistance  one 
could  have  searched  for  them  for  weeks  without  success.  There 
was  no  effort  to  conceal  supplies  or  withhold  information.  Many 
documents,  however,  had  already  been  destroyed  by  the  Japanese, 
on  orders  from  above. 

Marines  came  upon  some  weapons  that  the  Japanese  had  not 
begun  to  use  in  the  Pacific,  such  as  twin-mounted  8cm  and  1 6cm 
guns.  There  was  no  apparent  shortage  of  military  equipment, 
although  some  of  the  guns  had  obviously  been  dismounted  from 
battered  Japanese  combatant  ships  for  emplacement  ashore. 

In  contrast  to  Yokohama  and  Tokyo,  the  entire  Yokosuka  area 
was  remarkably  intact,  having  been  spared  by  U.S.  bombers.  On 
the  southwest  coast  of  the  peninsula  lay  six  drydocks,  four  ship- 
building ways,  and  a  major  naval  repair  base.  Landing  ships, 
crude  copies  of  American  LSTs,  were  anchored  there.  Apart 
from  the  military  installations,  the  landscape  of  the  peninsula  was 
rice-paddy  countryside  and  beach  resorts.  In  mid-October,  all  of 
the  demilitarized  peninsula,  except  the  naval  base  and  the  town 
of  Yokosuka,  was  taken  over  by  the  Eighth  Army. 

Yokosuka,  which  fringed  the  base,  was  a  navy  town,  like  San 
Diego.  And,  like  "Dago"  of  World  War  II,  it  became  a  liberty 
town,  patrolled  by  Marine  MPs  reporting  to  their  provost  marshal 
at  Yokosuka.  The  concept  of  the  occupation  prescribed  that 
law  enforcement  over  the  Japanese  people  be  left,  wherever  pos- 
sible, to  their  own  police,  who  were  permitted  to  retain  sidearms. 
Only  crimes  against  the  U.S.  forces  or  regulations  were  made 
punishable  by  the  occupation  authorities.   The  4th  Marines  MP 


346       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Company  was  responsible  for  enforcement,  but  the  Marines  were 
not  charged  with  military  government.  Crimes  were  negligible, 
although  petty  theft  was  something  of  a  nuisance.  Offenders, 
though  sentenced  by  a  military  court,  served  time  in  a  Japanese 
jail. 

There  were  no  serious  incidents  with  the  civilians,  but  black 
market  troubles  soon  arose.  Some  Americans  attempted  to 
smuggle  PX  supplies,  such  as  cigarettes,  out  to  the  civilian  market 
where  they  brought  a  high  price.  This  practice  was  curbed  by 
having  a  sentry  on  the  gates  "shake  down"  the  men  when  they 
went  out  on  liberty.  Men  were  allowed  to  take  only  two  packs 
of  cigarettes  with  them. 

Duty,  as  well  as  liberty,  had  unique  angles.  One  responsibility 
of  the  4th  Marines  was  to  keep  an  eye  on  Uraga,  port  of  entry 
for  Japanese  ships  repatriating  former  enemy  soldiers  and  ci- 
vilians from  Pacific  areas  and  the  Asiatic  mainland.  Beginning 
in  October,  almost  every  day  saw  ships  arriving  from  points  like 
Yap  and  Truk  and  the  remotest  Pacific  islands  where  Japan  had 
extended  her  sway.  American  officials  were  concerned  that  some 
of  the  returning  Japanese  soldiers  might  create  trouble,  but  they 
did  not. 

Occupation  life  and  duty,  with  its  varied  aspects,  was  not  new 
to  the  Marine  Corps,  but  to  most  of  the  Marines  of  World  War  II 
it  was  certainly  a  change.  Yet  a  remarkable  adjustment  took 
place.  Hard  combat  veterans,  only  recently  off  Okinawa,  left 
the  bitter  past  ungrudgingly  behind  and  substituted  sympathy  for 
enmity.  The  behavior  of  the  4th  Marines  was  markedly  excel- 
lent, whether  on  duty  or  liberty.  It  was  the  replacement,  not  the 
veteran,  who,  after  a  few  beers,  would  occasionally  feel  an  urge 
to  "slug  a  Jap." 

A  training  order  stated  that  "emphasis  on  the  traditional  Ma- 
rine Corps'  characteristics"  of  discipline  and  appearance  "will 
resume  their  pre-war  status."  15    The  traits  served  well  toward 

15  6th  MarDiv  TrngO  No.  32-45,  i7Aug45  (Unit  Hist-Rept  File,  HistBr, 
HQMG). 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  347 


success  of  the  occupation.  Marines  understood  that  "regardless 
of  the  fine  plans,  elaborate  directives,  or  foreign  policy,  it  is  the 
man  in  the  ranks  and  the  small  unit's  officers  who  are  the  final 
executors  of  the  occupation  policy."  16 

MARINES  SEE  JAPAN 

To  the  Japanese  people,  occupation  was  a  welcome  relief  from 
war.  They  had  known  no  real  peace  since  the  beginning  of  the 
conflict  with  China  in  the  early  1930's.  Their  feelings  regarding 
the  Marines — apart  from  curiosity — were  often  hard  to  fathom. 
Where  shown,  it  was  usually  by  a  child,  a  merchant,  or  a  woman. 
Fraternization  was  originally  forbidden  by  the  American  high 
command,  but  after  the  first  week,  when  liberty  began,  human 
nature  made  the  rule  difficult  to  enforce — and  it  was  not.  In 
everyone's  joy,  both  American  and  Japanese,  that  the  war  was 
over,  kindness  and  friendship  rushed  into  the  void  created  by 
war. 

Japanese  youngsters  responded  to  Marines  who  gave  them 
candy  ("ka-shee")  and  who  were  soon  teaching  them  to  sing  a 
few  notes  of  the  Marine  Corps  hymn.  As  the  days  went  by,  Jap- 
anese girls  captivated  a  number  of  Americans,  eventually  marry- 
ing them,  but  others,  like  Madame  Butterfly,  loved  in  vain.  A 
few  eager  young  Marines  were  disappointed  to  find  that  the 
fabled  geisha  girls,  as  a  class,  were  traditionally  devoted  to  sing- 
ing and  dancing — and  that  quite  prim.  Perhaps  the  Japanese 
most  glad  to  see  the  Marines  was  the  merchant,  who  knew  well 
that  the  American  abroad  is  a  confirmed  shopper  and  souvenir 
collector.  In  Japan  he  was  a  pushover  for  silk  prints,  brocades, 
cloisonne,  and  lacquer  ware,  or  whatever  had  a  native  flavor. 

When  he  returned  stateside,  a  Marine  was  permitted  to  take 
home  as  a  souvenir  either  a  samurai  sword  or  a  rifle.    But  the 


16  Maj  J.  A.  Donovan,  "The  Occupation  Marine,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette, 
v.  30,  no.  4  (Apr46),p.  19. 


348       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Eighth  Army  issued  an  order  that  any  sword  over  a  century  old 
was  to  be  considered  a  family  heirloom  and  be  exempt  from  the 
order  requiring  surrender  of  all  arms  to  the  occupation  forces. 

Marines  saw  both  the  old  beauty  and  the  new  sadness  of  Japan. 
Bombed  factories  stood  near  ancient  temples.  Poverty  dwelt 
under  bright  plum  blossoms.  There  was  bitterness,  but  it  was 
less  against  the  Americans  than  toward  the  Japanese  war  leaders, 
the  Emperor  excepted,  who  had  led  the  people  into  a  hopeless 
exhausting  struggle.  Marines,  also,  were  inclined  to  blame  for- 
mer Premier  Tojo  and  the  others — not  the  people  themselves, 
whose  culture  was  a  pleasant  surprise.  A  nation  so  old  as  Japan, 
however,  did  show  to  Marines  some  curious  contrasts  of  East 
and  West.  When  men  went  on  liberty  they  saw,  along  city  streets, 
more  women  wearing  slacks  than  kimonos. 

At  first,  few  Japanese  of  either  sex  would  stop  on  a  street  to 
talk.  Language  was  the  barrier,  usually,  for  wartime  propaganda 
had  never  entirely  spoiled  Japanese  goodwill  toward  America. 
Only  a  very  small  number  of  the  people  were  ever  fearful  of  the 
invaders.  A  few  natives  did  rush  their  daughters  and  other 
treasures  into  hiding,  but  even  they  soon  became  reassured,  first 
by  the  Japanese  press,  which  took  care  to  refute  rumors,  and 
then  by  the  occupation  itself.  They  saw  truckloads  of  American 
foodstuffs  arrive  at  Yokosuka  for  local  relief,  and  blankets  to 
warm  the  poor.17 

THE  TIME  COMES  FOR  GOODBYE— "SAY ON AR A" 

As  the  weeks  went  by,  the  regiment  dwindled  in  numbers.  It 
began  to  feel  the  pinch  of  the  hurried  postwar  demobilization. 

17  Kato,  op.  tit.,  pp.  227,  248,  251-252;  "The  Face  of  Japan,"  Leatherneck, 
v.  XXX,  no.  7  (J11I47),  p.  14;  "Notes  on  Nippon,"  Leatherneck,  v.  XXIX, 
no.  3  (Mar46),  pp.  47-48;  Sgts  Duane  Decker  and  Joseph  Purcell,  "Train  to 
Tokyo,"  Leatherneck  (Pacific  edition),  v.  3,  no.  11  (iDec45),  p.  4;  News- 
week, v.  XXVI,  no.  13  (24Sep45),  pp.  44-46.  MajGen  Charles  A.  Wil- 
loughby  and  John  Chamberlain,  MacArthur,  ig^i-ig^i  (New  York: 
McGraw-Hill  Book  Company,  Inc.,  1954),  p.  304. 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  349 


During  November  the  4th  Marines  lost  some  1,500  officers  and 
men,  detached  to  the  United  States  for  separation. 

On  3  and  4  December  the  1st  Battalion  sailed  for  San  Fran- 
cisco to  be  disbanded,  and  on  New  Year's  Day  it  was  followed 
by  the  Headquarters  and  Service  Company,  the  Weapons  Com- 
pany, and  the  2d  Battalion.  This  left  in  Japan  only  the  3d 
Battalion,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hochmuth,  with  about  800 
Marines,  and  a  token  regimental  headquarters.  A  week  later, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Beans  took  his  token  group  and  the  regi- 
mental records  to  Tsingtao  to  rejoin  the  6th  Marine  Division. 
The  4th  Marines  were  back  in  China,  whence  they  had  left  on  the 
eve  of  America's  involvement  in  World  War  II. 

At  the  end  of  January  1946,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Beans  was 
detached  to  the  United  States,  leaving  the  regimental  adjutant, 
2d  Lieutenant  Paul  W.  Stone,  in  charge  of  Headquarters,  4th 
Marines,  at  Tsingtao.  The  unit  then  consisted  of  only  nine  of- 
ficers and  nine  men.  The  4th  Marines'  last  tie  to  Japan  was 
broken  on  15  February  1946  when  the  3d  Battalion  was  reor- 
ganized and  designated  the  2d  Separate  Guard  Battalion  (Pro- 
visional), Fleet  Marine  Force,  Pacific.18 

CHINA  MARINES:  i945 

When  the  4th  Marines,  or  what  was  left  of  it,  reached  Tsingtao 
they  were  joining  47,000  Marines  in  China.19  On  30  September 

18  3d  Bn,  4th  Mar  WarD,  1-31^1146,  dtd  iFeb46;  and  2d  Sep  GrdBn 
(Prov),  FMFPac,  WarD,  1  Feb-  14JU1146  (both  in  Unit  Hist-Rept  File,  HistBr, 
HQMC)  ;  4th  Mar  MRolls,  i~3iDec45,  1  Jan-28Feb46. 

19  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  section  on  China  is  based  upon  the  follow- 
ing: U.S.  Dept.  of  State,  United  States  Relations  With  China  (Washington, 
1949);  Herbert  Feis,  The  China  Tangle  (Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press,  1953)  ;  4th  Mar  WarD,  ijun-3ijul46;  IIIAG  WarD,  iMar-ioJun46; 
6th  MarDivWarD,  iSep-3oNov45 ;  and  3d  MarBrig  WarD,  iApr-ioJun46 
(all  in  Unit  Hist-Rept  File,  HistBr,  HQMC)  ;  Maj  Bruce  A.  Rushlow  and 
Maj  Palmer  H.  Rixey  interviews  by  HistBr,  HQMC,  9  and  I2jan59,  respec- 
tively (both  in  Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC);  and  Cass, 
op.  cit. 


350       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


1945,  troops  of  the  1st  Marine  Division  had  landed  at  Tientsin, 
beginning  a  IIIAG  occupation  of  key  points  in  North  China.  On 
1 1  October,  the  6th  Marine  Division  (less  RCT-4)  had  followed 
at  Tsingtao,  to  occupy  that  port  and  Tsang-kou  Airfield,  1 2  miles 
inland,  where  Marine  aircraft  were  to  base.  General  Shepherd 
had  received  surrender  of  Japan's  $th  Independent  Mixed  Bri- 
gade at  Tsingtao  on  25  October. 

The  6th  Marine  Division,  like  the  1st,  was  to  help  the  Nation- 
alists send  thousands  of  Japanese  back  home,  writing  the  end  to 
decades  of  Japanese  design  upon  the  mainland.  Marines  were 
to  ensure  the  peaceful  and  orderly  repatriating  of  both  soldiers 
and  civilians.  The  Communists,  who  were  then  seeking  control 
of  China,  were  to  be  kept  from  entangling  the  process. 

Officially,  Uncle  Sam  was  sitting  on  the  fence  in  the  middle 
of  a  Chinese  civil  war — "intervention  is  inappropriate,"  said 
President  Truman  20 — but  it  was  a  lopsided  posture,  it  was  like 
trying  to  straddle  the  Great  Wall;  for  American  sympathy  lay 
with  the  recognized  Central  Government  of  Chiang  Kai-shek, 
and  he  had  received  our  financial  and  military  aid.  Still,  the 
United  States  took  the  position  of  a  friendly  neutral  interested 
only  in  seeing  a  democratic  government  in  China,  where  both 
the  Nationalists  and  Communists  could  coexist.  But  the  Na- 
tionalists would  not  accept  the  Communists  as  political  bed  fel- 
lows, and  the  Communists  resented  America's  obvious  leaning 
toward  Chiang.  A  fateful  impasse  existed. 

This,  then,  was  the  strife-torn  land  where  the  4th  Marines 
undertook  its  next  mission.  On  8  March  1946,  the  token 
Headquarters,  4th  Marines,  then  down  to  four  officers  and  five 
men  was  redesignated  4th  Marines.  A  Headquarters  and  Serv- 
ice Company  was  activated,  and  other  units  came  from  other 
regiments  of  the  division.  The  Weapons  Company,  2 2d  Marines, 


The  New  York  Times,  i6Dec45. 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  351 


was  redesignated  Weapons  Company,  4th  Marines.  The  2d  Bat- 
talion of  the  29th  Regiment  became  1/4;  the  2d  Battalion  of  the 
22d  was  changed  to  2/4;  and  the  3d  Battalion  of  the  22d  turned 
into  3/4. 

Colonel  William  J.  Whaling,  former  commanding  officer  of  the 
29th  Marines,  became  regimental  commander,  serving  until  26 
March  when  he  was  relieved  by  Colonel  John  D.  Blanchard  from 
the  2 2d  Marines.  By  the  end  of  the  month  the  4th  Regiment 
stood  at  a  strength  of  97  officers  and  3,151  men.  Shantung 
University  housed  the  command  post,  and  many  of  the  men  were 
quartered  in  former  Japanese  schools.21 

TSINGTAO:  PAWN  OF  POWER 

The  4th  Marines  found  Tsingtao  much  smaller  than  Shanghai, 
the  old  China  home  of  the  regiment.  Yet,  like  Shanghai,  the 
city  was  modern — in  an  Oriental  sense,  cosmopolitan,  and  used 
to  the  foreigner.  Much  of  the  architecture  was  European.  A 
few  Americans — missionaries  and  businessmen — were  still  there, 
but  there  had  always  been  more  British  and  Germans,  and  some 
White  Russians  and  Koreans.  The  port's  prewar  population  of 
around  600,000  had  recently  been  swelled  by  the  influx  of  Chi- 
nese from  the  interior,  seeking  refuge  from  Communism. 

Between  1897  and  19 14  Germany  had  leased  Tsingtao.  The 
Kaiser  based  his  Asiatic  Fleet  in  Kiaochow  Bay,  while  German 
businessmen  built  up  on  the  Shantung  Peninsula  a  small  economic 
empire.  The  Germans,  therefore,  had  a  backlog  of  experience 
at  Tsingtao.  Their  local  knowledge  and  linguistic  ability  were 
often  helpful  to  the  Marines. 

But  the  German  day  of  power  at  Tsingtao  had  long  been  over. 
In  World  War  I  Japan  seized  the  Shantung  Peninsula  to  exploit 
it  herself.   In  1922,  under  international  pressure,  she  relaxed  her 


21  4th  Mar  MRolls,  i-3iMar46. 


352       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


grip,  but  she  came  back  in  1937,  more  determined  than  ever 
to  stay.22 

By  March  1946,  when  the  4th  Marines  came  to  Tsingtao,  most 
of  the  Japanese  had  been  shipped  home.  A  number  of  Germans 
had  also  left.  To  the  population  of  Tsingtao  the  novelty  of 
seeing  Marines  had  begun  to  wear  off,  and  fewer  persons  lined 
the  streets  to  cheer  a  parade.  Yet,  to  everyone  at  Tsingtao,  it 
was  still  reassuring  to  have  the  Marines  there.  To  the  Japanese 
it  meant  getting  home,  spared  from  ill-treatment  by  vengeful 
Chinese.  To  other  people  at  Tsingtao,  the  fact  was  plain  that 
only  the  presence  of  the  Marines  kept  Tsingtao  from  becoming 
a  battleground  between  Nationalists  and  Communists. 

No  Communist  soldiers  ventured  into  Tsingtao  while  the  4th 
Regiment  was  there,  although,  outside  the  city,  they  outnumbered 
the  Nationalists,  whom  they  kept  huddled  at  Tsingtao  and  along 
the  125-mile  railroad  to  the  provincial  capital  at  Tsinan.  The 
Communists  were  then  biding  their  time  while  carrying  on  guer- 
rilla warfare  and  sabotage;  but  if  they  should  attempt  to  take 
Tsingtao,  the  4th  Marines  had  defense  plans  ready.  Marines 
were  alerted  to  occupy  selected  positions  across  the  neck  of  the 
Shantung  Peninsula,  barring  the  land  routes  to  Tsingtao.  They 
patrolled  the  outskirts  of  the  city  and  scouted  in  jeeps  beyond  it. 
But  few  actual  defenses  were  constructed,  and  these  were  mostly 
wire.  At  Tsang-kou  Arifield  a  rifle  company  supported  by  tanks 
was  maintained,  billeted  in  Quonset  huts. 

Marines  were  under  orders  to  avoid,  wherever  possible,  any 
friction  with  the  Communists.  No  clashes  occurred.  But  Ma- 
rines who  went  out  on  hunting  parties,  loaded  merely  for  ducks 
and  other  birds,  were  eyed  suspiciously  by  Communists.  After 
an  incident  near  Tientsin  in  November  1945,  when  a  Marine  out 
hunting  was  killed  by  a  Chinese,  Major  General  Keller  E.  Rockey, 


22  Harold  M.  Vinacke,  A  History  of  the  Far  East  in  Modern  Times  (New 
York:  F.  S.  Crofts  &  Co.,  1947),  pp.  364-365. 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  353 


the  IIIAG  commander,  had  forbidden  Marines  to  go  out  into  the 
country,  except  as  members  of  an  armed  party.23 

The  Navy  was  much  in  evidence  at  Tsingtao  when  the  4th 
Marines  got  there.  In  late  1945  Admiral  Charles  Maynard 
Cooke,  Jr.,  had  moved  the  home  base  of  the  Seventh  Fleet  from 
Shanghai  to  Tsingtao,  thereby  creating  a  security  responsibility 
which  fell  to  the  Marines. 

Both  the  Navy  and  Marines  obtained  quarters  in  the  vacated 
homes  of  Japanese  and  Germans  who  left  Tsingtao.  The  Edge- 
water  (nicknamed  "Bilgewater" )  Hotel  was  one  of  the  principal 
officers'  billets  and  became  also  a  center  of  social  life.  A  Marine 
officers'  club  was  set  up  there. 

Navy  dependents  began  to  arrive  at  Tsingtao  in  the  summer 
of  1946  and  Marine  dependents  in  October.  The  second  baby 
born  in  Tsingtao  to  American  parents  after  the  occupation  began 
was  the  daughter  of  a  Marine  Corps  officer.24 

ROUTINE  AT  TSINGTAO 

The  windup  of  repatriation  occupied  the  4th  Marines  during 
their  first  few  months  at  Tsingtao.  Some  of  them  served  as 
guards  on  the  LSTs,  which,  because  of  lack  of  Japanese  ship- 
ping, were  often  used  to  transport  repatriates.  In  April  the  4th 
Marines  supervised  the  departure  of  5,233  Japanese  military  and 
1 2,9 1 2  civilians  through  Tsingtao.  In  May,  4,000  Japanese  left. 
But  in  June  the  number  dwindled  to  1,220  civilians,  and  July's 
quota  came  to  only  4 1 1  civilians  and  1 7  military.25 

23  IIIAG  G-2  Periodic  Rept,  dtd  3N0V45  (Unit  Hist-Rept  File,  HistBr, 
HQMG) ;  Annex  A  to  6th  MarDiv  OPlan,  No.  108-45,  dtd  i8Sep45,  and 
6th  MarDiv  G-2  Study  of  the  Theater  of  Operations,  Shantung  Province, 
n.d.  (both  in  China  Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMG) ;  Maj  Robert  A.  Ghurley, 
"The  North  China  Operation,"  pt  II,  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  31,  no.  11 
(N0V47),  p.  19;  istLt  Alan  Shilin,  "Occupation  at  Tsingtao,"  Marine  Corps 
Gazette ,  v.  30,  no.  1  (Jan46),  pp.  31-36. 

24  Col  William  N.  McGill  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  6Apr59  (Monograph  &  Com- 
ment File,  HistBr,  HQMG ) . 

25  Gapt  Edwin  Klein,  "Back  to  Japan,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  30,  no.  3 
(Mar46),  pp.  18-19. 


354       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


So  repatriation  drew  to  a  close,  but  security  duty  at  Tsingtao, 
as  the  Seventh  Fleet  base,  continued  to  engage  the  4th  Marines. 
As  at  Yokosuka,  law  enforcement  over  the  natives  was  left  to  lo- 
cal authorities,  unless  Marines  were  involved.  Theft  was  ram- 
pant, however,  and  American  property  was  repeatedly  pilfered  by 
petty  thieves  and  organized  gangs.  Several  Chinese  attempting  to 
steal  U.S.  supplies  in  the  warehouse  area  were  shot  by  Marine 
sentries.  In  one  instance,  a  Marine  was  found  in  a  sentry  box 
shot  through  the  back  by  an  unknown  assailant.26 

A  training  program  served  to  keep  up  the  military  proficiency 
of  the  4th  Marines,  who  consisted  more  and  more  of  replace- 
ments. Schools  for  specialists  and  NCOs  were  organized.  Drills 
and  athletics  were  conducted  on  the  Tsingtao  race  course  and 
range  firing  was  begun.  The  surrounding  countryside  was  used 
for  tactical  problems  and  long  hikes. 

Sport  contests  between  units  were  a  favorite  recreation,  and 
the  beaches  were  excellent  for  swimming.  The  gym  at  Shantung 
University  saw  the  Seventh  Fleet  basketball  finals.  Baseball, 
volleyball,  and  touch  football  were  also  popular.  On  Thanksgiv- 
ing Day  a  "rice  bowl"  game  was  played  in  Tsingtao  stadium. 

The  Red  Cross,  USO,  and  unit  enlisted  men's  clubs  helped  to 
distract  men  from  the  town's  honky-tonk  entertainment.  Shop- 
ping was  a  favorite  pastime.  Some  Chinese  merchants  still  had 
old  beaten-up  U.S.  greenbacks  which  they  had  apparently  been 
hanging  onto  since  1 94 1 . 

At  the  barracks — indeed,  to  all  Americans  then  in  Tsingtao — 
the  radio  was  a  source  of  pleasure.  Marines  had  fixed  up  and 
put  into  operation  a  radio  station,  which  was  also  especially  valued 
as  a  means  for  alerting  dependents  in  case  of  emergency.  There 
seemed  always  the  chance  of  one,  particularly  as  postwar  reduc- 
tions continued  to  cut  down  Marine  strength. 


26  Col  Joseph  P.  Sayers  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  6Aprsg  (Monograph  &  Comment 
File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  355 


REDUCTION  AND  REORGANIZATION 

Of  unending  concern  to  the  4th  Marines  were  the  successive 
realignments  due  to  postwar  demobilizing  of  the  Marine  Corps. 
By  the  spring  of  1946  the  6th  Marine  Division  was  so  reduced 
in  strength  that  on  1  April  it  could  be  readily  transformed  into 
the  3d  Marine  Brigade,  Fleet  Marine  Force,  Pacific,  to  consist 
only  of  the  4th  Marines  and  three  supporting  battalions — head- 
quarters, service,  and  artillery.  But  the  brigade  was  extremely 
short-lived.  On  10  June  it,  too,  was  deactivated  in  a  shake-up 
which  also  ended  the  IIIAC,  now  reorganized  as  the  1st  Marine 
Division,  Reinforced.  By  the  end  of  June  1946,  the  Marine 
Corps  had  dropped  from  its  war's  end  strength  of  nearly  475,000 
to  155,000.  It  was  rapidly  shrinking  to  the  planned  postwar 
level  of  108,000. 

In  the  sweeping  change,  the  1st  Marine  Division  in  Tientsin, 
and  the  Marines  in  Tsingtao  were  joined  to  form  Marine  Forces, 
China,  commanded  by  Major  General  Rockey,  hitherto  the 
IIIAC  commander.  The  4th  Marines,  Reinforced,  became  the 
principal  element  of  the  task  group,  Marine  Forces,  Tsingtao, 
under  General  Clement.  Other  elements  included  an  artillery 
battalion  (3/12),  a  tank  company,  a  service  battalion,  a  medical 
battalion,  a  signal  company,  Marine  Observation  Squadron-6 
(VMO-6),  and  a  naval  construction  battalion.  Colonel 
Blanchard  continued  to  command  the  regiment  until  the  end  of 
June  1946. 

Execution  of  U.S.  policy  in  China  was  ever  having  to  adapt 
to  postwar  readjustment.  Even  the  China  Theater  itself  was 
deactivated  on  1  May  1946,  and  operational  control  of  Marine 
forces  in  China  passed  to  the  Commander,  Seventh  Fleet.27 


27  4th  Mar  MRolls,  iMar-3iAug46;  CMC,  Report  .  .  .  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  ig46  (Washington,  1946). 


356       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


MOST  OF  THE  4TH  GOES  HOME 

In  the  States  there  was  a  popular  clamor  to  bring  the  boys 
back  home.  Even  before  the  end  of  1945,  U.S.  Congressmen 
had  been  insisting  that  the  Marines  be  returned  home.  "In  God's 
name,"  declared  one  Congressman,  ear  to  the  ground,  "let's  get 
our  beloved  Marines  out  of  China!"  28 

President  Truman  had  explained  on  15  December  1945  that 
"the  United  States  has  been  assisting  and  will  continue  to  assist 
the  National  Government  of  China  in  effecting  the  disarmament 
and  evacuation  of  Japanese  troops  in  the  liberated  areas.  The 
United  States  Marines  are  in  North  China  for  that  purpose."  29 

By  the  middle  of  1946  that  purpose  had  been  practically  ac- 
complished, certainly  at  Tsingtao.  Moreover,  the  regiment  faced 
even  further  reduction  through  separations.  It  was  decided, 
therefore,  to  withdraw  all  the  4th  Marines  except  Colonel  Sam- 
uel B.  Griffith's  3d  Battalion,  which  was  left  at  Tsingtao  as  an 
outfit  of  about  a  thousand  regulars ;  only  seven  remaining  officers 
and  two  enlisted  men  were  reservists. 

On  3  September  1 946  the  H&S  Company,  the  Weapons  Com- 
pany, 1/4  and  2/4  sailed  in  the  troop  transport  Breckinridge.  It 
was  the  voyage  home  for  most  of  the  men  who,  after  docking 
at  Norfolk  on  the  30th,  were  returned  to  civilian  life.  The  regi- 
ment which  joined  the  2d  Marine  Division  at  Camp  Lejeune 
could  hardly  be  called  that,  although,  on  paper,  the  battalions 
and  companies  were  retained.  By  the  end  of  October  the  4th 
Marines  at  Lejeune  numbered  only  9  officers  and  35  men,  com- 
manded by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wesley  McC.  Piatt,  who  had 
taken  over  the  regiment  on  2 1  October.30 


28  Washington  Evening  Star,  ioDec45. 

29  The  New  York  Times,  i6Dec45. 

30  4th  Mar  MRolls,  iSep-3iOct46 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  357 


POSTWAR  DAYS  AT  LEJEUNE 

Beginning  in  May  1947  the  1st  Battalion  was  built  up  by  an 
influx  of  recruits  so  that  by  the  end  of  August  it  had  reached  a 
strength  of  821,  but  the  2d  Battalion  continued  to  be  a  paper 
unit.  In  September  and  October  the  restored  1st  Battalion  took 
part  in  amphibious  maneuvers  at  Little  Creek,  Virginia. 

At  Tsingtao  the  3d  Battalion  had  ceased  to  be  a  part  of  the  4th 
Marines,  when,  on  1  October  1947,  it  was  redesignated  the  3d 
Marines,  part  of  the  newly  formed  Fleet  Marine  Force,  Western 
Pacific  (FMFWesPac).31 

On  18  November  1947  all  other  elements  of  the  regiment  were 
disbanded  except  the  1st  Battalion.  That  unit  was  redesignated 
the  4th  Marines  and  continued  as  a  part  of  the  2d  Marine  Divi- 
sion at  Camp  Lejeune.  Commanded  by  a  colonel,  it  included 
three  rifle  companies  and  a  headquarters  and  service  company. 
The  H&S  Company,  besides  its  headquarters  section,  contained 
communication,  service,  antitank,  and  mortar  platoons.  Medical, 
dental,  and  chaplain  sections  also  indicated  the  regimental  type 
of  self-sufficiency  which  marked  this  particular  battalion 
organization.32 

Substitution  of  such  a  reinforced  battalion,  with  a  regimental 
designation,  for  the  conventional  infantry  regiment  resulted  from 
the  adoption  of  the  "J"  Series  Table  of  Organization  in  April 
1947.  This  was  the  Marine  Corps'  answer  to  the  problem  of 
maintaining,  with  a  strength  of  only  100,000  "a  flexible,  mobile, 
essentially  amphibious  organization  capable  of  easy  regrouping 
for  specific  missions,  ready  to  tackle  various  limited  scale  opera- 
tions on  short  notice."  33  It  was  suggested  partly  by  the  highly 
developed  battalion  landing  teams  of  World  War  II;  partly  by 

31  4th  Mar  MRolls,  iMay-i8Nov47 ;  CMC,  Report  .  .  .  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  1948  (Washington,  1948). 

32  4th  Mar  MRolls,  18-30N0V47;  2d  MarDiv  Station  List,  Camp  Lejeune, 
dtd  3  iDec47  (Unit  Hist-Rept  File,  HistBr,  HQMC ) . 

33  "The  New  FMF,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  31,  no.  5  (May47),  p.  10. 

519667—60  26 


358       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


the  prospect  of  atomic  warfare,  which  would  require  wide  disper- 
sion and  decentralization;  and,  finally,  by  the  fact  that  the  over- 
all peacetime  strength  of  the  Marine  Corps  favored  smaller 
commands. 

The  BLT  (Battalion  Landing  Team)  4th  Marines  was  formed, 
in  the  main,  by  consoHdating  the  remnants  of  the  old  1st  Bat- 
talion, 4th  Marines,  and  2d  Battalion,  8th  Marines.  This  "con- 
solidation" and  redesignation  took  effect  on  19  November  1947. 
The  first  commanding  officer  under  the  new  Table  of  Organiza- 
tion was  Colonel  Frank  M.  Reinecke.  A  period  of  intensive  field 
training  was  soon  instituted,  culminating  in  a  Fleet  Landing 
Exercise  (FLEX)  on  Vieques,  Puerto  Rico,  in  early  1948.  The 
4th  Marines  assaulted  and  captured  "Red  Beach"  and  the  area 
inland.34 

"MED"  CRUISE 

In  September  1948,  reinforced  by  detachments  from  other  ele- 
ments in  the  division,  the  battalion  joined  the  newly  designated 
Sixth  Task  Fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  for  a  period  of  training, 
involving  several  full-scale  landing  exercises.  Most  of  the  bat- 
talion boarded  the  carrier  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  and  three  cruis- 
ers, including  the  Albany,  which  flew  the  flag  of  Vice  Admiral 
Forrest  P.  Sherman,  new  commander  of  the  Sixth  Task  Fleet. 
Equipment  and  supplies  were  carried  in  the  cargo  ship  Montague. 

Marines  were  no  strangers  to  the  Mediterranean;  since  the 
war  with  Tripoli  under  President  Jefferson  they  had  served  there 
intermittently.  But  now  the  4th  Marines  became  the  instrument 
for  carrying  out  a  new  mission  of  the  Marine  Corps,  that  of 
showing  America's  interest  in  the  freedom  of  nations  bordering 
the  Mediterranean.    In  1947,  civil  war  in  Greece,  between  the 


34 Ibid.,  pp.  10-14;  "New  Developments,"  Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  31, 
no.  8  (Aug47),  pp.  55-57;  BriGen  Frank  M.  Reinecke  Itr  to  Hd,  HistBr, 
HQMC,  4Mar59  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMG). 


OCCUPATION  OF  JAPAN  AND  CHINA  359 


recognized  government  and  Communist  guerrillas,  had  taken  an 
ominous  turn,  foreboding  Communist  encroachment  upon  the  en- 
tire Mediterranean  area.  President  Truman  asked  Congress  for 
military  and  economic  aid  to  Greece  and  Turkey,  initiating  a 
definite  U.S.  policy  of  assisting  independent  countries  to  resist 
Communist  aggression. 

In  keeping  with  that  policy,  the  Marine  Corps  instituted  a  plan 
of  maintaining  a  battalion  landing  team,  including  tanks  and  ar- 
tillery, afloat  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  troops  were  drawn 
from  the  2d  Marine  Division  at  Camp  Lejeune,  and  the  units 
were  rotated  about  every  five  or  six  months.35 

In  January  1948  the  President  had  sent  1,000  Marines  from 
the  2d  Division,  ostensibly  "to  augment  the  shipboard  training 
of  Marines"  and  to  restore  the  normal  shipboard  complements 
of  Marines  with  the  Sixth  Task  Fleet.36  But  they  went  combat- 
equipped,  supplied  with  tanks  and  flame  throwers.  "The  Navy's 
little  army,  the  Marines,"  said  a  news  commentator,  "is  capable 
of  making  a  landing  to  show  clearly  that  our  warnings  are 
serious."  37 

Admiral  Sherman  indicated  that  the  men  would  "round  out 
the  Marine  forces  of  the  fleet  and  improve  the  capabilities  of 
the  force  to  meet  minor  emergencies."  38  The  Sixth  Task  Fleet 
now  had  the  capability  of  projecting  naval  power  ashore  in  the 
Mediterranean  as  that  ancient  sea  assumed  a  new  importance 
to  the  United  States. 


35  4th  Mar  MRolls,  i~3oSep48;  Thomas  A.  Bailey,  A  Diplomatic  History 
of  the  American  People  (New  York:  Appleton-Century-Crofts,  1958,  rev. 
ed.),  pp.  797-799;  LtCol  Charles  L.  Banks,  "To  the  Shores  of  Tripoli," 
Marine  Corps  Gazette,  v.  34,  no.  8  (Aug5o),  pp.  30-33;  The  New  York 
Times,  3-4-6 Jan48  and  9N0V48;  Stephen  G.  Xydis,  "The  Genesis  of  the 
Sixth  Fleet,"  United  States  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  v.  84,  no.  8  (Aug58), 
pp.  41-50. 

39  The  New  York  Times,  3jan48. 

37  Walter  Lippmann,  quoted  in  Newsweek,  v.  XXXI,  no.  4  (26Jan48), 
p.  28. 

38  The  New  York  Times,  23jan48. 


360       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


TEMPORARY  END 

When  the  4th  Marines  came  back  from  the  "Med"  cruise, 
in  January  1949,  the  BLT  joined  the  2d  Provisional  Marine 
Regiment,  a  unit  which  had  formed  at  Lejeune  on  1  November 
1948,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Reinecke.  But,  though 
part  of  a  new  provisional  regiment,  the  4th  Marines  kept  its 
name,  as  well  as  its  battalion  form. 

The  name,  4th  Marines,  disappeared  on  17  October  1949 
when  the  unit  was  redesignated  the  1st  Battalion,  6th  Marines.39 
Thus  the  4th  Marines  left  the  rolls  of  the  Corps,  but  only  for  a 
short  time.  A  few  years  later  the  regiment  was  again  summoned 
to  duty. 


4th  Mar  MRolls,  1 -31  Jan  and  1 -31  Oct  49. 


CHAPTER  XI 


Force  in  Readiness- 
Mid  Century  Model 

The  4th  Marines  was  reactivated  at  Camp  Pendleton,  Cali- 
fornia, on  2  September  1952.1  Not  quite  five  years  had  passed 
since  the  regiment  had  been  removed  from  the  active  list  in  wide- 
spread national  demobilization,  but  the  hopes  of  Americans  for 
a  peaceful  future  had  not  been  realized.  Even  in  1947  signs  of 
Communist  determination  for  world  dominance  were  becoming 
apparent.  Since  then  the  iron  curtain  had  slammed  down  across 
Central  Europe,  and,  on  25  June  1950,  Communist  expansive 
pressure  had  erupted  into  invasion  and  war  in  Korea. 

President  Truman  immediately  announced  that  the  United 
States  would  join  the  United  Nations  in  defending  the  Republic 
of  Korea  against  the  Communist  North  Korean  People's  Re- 
public. A  hastily  organized  1st  Provisional  Marine  Brigade 
joined  other  UN  forces  in  keeping  a  toe  hold  at  the  tip  of  the 
Korean  peninsula  around  the  port  of  Pusan.  Later  the  Marines 
of  the  brigade  rejoined  the  1st  Marine  Division  to  spearhead  a 
landing  behind  the  enemy  lines  at  Inchon.  The  enemy,  his  back 
broken  by  the  outflanking  maneuver,  was  pushed  north  almost 
to  the  Yalu  River  before  the  intervention  of  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists in  late  November  surprised  and  overwhelmed  the  UN 

^MFPac  HistD,  i~3oSep52.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  all  official  docu- 
ments cited  in  this  chapter  are  in  Unit  Hist-Rept  File,  HistBr,  HQMC. 

361 


362       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


troops  and  forced  a  general  pull-back  well  below  the  38th  parallel 
dividing  North  and  South  Korea.  It  was  then  that  the  1st 
Marine  Division  made  its  epic  break-out  to  the  sea. 

Reorganized  UN  forces  slowly  fought  their  way  north,  reach- 
ing the  38th  parallel  again  by  the  spring  of  1951.  After  the 
Communists  failed  in  two  massive  counterattacks,  truce  talks 
started  and  the  front  became  stalemated.  This  was  still  the  situ- 
ation in  Korea  when  the  4th  Marines  was  reactivated  in 
September  1952. 

The  military  build-up  stimulated  by  the  Korean  War  created 
the  opportunity  to  reactivate  the  4th  Marines.  With  more  Ma- 
rines available  the  Marine  Corps  was  able  to  build  up  a  force 
more  nearly  adequate  for  force-in-readiness  missions  in  a  tense 
world,  where  fighting  might  break  out  at  widely  scattered  points 
at  any  moment.  In  spite  of  the  advent  of  "massive  retaliatory 
power"  in  the  form  of  strategic  air  forces  armed  with  nuclear 
weapons,  Marine  leaders  had  always  believed  that  ready  ground 
forces  with  adequate  tactical  air  support  were  essential  to  national 
security.  The  Korean  War  vindicated  this  Marine  judgment  and 
also  convinced  the  Congress,  which,  in  1953,  passed  a  law  re- 
quiring the  Marine  Corps  to  "be  so  organized  as  to  include  not 
less  than  three  combat  divisions  and  three  air  wings,  and  such 
other  land  combat,  aviation,  and  other  services  as  may  be  or- 
ganic therein."  2  It  was  as  part  of  the  3d  Marine  Division  that 
the  4th  Marines  was  reactivated. 

REBUILDING  THE  REGIMENT 

At  Camp  Pendleton  Colonel  Robert  O.  Bowen,  the  regimental 
commander,  put  all  hands  to  work  on  a  vigorous  training  pro- 
gram. But  it  was  to  be  nearly  a  year  before  the  4th  Marines  and 
its  parent  3d  Division  would  be  declared  combat  ready.   In  con- 


2  U.S.  Code,  Title  io}  Chap  503,  Sect  5013. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — MID  CENTURY  MODEL  363 


trast,  the  4th  Provisional  Regiment  of  191 1  and  the  4th  Regiment 
of  19 14  assembled  at  the  gangplank  and  embarked  for  expedi- 
tionary duty  without  any  unit  training  at  all. 

This  difference  in  training  requirements  points  up  the  differ- 
ence between  forces  in  readiness  of  the  early  and  mid-twentieth 
century.  Early  in  the  century  Major  General  Commandant 
Barnett  could,  without  qualms,  activate  and  ship  out  a  regiment 
on  the  same  day.  He  knew  that  the  intended  action  did  not  in- 
volve the  vital  interests  of  great  powers  and  that  the  potential 
enemy  consisted  only  of  poorly  led,  trained,  and  equipped  Latin 
American  revolutionaries. 

General  Lemuel  C.  Shepherd,  Jr.,  Commandant  of  the  Ma- 
rine Corps  in  1952,  knew  that  his  Marines  would  face  a  tough, 
disciplined,  well-equipped  and  well-led  Communist  enemy  almost 
anywhere  in  the  world.  And  the  theaters  of  operations,  though 
most  likely  in  small  and  remote  countries,  would  involve  a  head-on 
collision  between  the  Communist  Bloc  and  the  Free  World. 

It  was  a  situation  calling  for  the  most  thorough  and  realistic 
training  possible  for  the  4th  Marines.  Originally  consisting  only 
of  the  1  st  Battalion,  a  Headquarters  and  Service  Company,  and 
a  4.2-inch  Mortar  Company,  the  regiment  made  such  rapid 
progress  in  training  by  1  October  that  it  was  able  to  play  the  role 
of  defenders  against  the  rest  of  the  3d  Division,  consisting  of  the 
3d,  9th,  and  1 2th  Marines,  in  an  amphibious  exercise  at  Camp 
Pendleton.  The  regiment  attempted  to  duplicate  Chinese  and 
North  Korean  tactics  of  night  counterattack.  These  efforts  were 
so  successful  that  the  3d  and  9th  Marines  were  caught  in  their 
sleeping  bags  on  several  occasions  and  thrown  off  objectives 
seized  during  the  day.3 

The  2d  Battalion  was  activated  on  29  October  and  the  3d  on 
28  November.    Training  continued,  and  during  the  first  two 

8Furgurson,  "The  4th  Marines,"  pp.  196-197;  FMFPac  HistD,  i-3oSep 
52;  Col  Franklin  B.  Nihart  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  27Mar59  (Monograph  &  Com- 
ment File,  HistBr,  HQMC),  hereafter  Nihart  letter. 


364       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


weeks  of  December  the  regiment  maneuvered  across  the  vast 
desert  artillery  ranges  of  Twentynine  Palms.  Constant  exercises 
in  the  field  contributed  greatly  to  combat  readiness.4 

On  7  November,  the  4th  Marines,  along  with  the  other  3d 
Division  units,  received  its  colors  at  a  memorable  review.  Major 
General  Samuel  Howard,  who  had  commanded  the  regiment  in 
China  and  on  Corregidor,  presented  the  colors  to  Colonel  Bowen. 
For  the  Marines  of  the  new  4th  it  was  a  reminder  of  the  history 
and  traditions  of  the  regiment  and  a  challenge  to  carry  them  on.5 

An  additional  mission  was  assigned  the  4th  Marines  on  5 
January  when  the  Commandant  directed  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, Fleet  Marine  Force,  Pacific,  to  test  the  feasibility  of  in- 
creasing the  infantry  component  of  a  Marine  division  by  modi- 
fying the  regiment  to  include  three  battalions  of  four  rifle 
companies  each,  or  four  battalions  of  three  rifle  companies  each. 
To  examine  the  practicality  of  both  these  organizations,  Company 
K  was  added  to  the  3d  Battalion  and  a  new  4th  Battalion  with 
three  rifle  companies  was  organized.6 

This  quadrangular  organization  was  the  first  major  change 
proposed  from  the  combat-tested  regimental  setup  perfected  in 
World  War  II.  Only  minor  differences  existed  between  the  4th 
Marines  of  Guam  and  Okinawa  and  the  strength  and  organiza- 
tion authorized  for  the  regiment  in  the  fall  of  1952.  Total 
authorized  strength  of  the  World  War  II  regiment  was  3,218 
officers  and  men,  and  of  the  1952  regiment  3,901.  Accounting 
for  the  strength  difference  was  the  addition  of  units  of  greatly 
increased  firepower.  At  regimental  level  an  antitank  company, 
consisting  of  a  platoon  each  of  medium  tanks  and  75mm  recoil- 
less  rifles,  and  a  company  of  4. 2 -inch  mortars  replaced  the  former 
weapons  company.    The  battalions  regained  the  weapons  com- 


1  Nihart  letter. 

5  Col  Robert  O.  Bowen  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  3Mar59  (Monograph  &  Comment 
File,  HistBr,  HQMC) ,  hereafter  Bowen  letter. 
9  Bowen  letter. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — MID  CENTURY  MODEL  365 


panies  taken  away  in  the  latter  part  of  World  War  II  and  added 
antitank  platoons  to  them.7 

The  culmination  of  training  for  the  4th  Marines  and  for  the 
whole  3d  Marine  Division  came  in  the  spring  of  1953.  Between 
20  April  and  10  May  the  Marines  engaged  in  PACPHIBEX-II, 
a  full-scale  division  amphibious  exercise.8  Embarking  in  APAs 
lying  off  Camp  Del  Mar,  a  landing  craft  base  adjacent  to  Camp 
Pendleton,  the  regiment  moved  to  San  Diego  for  a  rehearsal 
landing  on  the  Silver  Strand  at  Coronado  Island.  On  1  May 
the  Attack  Force  sortied  from  San  Diego  Harbor  en  route  for 
the  objective  area  at  Camp  Pendleton.  Landing  in  LVTs  on 
5  May,  the  4th  Marines  advanced  inland  for  the  next  four  days 
to  seize  the  Force  Beachhead  Line. 

An  outstanding  feature  of  PACPHIBEX-II  was  the  inclusion 
of  the  most  modern  weapons  and  tactics.  Both  the  attacking 
3d  Marine  Division  and  the  defenders  employed  atomic  bombs 
(simulated,  of  course) ,  and  the  assault  landing  included  a  vertical 
envelopment  by  a  force  set  down  behind  enemy  lines  by  heli- 
copter. This  latest  amphibious  tactic  had  been  pioneered  by  the 
Marine  Corps  as  early  as  1947  in  order  to  eliminate  the  lucrative 
nuclear  weapon  target  presented  by  the  concentration  of  a  mas- 
sive amphibious  attack  force  of  the  World  War  II  type.  By 
lifting  assault  troops  in  helicopters  from  widely  dispersed  shipping 
to  points  inland  to  the  rear  of  enemy  beach  defenses,  no  single 
nuclear  weapon  could  destroy  all  or  most  of  the  attack  force 
either  afloat  or  ashore. 

In  PACPHIBEX-II  the  2d  Battalion,  3d  Marines,  constituted 
the  helicopter  assault  force.  The  4th  Marines,  while  they  were 
not  helicopter  lifted,  gained  valuable  experience  in  the  new  tactics 
through  problems  involving  the  coordination  of  LVT  and 
helicopter-landed  forces. 


7USMC  T/O's,  F-io,  dtd  27Mar44,  and  K-1099,  dtd  3iMay4g. 
8CG  3d  MarDiv  PACPHIBEX-II  rept,  dtd  15J11I53;  and  3d  MarDiv 
OpO  2-53  (PACPHIBEX),  dtd  23Mar53. 


366       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


The  regiment  operated  with  four  battalions  during  this  exer- 
cise and  covered  a  very  wide  front.  In  spite  of  this  dispersal, 
Colonel  Bowen  was  able  to  exercise  effective  control  of  his  com- 
mand. Even  when  a  simulated  nuclear  weapon  knocked  out  the 
regimental  command  post,  control  procedures  were  so  well  con- 
ceived that  Lieutenant  Colonel  Brooke  Nihart,  the  ist  Battalion 
commander,  was  able  to  take  over  from  his  position  on  the  right 
flank.9 

Upon  completion  of  PACPHIBEX-II  Major  General  Robert 
H.  Pepper,  commanding  the  3d  Marine  Division,  reported  that 
the  training  objectives  had  been  achieved  in  a  superior  manner. 
With  the  success  of  this  amphibious  exercise,  an  eight-months' 
cycle  of  rigorous  training  for  the  4th  Marines  came  to  an  end. 
The  regiment  and  its  parent  division  were  now  rated  as  combat 
ready.  This  status  was  achieved  none  too  soon,  for  on  17  July 
the  3d  Marine  Division  was  alerted  for  movement  to  the  Far 
East. 

MOVEMENT  TO  JAPAN 

These  orders,  which  arrived  at  FMFPac  Headquarters  without 
warning,  were  the  result  of  enemy  successes  in  Korea.  After  two 
years  of  negotiations,  just  when  an  armistice  appeared  imminent, 
the  Communists  suddenly  attacked  and  punched  out  gains  all 
along  the  line.  The  United  Nations  Command  committed  all 
reserves  available  in  Korea  and  recalled  a  regimental  combat  team 
of  the  U.S.  24th  Infantry  Division  from  Japan,  leaving  the  Far 
East  theater  with  very  few  uncommitted  reserves.  It  was  to  bol- 
ster the  UN  forces  that  the  3d  Division  was  scheduled  by  the  JCS 
for  movement  to  the  Far  East.10 

The  alert  of  17  July  carried  neither  mission  nor  destination, 


9  Nihart  letter. 

10  FMFPac  Special  Rept,  "Deployment  of  the  3d  MarDiv  and  Air  Units 
to  the  Far  East  Command — Summer  1953,"  dtd  2gMar54. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— MID  CENTURY  MODEL  367 


but  the  possibility  of  combat  assignment  in  Korea  called  for  se- 
curity measures  to  conceal  preparations  for  departure.11  Com- 
manders and  staff  officers,  dressed  in  civilian  clothes,  met  in  their 
homes  on  Sunday,  19  July,  so  that  there  would  be  no  unusual 
activity  at  division  headquarters.  Tentative  plans  and  orders 
were  drawn  up  to  cover  assignment  either  to  Korea  or  Japan. 
They  were  put  into  effect  on  the  23d  when  orders  arrived  from 
Marine  Corps  Headquarters  to  mount  out.  But  there  was  still 
no  mission  or  destination  more  specific  than  reporting  to  the  Far 
East  Command. 

For  the  4th  Marines,  and  the  rest  of  the  3d  Division,  replace- 
ment of  personnel  ineligible  for  overseas  service  was  the  most 
serious  problem  to  be  solved  before  departure.  By  order  of  the 
Commandant,  no  Marines,  except  for  a  few  specialists  in  short 
supply,  who  had  already  served  in  Korea  could  return  to  the  Far 
East  without  waiving  in  writing  their  Korea  veteran  status. 
There  were,  in  addition,  a  number  of  Marines  who,  because  of 
pending  action  on  hardship  discharges  and  medical  surveys,  were 
to  be  left  behind.  All  in  all,  these  two  groups  amounted  to  nearly 
50  per  cent  of  division  strength. 

Separation  of  ineligibles  began  shortly  after  receipt  of  the  or- 
ders to  begin  movement  to  the  Far  East  and  was  completed  by  29 
July.  Replacements  began  pouring  into  Camp  Pendleton  on  the 
30th,  and,  by  5  August,  division  units  had  been  built  back  up  to 
authorized  strength.  For  the  4th  Marines,  the  necessity  to  dis- 
band the  quadrangular  test  units — Company  K  and  the  4th  Bat- 
talion— created  additional  administrative  problems.  Property 
had  to  be  inventoried  and  personnel  transferred.12 

Word  of  the  destination  came  on  30  July.  Three  days  before, 
an  armistice  had  finally  been  signed.  Under  its  terms,  reinforce- 
ments to  Korea  were  forbidden,  so  the  division  was  routed  to 

n  3d  MarDiv,  Type  G  Rept,  "Deployment  of  3d  MarDiv  to  the  Far  East," 
dtd  2gAug53. 
u  Bowen  letter. 


368       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Japan.  On  i  August  a  division  operation  order  was  issued  call- 
ing for  combat  loading  of  one  RGT  and  administrative  loading 
of  all  other  division  units. 

The  4th  Marines,  designated  for  administrative  loading, 
mounted  out  in  two  echelons.  On  4  August  the  first  echelon  be- 
gan loading.  By  the  8th  all  were  on  board  the  transports  General 
Black,  and  General  Brewster,  and  had  sailed  for  the  Far  East. 
The  second  echelon  sailed  on  board  the  General  Howze  on  the 
13th. 

During  the  voyage  to  the  Far  East,  Colonel  Bowen  revived  the 
famous  motto  of  the  regiment,  "Hold  High  the  Torch,"  which 
had  been  originated  by  Colonel  Shapley  in  1944  and  used  until 
1947  when  the  4th  Marines  was  disbanded.13 

JAPAN 

The  4th  Marines  landed  at  the  southern  Honshu  port  of  Kobe 
on  24  August  1953.  Boarding  trains  late  that  afternoon,  the 
Marines  headed  inland  for  Nara  which  was  to  be  their  home 
station  in  Japan.14  It  was  late  at  night  when  the  train  pulled 
into  the  Nara  station.  A  march  of  about  two  miles  through  the 
dark  streets  of  the  city  brought  the  Marines  to  Camp  Nara,  new 
home  of  the  regiment.15  This  camp  had  been  constructed  by 
the  U.S.  Army  originally  for  the  25th  Division.  When  the  in- 
fantrymen pulled  out  for  Korea,  their  camp  became  a  rest  and 


13  Bowen  letter;  MajGen  Alan  Shapley,  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMG,  dtd 
7Apr59  (Monograph  and  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMG). 

14  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  section  is  based  on  3d  MarDiv  and  4th  Mar 
GmD's,  July  1954-January  1955;  and  Furgurson,  "The  4th  Marines,"  pp. 
198-210. 

15  LtCol  George  M.  Dawes  memo  to  Head  HistBr,  HQMC,  n.d.,  hereafter 
Dawes  memo;  and  LtCol  James  T.  Kisgen  memo  to  Head  HistBr,  HQMG, 
dtd  27May59,  hereafter  Kisgen  memo  (both  in  Monograph  &  Comment  File, 
HistBr,  HQMG). 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— MID  CENTURY  MODEL  369 


rehabilitation  center  for  men  returning  from  the  war.  The  camp, 
which  was  administered  by  the  Army's  Southwestern  Command, 
was  made  up  of  five  separate  areas.  Three  of  them  were  prac- 
tically contiguous,  but  the  other  two  were  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  city,  nearly  30  minutes  away. 

Camp  Nara  was  close  to  good  liberty,  with  Kyoto,  Osaka, 
and  Kobe  less  than  an  hour  away  by  the  efficient  Japanese  inter- 
urban  railways.  Nara  itself  is  one  of  the  chief  tourist  attractions 
of  Japan.  An  ancient  cultural  center,  the  city  contains  the 
tombs  of  the  emperors  of  ancient  Japan,  the  park  of  the  Emperor's 
sacred  deer,  and  some  of  the  largest  and  most  beautiful  Buddhist 
temples  in  the  country. 

Liberty  was  not  granted  at  first.  This  was  a  precautionary 
measure  taken  by  Colonel  Bowen  after  a  warning  on  the  day  of 
arrival  from  Brigadier  General  Homer  L.  Litzenberg,  Assistant 
Commander  of  the  3d  Marine  Division,  that  Communists  were 
planning  to  create  incidents  between  the  Marines  and  the  local 
residents.  Shortly  after  arriving  at  Nara  a  meeting  between  Ma- 
rine and  Army  officers  and  Japanese  officials  and  business  men 
was  arranged  to  discuss  mutual  problems.  Colonel  Bowen  was 
told  at  this  meeting  that,  because  the  local  citizens  had  known 
Marines  only  as  enemy  combat  troops,  he  should  not  flood  the 
city  with  Marines  on  liberty  until  the  Japanese  had  become  ac- 
customed to  them. 

When  the  local  press  complimented  the  regiment  on  its  orderly 
conduct  during  its  march  from  the  railroad  station  to  the  camp, 
Bowen  decided  to  run  small  liberty  parties  during  daylight  hours. 
Joint  patrols  of  Marine  and  Army  MPs  and  Japanese  police 
were  organized  to  keep  order,  but  there  was  little  for  them  to  do. 
Liberty  parties  caused  little  or  no  trouble,  and,  before  long,  the 
restrictions  were  removed.  The  Marines  quickly  made  friends 
among  the  townspeople,  and,  by  the  end  of  the  first  month  at 
Nara,  Marines  were  playing  baseball  against  local  Japanese 


370       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


teams.  Of  particular  satisfaction  to  the  Marines  were  the  op- 
portunities to  join  in  the  life  of  Nara  by  contributing  to  churches, 
civic  groups,  and  local  charities.16 

In  Japan,  the  4th  Marines,  along  with  its  parent  division,  was 
charged  with  two  general  missions.  First  was  local  defense.  As 
the  Japanese,  by  terms  of  the  World  War  II  peace  treaty,  were 
allowed  to  maintain  only  very  modest  defense  forces,  the  U.S. 
occupation  forces  assumed  the  major  responsibility  for  defending 
the  country.  The  4th  Marines,  as  a  unit  of  the  Provisional  Corps, 
Japan,  shared  responsibility  for  defense  of  southern  Honshu. 
Made  up  of  the  3d  Marine  Division,  the  Army's  387th  Airborne 
RCT,  and  the  2d  Amphibious  Support  Command,  the  corps  was 
headed  by  the  commanding  general  of  the  3d  Marine  Division. 

To  be  instantly  ready  for  emergency  operations  in  the  Far  East 
was  the  other  major  mission  of  the  4th  Marines  in  Japan.  In 
Korea  an  uneasy  armed  truce  existed;  in  Indochina  aggressive 
local  Communist  forces,  supplied  and  encouraged  by  the  Chinese, 
were  threatening  to  overthrow  the  French  regime;  and  elsewhere 
around  the  rim  of  free  Asia,  Communist  diplomatic  and  psycho- 
logical offensives  might  erupt  into  open  warfare  at  any  moment. 
If  armed  intervention  were  called  for  in  any  of  these  cases,  the 
4th  Marines,  along  with  other  Marine  forces,  had  specific  missions 
to  perform. 

To  maintain  readiness  for  these  missions  required  constant 
training.  Japan  was  far  from  ideal  as  a  training  site.  Dense  pop- 
ulation and  rugged  terrain  combined  severely  to  limit  maneuver 
room.  Most  land  not  occupied  or  cultivated  was  nearly  vertical, 
leaving  only  the  slopes  of  Mt.  Fuji  for  exercises  of  a  full  regiment. 
Employed  before  World  War  II  by  the  Japanese  Army,  the  Fuji 
area,  because  of  its  isolation  from  populated  areas,  freedom  from 
administrative  routine  of  garrison  life,  and  facilities  for  artillery 


19  Bow  en  letter;  Kisgen  memo;  and  Col  John  C.  Miller,  Jr.,  Itr  to  Col 
Charles  W.  Harrison,  dtd  3oMar59  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr, 
HQMC),  hereafter  Miller  letter. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— MID  CENTURY  MODEL  371 


and  tank-supported  problems  of  the  whole  regiment,  was  an  excel- 
lent maneuver  ground.17 

Two  smaller  areas  were  also  available  to  the  4th  Marines — 
Aebano,  60  miles  from  Nara,  where  battalion  problems  could 
be  conducted,  and  Uji,  between  Nara  and  Kyoto,  suitable  for 
company-size  problems.  Amphibious  maneuver  areas  were  even 
more  limited.  There  were  only  two  beaches  available.  At  Nagai 
in  the  Yokosuka  area,  reconnaissance  company  and  limited  shore 
party  exercises  could  be  held.  Chigasaki  could  accommodate  a 
regimental  landing  on  the  beach  but  lacked  maneuver  room  in- 
land. As  a  result,  most  amphibious  training  came  to  be  con- 
ducted at  Okinawa  or  Iwo  Jima.    (See  Map  32.) 

Almost  constant  shuttling  between  Camp  Nara  and  the  various 
training  areas  was  the  inevitable  result  of  this  setup.  The  moving 
began  in  November  1953  when  Colonel  John  C.  Miller,  Jr.,  who 
had  relieved  Bowen  on  3  October,  led  the  4th  Marines  to  Fuji 
for  a  month  of  intensive  training  at  every  level  from  fire  team  to 
regiment.  Following  the  maneuvers  at  Fuji  was  a  regimental 
landing  exercise  at  Chigasaki,  then  back  to  Nara  for  a  period  of 
garrison  routine. 

OPERATION  COMEBACK 

The  4th  Marines'  only  direct  participation  in  the  Korean  con- 
flict came  in  January  and  February  1954.  Although  an  armistice 
agreement  had  been  in  effect  since  the  preceding  July,  the  strug- 
gle between  the  Communist  and  the  Free  World  forces  continued 
on  the  political  and  psychological  fronts.  Chief  among  the  points 
at  issue  was  the  fate  of  prisoners  of  war  held  by  both  sides — some 
22,000  North  Koreans  and  Chinese  and  359  UN  personnel — who 
did  not  wish  to  return  home. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  armistice  agreement,  120  days  were 
devoted  to  "explanations,"  under  neutral  supervision,  by  repre- 

17  Kisgen  memo. 


372       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— MID  CENTURY  MODEL  373 


sentatives  of  both  sides  in  an  attempt  to  persuade  their  country- 
men to  return.  In  most  cases,  the  "explanations"  failed,  and  the 
UN  Command  decided  to  turn  their  prisoners  over  to  the  South 
Korean  and  Chinese  Nationalist  governments,  respectively.18 

The  U.S.  Navy  agreed  to  furnish  16  LSTs  to  carry  the  14,500 
soon  to  be  liberated  Chinese  to  Formosa.  To  insure  their  safe 
delivery,  Marine  guards  were  to  be  stationed  in  each  ship.  The 
3d  Battalion,  4th  Marines,  was  designated  for  the  job  and  arrived 
at  Inchon  on  19  January.  Tragedy  struck  when  3/4  was  trans- 
ferring from  the  transport  to  the  LSTs.  A  loaded  landing  craft 
capsized  and  drowned  2  7  Marines  and  two  Navy  hospital  corps- 
men  in  the  icy  waters  of  the  harbor. 

On  22  January,  the  Chinese  prisoners  were  released  and  loaded 
on  board  for  the  voyage  to  Formosa.  Accompanying  the  prison- 
ers were  Chinese  Nationalist  officers  who,  according  to  a  directive 
from  the  UN  Command,  were  to  take  charge  of  their  countrymen. 
The  Marine  mission  was  accordingly  modified  to  providing  gen- 
eral security  for  the  ships.  The  LSTs  reached  Formosa  on  the 
fifth  day  out,  unloaded  the  Chinese  passengers,  and  sailed  imme- 
diately for  Japan. 

After  an  absence  of  about  three  weeks,  3/4  was  back  at  Nara. 
Marines  of  the  battalion  had  played  a  part,  though  a  small  one, 
in  one  of  the  important  victories  of  the  Cold  War.  They  had 
escorted  to  freedom  former  Reds  who,  given  the  opportunity,  had 
chosen  not  to  return  to  Communist  rule.19 

TRAINING  CONTINUES 

Amphibious  training  moved  into  high  gear  in  February  and 
March  when  the  regiment  sailed  to  I  wo  Jima  to  participate  in 
a  division  landing  exercise.   The  2d  Battalion  sailed  first,  on  22 

18  Carl  Berger,  The  Korea  Knot  (Philadelphia:  University  of  Pennsylvania 
Press,  1957),  PP-  I73-I75- 

19MSgt  Robert  E.  Heinecke,  "Operation  Comeback,"  Leatherneck,  v.  37, 
no.  4  (Apr54),p.  44. 

519667—60  27 


374       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


February,  to  construct  defenses  on  the  island  in  preparation  for 
its  role  as  aggressors.  In  March  the  remainder  of  the  regiment 
left  Kobe  for  Iwo  Jima  where  it  was  assigned  at  first  as  division 
reserve.  After  the  initial  landing,  the  regiment  went  ashore  and 
maneuvered  as  an  assault  element  for  the  last  five  days  of  the 
exercise. 

Back  at  Nara,  training  continued  with  companies  and  bat- 
talions shuttling  back  and  forth  between  the  base  camp  and  Uji 
and  Aebano.  At  the  end  of  May  the  regiment  moved  back  to  the 
Fuji  area  for  a  month  of  concentrated  exercises  at  all  levels. 

On  8  June,  at  North  Camp  Fuji,  the  first  reproduction  of  the 
4th  Marines'  crest  was  delivered  to  the  regiment.  Adoption  of 
this  insignia  had  been  originated  the  previous  fall  by  Colonel 
Miller,  whose  purpose  was  to  stimulate  the  intangible  qualities 
of  esprit  de  corps  and  unit  loyalty  through  a  tangible  symbol — a 
military  practice  as  old  as  war  itself.  A  contest  among  the  mem- 
bers of  the  regiment  produced  the  design,  composed  of  a  yellow 
shield  with  a  red  cross  and  border,  crossed  officer  and  NCO 
swords,  a  blue  scroll  below  the  shield  bearing  the  words  "Fourth 
Marines,"  and  an  eagle  with  wings  outspread  above  the  shield. 
This  design  included  the  Marine  Corps  colors  of  scarlet  and  gold ; 
the  national  red,  white,  and  blue;  the  crossed  swords  represent- 
ing the  close  relationship  between  officers  and  enlisted  men;  and 
the  spread  eagle,  symbolizing  the  regiment's  tradition  of 
readiness.20 

The  following  summer  saw  the  regiment  engaged  in  another 
major  amphibious  exercise  under  the  leadership  of  Colonel  Fred- 
erick A.  Ramsey,  the  commanding  officer  since  7  April  1954. 
From  30  July  to  1 1  August  the  4th  Marines,  along  with  the 
Army's  187th  Airborne  RCT,  carried  out  landings  on  Okinawa. 
Leaving  Kobe  on  the  30th,  the  naval  attack  force  steamed  south 

20  Col  John  C.  Miller  ltr  to  Col  Charles  W.  Harrison,  dtd  24Mar5g;  and 
LtCol  George  M.  Dawes  interview  by  HistBr,  HQMC,  dtd  isMarsg  (both 
in  Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — MID  CENTURY  MODEL  375 


under  simulated  combat  conditions  to  put  the  Marine  and  Army 
regiments  ashore  in  an  assault  landing  on  6  August.  Three  days 
of  maneuvers  ashore  ended  on  the  9th  when  an  emergency  call 
came  for  the  transport  shipping  to  shift  refugees  from  northern 
to  southern  Indochina — an  aftermath  of  the  truce  ending  the 
civil  war  in  that  country.  The  troops  hastily  loaded  back  aboard 
for  a  high  speed  return  voyage  to  Japan.  On  1 1  August  the 
Marines  debarked  at  Kobe  and  returned  by  truck  to  Camp  Nara. 
Colonel  Wood  B.  Kyle  took  command  of  the  regiment  on  the 
24th. 

During  September  and  October  the  4th  Marines  was  back  at 
Fuji  for  another  round  of  training  exercises.  The  advance  eche- 
lon arrived  at  the  mountain  training  area  in  the  midst  of  typhoon 
"Marie."  North  Camp  Fuji's  tent  city  was  completely  flattened 
by  the  heavy  winds,  and  the  Marines  huddled  together,  wet  and 
miserable,  in  the  few  tents  they  were  able  to  erect.  Long  hours 
of  hard  work  barely  made  the  camp  habitable  in  time  before  the 
main  body  of  the  regiment  arrived.21 

This  was  the  last  training  period  on  Fuji  for  the  4th  Marines. 
On  2  January  1955  the  regiment  was  alerted  for  imminent  trans- 
fer to  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  Part  of  President  Eisenhower's 
strategy  of  disengagement,  the  withdrawal  of  the  4th  Marines 
was  one  step  in  a  general  redeployment.  This  included  also  the 
recall  of  the  1st  Marine  Division  and  certain  Army  units  from 
the  Far  East  to  strategic  reserve  positions  in  Hawaii  and  the 
continental  United  States.22 

On  20  December  1954,  Secretary  of  Defense  Charles  E.  Wilson 
had  announced  the  imminent  withdrawal  of  the  1st  Marine  Di- 
vision from  Korea,  and  on  the  23d  General  Shepherd  sent  Lieu- 
tenant General  Robert  H.  Pepper,  then  Commanding  General, 


21  Kisgen  memo. 

22  "Budget  Message  of  the  President,"  in  The  Budget  of  the  United  States 
Government  for  the  Year  Ending  June  30,  1956  (Washington:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1956). 


376       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


FMFPac,  detailed  instructions  for  the  move,  including  orders  for 
transferring  an  RCT  of  the  3d  Marine  Division  to  Hawaii.  Ma- 
jor General  James  P.  Risely,  now  commanding  the  division,  des- 
ignated the  4th  Marines  for  the  move. 

Preliminary  planning  conferences  between  regimental  and  di- 
vision staffs  regarding  embarkation  of  the  4th  Marines  took  place 
on  3  and  5  January,  and,  on  the  6th,  FMFPac  issued  an  opera- 
tion plan  for  the  redeployment  of  an  RCT  built  around  the  4th 
Marines.  On  the  8th  the  3d  Division  issued  its  operation  plan  for 
the  move  and  activated  RCT-4.  Reinforcing  units  included  the 
3d  Battalion,  12th  Marines  (artillery);  Company  C,  3d  Motor 
Transport  Battalion;  Company  E,  3d  Medical  Battalion;  Com- 
pany B,  3d  Shore  Party  Battalion;  and  detachments  of  the  3d 
Service  Regiment  and  Division  Headquarters  Battalion. 

Detailed  planning  for  outloading  RCT-4  began  at  once,  and, 
with  receipt  on  18  January  of  the  division  directive  to  execute 
redeployment  plans,  movement  of  supplies  and  equipment  to 
Kobe  began.  Loading  of  shipping  began  on  the  2 2d.  By  the 
25th  all  hands  and  gear  were  on  board,  and  the  convoy  sortied 
for  Hawaii. 

Embarkation  was  complicated  by  arrival  of  about  1,900  re- 
placements, needed  to  bring  the  regiment  up  to  strength  after  the 
transfer  of  "short-timers"  and  non-effectives.  The  vast  majority 
of  the  new  men  were  privates  and  privates  first  class  who,  under 
existing  Marine  Corps  policy,  had  not  been  classified  according 
to  their  specialized  skills.  There  was  not  enough  time  to  perform 
a  complete  individual  classification  on  each  man,  so  blocks  of  re- 
placements were  assigned  arbitrarily  to  units  and  the  necessary 
classification  performed  on  board  ship  during  the  voyage  to 
Hawaii.23 


^LtCol  William  R.  Ourand,  Jr.,  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  7May59  (Monograph  & 
Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC ) . 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— MID  CENTURY  MODEL  377 


THE  AIR-GROUND  TASK  FORCE 

Hula  girls  and  Hawaiian  music  greeted  the  4th  Marines  on  4 
February  when  the  ships  carrying  the  regiment  docked  at  Pearl 
Harbor.  Boarding  trucks  the  Marines  motored  through  Hono- 
lulu and  over  the  Pali,  the  famous  pass  where  the  Hawaiian  na- 
tional hero,  King  Kamehameha  I,  is  alleged  to  have  disposed  of 
his  enemies,  to  their  new  post  on  the  windward  side  of  Oahu. 
The  Marine  Corps  Air  Station,  Kaneohe  Bay,  new  home  of  the 
4th  Marines,  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  comfortable  posts  in 
the  Corps.  Modern  barracks  set  among  lawns  and  well-kept 
shrubbery  provide  a  standard  of  life  as  good  as  any  in  the  Marine 
Corps.24 

At  this  post  the  4th  Marines  assumed  a  new  mission  as  the 
ground  element  of  the  1st  Provisional  Marine  Air-Ground  Task 
Force.  Under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General  Edward  C. 
Dyer,  this  composite  force  also  included  Colonel  Robert  John- 
son's Marine  Aircraft  Group  (MAG)  13.  The  4th  Marines  and 
the  reinforcing  units  making  up  RCT-4  were  attached  to  the  Air- 
Ground  Task  Force  only  for  operational  control.  They  con- 
tinued under  the  administrative  control  of  the  3d  Marine  Divi- 
sion, until  1  o  July  when  this  latter  function  was  transferred  to  the 
Air-Ground  Task  Force. 

This  change  in  status  resulted  from  the  Commandant's  decision 
to  assign  the  4th  Marines  permanently  to  Kaneohe  rather  than  to 
rotate  it  with  other  regiments  of  Fleet  Marine  Force,  Pacific — a 
plan  which  had  to  be  abandoned  because  of  a  shortage  of  ship- 
ping. For  the  members  of  the  4th  Marines,  one  important  result 
of  this  "home  porting"  was  that  families  were  officially  author- 
ized to  join  the  regiment  overseas  for  the  first  time  since  December 
1940.25 

24  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based  on  4th  Mar  HistD,  ijan- 
3iOct55. 

25  CMC  msg  to  CinCPac,  dtd  7^55,  End  12,  App  I,  FMFPac  HistD, 
iApr-3oJun55. 


378       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


An  air-ground  task  force  had  first  been  proposed  by  the 
FMFPac  staff  in  a  study  completed  in  October  1950.  The 
Inchon-Seoul  campaign  had  just  ended,  and  total  defeat  of  the 
North  Korean  Communists  seemed  imminent.  Early  with- 
drawal of  the  Marines  appeared  likely.  General  Shepherd,  then 
FMFPac  commanding  general,  was  rightly  concerned  with  main- 
taining a  ready  force  capable  of  dealing  with  future  emergencies 
in  the  Far  East.  Pointing  out  the  continuing  instability  in  the 
Orient,  his  staff  anticipated  situations  "which  [might]  demand 
the  immediate  dispatch  of  a  balanced  amphibious  force-in-readi- 
ness  to  preserve  or  protect  United  States  interests  in  the  Pacific 
Area.  Operations  of  such  a  force,"  the  report  continued,  "may 
extend  all  the  way  from  peaceful  occupation  and  installation  of 
defenses  to  the  short-notice  conduct  of  a  full-scale  amphibious  as- 
sault, including  close  air  support."  26 

If  this  emergency  force  were  to  achieve  the  desired  perfection 
in  tactical  teamwork,  the  FMFPac  staff  officers  felt,  a  single 
commander  over  both  air  and  ground  elements  was  needed.  A 
precedent  existed  for  such  a  balanced  force  in  the  1st  Provisional 
Marine  Brigade  sent  to  Korea  in  July  1950 — a  unit  which  in- 
cluded an  RGT  and  a  Marine  Air  Group. 

Close  coordination  between  air  and  ground  elements  had  al- 
ways been  a  fundamental  Marine  Corps  principle,  and  over  the 
years  a  remarkably  efficient  system  of  close  air  support  for  ground 
troops  had  been  developed.  But  never  before  the  activation  of 
the  1  st  Provisional  Brigade  in  1950  had  the  intimacy  between  air 
and  ground  elements  extended  so  far  as  to  place  both  under  a  sin- 
gle commander.  It  was  this  newly  battle-proven  concept  which 
General  Shepherd  wished  to  perpetuate  and  perfect. 

The  following  month  General  Shepherd  recommended  to  Ad- 
miral Arthur  W.  Radford,  the  Commander  in  Chief  Pacific  Fleet, 

29  Hq  FMFPac  Staff  Study:  "The  Establishment  of  a  Balanced  FMF  Air- 
Ground  Force  in  the  WestPac,"  dtd  igOctso,  Encl  J,  App  II,  FMFPac 
HistD,  i-3iOct50. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — MID  CENTURY  MODEL  379 


that  the  proposed  air-ground  task  force  be  stationed  at  the  Ma- 
rine Corps  Air  Station,  Kaneohe  Bay.  Favoring  this  selection,  in 
Shepherd's  opinion,  were  the  advantages  of  central  location  of 
Hawaii  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  operating  area  and  good  port  facilities 
which  would  permit  speedy  assembly  of  shipping  and  embarka- 
tion of  the  landing  force.  These  advantages  outweighed,  in  Shep- 
herd's mind,  the  disadvantage  of  long  steaming  distance  to 
potential  trouble  areas.  The  climate  favored  all-year  training, 
liberty  conditions  were  good,  and  Kaneohe  could  be  expanded  to 
house  an  RGT  and  MAG  at  minimum  cost.  Also,  forces  could 
easily  be  rotated  between  Hawaii  and  California  if  necessary. 
Finally,  and  most  important  to  Shepherd,  locating  the  force  at 
Kaneohe  would  keep  it  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  operating  area  and 
therefore  under  naval  control.27 

Not  until  26  months  later  were  troops  available  for  assignment 
to  the  proposed  air-ground  unit.  On  16  January  1953,  the  1st 
Provisional  Marine  Air-Ground  Task  Force  was  activated  at 
Kaneohe.  But  continued  troop  shortages  permitted  the  assign- 
ment of  only  a  battalion-size  ground  element.  Effective  organiza- 
tion was  delayed  until  the  arrival  of  RCT-4  in  February  1955. 28 

Training  of  the  Air-Ground  Task  Force  to  work  effectively  as 
a  team  was  General  Dyer's  major  responsibility.  But  before  this 
job  could  be  started,  RCT-4  na<^  to  regain  a  state  of  combat 
readiness.  In  Japan  the  4th  Marines  had  been  a  highly  trained 
and  efficient  combat  unit,  but  replacement  of  large  numbers  of 
experienced  Marines  by  relatively  unskilled  personnel  had  greatly 
reduced  the  combat  readiness  of  the  regiment.  Attachment  of 
supporting  units  undergoing  similar  changes  aggravated  the 
problem. 

Colonel  Kyle  lost  no  time  in  beginning  the  rebuilding  task. 
On  9  February,  only  five  days  after  arrival,  units  of  the  regiment 

*  GG  FMFPac  ltr  to  CinCPac,  14N0V50,  End  5,  App  II,  FMFPac  HistD, 
1-30N0V50. 
28  FMFPac  HistD,  1-31^1153. 


380       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


began  basic  individual  instruction,  looking  forward  to  an  in- 
tensive training  program  scheduled  to  begin  on  i  March.  The 
first  month  of  this  program  was  devoted  to  individual  training, 
small  unit  tactics,  and  requalification  firing.  By  the  beginning 
of  April  the  regiment  was  ready  for  field  exercises  and  air-ground 
training,  including  air  lift  and  close  air  support. 

Kaneohe,  so  ideal  in  many  respects,  lacked  facilities  for  more 
than  non-firing  small  unit  problems.  To  conduct  battalion 
maneuvers  or  firing  exercises  of  any  kind  the  regiment  had  to 
move  off  the  base.  Ever  since  the  arrival  of  RCT-4  in  Hawaii 
the  regimental  staff  had  been  busy  lining  up  suitable  training 
areas,  pressing  into  service  facilities  all  over  the  island. 

Bellows  Air  Force  Base,  13  miles  away,  was  the  closest.  The 
approximately  1,300  acres  of  this  disused  airfield  were  used  for 
non-firing  small  unit  problems,  landing  exercises,  and  air  support 
and  helicopter  air  lift  problems.  At  Waikane,  a  15-mile  drive 
from  the  main  gate,  .30  and  .50  caliber  machine  guns,  60  and 
81mm  mortars,  and  75mm  recoilless  rifles  could  be  fired.  The 
Kahuku  area  also  provided  firing  ranges  for  all  these  weapons, 
and,  in  addition,  space  for  battalion  exercises  and  close  air  sup- 
port problems.  To  fire  105mm  howitzers  or  4.2-inch  mortars  it 
was  necessary  to  make  a  70-mile  trip  to  Makua  or  Schofield  cen- 
tral range,  both  Army  training  areas.  Exercise  of  the  entire  RGT 
at  once  required  a  move  off  the  island.    (See  Map  33.) 

Intensive  training  utilizing  these  training  facilities  got  under 
way  during  April  and  continued  from  then  on  at  an  intensive 
pace.  In  keeping  with  its  role  as  the  ground  component  of  an 
air-ground  task  force,  RCT-4  placed  particular  emphasis  on  train- 
ing with  MAG- 1 3.  To  the  maximum  extent  possible,  fighter 
aircraft  flew  close  air  support  as  part  of  ground  unit  problems. 
And  training  in  troop  and  supply  movement  by  helicopter  and 
fixed-wing  aircraft  was  given  continuing  attention.  Guerrilla 
operations,  mountain  warfare,  and  night  operations  were  also 
stressed  throughout  training. 


382       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 

By  the  winter  of  1956,  training  of  both  ground  and  air  ele- 
ments of  the  1  st  Provisional  Marine  Air-Ground  Task  Force  had 
progressed  to  the  stage  where  a  full-scale  Task  Force  landing 
exercise  was  practical.  Accordingly,  General  Dyer,  in  February, 
announced  Operation  MAUKA,  to  be  held  between  7  and  13 
April.29  The  purpose  of  the  exercise  was  to  gain  experience  in 
operating  on  a  task  force  level,  and  to  test  the  latest  atomic-age 
tactics  in  amphibious  operations.  Employing  helicopters  and 
simulated  atomic  weapons,  as  well  as  conventional  air,  sea,  and 
ground  forces,  the  Task  Force  was  to  seize  and  defend  a  beach- 
head enclosing  an  airstrip  on  the  island  of  Kauai,  about  75  miles 
northwest  of  Oahu. 

At  0800  on  7  April,  2/4  and  3/4  landed  on  the  Black  and 
Blue  Beaches  respectively,  under  the  critical  eye  of  Colonel  James 
M.  Masters,  Sr.,  the  regimental  commander.  A  part  of  the  2d 
Battalion  was  put  down  on  the  airstrip  by  helicopters.  These 
men  were  soon  joined  by  their  LVT-landed  comrades  who,  sup- 
ported by  close  air  strikes  and  naval  gunfire,  quickly  overcame 
aggressor  defenses. 

Aggressors  concealed  on  the  high  volcanic  cliffs  overlooking 
the  beaches  harassed  3/4  with  simulated  mortar  and  small-arms 
fire  until  aircraft  of  MAG- 13  delivered  an  "atomic"  strike  on 
the  cliff  positions.  After  a  helicopter-borne  radiation  team  had 
checked  the  blast  area  for  radiation,  other  helicopters  lifted  two 
platoons  of  Company  G  to  seize  enemy  positions  knocked  out 
by  the  blast.  The  airstrip  secured,  MAG- 13  fighters  landed  to 
base  there  and  continue  close  air  support  of  the  ground  troops. 
Four-engined  transports  of  VMR-152  and  -352  began  air  lifting 
supplies,  delivering  260,000  pounds  during  a  17-hour  period. 

Under  cover  of  simulated  atomic  weapons  the  2d  and  3d  Bat- 
talions jumped  off  to  clear  the  enemy  from  his  remaining  cliff 
positions.    An  Aggressor  atomic  bomb  exploded  over  3/4,  "an- 


The  Windward  Marine  (Kaneohe),  ioFeband  i3Apr56. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — MID  CENTURY  MODEL  383 


nihilating"  two  companies.  All  available  personnel  and  vehicles 
were  pressed  into  service,  evacuating  300  casualties  to  Company 
E,  3d  Medical  Battalion  in  a  two-hour  period.  To  replace  the 
shattered  assault  battalion,  1/4  was  helicopter  lifted  from  reserve 
to  attack  positions  and  completed  the  seizure  of  enemy  emplace- 
ments on  the  cliffs. 

This  ended  Operation  MAUKA.  General  Dyer  gave  a  "hearty 
well  done"  to  all  members  of  his  command,  while  the  Aggressor 
commander  remarked  that  "the  4th  Marines  appear  well  trained, 
particularly  on  the  small  unit  level  .  .  .  30 

On  1  May  1956,  the  Air-Ground  Task  Force  was  redesignated 
the  1  st  Marine  Brigade.  No  organizational  changes  accompanied 
the  switch  in  title,  the  main  purpose  of  which  was  to  perpetuate 
the  honors  and  traditions  of  the  1st  Brigade,  dating  back  to  the 
Philippine  insurrection  and  including  service  in  Haiti,  World  War 
II,  and  Korea.31 

In  June,  Brigadier  General  George  R.  E.  Shell  relieved  General 
Dyer  as  commander  of  the  1st  Brigade.  Soon  after  his  arrival 
the  new  commanding  general  ordered  the  reinforcing  units  of 
RCT-4  placed  directly  under  brigade  command.  The  purpose 
of  this  change  was  to  relieve  the  Commanding  Officer,  4th  Ma- 
rines, of  the  burden  of  administering  the  attached  units  of  the 
regiment  and  to  simplify  the  command  and  administration  of  the 
entire  brigade.  Carried  out  in  stages,  the  reorganization  was  com- 
pleted by  September  1956.  RCT-4  was  tnen  dissolved  and  the 
4th  Marines  became  a  regular  infantry  regiment  for  the  first  time 
since  January  1955. 32 

Because  of  the  demands  of  the  atomic  age  for  unit  separation, 
a  program  of  independent  battalion  landing  team  exercises  oc- 


30  The  Windward  Marine,  i3Apr56. 

31  The  Windward  Marine,  2  7Apr56. 

^LtGol  James  G.  Juett  memo  to  CMC,  dtd  i6Mar59,  hereafter  Juett 
memo;  and  LtCol  John  A.  Lindsay  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  4Mar59,  hereafter 
Lindsay  letter  (both  in  Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 


384       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


cupied  the  summer  of  1956.  Each  battalion,  reinforced  to  BLT 
strength,  conducted  an  amphibious  landing  on  Kauai.  All  phases 
of  each  program,  including  planning,  naval  coordination,  em- 
barkation, landing,  passing  of  control  ashore,  and  operations 
against  the  aggressors  ashore,  were  carried  out  entirely  at  bat- 
talion landing  team  level.  Tactical  withdrawal  after  three  days 
ashore  concluded  the  first  phase  of  this  training.  The  second 
phase  consisted  of  battalion  landing  team  firing  exercises  in  the 
Pohakuloa  area  of  the  island  of  Hawaii.  Air  strikes  and  artillery 
fires,  as  well  as  the  firing  of  all  infantry  weapons,  characterized 
this  part  of  the  training.  Tactical  helicopter  lifts  were  also  con- 
ducted. Colonel  Bryghte  D.  Godbold,  the  regimental  com- 
mander since  9  June,  and  his  staff  observed,  graded,  and  de- 
livered a  critique  of  the  performance  of  each  battalion  landing 
team.33 

A  full  brigade  air-transported  attack  on  Kaneohe  Bay  followed 
the  battalion  landing  team  exercises.  On  26  September,  the 
brigade  moved  by  air  from  Hilo,  on  the  island  of  Hawaii,  to  land 
and  seize  Kaneohe  Air  Station  and  surrounding  area.  Follow- 
ing an  atomic  weapon  drop  by  MAG— 13,  designed  to  clear  the 
area  of  enemy  resistance  yet  leave  the  field  usable  by  friendly 
planes,  3/4  began  landing  in  fixed-wing  aircraft.  By  nightfall,  the 
battalion  had  occupied  defensive  positions  around  the  field.  On 
the  two  following  days,  1/4,  2/4,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
brigade  landed  and  expanded  the  air  head.  Altogether,  about 
6,000  troops,  together  with  their  supplies,  had  been  transported 
by  air  over  a  distance  of  more  than  100  miles  and  landed  in 
tactical  sequence.34 

Training  of  the  1st  Marine  Brigade  continued  at  an  intensive 
level.  Continuous  individual  and  small  unit  training  were  com- 
bined with  major  exercises  to  maintain  a  high  state  of  combat 
readiness.    In  Operation  TRADEWINDS,  held  on  Kauai  dur- 


33  Juett  memo;  and  Lindsay  letter. 
3i  Juett  memo. 


FORCE  IN  READINESS — MID  CENTURY  MODEL  385 


ing  August  1957,  the  brigade  continued  to  develop  the  am- 
phibious techniques  of  the  atomic  age.  This  exercise  included 
an  amphibious  assault  followed  by  three  days  of  maneuvers 
ashore.  Of  particular  importance  was  the  landing  in  assault  of  a 
full  BLT  by  helicopters  from  the  specially  converted  carrier 
Thetis  Bay.  Other  techniques  tested  included  a  system  for  pump- 
ing fuel  ashore  in  bulk  through  a  floating  pipeline,  mass  casualty 
evacuation  after  atomic  attack,  and  communications  under  con- 
ditions of  wide  dispersal.35 

Ability  to  embark  rapidly  in  ships  or  aircraft  with  all  equip- 
ment necessary  for  combat  in  any  climatic  zone  is  also  of  great  im- 
portance to  a  mobile  striking  force.  Beginning  in  October  1956, 
special  measures  designed  to  achieve  the  utmost  in  embarkation 
readiness  were  taken  by  the  4th  Marines.  With  the  encourage- 
ment of  Colonel  Godbold,  Major  Franklin  J.  Harte  and  his  1st 
Battalion  drew  up  a  list  of  supplies  and  equipment  needed  to 
maintain  the  battalion  for  30  days  in  a  temperate,  tropical,  or 
arctic  climate.  A  further  breakdown  indicated  the  items  required 
for  immediate  combat  and  those  necessary  only  for  garrison  serv- 
ice in  each  of  the  climatic  zones.  Based  on  this  data,  complete 
embarkation  tables  were  prepared  to  cover  movement  by  air  or 
surface  transportation  to  any  of  the  three  climatic  zones.36 

Colonel  Godbold  was  so  impressed  by  this  system  that  he  di- 
rected its  application  to  the  entire  regiment.  In  addition  to  the 
preparation  of  embarkation  tables,  the  regimental  commander 
took  an  additional  step  by  ordering  the  physical  separation  of  the 
supplies  and  equipment.  Completion  of  these  measures  made 
possible  embarkation  of  the  4th  Marines,  ready  to  fight,  in  a  mat- 
ter of  hours. 

In  addition  to  maintaining  a  high  state  of  combat  readiness, 
the  4th  Marines  carried  on  the  regimental  tradition  for  military 

35  1  st  MarBrig  Type  E  Rept,  Brig  AGLEX  58A  (TRADE WINDS),  dtd 
gOct57. 

38  CO  1/4,  Type  C,  Special  Rept:  Embarkation  Preparation,  dtd  i8Jun57. 


386       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


smartness  and  perfection  in  drill.  Ever  since  its  service  at  the  San 
Diego  and  San  Francisco  expositions  of  19 15  the  regiment  had 
enjoyed  a  reputation  for  "spit  and  polish"  as  well  as  combat  readi- 
ness. At  Kaneohe,  located  as  it  is  at  the  "crossroads  of  the  Pa- 
cific," inspections  by  high  ranking  military  officers  and  civilian 
officials  of  the  Department  of  Defense  were  so  frequent  as  to  be- 
come routine.  Praise  of  the  regiment  as  outstanding  was  com- 
mon. The  highest  commendation  came  from  senior  Marine 
officers  who,  having  served  in  the  regiment  during  its  palmy  days 
in  Shanghai,  declared  the  new  4th  to  be  superior  to  the  old  China 
Marines  in  military  drill  and  appearance.  Adding  to  the  color 
of  these  ceremonies  was  the  regimental  drum  and  bugle  corps 
which  played  the  regiment  past  many  distinguished  visitors  to  the 
strains  of  a  special  version  of  "Battle  Hymn  of  the  Republic," 
adopted  as  the  regimental  marching  song.37 

The  regiment  was  also  outstanding  in  esprit  de  corps,  as  evi- 
denced by  its  reenlistments.  For  the  five-month  period  from 
June  through  September  1956,  the  4th  Marines  attained  a  re- 
enlistment  rate  approximately  65  per  cent  above  the  Marine 
Corps  average.  The  Commandant  of  the  Marine  Corps  was  so 
impressed  with  the  results  that  he  directed  the  regimental  com- 
mander, Colonel  Godbold,  to  report  in  detail  on  the  method 
which  had  been  used  in  the  4th  Marines  to  achieve  this  high  score. 
This  report  was  subsequently  published  to  all  commanding  of- 
ficers in  the  Marine  Corps.38 

During  the  same  period,  the  brig  and  hospital  lists  were  of 
moderate  proportions.  Unauthorized  absence  was  never  a  prob- 
lem and  disease  was  practically  non-existent.  As  one  battalion 
commander  put  it,  "In  every  endeavor,  in  the  field  or  in  the  gar- 
rison, the  4th  Marines  was  never  satisfied  with  a  'well-done.5  The 

37  Juett  memo;  Miller  letter;  and  LtCol  Alex  H.  Sawyer  ltr  to  CMC,  dtd 
3Mar59  (Monograph  &  Comment  File,  HistBr,  HQMG),  hereafter  Sawyer 
letter. 

38MarCorpsO  1 133.10,  dtd  27N0V56;  and  Encl  (1)  thereto:  GO  4th  Mar 
ltr  to  CMC,  dtd  5N0V56  (HistBr,  HQMG) . 


FORCE  IN  READINESS— MID  CENTURY  MODEL  387 


4th  was  a  'second  to  none'  outfit  capable  of  competing  in  any 
league  and  winning  the  pennant."  39 

On  27  November  1957,  the  4th  Marines  honored  a  fallen  for- 
mer comrade  and  commanding  officer.  At  impressive  ceremo- 
nies, the  regimental  parade  ground  was  named  Piatt  Field  in 
honor  of  Colonel  Wesley  McC.  Piatt,  who  died  on  27  September 
1 95 1  of  wounds  received  in  action  in  Korea.  Colonel  Piatt  had 
served  in  the  4th  Marines  as  a  second  lieutenant  at  Shanghai  from 
February  1938  to  July  1940,  and  from  21  October  1946  to  10 
July  1947  he  was  the  regimental  commander  at  Camp  Lejeune. 
Culminating  the  ceremony,  Colonel  George  A.  Roll,  commanding 
officer  of  the  4th  Marines  and  a  classmate  of  Colonel  Piatt's, 
accepted  for  the  regiment  a  bronze  memorial  plaque  from  the  1st 
Marine  Brigade  commander,  Brigadier  General  Avery  R.  Kier.40 

CONCLUSION 

Nearly  half  a  century  has  passed  since  the  4th  Marines  was  first 
organized  in  191 1.  All  but  five  of  the  regiment's  38  active  years 
have  been  spent  abroad — engaged  in  a  World  War,  fighting  a 
limited  engagement  in  the  Caribbean,  protecting  U.S.  interests 
in  China,  or  standing  ready  in  Japan  or  Hawaii  for  action  in  the 
Pacific  area.  Missions  have  varied,  and  the  regiment  has  ad- 
justed to  the  changing  conditions  of  operational  employment. 
But  readiness  for  varying  assignments  has  been  constant;  the  4th 
Marines  has  undertaken  its  widely  differing  tasks  swiftly  and 
effectively. 

Today,  the  4th  and  its  brother  Marine  regiments  are  as  neces- 
sary to  national  security  as  ever.  The  struggle  between  the  Free 
and  Communist  Worlds  continues — by  economic,  political,  and 
propaganda  methods  today,  but  possibly  by  armed  conflict  to- 


89  Sawyer  letter. 

40  The  Windward  Marine,  29N0V57;  4th  Mar  MRolls,  iFeb38~3 1 J11I40, 
iOct46-3iJul47. 


388       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


morrow.  In  this  troubled  world,  the  preservation  of  freedom 
calls  for  military  force  in  being.  It  must  be  ready  for  employ- 
ment if  necessary,  but,  in  any  event,  its  very  existence  is  a  constant 
reminder  to  the  Communists  to  treat  the  vital  interests  of  the 
United  States  with  respect. 

Mass-destruction  weapons,  employed  under  the  doctrine  of 
massive  retaliation,  are  not  suited  to  all  types  of  military  actions. 
They  are  essential  to  deter  all-out  attack  but  are  vastly  over-de- 
structive for  use  in  limited  actions  around  the  perimeter  of  the 
Free  World.  "An  H-bomb  cannot  project  our  national  policy 
ashore  in  foreign  lands  .  .  .  nor  bring  about  constructive 
changes  in  the  political  arrangements  of  an  area  vital  to  our  na- 
tional security,"  as  General  Randolph  McC.  Pate,  the  Com- 
mandant of  the  Marine  Corps,  put  it.  "The  man  on  the  ground 
with  a  rifle  and  the  warship  in  the  harbor  are  tangible  symbols  of 
the  power  of  the  United  States  of  America.  But  the  threat  of 
nuclear  attack  ...  is  impossible  to  see  with  the  naked  eye.  It 
is  like  the  electric  chair;  not  like  the  policeman  on  the  corner."  41 

Hard-hitting,  mobile  amphibious  forces — ground  and  air — are 
needed  to  deal  with  limited  aggression.  In  Korea,  Taiwan,  and 
Lebanon,  the  Marine  ground  soldier  and  fighter  pilot  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  action,  while  the  long  range  bomber  and  missile  re- 
mained on  the  runway  and  launching  pad. 

The  4th  Marines,  as  part  of  the  1st  Marine  Brigade,  is  a  vital 
element  of  ready  force.  True  to  the  traditions  of  its  Corps,  the 
4th  Marines  stands  today,  as  it  has  for  nearly  half  a  century, 
ready  to  do  its  part  as  a  component  of  the  nation's  force  in 
readiness. 


41  Statement  of  Gen  Randolph  McC.  Pate,  House  of  Representatives  Com- 
mittee on  Armed  Services,  Hearings  on  Sundry  Legislation  Affecting  the 
Naval  and  Military  Establishments,  85th  Congress,  1st  Session  (Washington, 
1957),  P-  185. 


APPENDIX  A 


Glossary  of  Abbreviations  and 
Technical  Terms 


AAA 

Antiaircraft  Artillprv 

1  XXI  1-J.CIXJ.  VI  CA.X.  i>   X  XL  till  vl  y 

AA 

Antiaircraft 

AGofS 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff 

Ad 

Administr?)  ti  vp 

X  lUllliillJLl  CL  LJ.  V 

Adv 

Advance 

AGLEX 

Air-Ground  Exercise 

ALUSNA 

U.S.  Naval  Attache 

AmXrac 

Amphibian  Tractor 

Amph 

Amnhihiou^ 

Ann 

Annual 

APA 

Assault  Transport 

Appr 

Approved 

AR 

Action  Report 

Art 

Article 

ARWC 

Army  War  College 

AsFlt 

Asiatic  Fleet 

Asst 

Assistant 

Ba 

Basic 

Bks 

Barracks 

BLT 

Battalion  Landing  Team 

Bn 

Battalion 

Brig 

Brigade 

Btry 

Battery 

GA 

Coast  Artillery 

CG 

Commanding  General 

CinC 

Commander  in  Chief 

CinCAF 

Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet 

519667—60  28  389 


390  HOLD 

HIGH  THE  TORCH 

CinCPac 

Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet 

CMC 

Commandant  of  the  Marine  Corps 

GmdD 

Command  Diary 

CO 

Commanding  Officer 

Co 

Company 

Cdr 

Commander 

ComAdvFor 

Commander  Advance  Force 

ComCruLant 

Commander  Cruisers,  Atlantic  Fleet 

CominCh 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.S.  Fleet 

ComSoPac 

Commander,  South  Pacific 

CTF 

Commander  Task  Force 

DA 

Department  of  the  Army 

Dept 

Department 

Det 

Detachment 

Dist 

District 

Div 

Division 

DOW 

Died  of  Wounds 

Eng 

Engineer 

ExO 

Executive  Officer 

Exped 

Expeditionary 

FEC 

Far  East  Command 

FieldO 

Field  Order 

IMAC 

I  Marine  Amphibious  Corps 

1/4 

1  st  Battalion,  4th  Marines 

Fit 

Fleet 

FltMarOff 

Fleet  Marine  Officer 

FMF 

Fleet  Marine  Force 

FMFPac 

Fleet  Marine  Force,  Pacific 

FMFWesPac 

Fleet  Marine  Force,  Western  Pacific 

For 

Force 

G-2 

Intelligence  Officer  or  Section,  Division  or  Above 

Gen 

General 

Gen  Corr 

General  Correspondence 

GHQ 

General  Headquarters 

Govt 

Government 

Grd 

Guard 

Hd 

Head 

Hist 

Historical 

HistBr 

Historical  Branch 

GLOSSARY  OF  ABBREVIATIONS  AND  TECHNICAL  TERMS 


391 


HistSec 

Historical  Section 

HQMG 

Headquarters,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 

H&S  Go 

Headquarters  and  Service  Company 

IIIAG 

III  Amphibious  Corps 

IJN 

Imperial  Japanese  Navy 

Inf 

Infantry 

Intel 

Intelligence 

JAN 

Joint  Army-Navy 

JASGO 

Joint  Assault  Signal  Company 

JCS 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 

MAG 

Marine  Aircraft  Group 

Mar 

Marine 

MarCorps 

Marine  Corps 

MarPac 

Department  of  the  Pacific,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 

Med 

Medical 

MIA 

Missing  in  Action 

MLR 

Main  Line  of  Resistance 

MP 

Military  Police 

MRoll 

Muster  Roll 

Msg 

Message 

MT 

Motor  Transport 

NA 

National  Archives 

Nav 

Navy 

NCO 

Noncommissioned  Officer 

NGF 

Naval  Gunfire 

NHD 

Naval  History  Division 

OGMH 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Military  History 

Off 

Officer 

OIG 

Officer  in  Charge 

OpO 

Operation  Order 

Op(s) 

Operation  (s) 

OPlan 

Operation  Plan 

Ord 

Ordnance 

PacFlt 

Pacific  Fleet 

PAGPHIBEX 

Pacific  Amphibious  Exercise 

PBY 

"Catalina"    Patrol   Bomber  Aircraft,   made  by 

Gonsolidated-Vultee 

Pers 

Personnel 

Plat 

Platoon 

392  HOLD 


HIGH  THE  TORCH 


POA 

Pacific  Ocean  Area 

POW 

Prisoner  of  War 

Prov 

Provisional 

PT  Boat 

Motor  Torpedo  Boat 

PX 

Post  Exchange 

QM 

Quartermaster 

R-i 

Regimental  Personnel  Officer 

R-2 

Regimental  Intelligence  Officer 

Rec 

Record 

Regt 

Regiment 

Reinf 

Reinforced 

Rept 

Report 

SAR 

Special  Action  Report 

S&G 

Secret  and  Confidential 

SctyFor 

Security  Force 

Sec 

Secretary  or  Section 

Sep 

Separate 

Ser 

Service 

S&S 

Service  and  Supply 

Stat 

Statute 

TAG 

The  Adjutant  General 

T/E 

Table  of  Equipment 

TF 

Task  Force 

TG 

Task  Group 

Tk 

Tank 

T/O 

Table  of  Organization 

Trk 

Truck 

Trng 

Training 

TU 

Task  Unit 

UN 

United  Nations 

USAFFE 

U.S.  Army  Forces  in  the  Far  East 

USFIP 

U.S.  Forces  in  the  Philippines 

VAC 

V  Amphibious  Corps 

VMF 

Marine  Fighter  Squadron 

VMO 

Marine  Observation  Squadron 

WarD 

War  Diary 

WD 

War  Department 

WIA 

Wounded  in  Action 

WMG 

W estern  Mail  Guard 

GLOSSARY  OF  ABBREVIATIONS  AND  TECHNICAL  TERMS 


393 


WWII  World  War  II 

Zero  Japanese  Mitsubishi  Single-engined  Fighter  Air- 

craft 


APPENDIX  B 


Chronology 


io  Mar  191 1  Colonel  Charles  A.  Doyen  activates  a  provisional 
regiment  at  Mare  Island.  Regiment  sails  for 
San  Diego. 

12  Mar  191 1  Provisional  regiment  arrives  at  San  Diego  and 
goes  into  camp  on  North  Island. 

20  Apr  191 1  Regiment  is  designated  4th  Provisional  Regi- 

ment. 

24  Jun  191 1  4th  Provisional  Regiment  is  disbanded  at  North 

Island. 

9  Apr  1 9 14  Mexican  authorities  at  Tampico  seize  a  ration 

party  from  USS  Dolphin. 
16  Apr  1 9 14         Colonel  Joseph  H.  Pendleton  reactivates  4th 
Regiment  at  Marine  Barracks,  Navy  Yard,  Puget 
Sound. 

U.S.  forces  land  and  occupy  Vera  Cruz,  Mexico. 

21  Apr  1 9 14  4th  Regiment  assembles  at  San  Francisco. 

22  Apr  1 9 14  4th  Regiment  sails  from  San  Francisco  for  west 

coast  of  Mexico. 
27  Apr  1 9 14         4th  Regiment  arrives  off  coast  of  Mexico. 

25  Jun  1 9 14  U.S.  agrees  to  withdraw  forces  from  Mexico. 

2  Jul  1 9 14  First  elements  of  the  4th  Regiment  depart  from 

Mexican  waters. 

10  Jul  1 9 14  4th  Regiment  encamps  on  North  Island,  San 

Diego. 

12  Dec  1 9 14  Regimental  Headquarters  and  the  2d  Battalion 

go  into  camp  at  the  Panama-California  Exposi- 
tion in  San  Diego. 

394 


16  Feb  1915 

17  Jun  1915 

30  Jun  1915 
26  Nov  1915 

3  Feb  1916 

18  Feb  1916 
14  Apr  1916 

5  May  1916 

4  Jun  1916 

21  Jun  1916 

26  Jun  1916 

27  Jun  1916 
3  Jul  1916 

6  Jul  19 16 

31  Jul  1916 

29  Nov  1 9 16 
29-30  Nov  1 9 16 
10  Jan  1917 


CHRONOLOGY  395 

1  st  Battalion  establishes  model  camp  at  Panama- 
Pacific  Exposition  in  San  Francisco. 
Regimental  Headquarters  and  the  2d  Battalion, 
less  one  company,  sail  again  from  San  Diego  for 
the  west  coast  of  Mexico. 

Units  of  4th  Regiment  arrive  back  in  San  Diego. 
4th  Regiment,  less  two  companies,  departs  for 
third  time  for  the  west  coast  of  Mexico. 
4th  Regiment,  less  the  1st  Battalion  which  pro- 
ceeded on  to  San  Francisco,  debarks  at  San 
Diego. 

1  st  Battalion  arrives  in  San  Diego. 
Juan  Isidro  Jimenez,  the  elected  president  of  the 
Dominican  Republic,  is  overthrown  by  revolu- 
tionaries under  Desiderio  Arias. 
The  first  Marines  land  in  the  Dominican 
Republic. 

4th  Regiment  is  ordered  to  the  Dominican 
Republic. 

4th  Regiment  lands  at  Monte  Cristi. 

4th  Regiment,  reinforced,  begins  march  inland 

to  Santiago. 

4th  Regiment  defeats  Dominican  rebels  at  Las 
Trencheras. 

4th  Regiment  defeats  Dominican  rebels  at 
Guayacanas,  thereby  ending  organized  resist- 
ance. 

4th  Regiment,  reinforced,  enters  Santiago. 
4th  Regiment  completes  occupation  of  key 
towns  in  the  northern  part  of  the  Dominican 
Republic. 

U.S.  establishes  military  government  in  the 
Dominican  Republic. 

4th  Regiment  crushes  an  attempted  revolt  at 
San  Francisco  de  Macoris. 

Marines  begin  anti-bandit  operations  in  the 
eastern  part  of  the  Dominican  Republic. 


396       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 

1 6  Jan-2  Feb  191 7  4th  Regiment  detachments  reinforce  the  3d 
Marine  Regiment  in  anti-bandit  operations. 

31  Jul  1 9 18-  4th  Regiment  detachments  again  reinforce  the 
25  Feb  19 1 9       3d  Regiment  in  anti-bandit  operations. 

24  Dec  1920  President  Wilson  announces  decision  to  with- 
draw U.S.  forces  from  the  Dominican  Republic. 

24  Sep  1922  4th  Regiment  completes  concentration  at  San- 

tiago and  Puerto  Plata. 
21  Oct  1922  Provisional  government  takes  office.    The  4th 

Regiment  surrenders  police  powers. 
12  Jul  1924  An  elected  Dominican  government  is  installed. 

6  Aug  1924  4th  Regiment  departs  for  San  Diego. 

25  Aug  1924         4th  Regiment  arrives  in  San  Diego. 

10  Apr-  4th  Regiment  participates  in  a  landing  exercise 

8  May  1925       in  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 
18  Oct  1 926-        4th  Regiment  guards  the  mails  in  western  U.S. 

18  Feb  1927 

10  Jan  1927  American  Minister  in  China  recommends  that 

reinforcements  be  sent  to  Shanghai. 

28  Jan  1927  4th  Regiment,  less  the  2d  Battalion,  is  ordered 

to  Shanghai. 

24  Feb  1927  4th  Regiment  arrives  in  Shanghai. 

21  Mar  1927  Fighting  breaks  out  in  native  section  of  Shanghai 
when  Communists  revolt  against  the  local  war- 
lord; the  4th  Regiment  lands  in  the  Interna- 
tional Settlement  and  takes  up  security  duties. 

27  Mar  1927  Chinese  Nationalist  troops  enter  native  section 
of  Shanghai. 

12  Apr  1927  Chiang  Kai-shek  purges  the  Communists  and 

takes  undisputed  control  of  Chinese  city. 

2  May  1927  6th  Marine  Regiment,  less  the  3d  Battalion,  and 

3d  Brigade  Troops  arrive  in  Shanghai. 

4  May  1927  2d  Battalion,  4th  Regiment,  3d  Battalion,  6th 

Regiment,  and  reinforcing  units  arrive  in  the 
Philippines. 

16  May  1927         Emergency  at  Shanghai  is  declared  at  an  end. 


CHRONOLOGY  397 


2  Jun  1927  The  6th  Regiment  (minus)  departs  Shanghai 

for  Tientsin. 

4  Jun  1927  2d  Battalion,  4th  Regiment,  and  3d  Battalion, 

6th  Regiment,  depart  Philippines  for  Tientsin. 

4  Oct  1927  2d  Battalion,  4th  Regiment  redesignated  1st 

Battalion,  1 2th  Regiment. 

4  Jun  1928  Chiang  Kai-shek's  forces  occupy  Peiping  with- 

out harming  foreign  lives  or  property. 

23  Jan  1929  3d  Brigade  (minus  4th  Regiment)  completes 

withdrawal  from  China. 

13  Feb  1930  4th  Regiment  redesignated  the  4th  Marines. 

18  Sep  1 93 1  Japanese  invade  Manchuria. 

28  Jan  1932  Japanese  attack  Chinese  in  Shanghai;  4th  Ma- 

rines man  defenses  along  Soochow  Creek  as  a 
state  of  emergency  is  declared  in  the  Interna- 
tional Settlement. 

2  Mar  1932  Chinese  retreat  from  Shanghai. 

3  Mar  1932  Fighting  stops  between  Chinese  and  Japanese. 

5  May  1932  Chinese   and   Japanese   accept   a  settlement 

worked  out  by  a  special  committee  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

13  Jun  1932  State  of  emergency  in  the  International  Settle- 

ment is  terminated;  4th  Marines  return  to 
garrison. 

7  Jul  x937  Japanese  invade  North  China. 

13  Aug  1937  Fighting  breaks  out  between  Chinese  and  Japa- 
nese at  Shanghai;  4th  Marines  again  man  Soo- 
chow Creek. 

19  Sep  1937  Headquarters,    2d   Marine  Brigade,  Brigade 

Troops,  and  the  6th  Marines,  arrive  at  Shanghai 
from  San  Diego. 

9  Nov  1937  A  successful  Japanese  flanking  maneuver  forces 

a  general  Chinese  withdrawal  from  Shanghai. 

17  Feb  1938  All  Marines,  except  the  4th  Regiment,  are  with- 

drawn from  Shanghai. 


398       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


5  Jul  1940  Export  Control  Act  is  invoked  against  Japan 

to  prohibit  exportation  of  strategic  materials 
and  equipment. 

27  Jul  1940  Japan,  Germany,  and  Italy  sign  a  mutual  de- 

fense treaty — the  Tripartite  Pact. 

Nov  1 940  Asiatic  Fleet,  except  for  the  Yangtze  River  gun- 

boats, withdraws  from  China  waters  to  the 
Philippines. 

23  Jul  1 94 1  Japanese  complete  the  seizure  of  Indochina, 

26  Jul  1 94 1  U.S.  government  freezes  Japanese  assets  in  the 

U.S.,  resulting  in  stoppage  of  oil  shipments. 
Jul  1 94 1  Admiral  Thomas  C.  Hart  recommends  with- 

drawal of  4th  Marines  to  the  Philippines. 

10  Nov  1 94 1         U.S.  government  decides  to  evacuate  4th  Ma- 

rines from  Shanghai. 

27  &  28  Nov  4th  Marines  sails  for  the  Philippines. 

30  Nov  &  1  4th  Marines  arrives  at  Olongapo,  Philippine 

Dec  1 94 1  Islands. 

7  Dec  1 94 1  Japanese  attack  Pearl  Harbor. 

8  Dec  1941  U.S.  declares  war  on  Japan. 

22  Dec  1 94 1  4th  Marines  placed  under  operational  control 

of  USAFFE. 

26-29  Dec  1 94 1      4th  Marines  arrives  at  Corregidor  to  take  over 
beach  defense. 

23-29  Jan  1942      Japanese  landing  attempt  at  Longoskawayan 
Point  turned  back. 

9  Apr  1942  Bataan  falls. 

5  May  1942  Japanese  make  assault  landing  on  Corregidor. 

6  May  1942  Corregidor  falls;  the  survivors  of  the  4th  Ma- 

rines become  prisoners  of  war;  the  regiment 
ceases  to  exist. 

1  Feb  1944  4th  Marine  Regiment  is  reactivated  on  Guadal- 

canal. 

19  Mar  1944         4th  Marines  lands  unopposed  on  Emirau. 

11  Apr  1944  4th  Marines  returns  to  Guadalcanal. 


CHRONOLOGY  399 


19  Apr  1944         4th  Marines  is  attached  to  the  1st  Provisional 

Marine  Brigade — mission,  the  recapture  of 
Guam. 

3 1  May  1 944         4th  Marines  sails  for  Guam. 

21  Jul  1944  4th  Marines  makes  assault  landing  on  Guam. 

22  Jul  1944  Japanese  counterattack  repulsed. 

24  Jul  1944  Southern  Landing  Force  beachhead  secured. 

26  Jul  1944  Attack  on  Orote  Peninsula  begins. 
29  Jul  1944  Orote  Peninsula  secured. 

7  Aug  1944  Final  drive  to  conquer  Guam  begins. 

10  Aug  1944         Organized  resistance  on  Guam  declared  at  an 
end. 

27  Aug  1944         4th  Marines  leaves  Guam. 

8  Sep  1944  4th  Marines  assigned  to  the  6th  Marine  Division. 
11,  12,  15              4th  Marines  leave  Guadalcanal  for  Okinawa. 

Mar  1945 

1  Apr  1945  4th  Marines  lands  on  Okinawa. 

4  Apr  1945  4tn  Marines  reaches  east  coast  of  Okinawa. 

14  Apr  1945  4th  Marines  attacks  Motobu  Peninsula. 

16  Apr  1945         4th  Marines  seizes  Mount  Yaetake,  stronghold 
of  Japanese  defense  on  Motobu. 

20  Apr  1945  Organized  resistance  ends  on  Motobu  Peninsula. 

21  Apr  1945  Organized  resistance  ends  in  northern  Okinawa. 
13  May  1945         4th  Marines  enters  the  lines  on  the  southern 

front. 

28  May  1945         4th  Marines  relieved  after  helping  turn  the  west- 

ern end  of  the  Shuri  line  and  capturing  Naha. 
4  Jun  1945  4th  Marines  attacks  Oroku  Peninsula. 

13  Jun  1945  Organized  resistance  ends  on  Oroku  Peninsula. 

20  Jun  1945  4th  Marines  joins  in  reducing  the  last  Japanese 

defenses  on  Okinawa. 

21  Jun  1945  Organized  resistance  on  Okinawa  ends. 

8  Jul  1945  4tn  Marines  sails  from  Okinawa  for  Guam. 

6  Aug  1945  Atomic  bomb  is  dropped  on  Hiroshima. 

14  Aug  1945         Japan  surrenders. 


400       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


15  Aug  1945         4th  Marines  leaves  Guam  for  the  occupation  of 
Japan. 

30  Aug  1945         4th  Marines  lands  at  Yokosuka. 

2  Sep  1945  Japan  surrenders  formally  on  board  USS  Mis- 

souri in  Tokyo  Bay. 
3&4Dec  1945        1st  Battalion,  4th  Marines  sails  for  San  Diego. 

29  Dec  1945  1  st  Battalion,  4th  Marines  is  disbanded  at  San 

Diego. 

1  Jan  1946  Regt  H&S  Company,  Weapons  Company,  and 

the  2d  Battalion,  4th  Marines,  sail  for  San 
Diego. 

17  Jan  1946  A  token  headquarters,  4th  Marines,  joins  the 

6th  Marine  Division  in  Tsingtao,  China. 

31  Jan  1946  2d  Battalion  and  H&S  Company,  4th  Marines, 

are  disbanded  at  San  Diego. 

15  Feb  1946  3d  Battalion,  4th  Marines,  at  Yokosuka  is  re- 

designated 2d  Separate  Guard  Battalion. 

8  Mar  1946  4th  Marines  is  built  back  up  by  transfers  from 

other  units  of  the  6th  Division  at  Tsingtao. 

3  Sep  1946  4th  Marines  (less  the  3d  Battalion)  sails  for  the 

U.S. 

30  Sep  1946  4th  Marines  (  — )  arrives  at  Camp  Lejeune, 

joins  the  2d  Marine  Division. 

1  Oct  1947  3d  Battalion,  4th  Marines,  is  disbanded. 

18  Nov  1947         All  remaining  regimental  units  except  the  1st 

Battalion  (redesignated  the  4th  Marines  under 
"J"  T/O)  are  disbanded. 
13  Sep  1948  4th  Marines  joins  the  Sixth  Fleet  in  the  Medi- 

terranean. 

24  Jan  1949  4th  Marines  returns  to  Camp  Lejeune. 
17  Oct  1949  4th  Marines  is  disbanded. 

25  Jun  1950  North  Koreans  invade  south  Korea. 

2  Sep  1952  4th  Marines  is  reactivated  at  Camp  Pendleton 

as  part  of  the  3d  Marine  Division. 
23  Jul  1953  4tn  Marines,  along  with  the  3d  Marine  Division, 

is  ordered  to  prepare  for  movement  to  the  Far 
East. 


CHRONOLOGY  401 

27  Jul  1953  Korean  armistice  is  signed  at  Panmunjom. 

24  Aug  1953  4th  Marines  arrives  in  Japan. 

25  Jan  1955  4th  Marines  sails  from  Japan  for  Hawaii. 

29  Jan  1955  Operational  control  of  RCT-4  passes  to  CG,  1st 

Provisional  Marine  Air-Ground  Task  Force. 

4  Feb  1955  4th  Marines  arrives  in  Hawaii. 

1  May  1956  1  st  Provisional  Marine  Air-Ground  Task  Force 

redesignated  1st  Marine  Brigade. 


APPENDIX  C 


Regimental  Honors 


CITATIONS  AND  COMMENDATIONS 

Presidential  Unit  Citation,  with  one  bronze  star  signifying  second 
award.1 

1.  Guadalcanal,  7  Aug-9  Dec  1942  (1st  and  2d  Raider 
Battalions,  as  part  of  the  1st  Marine  Division) . 

2.  Okinawa,  1  Apr-21  Jun  1945  (as  part  of  the  6th  Marine 
Division) . 

Army  Distinguished  Unit  Citation,  with  one  bronze  oak  leaf 
cluster  signifying  second  award.2 

1.  Philippines,  14  Mar-9  Apr  1942. 

2.  Philippines,  7  Dec  194 1-6  May  1942. 

Navy  Unit  Commendation. 

Guam,  21  Jul- 10  Aug  1944  (as  part  of  the  1st  Provisional 
Marine  Brigade). 

CAMPAIGN  AND  SERVICE  STREAMERS 

Expeditionary  Streamer — Navy  and  Marine  Corps,  with  one 
bronze  star  signifying  second  award. 

1.  Dominican  Republic,  5  Dec  19 16-5  Apr  191 7;  12  Nov 
1 9 18-6  Aug  1924. 

2.  China,  7  Jun-4  Oct  1927  (2d  Battalion,  4th  Marines  at 
Tientsin) ;  22  Oct  1927-28  Feb  1930,  1  Jan  1933-6  Jul  1937 
(Shanghai). 

1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  appendix  is  based  on  BuPers,  NavDept,  U.S. 
Navy  and  Marine  Corps  Awards  Manual  (Washington,  1953). 

s  TAG,  USWD,  AR  220-315,  dtd  nApr52;  USWD  GO's  21  and  22,  dtd 
3oApr42  (closing  date  auth  WD  GO  46  of  1948). 

402 


REGIMENTAL  HONORS  403 

Dominican  Campaign  Streamer. 

Dominican  Republic,  21  Jun-4  Dec  19 16. 

World  War  I  Victory  Streamer,  with  one  bronze  star  signifying 
the  West  Indies  Clasp. 

Dominican  Republic,  6  Apr  191 7-1  iNov  19 18. 

Yangtze  Service  Streamer. 

Shanghai,  24  Feb-21  Oct  1927;  1  Mar  1930-31  Dec  1932. 

China  Service  Streamer,  with  one  bronze  star  signifying  second 
award. 

1.  Shanghai,  7  Jul  1937-7  SeP  !939- 

2.  Tsingtao,  17  Jan  1 946-1  Oct  1947. 

American  Defense  Streamer,  with  one  bronze  star  signifying  award 
of  "Base"  service  clasp  for  service  on  shore  outside  the  continental 
limits  of  the  U.S. 

Shanghai,  8  Dec  1939-28  Nov  1941;  and  Philippines,  1-7 
Dec  1941. 

Asiatic-Pacific  Campaign  Streamer,  with  two  silver  and  one  bronze 
stars  signifying  operations  as  follows : 

1.  Philippine  Islands  Operation,  8  Dec  194 1-6  May  1942. 

2.  Midway,  4-6  Jun  1942  (2d  Raider  Bn) . 

3.  MakinRaid,  17-18  Aug  1942  (2d  Raider  Bn) . 

4.  Guadalcanal-Tulagi  Landing,  7-9  Aug  1942  (1st  Raider 
Bn). 

5.  Capture  and  Defense  of  Guadalcanal,  10  Aug-17  Dec 
1942  ( 1  st  and  2d  Raider  Bns) . 

6.  New  Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu,  5  Jul-29  Aug  *943  (Ist 
Raider  Bn) . 

7.  Occupation  and  Defense  of  Cape  Torokina  (Bougain- 
ville) ,  1  Nov-14  Dec  1943  (2d  Raider  Regt  (Prov) ) . 

8.  Consolidation  of  the  Solomon  Islands: 

Northern  Solomons  (Bougainville),  15  Dec  1943-12  Jan 
1944  (2d  Raider  Regt  (Prov) ) ;  and  Southern  Solomons  (the 
Russell  Islands),  21  Feb-20  Mar  1943  (3d  Raider  Bn). 

9.  Admiralty  Island  Landings  (Emirau),  20  Mar-12  Apr 
1944- 

10.  Capture  and  Occupation  of  Guam,  21  Jul- 15  Aug  1944. 

11.  Assault  and  Occupation  of  Okinawa  Gunto,  1  Apr~3C 
Jun  1945. 


404       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 

World  War  II  Victory  Streamer. 

7  Dec  1 94 1-6  May  1942;  and  1  Feb  1944-31  Dec  1946. 

Navy  Occupation  Streamer,  with  Asia  and  Europe  Clasps. 

1.  Japan,  2  Sep  1945-14  Feb  I946- 

2.  Mediterranean,  23  Sep-28Dec  1948. 

National  Defense  Service  Streamer. 
2  Sep  1952-27  Jul  1954. 

Korean  Service  Streamer. 

Japan,  23  Aug  1953-27  Jul  J954- 
U nited  Nations  Service  Streamer. 

Japan,  23  Aug  1953-27  Jul  1954. 

Philippine  Defense  Streamer  (Commonwealth  of  the  Philippines), 
with  one  bronze  star  signifying  combat  against  the  enemy  on  Philip- 
pine territory. 

7  Dec  1941-6  May  1942. 


APPENDIX  D 


Regimental  Citations  and  Commendations 


THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY 
WASHINGTON 

4  February  1943. 

Cited  in  the  Name  of 
The  President  of  the  United  States 

THE  FIRST  MARINE  DIVISION,  REINFORCED 

Under  command  of 
Major  General  Alexander  A.  Vandegrift,  U.S.M.C. 

CITATION: 

"The  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  First  Marine  Division,  Rein- 
forced, on  August  7  to  9,  1942,  demonstrated  outstanding  gallantry 
and  determination  in  successfully  executing  forced  landing  assaults 
against  a  number  of  strongly  defended  Japanese  positions  on  Tulagi, 
Gavutu,  Tanambogo,  Florida  and  Guadalcanal,  British  Solomon 
Islands,  completely  routing  all  the  enemy  forces  and  seizing  a  most 
valuable  base  and  airfield  within  the  enemy  zone  of  operations  in 
the  South  Pacific  Ocean.  From  the  above  period  until  9  December, 
1942,  this  Reinforced  Division  not  only  held  their  important  stra- 
tegic positions  despite  determined  and  repeated  Japanese  naval,  air 
and  land  attacks,  but  by  a  series  of  offensive  operations  against 
strong  enemy  resistance  drove  the  Japanese  from  the  proximity  of 
the  airfield  and  inflicted  great  losses  on  them  by  land  and  air  attacks. 
The  courage  and  determination  displayed  in  these  operations  were 
of  an  inspiring  order." 

Frank  Knox, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

519667—60  29  405 


406       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY 
WASHINGTON 

The  President  of  the  United  States  takes  pleasure  in  presenting 
the  PRESIDENTIAL  UNIT  CITATION  to  the 

SIXTH  MARINE  DIVISION,  REINFORCED 

consisting  of:  The  Sixth  Marine  Division;  First  Marine 
War  Dog  Platoon;  Fifth  Provisional  Rocket  Detachment; 
Third  Platoon,  First  Bomb  Disposal  Company;  Marine 
Observation  Squadron  Six;  Sixth  Joint  Assault  Signal 
Company;  First  Armored  Amphibian  Battalion;  Fourth 
Amphibian  Tractor  Battalion;  Ninth  Amphibian  Tractor 
Battalion;  First  Section,  Second  Platoon,  First  Bomb 
Disposal  Company;  708th  Amphibian  Tank  Battalion, 
U.S.  Army;  Third  Armored  Amphibian  Battalion  (less 
4  platoons)  ;  91st  Chemical  Mortar  Company  (Separate), 
U.S.  Army;  First  Platoon,  Company  B,  713th  Armored 
Flame-Thrower  Battalion,  U.S.  Army, 

for  service  as  set  forth  in  the  following 

CITATION: 

"For  extraordinary  heroism  in  action  against  enemy  Japanese 
forces  during  the  assault  and  capture  of  Okinawa,  April  1  to  June 
21,  1945.  Seizing  Yontan  Airfield  in  its  initial  operation,  the 
SIXTH  Marine  Division,  Reinforced,  smashed  through  organized 
resistance  to  capture  Ishikawa  Isthmus,  the  town  of  Nago  and 
heavily  fortified  Motobu  Peninsula  in  1 3  days.  Later  committed  to 
the  southern  front,  units  of  the  Division  withstood  overwhelming 
artillery  and  mortar  barrages,  repulsed  furious  counterattacks  and 
staunchly  pushed  over  the  rocky  terrain  to  reduce  almost  impregnable 
defenses  and  capture  Sugar  Loaf  Hill.  Turning  southeast,  they 
took  the  capital  city  of  Naha  and  executed  surprise  shore-to-shore 
landings  on  Oroku  Peninsula,  securing  the  area  with  its  prized  Naha 
Airfield  and  Harbor  after  nine  days  of  fierce  fighting.  Reentering 
the  lines  in  the  south,  SIXTH  Division  Marines  sought  out  enemy 
forces  entrenched  in  a  series  of  rocky  ridges  extending  to  the  southern 
tip  of  the  island,  advancing  relentlessly  and  rendering  decisive  sup- 
port until  the  last  remnants  of  enemy  opposition  were  exterminated 
and  the  island  secured.    By  their  valor  and  tenacity,  the  officers 


REGIMENTAL  CITATIONS  AND  COMMENDATIONS  407 


and  men  of  the  SIXTH  Marine  Division,  Reinforced,  contributed 
materially  to  the  conquest  of  Okinawa,  and  their  gallantry  in  over- 
coming a  fanatic  enemy  in  the  face  of  extraordinary  danger  and 
difficulty  adds  new  luster  to  Marine  Corps  history,  and  to  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  United  States  Naval  Service." 

James  Forrestal, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy 

(For  the  President) . 


General  Orders    )  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

No.  21  I  Washington,  ^pn7  30, 1Q42 

Citation  of  units  in  the  United  States  Forces  in  the  Philippines. — 
As  authorized  by  Executive  Order  9075  (sec.  II,  Bull.  11,  W.D., 
1942),  a  citation  in  the  name  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
as  public  evidence  of  deserved  honor  and  distinction,  is  awarded 
to  the  following-named  units.   The  citation  reads  as  follows: 

The  Harbor  Defenses  of  Manila  and  Subic  Bays  and  Naval  and 
Marine  Corps  units  serving  therein,  United  States  Forces  in  the 
Philippines,  are  cited  for  outstanding  performance  of  duty  in  action, 
during  the  period  from  March  14  to  April  9,  1942,  inclusive. 

Although  subjected  repeatedly  to  intense  and  prolonged  artillery 
bombardment  by  concealed  hostile  batteries  in  Cavite  Province  and 
to  heavy  enemy  aerial  attacks,  during  the  period  above-mentioned, 
and  despite  numerous  casualties  and  extensive  damage  inflicted  on 
defensive  installations  and  utilities,  the  morale,  ingenuity,  and  com- 
bat efficiency  of  the  entire  command  have  remained  at  the  high 
standard  which  has  impressed  fighting  men  the  world  over. 

On  March  15,  approximately  1,000  240-mm  projectiles  were  fired 
at  Forts  Frank  and  Drum,  and  large  numbers  of  lesser  caliber  pro- 
jectiles struck  Forts  Hughes  and  Mills.  Again  on  March  20,  over 
400  240-mm  shells  were  fired  at  Fort  Frank  and  a  lesser  number  at 
Fort  Drum,  while  enemy  air  echelons  made  a  total  of  50  attacks 
on  Fort  Mills  with  heavy  aerial  bombs. 

During  the  entire  period  all  units  maintained  their  armament  at 
a  high  degree  of  efficiency,  while  seaward  defense  elements  executed 
effective  counter  battery  action.  Antiaircraft  batteries  firing  at  ex- 
treme ranges  exacted  a  heavy  toll  of  hostile  attacking  planes,  and 


408       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Naval  and  Marine  units  from  exposed  stations  assured  the  defense 
of  the  beaches  and  approaches  to  the  fortified  islands.  By  unceasing 
labor  and  regardless  of  enemy  activity,  essential  utilities  were  restored 
and  the  striking  power  of  the  command  maintained  unimpaired. 

As  a  result  of  their  splendid  combined  efforts,  ruggedness,  and 
devotion  to  duty  the  various  units  and  services  comprising  the 
Harbor  Defenses  of  Manila  and  Subic  Bays  frustrated  a  major 
hostile  attempt  to  reduce  the  efficiency  of  the  fortified  islands. 

Units  included  in  above  citation :  59th  Coast  Artillery,  60th  Coast 
Artillery  (AA),  91st  Coast  Artillery  (PS),  92d  Coast  Artillery  (PS), 
Headquarters  and  Headquarters  Battery,  Harbor  Defenses  of  Ma- 
nila and  Subic  Bays,  Medical  Detachment,  Ordnance  Detachment, 
Quartermaster  Detachments  (American  and  Philippine  Scouts), 
Finance  Detachment,  1st  Coast  Artillery  (PA)  (less  2d  Battalion), 
Company  A,  803d  Engineer  Battalion  (Aviation)  (Separate),  de- 
tachments DS  Army  Mine  Planter  Harrison  (American  and  Philip- 
pine Scouts),  4th  U.S.  Marines,  U.S.  Navy  Inshore  Patrol,  Manila 
Bay  area,  Naval  Force  District  Headquarters  Fort  Mills,  Naval 
Forces  Mariveles  Area  Philippine  Islands,  Battery  D,  2d  Coast  Artil- 
lery (PA),  1st  Platoon  Battery  F,  2d  Coast  Artillery  (AA),  (PA), 
2d  Platoon  Battery  F,  2d  Coast  Artillery  ( AA) ,  (PA) . 

(A.G.  201.54  (4-12-42)) 

By  Order  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

G.  C.  Marshall, 
Official:  Chief  of  Staff. 

J.  A.  Ulio, 
Major  General, 
The  Adjutant  General. 


General  Orders  I  WAR  DEPARTMENT 

No.  22  Washington,  A pril  30,  ig^2 

Citation  of  units  of  both  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  and  Philippine  Governments. — As  authorized  by  Executive 
Order  9075  (sec.  II,  Bull.  11,  W.D.,  1942),  a  citation  in  the  name 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States  as  public  evidence  of  de- 
served honor  and  distinction,  is  awarded  to  all  units  of  both  military 


REGIMENTAL  CITATIONS  AND  COMMENDATIONS  409 


and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  and  Philippine  Governments 
engaged  in  the  defense  of  the  Philippines  since  December  7,  1941 
to  10  May  1942. 

(A.G.  210.54  (4-12-42).) 

(Closing  date  auth.  by  W.D.G.O.  #46  of  1948) 

By  Order  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

G.  C.  Marshall, 
Official:  Chief  of  Staff. 

J.  A.  Ulio, 
Major  General, 
The  Adjutant  General. 


THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY 
WASHINGTON 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  takes  pleasure  in  commending  the 

FIRST  PROVISIONAL  MARINE  BRIGADE 

for  service  as  follows : 

"For  outstanding  heroism  in  action  against  enemy  Jap- 
anese forces  during  the  invasion  of  Guam,  Marianas 
Islands,  from  July  21  to  August  10,  1944.  Functioning 
as  a  combat  unit  for  the  first  time,  the  First  Provisional 
Marine  Brigade  forced  a  landing  against  strong  hostile 
defenses  and  well  camouflaged  positions,  steadily  ad- 
vancing inland  under  the  relentless  fury  of  the  enemy's 
heavy  artillery,  mortar  and  small  arms  fire  to  secure  a  firm 
beachhead  by  nightfall.  Executing  a  difficult  turning 
movement  to  the  north,  this  daring  and  courageous  unit 
fought  its  way  ahead  yard  by  yard  through  mangrove 
swamps,  dense  jungles  and  over  cliffs  and,  although  ter- 
rifically reduced  in  strength  under  the  enemy's  fanatical 
counterattacks,  hunted  the  Japanese  in  caves,  pillboxes  and 
foxholes  and  exterminated  them.  By  their  individual  acts 
of  gallantry  and  their  indomitable  fighting  teamwork 
throughout  this  bitter  and  costly  struggle,  the  men  of  the 


410       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


First  Provisional  Marine  Brigade  aided  immeasurably  in 
the  restoration  of  Guam  to  our  sovereignty." 

James  Forrestal, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

All  personnel  serving  in  the  First  Provisional  Marine  Brigade, 
comprised  of:  Headquarters  Company;  Brigade  Signal  Company; 
Brigade  Military  Police  Company,  4th  Marines,  Reinforced;  2 2d 
Marines,  Reinforced;  Naval  Construction  Battalion  Maintenance 
Unit  515;  and  4th  Platoon,  2d  Marine  Ammunition  Company, 
during  the  above  mentioned  period  are  hereby  authorized  to  wear 
the  NAVY  UNIT  COMMENDATION  Ribbon. 


APPENDIX  E 


Medal  of  Honor  Citations 


WINANS,  Roswell 
i st  Sergeant,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 
G.O.  Navy  Department,  No.  244 
October  30,  19 16 

"For  extraordinary  heroism  in  the  line  of  his  profession  and  for 
eminent  and  conspicuous  courage  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
at  the  action  at  GUAYACANES,  Dominican  Republic,  July  3, 
1916." 

GLOWIN,  Joseph  Anthony 
Corporal,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 
G.O.  Navy  Department,  No.  244 
October  30,  19 16 

"For  extraordinary  heroism  in  the  line  of  his  profession  and  for 
eminent  and  conspicuous  courage  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
at  the  action  at  GUAYACANES,  Dominican  Republic,  July  3, 
1916." 

WILLIAMS,  Ernest  Calvin 
1st  Lieutenant,  U.S.  Marine  Corps 
G.O.  Navy  Department,  No.  289 
April  27,  19 1 7 

"For  extraordinary  heroism  in  the  line  of  his  profession  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy  at  SAN  FRANCISCO  de  MACORIS,  Domini- 
can Republic,  November  29,  19 16." 

411 


412       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


The  President  of  the  United  States  takes  pleasure  in  presenting 
the  MEDAL  OF  HONOR  to 

CORPORAL  RICHARD  E.  BUSH,  USMCR., 
for  service  as  set  forth  in  the  following 

CITATION: 

"For  conspicuous  gallantry  and  intrepidity  at  the  risk  of  his  life 
above  and  beyond  the  call  of  duty  as  a  Squad  Leader  serving 
with  the  First  Battalion,  Fourth  Marines,  Sixth  Marine  Division, 
in  action  against  enemy  Japanese  forces  during  the  final  assault 
against  Mt.  Yaetake  on  Okinawa,  Ryukyu  Islands,  16  April  1945. 
Rallying  his  men  forward  with  indomitable  determination,  Cor- 
poral Bush  boldly  defied  the  slashing  fury  of  concentrated  Japa- 
nese artillery  fire  pouring  down  from  the  gun-studded  mountain 
fortress  to  lead  his  squad  up  the  face  of  the  rocky  precipice,  sweep 
over  the  ridge  and  drive  the  defending  troops  from  their  deeply 
entrenched  position.  With  his  unit,  the  first  to  break  through  to 
the  inner  defense  of  Mt.  Yaetake,  he  fought  relentlessly  in  the 
forefront  of  the  action  until  seriously  wounded  and  evacuated  with 
others  under  protecting  rocks.  Although  prostrate  under  medical 
treatment  when  a  Japanese  hand  grenade  landed  in  the  midst  of 
the  group,  Corporal  Bush,  alert  and  courageous  in  extremity  as  in 
battle,  unhesitatingly  pulled  the  deadly  missile  to  himself  and  ab- 
sorbed the  shattering  violence  of  the  exploding  charge  in  his  own 
body,  thereby  saving  his  fellow  Marines  from  severe  injury  or 
death  despite  the  certain  peril  to  his  own  life.  By  his  valiant 
leadership  and  aggressive  tactics  in  the  face  of  savage  opposition, 
Corporal  Bush  contributed  materially  to  the  success  of  the  sus- 
tained drive  toward  the  conquest  of  this  fiercely  defended  outpost 
of  the  Japanese  Empire  and  his  constant  concern  for  the  welfare 
of  his  men,  his  resolute  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  and  his  unwavering 
devotion  to  duty  throughout  the  bitter  conflict  enhance  and  sus- 
tain the  highest  traditions  of  the  United  States  Naval  Service." 

Harry  S.  Truman. 


APPENDIX  F 


Command  List1 


REGIMENTAL  COMMANDERS 


Col  Charles  A.  Doyen  

.  .  .  .            10  Mar- 

-23  Jun 

1911 

Col  Joseph  H.  Pendleton  

....  1 6  Apr 

-11  Dec 

1916 

Maj  Arthur  T.  Marix  

12- 

-31  Dec 

1916 

Col  Theodore  P.  Kane  

1  Jan- 

-  4  May 

i9!7 

LtCol  John  H.  Russell  

5  Mar 

-  2  Nov 

1917 

LtCol  Arthur  T.  Marix  

3  Nov- 

-20  Dec 

i9!7 

Col  William  N.  McKelvy  

.  .  .  .  21  Dec 

J9i7- 

-17  Apr 

1919 

Col  Dion  Williams  

1 8  Apr 

1919- 

-14  May 

1921 

Col  Charles  H.  Lyman  

.  .  .  .  15  May  192 1- 

-  9  May 

1923 

LtCol  Robert  Y.  Rhea  

-22  Jul 

1923 

Col  Alexander  S.  Williams  

  23  Jul 

1923- 

-  7  Mar 

1926 

LtCol  Ellis  B.  Miller  

8  Mar- 

-27  Jun 

1926 

Col  Charles  S.  Hill  

....  28  Jun 

1926- 

-  4  Sep 

1927 

LtCol  Fred  D.  Kilgore  

5  Sep- 

-  6  Oct 

1927 

Col  Henry  C.  Davis  

7  Oct 

1927-26  Sep 

1928 

LtCol  Fred  D.  Kilgore  

....  27  Sep 

1928- 

•13  Jan 

J929 

Col  Charles  H.  Lyman  

  14  Jan 

1929- 

-20  Nov 

1930 

Col  Richard  S.  Hooker  

.   ,    21  Nov 

1930- 

23  Dec 

1932 

LtCol  Emile  P.  Moses  

.  .  .  .  24  Dec 

1932- 

-12  Mar 

1933 

Col  Fred  D.  Kilgore  

3  Mar- 

-  6  May 

1933 

LtCol  Emile  P.  Moses  

7  May- 

-10  Jul 

1933 

Col  John  C.  Beaumont  . 

....  11  Jul 

1933- 

-  6  May 

1936 

Col  Charles  F.  B.  Price  

7  May 

I936- 

-23  Oct 

1938 

Col  Joseph  C.  Fegan  

24  Oct 

1938- 

-  3  Dec 

1939 

1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  Appendix  is  based  on  4th  Mar  MRolls  and 
Unit  Diaries.  Gaps  in  chronology  result  from  nonexistence  of  the  unit  or  a 
vacant  command  position  in  the  existing  unit. 

413 


414       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


LtCol  Charles  I.  Murray   4  Dec    1939-  2  Jan  1940 

Col  DeWitt  Peck   3  Jan     1940-13  May  1941 

Col  Samuel  L.  Howard  2  14  May  1941-  6  May  1942 

LtCol  Alan  Shapley   1  Feb    1944-  3  Jul  1945 

(promoted  to  colonel  on  16  Nov 
I944)- 

LtCol  Fred  D.  Beans   4  Jul-30  Dec  1945 

Col  William  J.  Whaling   8-25  Mar  1946 

Col  John  D.  Blanchard   26  Mar-30  Jun  1946 

BriGen  William  T.  Clement   1  Jul-24  Aug  1946 

LtCol  Robert  L.  Denig   1-20  Oct  1946 

LtCol  Wesley  McC.  Piatt   21  Oct    1946-10  Jul  1947 

Col  Robert  B.  Luckey   n  Jul-i  1  Nov  1947 

LtCol  Frank  M.  Reinecke   12  Nov    1947-28  Oct  1948 

(promoted  to  colonel  on  29  Feb 
1948) 

LtCol  Donald  J.  Decker   29  Oct    1948-  8  May  1949 

Maj  Donald  E.  Asbury   gMay-igJun  1949 

LtCol  John  F.  Dunlap   20  Jun-i  7  Oct  1949 

Col  Robert  O.  Bowen   2  Sep    1952-  2  Oct  1953 

Col  John  C.  Miller,  Jr   3  Oct    1953-  6  Apr  1954 

Col  Frederick  A.  Ramsey   7  Apr-21  Aug  1954 

LtCol  Richard  L.  Boll   22  Aug-23  Sep  1954 

Col  Wood  B.  Kyle   24  Sep     1954-  5  Jun  1955 

LtCol  John  E.  Decher,  Jr   6-22  Jun  1955 

Col  Robert  E.  Hill   23  Jun-18  Aug  1955 

Col  James  M.  Masters,  Sr   19  Aug    1955-  8  Jun  1956 

Col  Bryghte  D.  Godbold   9  Jun     1956-24  Aug  1957 

Col  George  A.  Roll   25  Aug    1957-  2  May  1958 

1ST  BATTALION  COMMANDERS 

Capt  John  N.  Wright   21  Apr-11  Jun  191 1 

Maj  John  T.  Myers   21  Apr    1914-  5  Jun  1916 


2  After  28  Feb  1942  no  muster  rolls  reached  Headquarters  USMG  from  the 
Philippines.  Names  of  commanders  after  that  date  until  the  surrender  of  Cor- 
regidor  on  6  May  1942  are  from  LtCol.  Frank  O.  Hough,  Major  Verle  E.  Lud- 
wig,  and  Henry  I.  Shaw,  Jr.,  Pearl  Harbor  to  Guadalcanal — History  of  U.S.  Marine 
Corps  Operations  in  World  War  II,  v.  I  (Washington:  HistBr,  HQMC,  1957), 
PP-  387~388- 


COMMAND  LIST 


415 


Capt  Arthur  T.  Marix   6Jun    1 916-31  July    191 7 

(promoted  to  major  on  23  Aug 
1916) 


MVn  William  FT  Prifrhptf" 

1  Aug 

1917- 

-  0  Tul 

iqi8 

1  y  j.o 

fnrnmof^f]   to  lifMitpnant  rolnnpl 

nn  0  Aiip*  inrRl 

LtCol  Henrv  C  Davis 

1 4  Jul 

1918- 

-27  Oct 

IQl8 

y 

(promoted  to  colonel  on  2  Aug 

IQl8>) 

Cant  Tpssp  H  Filiate 

28  Oct 

1918- 

-  0  Tan 

T  O  T  O. 

1y1y 

M!aj  John  B  Sebree 

r5  Jan" 

~20  Sep 

T  O  T  Q 

xyxy 

22  Sep- 

-t  t  T\Tr»\7 

i9iy 

Capt  Rafael  Griffin 

12  Nov 

IQIQ- 

-15  Mar 

T  020 

Maj  Chandler  Campbell 

l6- 

-22  M^ar 

I  Q20 

M!aj  Harold  L  Parsons 

29  Mar 

I  Q20- 

-TO  AllO" 

T  Q.2  T 
1  y^  i 

M^aj  James  T  Reid 

1  Aug 

1922- 

-OQ  Tul 

I  Q2°. 

Maj  Franklin  B  Garrett 

24  Jul 

1923- 

-on  Tun 

T  Q2/1 

Maj  Adolph  B  Miller 

1  Sep- 

-14  Dec 

T  QQA 

1  yzzt 

LtCol  Giles  Bishop  Jr 

15  Dec 

1924- 

-or  Tan 

t  02  c; 

LtCol  Ellis  B.  Miller 

1- 

-28  Feb 

I  Q2  ^ 

1  y^4  j 

Maj  Gerald  A  Johnson 

1  Mar- 

-  1  Mav 

I  Q2  ^ 

1  y^o 

Maj  Edward  M  Reno 

9  May 

1925- 

-to  Tun 

1 026 

"Mai  Beniamin  A  Mneller 

] 

4Jun- 

-  ^  Tul 

T  09fS 

1  yzu 

Maj  Edward  M  Reno 

6  Jul 

1926- 

-26  Jan 

1  y^  / 

A/fai  T'hporlnrp  A  Sppot* 

1  Feb 

1927- 

_3 1  Dec 

T  no  *7 

M!aj  Harold  L  Parsons 

1  Jan 

1928- 

-  2  Tun 

I  Q°.0 

1  yj^ 

M^aj  George  H  Osterhout  Jr 

3  Jun 

1930- 

-22  Dec 

1  yj^ 

M^aj  John  L  Doxey 

23  Dec 

1932- 

-00  Tul 

1  yoo 

LtCol  Edward  W  Sturdevant 

24  Jul 

r933" 

-26  Aug 

T  OQ/1 
1  yj'4r 

M!aj  Selden  B  Kennedy 

27  Aug 

1934- 

-on  Anr 
Or1  1  vr'A 

I  02  ^ 

1  yjo 

(promoted  to  lieutenant  colonel 

on  25  Oct  1934) 

LtCol  Edwin  W.  McClellan  

1  May- 

-  8Jun 

1935 

Maj  Archibald  Young  

9  Jun- 

"  4  Jul 

1935 

Capt  William  McN.  Marshall  

5Jul" 

-31  Jul 

1935 

Maj  Franklin  T.  Steele .  

1  Aug- 

-14  Oct 

1935 

LtCol  Lowry  B.  Stephenson  

15  Oct 

!935" 

-14  Dec 

1936 

LtCol  Harold  C.  Pierce  

15  Dec 

1936- 

-21  Mar 

1937 

Maj  Blythe  G.  Jones  

22  Mar- 

-19  Apr 

1937 

LtCol  William  H.  Rupertus  

20  Apr 

1937- 

"31  Jan 

i938 

416       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


T  tCnl  Harold  C!  Piprrp 

t  Fph- 
1  rcu 

20  Oct 

t  nofi 

r93o 

wet 

T  AflP 

J93° 

■12  Sep 

r939 

T  tCol  Eiicrpne  F  CI  Cnllipr 

T  O 

Sep 

1939- 

"i  2  Jun 

T94T 

A/Tai  Slamnpl  W  Frppnu 

13  Jun- 

-13  Aug 

x94r 

T  tCnl  Curtis  T  Rpprhpr 

■  •  *4 

Aug 

I94I- 

u  ividy 

1942 

LtCol  Charles  L  Banks 

1  Feb- 

-TO  A/Tmr 

t  n  /i  a 

*944 

Mai  "Bernard  W  Grppn  fKTA^ 

lvxcxj  uci  uai  u   vv  .  vji  ecu  ^rvirv y  .  .  . 

o  r\ 

May  1 944- 

-15  Apr 

T  n  /<  C 

r945 

T  tCol  Fred  D  Bp^ns 

.on   A  tit* 

30  i\pr 

T  C\  A  c 

1945 

LtCol  Oenrp-e  R  Bell 

1  K^fay- 

-on  iXTrwr 

T  C\  A  C 

1945 

T  — 

1 

"i  7  Dec 

r945 

Pt(!ol  Tncpnn  P  S^T/prc 

-00  Tnl 
22  JUl 

T  O  /<  f"» 

194° 

T  tCnl  Warrpn  P  Rakpr 

00  Tnl— 

-   *7  A  no- 

1940 

LtCol  Waltpr  FT  Stpohpns 

O  Aug 

-0  c  Ort 

T  .tCol  Frpdprirk  Rplton 

i  Apr- 

-on  inn 

1 947 

21  Jun- 

-  2  Sep 

r947 

T  tCol  WpsIpv  MrC  Pl^tt 

3  Sep- 

1 4  -»-^  c)v 

T947 

LtCol  Franklin  B  Nihart 

o 

Sep 

1952- 

I  O  ivj-dy 

19oo 

T  .'fl.nl   Tqitipc  A     A/1  nn  a  rt\r  Ir 

1 

9  May- 

-t  n  Tnl 

LtCol  Chp^tpr  T  Chri«:tpn<;on 

20  Jul- 

-  fi  Ort 

A/Tqi   Tcimpc  F     \/Tr>iI1  a  n  a  Vi  a  n 

7  Oct- 

-to  lSJo^r 
1U  1M  vJV 

TOCO 

LtCol  Loni<?  IV  Ca^pv 

20 

Nov 

!953- 

-28  Sep 

T  O  r /j 

LtCol  William  R.  Ourand,  Jr 

••  29 

Sep 

1954- 

-  3  Aug 

r955 

Maj  John  A .  Lindsay  

•  •  4 

Aug 

r955- 

-  4  Oct 

1956 

Maj  Franklin  J.  Harte  

•  •  5 

Oct 

1956- 

-  3  SeP 

1957 

LtCol  Ernest  L.  Medford,  Jr  

•  •  5 

Sep 

1957- 

-  3  Sep 

1958 

2D  BATTALION  COMMANDERS 

Capt'  William  W.  Low  

  21  Apr- 

-1 1  Jun 

1911 

Maj  William  N.  McKelvy 

  21  Apr  1914- 

-1 7  Feb 

1916 

Maj  Melville  J.  Shaw  

  20  Feb- 

-  5  Dec 

1916 

Capt  Robert  B.  Farquharson 

  7  Dec    1 91 6- 

-29  Jan 

i9J7 

Maj  William  H.  Pritchett 

  3xJan- 

-  7  Mar 

1917 

Capt  Charles  F.  Williams 

  14  May- 

-  1  Jul 

1917 

Maj  William  H.  Pritchett 

  17- 

-31  Jul 

I9I7 

Maj  Ellis  B.  Miller  

  7  Aug- 

-18  Sep 

1917 

Capt  Robert  B.  Farquharson 

  4°ct  I9I7" 

-  2  Aug 

1918 

(promoted  to  major  on  2£ 

1  Nov  191 7) 

Maj  Gerald  A.  Johnson  

  1  Sep- 

-14  Dec 

1924 

Maj  Adolph  B.  Miller  

  15  Dec  1924- 

-19  Jun 

1925 

COMMAND  LIST  417 


Jun 

1925- 

-22  Feb 

1926 

...  23 

Feb 

1926- 

-  1  Mar 

1926 

2  Mar- 

-19  Apr 

1926 

20  Apr- 

-13  Jun 

1926 

\/f  oi    X? r]t,-o A /T  /z»-r^ 

14  Jun- 

5  Jul 

1926 

jD        i  o  tt">  l  r~i    A            /-i/~M  1  /-iv* 

6Jul- 

-   ft  Anrr 
O  AUg 

1926 

1     0*1-1  +     1  Vi            /-"if*/"*    A  Nppav 

12  Aug- 

■27  Oct 

1926 

T  tPnl  Fllie  "R  TV/Till--=>T* 

19  Feb- 

-  3  M^ar 

1927 

|\  /\  «-» i     (h  r\  T  iro              \  f\        \<  /-y 

4" 

-3 1  Mar 

1927 

1  Apr- 

3  Uct 

1927 

iviaj  .L-yie  ri.  iviiiier  

T  ft 

...  10 

Sep 

1932- 

-  6  Mar 

J934 

A/foi    Tnlion            "\A7i  1  l/'-'iO'v- 

7  Mar- 

oft  TV^> 

20  uec 

J934 

T  tPrJ  TnVin  R  QpKrpp 

...  29 

Dec 

1934- 

-30  Oct 

J93^ 

iviaj  xvaymonQ  jviiapp  

31  Oct- 

-  2  Nov 

J936 

•  •  •  3 

Nov 

1936- 

31  Jan 

T  /-.oft 

J93y 

T  tPnl  -PliTVrm  R    f  dtPO 

Feb 

1938- 

T  *1     TV  /To  X  T 

1 7  iviay 

T939 

T  -fOz-vl   T?  /^l-i/^r-Y-  A/T  A/Tnntami^ 

MaY  *939" 

25  Jun 

1940 

2 

5  Jun- 

10  JUI 

1940 

1     OT"\"f-    1    mine    W      V^i  1 1  1  pr 

i9Jul- 

_r\  r\    An  pr 

20  ^vug 

1940 

T  tPrJ  Fi/~»t-i  alr-l  Piir-tic- 

...  27 

Aug 

1940- 

-14  Apr 

I94I 

...  15 

Apr 

1941- 

-  0  iviay 

1942 

1  Feb- 

-20  Nov 

J944 

T  tP-ol  T)  f±\7Trt /ol c  FT  Hciurlpn 

Nov 

1944- 

-op  Ayf 

20  iviay 

x945 

Maj  Edgar  F.  Carney,  Jr  

...  27 

MaY  r945~ 

-30  Jan 

1946 

T              T  ^        f~~^     T 1,    ^ ^ 

8  Mar- 

-12  Apr 

1946 

\  /|  *-v  i     T  j-^-flT    \-J  llTTQratroot 

13- 

-2 1  Apr 

1946 

T  tPnl  Tnhn  F  Wphpr 

22  Apr- 

"  5  Aug 

1946 

T  +C*r~A  T7^It»7,'t-,  -P1    -P- ™^  K,-.  1  ,-1 

6- 

-15  Aug 

1946 

1   +f    o,  1     I  rt  £i(~\r\  f^\Y*f^    Ih      Wf±&TY\  o  "ft 

16  Aug- 

-to  C^lnf 

1946 

T  tPnl   TiV/=»rl  <=>T'i/^L'  Ti /•"•>!  f-r\r-i 

...  19 

Oct 

1946- 

-10  Jul 

T947 

11  Jul- 

-  i  Sep 

T  r\  A  *7 

I947 

T  ~tl  .r~\t  (  Z-r\Yr\  s~\y*i   F  1— T^n/*iT%i/^l^o 

2  Sep- 

1  y  i\  uv 

r947 

T  tPnl  Clmrcrf*  P  R 

...  30 

Oct 

1952- 

-T  T  Tnl 
I  I  JUI 

J953 

T  O 

Jul 

1953- 

-23  Jan 

J954 

LtCol  George  P  Wolf  Jr 

24jan- 

-TO  Till 

Maj  George  W.  McHenry  

1 1- 

-12  Tul 

u  Jt 

LtCol  James  T.  Kisgen  

...  13 

Jul 

J954- 

■  7  Jan 

1955 

LtCol  Frank  H.  Vogel,  Jr  

8Jan- 

-  7  Jun 

1955 

Maj  Paul  M.  Moriarty  

8  Jun- 

-26  Jul 

1955 

Maj  Arthur  W.  Zimmerman .  .  .  . 

...27 

Jul 

J955- 

-21  Mar 

1956 

418       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


LtCol  Alex  H.  Sawyer  

22  Mar- 

-16  Jul 

J956 

LtCol  Quintm  A.  Bradley  

17  Jul 

1956- 

-  1  Jun 

!957 

Maj  Leo  V.  R.  Gross  

2- 

-13  Jun 

1957 

LtCol  Foster  C.  Lahue  

t  a  Tun 

Tfic,7- 

1yj/ 

-15  Aug 

1958 

3D  BATTALION  COMMANDERS 

Maj  Lowry  B.  Stephenson  

1  (Jet 

-  1  Jan 

1926 

Gapt  Norman  G.  Bates  

1 1  Jan- 

1-  Tul 

1926 

^promoted  to  major  on  3  iviar 

1926) 

1 0  Jan- 

-26  Mar 

1927 

f^^Y-it  T  (±~Q       P  Miint 

1  Apr- 

-  2  Aug 

1927 

3  Au§~ 

-10  Oct 

1927 

Maj  James  L.  Underhill  

I  i  (Jet 

1927- 

-  7  Sep 

1928 

iviaj  r\aoipn  jj.  iviiiier  

0  oep 

1928- 

13  Dec 

J929 

1 4  Dec 

i929~ 

-2 1  Feb 

I  nrnmntpn   f"f~>  lifMitf^'nc}  nt  col  /~>t~i 
l  Ul  UllJUlCU.   IU   11C LI LClla.il L  CvJlvJllCl 

on  1  Nov  1930) 

22  Feb- 

-24  Sep 

J93r 

(promoted  to  major  on  4  Au§^ 

r930 

25  Sep 

-30  Sep 

*933 

(promoted  to  lieutenant  colonel 

on  30  Jun  1932) 

i  (Jet 

l933~ 

5  Mar 

x934 

0  Jviar- 

-i  0  uec 

J934 

JLtvjOl  jonn  r\  Auams  

1  Jan- 

-  6  May 

1942 

Maj  Ira  J.  Irwin  

i  reb- 

16  Apr 

1944 

1 7  Apr- 

10  Oct 

J944 

1 1- 

-10  (JCt 

1944 

Maj  Anthony  Walker  

1 7  (Jct- 

_   TA  _  _ 

-  3  Dec 

1944 

4  Dec 

1944- 

x945 

_    T  "I 

-30  Dec 

r945 

.LtL<ol  rSruno  A.  riocnmutn  

3 1  Dec 

r945~ 

■15  Feb 

1946 

ijtL^oi  waiter  ri.  otepnens  

0  iviar- 

"  5  Aug 

1946 

6  Aug 

1946- 

30  /\pr 

r947 

Col  Jaime  Sabater  

1  May- 

1  Oct 

1947 

LtCol  Kirby  B.  Vick  

28  Nov 

1952- 

■  6  Jan 

1953 

LtCol  James  A.  Moriarty,  Jr  

7  Jan- 

■17  May 

J953 

COMMAND  LIST 


419 


T  H    Tt  1  1 

...  17  Jul 

I953~ 

24 

May 

x954 

25 

May— 

3° 

Sep 

x954 

\  fx  oi    \ A /  0 rvp r"^  1 — 1  ^iTTrncnn 

t  Ort- 

5 

1\  U  V 

*954 

LtCol  Richard  L.  Boll  

6  Nov 

1954- 

3° 

Mar 

r955 

LtCol  James  G.  Juett  

.  .  .  13  Apr 

1955- 

20 

Jun 

1956 

LtCol  Ernest  P.  Freeman,  Jr .  . 

21  Jun 

r956- 

2 

May 

1957 

LtCol  Milton  A.  Hull  

...    5  May 

!957- 

16 

Jun 

1958 

4TH  BATTALION  COMMANDERS 

Maj  Francis  H.  Williams   9  Apr-  6  May  1942 

LtCol  Roy  D.  Miller   5  Jan-  3  Apr  1953 

Maj  Frederick  Simpson   4Apr-25jun  1953 

LtCol  William  R.  Bonner   26  Jun-23  Jul  1953 

Maj  John  D.  Fair   24-29  Jul  1953 


PROVISIONAL  BATTALION  COMMANDER 

Maj  Julian  P.  Willcox   1  Apr-  7  Oct  1927 

RESERVE  BATTALION  COMMANDER 

Maj  Max  Schaeffer   19  Feb-  6  May  1942 


APPENDIX  G 


Regimental  Strength 1 


Date 

v^/inccrs 

Jinlisted 

Jxerciarks 

31  Mar 

[911 

^1 1 

Month  of  first  organization. 

31  May 

[911 

18 

457 

Prior  to  disbandment,  24  Jun  191 1. 

30  Apr 

f9H 

26 

1,  006 

Month  of  reactivation. 

30  Jun 

19*4 

3° 

1 19 

30  Jun 

1915 

26 

642 

30  Jun 

[916 

28 

701 

30  Jun 

1917 

26 

997 

30  Jun 

[918 

32 

733 

30  Jun 

1919 

36 

643 

30  Jun 

[920 

29 

525 

30  Jun 

[921 

35 

673 

30  Jun 

[922 

32 

602 

30  Jun 

r923 

33 

772 

30  Jun 

[924 

29 

458 

30  Sep 

[924 

4i 

999 

Month  of  reactivation. 

30  Jun 

1925 

45 

643 

30  Jun 

[926 

20 

582 

9  Nov 

[926 

25 

679 

Mail  Guard  service.3 

28  Feb 

[927 

82 

i>729 

Beginning  of  China  duty. 

30  Jun 

[927 

93 

1,829 

30  Jun 

[928 

54 

1,  012 

30  Jun 

t929 

57 

938 

30  Jun 

[930 

56 

i>  15° 

30  Jun 

1931 

61 

i>  *59 

29  Feb 

'932 

66 

i>558 

Crisis  of  China  duty. 

30  Jun 

1932 

56 

1,272 

1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  all  statistics  are  from  4th  Mar  MRolls  and  Unit 
Diaries. 

2  Includes  warrant  officers. 

3  CG  Western  Mail  Guard,  msg  to  MarCorps,  dtd  9N0V26  (1645-80,  Central 
Files,  HQMC). 

420 


REGIMENTAL  STRENGTH  421 


Date 

Officers  2 

30  Jun 

1933 

82 

!>  778 

30  Jun 

J934 

94 

1,668 

30  Jun 

1935 

61 

982 

30  Jun 

1936 

58 

978 

30  Jun 

1937 

58 

979 

30  Sep 

1937 

70 

J>  239 

Crisis  of  China  duty. 

30  Jun 

1938 

61 

1,  o76 

30  Jun 

1939 

51 

997 

30  Jun 

1940 

49 

1,  010 

30  Jun 

1 941 

54 

837 

30  Nov 

1 941 

46 

675 

End  of  China  duty. 

1  May 

1942 

220 

4  3>  671 

Last  strength  figure  from  Corregidor. 

21  Jul 

1944 

210 

4>  581 

W-Day,  Guam. 

1  Apr 

1945 

r47 

3,  128 

L-Day,  Okinawa. 

30  Aug 

1945 

148 

5  3,  264 

L-Day,  Japan. 

31  Mar 

1946 

100 

3,  i46 

Month  of  reorganization  in  China. 

31  Oct 

1946 

9 

35 

Postwar  demobilization. 

30  Jun 

*947 

44 

r43 

30  Nov 

1947 

39 

!j  034 

Reorganization   of  4th   Marines  as 

battalion  landing  team. 

30  Jun 

1948 

42 

9r5 

30  Jun 

J949 

36 

821 

30  Sep 

1949 

51 

768 

Eve  of  redesignation  as  1st  Battalion, 

6th  Marines,  17  Oct  1949. 

30  Sep 

1952 

35 

1,879 

Month  of  reactivation. 

30  Jun 

1953 

171 

4,  691 

30  Jun 

1954 

165 

3,  o69 

30  Jun 

1955 

157 

3,  380 

30  Jun 

1956 

178 

3,  202 

30  Jun 

1957 

156 

3,  081 

4  These  figures  are  the  total  personnel  of  all  services  in  the  regiment  on  1 
May  1942.  Marine  strength  was  the  largest:  72 — 1,368.  Others  were  Army, 
83 — 532;  Navy,  37 — 804;  and  Philippine  personnel,  28 — 967.  4th  Mar  Rec  of 
Events,  iMay42  (Philippines  Area-Op  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

5  6th  MarDiv  OpO,  No.  106-45,  dtd  I3^ug45  (Japan  Area- Op  File,  HistBr, 
HQMC). 


519667—60  30 


APPENDIX  H 

4th  Regimental  Casualties1 


Operations 

KIA2 

DOW 

WIA 

MIAPD 

POW 

CF 

Total 

O 

Enl 

O 

Enl 

O 

Enl 

O 

Enl 

O 

Enl 

O 

Enl 

O 

Enl 

DOMINICAN 

— 

— 

— 

REPUBLIC  3 

Santiago  Opn, 

26  Jun-6  Jul 

1916  

3 

1 

13 

1 

16 

San  Francisco 

de  Ntacoris, 

29  Nov  1 9 1 6 

8 

8 

Sanchez,  30 

Nov  191 6. . . . 

1 

1 

CHINA4 

15  °ct  x937  

1 

1 

WORLD  WAR  II 

43 

267 

5 

33 

324 

16 

1,440 

154 

2,  052 

Guam  

1 1 

I5I 

28 

38 

686 

4 

1 

87 

50 

956 

Okinawa, 

iApr-22  Jun 

*945  

23 

377 

9 

9i 

107 

2,  334 

4 

2 

159 

141 

2,  965 

1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  these  figures  are  from  Pers  AccountingSec,  HQMC, 
Final  WW  II  Tabulation,  dtd  26Aug52. 

2  The  key  to  the  abbreviations  used  at  the  head  of  the  columns  in  this  table  is 
as  follows:  O,  Officers;  Enl,  Enlisted  Men;  KIA,  Killed  in  Action;  WIA.  Wound- 
ed in  Action;  MIAPD,  Missing  in  Action,  Presumed  Dead;  POW  Prisoner  of 
War;  CF,  Combat  Fatigue. 

3  Figures  are  from  1975-70/2,  Central  Files,  HQMC. 

4  Figures  are  from  4th  Mar  R-2  Rept,  dtd  150^37  (Mar Corps  Units  in  China, 
1927-1938  File,  HistBr,  HQMC). 

422 


Bibliography 


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This  volume  is  based  primarily  on  official  records.  Inasmuch  as  footnote 
references  to  primary  sources  have  been  bibliographical  in  nature,  giving 
precise  file  designations  and  locations  for  each  document  cited,  it  is  not 
considered  necessary  to  repeat  this  detailed  information  here.  This  note 
on  primary  sources  will  be  confined,  therefore,  to  a  listing  of  general 
groups  of  records  consulted.  Except  for  those  items  noted  as  being  in  the 
National  Archives,  all  unpublished  documents  may  be  obtained  from  the 
office  under  which  they  are  listed. 

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  Reports  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1946-1948.  Washington, 

1 946-1 948. 

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 ■  Personnel  Accounting  Section.    Contains  Final  Casualty  Tabulation, 

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Marine  Corps  Units  in  China,  192  7-1 938  File. 

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423 


424       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


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Santo  Domingo  File.  Contains  miscellaneous  records  of  the  2d  Marine 
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Subject  File.  Contains  miscellaneous  records  of  Marines  in  China  and 
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Unit  Historical  Report  File.  Contains  war  diaries,  command  diaries, 
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War  Plans  Section,  Headquarters,  U.S.  Marine  Corps,  Miscellaneous 
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U.S.  Navy.    The  Landing  Force  and  Small  Arms  Instructions,  United  States 

Navy.    Annapolis:  United  States  Naval  Institute,  19 12. 
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Santo  Domingo;  reports  of  the   Commander  in   Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet 

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426       HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


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Index 


"ABC  Powers",  19 
Acapulco,  14,  16-18 
Adair,  284 

Adams,  LtCol  John  P.,  198 
Adelup  Point,  254 
Aebano,  371,  374 
Agat,  256,  263 
Agat  Bay,  266  268 
Agat  Point,  254 
Agat-Sumay  Road,  268 
Agfayan  Point,  273 
Aircraft 

B-29,  252,  277,  281,  284 

PBY,  199 

Zero,  199 
Albany,  358 

Albuquerque,  New  Mexico,  112,  114 
Alford,  Gapt  Leonard  W.,  314 
Alta  Mira,  61 

American    Company    and  Troop, 
Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps,  148 
Amphibian  vehicles 

LVT,  260,  260*2,  289,  298,  313, 
317,  320-323,  365,  382 

LVT  (A),  26on,  288,  320 
Anderson,  LtCol  Herman  R.,  207 
Annapolis,  25 
Appalachian,  259 
Apra  Harbor,  254,  266,  271 
Ara  Saki,  328 
Area  "B",  172 
Argentina,  19 

Arias,  Desiderio,  34-36,  43,  51,  63, 
67 

Arizona,  112,  242 
Armstrong,  Maj  Robert  H.,  291 
Arnold,  PhM  Floyd,  175 
Arnold,  Gen  Henry  H.,  251 


Asa  Kawa,  311 
Asan  Beaches,  271 
Asan  Point,  254 
Asato  Gawa,  313-317 
Asheville,  131 
Asia,  190,  370 
Atlantic  Ocean,  31 
Atsugi  Airfield,  339 
Augusta,  172-174 

Ausmus,  LtCol  Delbert,  USA,  206, 
225 

Australia,  244,  251 
Avenue  Edward  VII,  172 
Avenue  Foch,  139 
Awa,  303 
Ayuntiamento ,  70 

Badger,  RAdm  Oscar  C,  334,  335, 
34i 

Bagac,  201,  210 

Bailey  bridge,  315 

Bain,  Gapt  James  M.,  88,  89 

Bakersfield,  California,  114 

Balboa  Park,  23,  27 

Banger,  istLt  Lawrence  S.,  262 

Bangi  Point,  254,  260,  262 

Barber's  Point,  107 

Barbero,  72 

Barker,  Capt  Frederick  A.,  54 
Barnett,  Major  General  Comman- 
dant George  C,  363 
Bataan,  195,  196,  198,  201,  202  204, 
206-210,  216,  220-222,  225- 
228,  230-233 
fall  of,  227,  228 
hardships  of,  227,  228 
start  of  Japanese  drive  upon,  221 
Battery  Point,  231 


431 


432        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Beans,  LtCol  Fred  D.,  305,  331, 

333,  333^  340,  349 
Bearss,   Maj   Hiram   A.  ("Hiking 

Hiram"),  58,  59,  61,  62 
LtCol,  84,  85,  87 
Beaumont,  BriGen  John  C,  175 
Beecher,  LtCol  Curtis  T.,  199,  207, 

234 

Belgian  government,  30 
Bell,  LtCol  George  B.,  305,  337 
Bellingham,  Washington,  114 
Bellows  Air  Force  Base,  380 
Benton,  Surgeon  Frederick  L.,  USN, 
45 

Berkeley,  California,  114 
Biaan  Point,  214 

Biddle,  Major  General  Commandant 

William  P.,  2,  1 1 
Bishi  Gawa,  285 
Bismarcks  Barrier,  244,  245,  251 
Blackburn,  Capt  John  H.,  133 
Blanchard,  Col  John  D.,  351,  355 
Blandy,  RAdm  William  H.  P.,  285 
Bliss,  BriGen  Tasker  H.,  USA,  6n 
BLT,  384,  385 
Boise,  Idaho,  114 
Boone,  Capt  Ronald  A.,  171,  180 
Bordas,  Jose,  33,  34 
Bougainville,  242,  245,  247 
Boulevard  de  Montigny,  72 
Bowen,  Col  Robert  O.,  362,  364,  366, 

368,369,  371 
Boxer  Rebellion,  125,  126,  136 
Boxers,  1 2  5 
Brazil,  19 
Breckinridge,  356 

Bridget,  Cdr  Francis  J.,  208,  209, 

212,  214,  218 
Bristol,  Adm  Mark  L.,  143,  144 
British 

Army  commander,  Shangai,  129 
government,  188 
Landing  Force,  334,  339,  341 
Navy,  335 

Shangai  Area  Force,  168 
Bubbling  Well  Road,  180,  187,  193 


Buckner,  LtGen  Simon  B.,  Jr.,  USA, 
280,  282,  296,  303,  310,  316, 
3*7,  325,  328 

Buffalo,  3,  4,  27 

Bulkeley,  Lt  John  D.,  210 

Buna,  245 

Bund,  131,  172,  178,  193 
Bush,  Cpl  Richard  E.,  306 
Butler,  BriGen  Smedley  D.,  112,  116, 

136-139,  142,  144,  146,  147 
Butte,  Montana,  114 

Cabras  Island,  254 

Caceres,  Ramon,  33 

Caibobo  Point,  210 

California,  23,  112,  379 

California,  4 

California  City,  13 

Camino  Real,  47,  51-53 

"Camp  Carefree",  203,  208 

Camp  Del  Mar,  365 

Camp  Howard,  20,  22,  23 

Camp  Lejeune,  280,  356,  357,  359, 

360,  387 
Camp  Nara,  368,  369,  371,  375 
Camp  Pendleton,  361-363,  365,  367 
Camp  Point,  224 
Camp  Thomas,  5,  7 
Campaign  Order  No.  1,  90 
Campbell,  Capt  Chandler  C,  47,  64 
Canopus,  208,  218 
Canton,  125 
Cape  Esperance,  256 
Cape  Gloucester,  245 
Cape  Torokina,  245 
Caperton,  RAdm  William  B.,  35,  36, 

39,  43,  5i,  63,  65 
Caribbean  Sea,  31,  387 
Carlson,  istLt  William  H.,  305,  30571 
Carney,  Maj  Edgar  F.,  335,  340 
Carney,  RAdm  Robert  B.,  338,  341 
Carolines,  251 

Carranza,  Venustiano,  12,  24,  26,  27 
Carter  Road,  131 
Castillo,  63 


INDEX  433 


Castle,  Capt  Noel  O.,  234,  236 
Casto,  Passed  Assistant  Surgeon  Dow 

H.,  USN,  45 
Casualties 

Dominican  Republic 

4th  Marines,  50,  52,  58,  71,  87 
Dominicans,  50,  71,  85,  91 
Guam 

4th  Marines  262,  268,  271,  276 
Japanese,  263,  266,  270,  273 
Okinawa 

4th  Marines,  289,  293,  294,  296, 

302,  303,  305,  309,  313, 

326,  327,  330 
6th  Marine  Division,  309 
Japanese,  294,  295,  304,  307, 

309  313,  327,  330 
Philippines 

4th  Marines,  200,  204,  22 1,  228, 

233,  239,  240 
All  U.S.,  219 
Japanese,  218,  236 
POWs  4th  Marines,  342 
CAUSEWAY,  280 
Cavalry  Point  Beach,  224,  230,  234, 
236 

Cavite,  173,  198,  203,  208,  220 
Cavite  Naval  Ammunition  Depot, 
208 

Central  Bank  of  China,  1 9 1 
Central  China,  126,  185 
Central  Pacific,  251,  242,  277 

Allied  offensive  drive  across,  251 
Chacha,  85 
Chahar,  166 

Chambers,  Capt  Robert,  226,  237 
Chang  Tsung-ch'ang,  126,  134,  135 
Chapei,  123,   130,   134,   135,  152, 

156,  159,  162,   163,  167-169, 

174,  176 

Chaumont  119-121,  129,  133,  134, 

142,  161,  165,  175 
Cheney  Ravine,  224 
Chiang  Kai-shek,    125,    126,  135, 

139-144,  150,   169,  178,  191, 

350 


Chibana,  3 1 1 

Chicago  Evening  Post,  1 10 
Shigasaki,  371 
Chile,  19 
Chimu  Wan,  295 

China,  102-104,  116,  1 19-127,  135, 
136,    143-146,    148-153,  164, 
166,  167,  178,  190,  252,  347, 
350,  355,  356,  364,  387 
British  in,  188 

economic  boycott  of  Japan  (1932), 
152 

foreign  interests,  121,  123,  124 
4th  Marines 

arrive  ( 1927) ,  120 

danger  from  Japan,  148 

defenses,  139 

depart  for  (1927),  119 

land  (1927),  134 

mission,  121,  127-129,  137,  138, 

144,  146 
sports  program  147 
Marine  policy  re  Communists,  353 
mission  of  the  Marines    ( 1 945- 

1947),  350,  356 
resents  foreigners,  125,  126 
IIIAC  begins  occupation,  350 
U.S.  interests,  123 
U.S.  policy,  119,   127-129,  169, 
350,  355,  356 
China  Marines,  388 
China  Theater,  355 
Chinese 

Central  Army  (Nationalist),  167, 
180 

Central    Government  (National- 
ist), 350,  373 
Civil  war,  350 

88th  Division  (Nationalist),  168 
1st  Division  (Nationalist),  140 
government,  125,  169 
Nineteenth  Route  Army  (Com- 
munist), 152,  156,  162 
Peace  Preservation  Corps,  167 
Puppet  government,  178 
Revolution,  119,  125 


434        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Chiwa,  325 

Chungking,  191 

Cibao,  37,  39,  59,  66 

Clark,  Capt  Golland  L.,  Jr.,  237,  240 

Clark  Field,  220 

Clement,  LtCol  William  T.,  201, 
202;  BriGen,  325,  33m,  333- 

335,  341-343,355 
Clements,  PISgt  Robert  A.,  2 15 
Cold  War,  373 
Coldstream  Guards,  146 
Collier,  LtCol  Eugene  F.,  187 
Collins,  Cpl  Raymond  H.,  215 
Colorado,  1 1 2 
Colorado,  25,  303 
Columbia  Country  Club,  145 
Communist  General  Labor  Union, 

140 

Communist  Workers'  Militia,  134, 
135 

Communist  World,  387 
Communists,  125,  126,  130,  135,  140, 
142,  144,  350-352,  359,  361, 
362,366,  369,370,373,388 
Chinese,  361 
North  Korean,  376 
Russian,  125 
Congress,  U.S.,  14,  36 
Conolly,  RAdm  Richard  L.,  252,  253, 

258,  259 
Consuelo,  86,  87 

Cooke,  Adm  Charles  M.,  Jr.,  353 
Coolidge,  President  Calvin,  no,  112, 
127 

Cordillera  Central,  37,  78 
Cordillera  Septentrional,  37 
Coronado,  California,  5 
Corregidor,  195,  201,  202,  204-207, 
216,  219-222,   224-228,  231- 
233,  236,  241,  332,  343,  364 
Bottomside,  206,  207 
Central  Sector,  207,  221,  222 
defense  of,  206 

deployment  against  Japanese  land- 
ing (May  1942),  234 
East  Sector,  207,  222,  224,  225, 
231,  234 


Corregidor — Continued 
final  stand,  239 

Japanese  landing  imminent  (May 
1942),  233,  236,  237 

Japanese  landing  plans  (April 
1942),  231 

Japanese  pre-landing  bombard- 
ment (April-May  1942),  232, 
234 

Japanese  siege  of,  begins,  220 
Middleside,  204,  206,  207,  221, 

222,  231 
mythical  Gibraltar,  205 
strengthening  beach  defenses,  221, 

222,  224-226 
surrender  of  (May  1942),  240 
Topside,  206,  221,  222,  231 
West  Sector,  207,  221,  222,  224 

Corregidor  Bay,  231 

Crall,  Sgt  John  H.,  57 

Crawford,  Maj  Wallace  L.,  342 

Cuba,  4,  9,  10,  31,  35 

Culebra,  10 

Curtis,  LtCol  Donald,  203 

Dale,  Capt  Nelson  C,  Jr.,  294 
Dalness,  Capt  Harold  E.,  USA,  238 
Dampier  Strait  245 
Daniels,  Secretary  of  Navy  Josephus, 
26 

Darrah,  Cpl  Clyde  R.,  88 
Davis,  Col  Henry,  146 
Davis,  istLt  Ralph  E.,  52,  54 
Dededo,  272,  274 

Del  Valle,  Maj  Gen  Pedro  A.,  64^ 

282 

Denver,  Colorado,  1 12-1 14 
Department  of  Defense,  386 
Deragawa,  3 1 1 
Diamond  Head,  107 
Diaz,  Porfirio,  1,2,  n 
Diego,  89 

Dodd,  istLt.  Thad  N.  262,  294 
Dolphin,  12 

Dominican  Congress,  33-35,  67 
Dominican  government,  30,  33,  34 


INDEX  435 


Dominican  Republic,  29-31,  36,  37, 
76,  80,  83,  92,  96,  98 
banditry  in,  83,  84 
crisis  of  19 16,  35 
Eastern  District,  78,  8ora,  92 
guerrillas,  82 
history  of,  29,  30 

Marine     anti-bandit  operations, 
82-92 

Marines  withdrawn  from,  96-98 
Northern  District,  78-82,  84,  95, 
98 

opposition  to  U.S.,  93,  95 
president  elected  (1924),  97 
provisional  government  takes  of- 
fice (1922),  97 
Senate    Investigating  Committee 

(1921),  79 
Southern  District,  78,  84 
strategic  importance,  31 
U.S.    military    government,  69, 
76-78,  93-95,  98 
Dominican  Treaty  of  1907,33 
Dos  Rios,  91 

Doyen,  Col  Charles  A.,  2-7,  103 
Duncan,    MajGen    John,  British 

Army,  129,  130,  133,  135,  138 
Dunlap  Maj  Robert  H.,  41,  49,  56; 

Col,  106 
Durham  Light  Infantry,  134 
Dyer,  BriGen  Edward  C,  377,  379, 

382,  383 

Earthquake,  4th  Marines  emergency 
duty,  Santa  Barbara  (1925),  no 

East  China  Sea,  287 

Eastment,  Capt  Clinton  B.,  302,  305 

Edgewater  ( "Bilgewater" )  Hotel, 
353 

Edwards,  Clement  S.,  14 
Eisenhower,   President  Dwight  D., 
375 

El  Paso,  Texas,  112,  114 
Elizabeth,  New  Jersey,  1 1 1 
Elomusad,  248 


Emirau,  244,  245,  247,  248,  250,  253, 
256 

Beach  Green,  248 
Beach  Red,  248 

first  combat  mission  of  reactivated 
4th  Marines  (1944),  244 

Halsey's  first  order  for  seizure  of 
(December  1943),  245 

Halsey's  second  order  for  seizure  of 
(March  1944),  247 

key  to  the  Bismarcks  Barrier,  244 

Col   Shapley   commands  assault 
troops,  248 

4th  Marines  land  unopposed  (20 
March  1944),  250 

4th  Marines  relieved,  250 

intelligence  reports,  248 

landing  plans,  248 

plans  set  aside  because  of  pro- 
jected Kavieng  assault,  245 

strength  of  landing  force,  248 

substituted     for    Kavieng  plan 
(March  1944),  247 
Engineer  Point,  233 
Eniwetok,  4th  Marines  at,  259 
Esperanza,  58 
Europe,  184 

Evans,  Maj  Francis  T.,  no 
Extraterritoriality,  121,  124 

Far  East,  119,  127,  366-368,  370, 

375,  378 
U.S.  policy,  151,  153 
Far  East  Command,  367 
Fegan,  Col  Joseph  C,  183,  184,  186 
Feland,  BriGen  Logan,  106,  112 
Ferguson,  QMClk  Frank  W.,  237 
Fernandez,  Senior,  16,  17 
Ferrell,  MG  Harold  M.,  236 
Ferrocarril  Central  Dominicano,  59 
Fessenden,  Sterling,  148 
Fessenden  Fifes,  148 
Field  Order  No.  2,  47 
Five-five-three  Naval  ratio,  150 
Fleming,  Brigadier,  154,  160 
FORAGER,  252,  254,  256,  257,  265 


436        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


"Foreign  devils",  125 

Formosa,  124,  149,  280,  281,  373 

Fort  Drum,  207,  220,  222,  232 

Fort  Frank,  220,  232 

Fort  Hughes,  207,  220,  222,  236 

Fort  Wint,  200 

Fortaleza  San  Francisco  de  Macoris, 
70-72 

Fortaleza  San  Luis,  63,  69 
Fortson,  Capt  Eugene  P.,  59,  60 
France,  124,  150,  178,  179 
Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  358 
Frazee,  Cpl  George,  56 
Free  World,  363,  371,  387,  388 
French  Concession,  121,  123,  130, 

138,  139,  167,  172,  176,  178- 

180,  184,  191 
French  government,  30 
Fresno,  California,  114 
Fukabori,  LtCol  Yuki,  1 79-1 81 
Fuller,  Major  General  Commandant 

Ben  H.,  163,  165 
Fulton,  199 

Futtsu  Cape,  335,  339,  340 


Gaan  Point,  260,  272 

Gaan  Point — Port  A  jay  an  line,  272 

Gabral,  Gen  Maximo,  57 

Gage,  284 

Garden,  Emilio,  95 

Garden  Bridge,  193 

Gauss,  Clarence,  129,  134,  168,  169, 

171,  174,  175 
Geary  Point,  229 

Geiger,  MajGen  Roy  S.,  243,  247, 
252,  253,  259,  265,  272,  273, 
276,  282,  296,  328,  330 

General  Black,  368 

General  Brewster,  368 

General  Howze,  368 

Genke,  308 

German  Pacific  island  possessions, 
150 

Germany,  30,  124,  186,  190,  351 
Gilberts,  241 

Gilmer,  Capt  William  W.,  16,  17 


Glassford,  RAdm  William  A.,  192 
Glowin,  Cpl  Joseph  A.,  56,  58 
Godbold,  Col  Bryghte  D.,  384-386 
Gona,  245 
Gonzales,  Padre,  70 
Gordon,  Col  F.  R.  W.,  172 
Gordon  Road,  159 
Gordon's  Riverside  Cabaret,  200 
Government  Ravine,  207,  229,  237 
GRANITE,  252 

Great  Britain,  121,  124,  130,  150, 

178,  179 
Great  Wall,  166 
Greece,  358,  359 

Green,  Maj  Bernard  W.,  257,  262, 

266,  289,  302 
Green  Howards,  148 
Green  River,  Wyoming,  1 1 2 
Green  society,  140 
Griffith,  Col  Samuel  B.,  356 
Grimes,  335,  341 
Grundels,  Ens,  USN,  209,  212 
Guadalcanal,   241,   243,   245,  247, 

250,  251,  256,  276,  279,  280, 

282,  283 

Guam,  9,  102,  131,  182,  250-254, 
256-259,  265,  271-274,  276, 
277,  279,  330,  331,  333,  341, 

343,  364 
assault  of  Orote  Peninsula,  266, 
268-270 

declared     secured     (10  August 

1944),  276 
description  of,  254 
Expeditionary  Troops  Reserve,  258 
final  drive,  274,  276 
4th  Marines 

assigned  to  reconquest  of,  251 

land,  260,  262 

leave  for  Guadalcanal,  276 

leave    for    Japan  occupation 
duty,  331 

mission,  264 

ordered  north,  273 

patrol  in  south,  273 

prepared  for  expected  invasion 
of  Japan,  331 

sail  for,  257 


INDEX  437 


Guam — Continued 
Green  Beach,  285 
Hill  40,  254,  262,  263 
Japanese  defending  force,  256 
Japanese  withdraw  to  the  north, 
272 

Landing  plans,  254 
Old  Marine  barracks,  269,  270 
Operation  Plan  No.  1,  254 
Orote  Peninsula  secured,  270 
Preliminary  bombardment,  259 
Results  of  the  reconquest,  277 
Rifle  range  attacked,  269 
Regimental  CP,  263 
Road  Junction  15,  268 
Road  Junction  460,  274,  276 
Road  Junction  462,  274 
Road  Junction  470,  276 
Seizure  of  beachhead,  262-265 
Significance  of  4th  Marines  vic- 
tory, 277 
W-Day  (21  July  1944),  258,  260 
W-Day  postponed  by  naval  battle, 
258 

White  Beaches,  254 
Yellow  Beaches,  256 
Guantanamo,  4,  10,  35 
Guardia  Nacional  Dominicana,  77. 

See  also  Policia  Nacional. 
Guayacanas,  Battle  of,  53,  54,  56-58, 
173" 

Guaymas,  18,  25,  27 
Guayubin,  51 
Gulf  of  California,  27 
Gushichan,  3 1 7 


Hagushi,  284,  285 

beaches,  295,  321 
"Hail     Sunny     California",  4th 

Marines'  marching  song,  22 
Hainan  Island,  190 
Haiphong  Road,  159 
Haiti,  29,  31,  35,  37,  44,  383 
Halsey,  Adm  William  F.,  244,  245, 

247,  333,  334,  338 
Hancock,  29,  37,  39,  41 

519667—60  31 


Hangchow  Bay,  176 
Hankow,  126,  141,  164 
Harada,  MajGen,  180 
Harding,  President  Warren  G.,  1 1 1 
Harmon  Road,  262,  263 
Harrington,   istLt  Samuel  M.,  72; 
Capt,  79 

Harris,  istLt  William  F.,  234,  237 
Hart,  Adm  Thomas  C,  189-192,  196 

198-202 
Harte,  Maj  Franklin  J.,  385 
Hato  Mayor,  83,  85-87,  89 
Hauck,  Capt  Herman,  USA,  239 
Hawaii,  9,  105,  106,  375,  376,  379, 
380,384,387 
advantageous   site   for   new  air- 
ground  task  force,  379 
time  difference  from  Philippines, 
199 

Hawaiian  National  Guard,  107 
Hayakawa,  Col  Masoyoshi,  220 
Hayden,  LtCol  Reynolds  H.,  288, 
304 

Helena,  Montana,  114 
Helicopters,  365,  380,  382-385 
Henderson,  98,  101,  105,  106,  no, 

136,  142,  192 
Henriquez  y  Carvajal,  Dr.  Federico, 

67,  93,  94 
Hedo  Misaki,  308 
Heureaux,  Ulises,  30,  33 
Hiatt,  Pvt  Milton  O.,  176 
Higuey,  83 

Hill,  Col  Charles  S.,  119,  121,  129, 

131,  134,  136-139,  Hi 
Hilo,  384 

Hines,  MajGen  John  L.,  USA,  109 
Hirohito,  Emperor,  231,  330,  332, 

338,  348,  369 
Hiroshima,  277,  331 
Hispaniola,  31,  37 
Ho-Umetsu  Agreement,  166 
Hochiya,  297 

Hochmuth,  LtCol  Bruno  A.,  289, 

322,  349 
Hodge,  MajGen  John  R.,  282 


438        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Hogaboom,  istLt  William  F.,  208, 
209,  2i2,  214-217,  225,  226, 
237 

Holcomb,  LtGen  Thomas  (CMC), 
242 

Holdredge,  istLt  Willard  C,  208, 

209,  212,  214-216 
Homma,  LtGen  Masaharu,  209.  220, 

221,  226,   227,  232 

Hong  Kong,  147 

Hongkew,  145,  153,  180 

Hongkew  Creek,  131 

Hongkew  Park,  162 

Honolulu,  105,  1 10,  377 

Honshu,  368,  370 

Hooker,  Col  Richard  S.,  160,  165 

Hooker  Point,  232 

Hopei,  166 

Hotta,  Lord,  149 

Houston,  161 

Howard,  Col  Samuel  L.,  192,  193, 
196,   198,  202,  203,  206,  207, 

222,  230,  237,  239,  240,  343; 
Ma j  Gen,  364 

Howard,  RAdm  Thomas  B.,  20 
Hoyler,  Maj  Hamilton  M.,  257, 
268,  269 

Huerta,  Victoriano,  12,  14,  18,  28 
Hughes,  Capt  John  A.  "Johnny  the 

Hard",  74,  75 
Hull,  Secretary  of  State  Cordell,  190 
Hungjao  Airfield,  167,  171 
Hunt,  Maj  Wilson  E.,  337 
Huntington,  LtCol  Robert  W.,  10 

ICEBERG,  280-285,  287 
Idaho,  112 
Idzumo,  171,  172 

"Imperial  command",  doctrine  of, 
150 

"In  Flanders  Fields"  (poem),  243 
Inchon,  361,  373 
Inchon-Seoul  campaign,  378 
Indochina,  190,  370,  375 
Infantry  Point,  222,  230,  233,  234 


International  Settlement,    119,  121, 
123,   124,   126-131,   133,  134, 
136-140,  144,  145,  148,  152- 
154,  156,  157,  162,  167,  169, 
172,  174,  176,  178,  179,  181, 
183-186,  188,  191,  193 
American  Sector,  159,  160,  169, 
171,  172,  180-182,  184,  186, 
191 

British  Sector,  159,  160,  169,  184, 
188 

Defense  Committee,  153,  154,  160, 
188,  189 

Defense  plans  (1927),  128,  129, 
131 

Eastern  Area,  131,  133,  139,  146 
foreign  forces,  136 
International  Defense  Agreement, 
181 

International  Defense  Forces,  161 
International    Defense  Scheme, 

153,  156,  185 
Marine  billets,  146 
Marine  Sector,  162,  165,  171,  173, 

175,  176 
Municipal  Police,  185 
Sector  A,  153,  157 
Sector  B,  153,  161,  181,  185,  188 
Sector  C,  153,  157,  159,  160,  169, 

171,  174,  175,  179,  181-184, 

186,191 

strength  of  foreign  units,  130,  178 
Western  Area,  131,  133,  139,  146, 
153,  185,  186,  188 

Iowa,  335 

Ipapao,  272 

Iron  curtain,  361 

Ishikawa,  295,  297 

Ishikawa  Isthmus,  285,  294-296, 
298 

Italy,  30,  186 

Itoman,  317 

Itomi,  300,  304,  307 

Itomi-Manna  Road,  300 

Iwo  Jima,  281,  299,  371,  373,  374 


INDEX  439 


Jaibon,  53 
James  Ravine,  224 
Japan,  124,  147-152,  167,  178,  189, 
190,  244,  251,  252,  277,  280, 

309,  331-333,  339,  346-349, 
351,  366-370,  373,  375,  379, 

387 

attitude  of  Marines  toward  Jap- 
anese, 346 

Foreign  Office,  156 

L-Day  (30  August  1945),  339, 
342 

Marines  aid  success  of  U.S.  oc- 
cupation, 346 

4th  Marines 

and  the  Japanese,  347,  348 
at  Camp  Nara  (1953),  369 
carry  out  demilitarization,  345 
depart  from,  349 
end  of  occupation,  349 
land  at  Kobe  (24  August  1953), 
369 

land  at  Yokosuka  (30  August 

1945),  340,  34i 
missions  (1953),  370 
movement  to,  334 
oversee    return    of  Japanese 

troops  from  overseas,  346 
participate  in  Nara  community 

We  (1953),  370 
reunion  with  the  "old  4th",  343 
selected  to  make  first  landing. 

332 

settle  to  occupation  duty,  344 
signing  of  surrender,  342 
steps  of  conquest  (1894-1941), 

149-151 
surrender  of,  331,  332 
2/4  lands  at  Futtsu  Cape,  340 
U.S.  landing  plans  (1945),  335, 

337,  338 
U.S.  occupation  policy,  345 
World  War  II  peace  treaty,  370 
Japanese  Army,  163,  178,  179,  18 1, 
182,  184,  187,  292,  29971,  370 
Headquarters,  Hongkew,  180 
Special  Service  Section,  183 


Japanese  aggression  in  North  China 
(1933-1935),  166,  167 

Japanese  attitude  toward  occupation, 
338 

Japanese  Buddhist  monks,  attacks  on, 
152 

Japanese  Cabinet,  338 
Japanese  Consul,  Shanghai,  152,  171 
Japanese  consular  service,  184 
Japanese  forces  in  Central  China, 
186 

Japanese  gendarmes,  187 
Japanese  government,  150,  151,  179, 
344 

Japanese  Imperial  Navy,  156,  163, 

178,  184,  344 
Japanese  prime  minister,  149 
Japanese  puppet  police,  185-186 
Japanese  Units 
Army 

Thirty-Second  Army,  28771,  309, 
317 

4th  Division,  230,  231 
5th    Independent    Mixed  Bri- 
gade, 350 
44th  Independent  Mixed  Bri- 
gade, 298 
Udo  Force,  299,  307 
5th  Air  Group,  219,  220 
60th    Bombardment  Regiment 

(Air),  220 
62d    Bombardment  Regiment 

(Air),  220 
1st  Heavy  Artillery  Regiment, 
220 

38th  Infantry  Regiment,  256, 
266 

6 1  st  Infantry  Regiment,  230, 

234,  236 
gth  Tank  Regiment,  256 
1st    Battalion,    38th  Infantry 

Regiment,  264 
2d    Battalion,    38th  Infantry 

Regiment,  264 
1st    Battalion,    61st  Infantry 

Regiment,  234,  236 


440        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Japanese  Units — Continued 
Army — Continued 

2d    Battalion,    6ist  Infantry 

Regiment,  236 
2d    Battalion,    20th  Infantry 

Regiment,  210 
3d    Battalion,    20th  Infantry 

Regiment,  210 
Hayakawa  Detachment,  220 
Kondo  Detachment,  220 
2d  Independent  Heavy  Artillery 
Battery,  220 
Kamikaze  Corps,  287,  291 
Navy 

Combined  Fleet,  258 
nth  Air  Fleet,  219 
Okinawa  Base  Force,  318 
Special  Naval  Landing  Force, 
153,  154,   156,   159,  160, 
162,  167,   171,   174,  176, 
188 

54th  Naval  Guard  Force,  256, 
266 

Jefferson,  President  Thomas,  358 
Jehol,  166 

Jenkins,  istLt  Robert  F.,  228 

Jessfield  Park,  145 

Jimenez,  Juan  Isidro,  34,  35 

Johnson,  Nelson,  169 

Johnson,  Col  Robert,  377 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (JCS),  245, 

251,  252,  366 
Jones,  istLt.  Charles  E.,  302 
Jones,  Capt  Harry  L.,  88,  91 
Junta  Consultiva,  94 
Jupiter,  13,  16,  18,  19 

Kahuku,  380 
Kakazu  Ridge,  317 
Kamehameha  I,  King,  377 
Kane,  Col  Theodore  P.,  66,  69,  70, 
75,  78 

Kaneohe,  377,  379,  380,  386 
Kauai,  382,  384 
Kavieng,  245,  247,  248 
Kawada,  298,  308 


Kellogg,  Secretary  of  State  Frank  B., 
127 

Kemp,  istLtFrank  A.,  262 
Kerr,  istLt.  William  A.,  264,  266, 
268 

Kiaochow  Bay,  351 

Kier,  BriGen  Avery  R.,  387 

Kilgore,  LtCol  Frederick  D.,  133,  134 

Kimura,  MajGen  Naoki,  210 

Kindley  Field,  206 

King,  2dLt  Charles  A.,  72,  75 

King,  MajGen  Edward  P.,  Jr.,  227 

King,   Adm  Ernest   J.,  247,  251; 

FAdm,  281 
King,  Maj  Stuart  W.,  207,  226,  227 
Kingston,  2d  Lt  Arthur,  72 
Kiyamu-Gusuku  mass,  328 
Knapp,  RAdm,  Harry  S.,  69,  93 
Knowles,  Como  Herbert  B.,  287 
Knox,  Sgt  William  R.,  87 
Kobe,  368,  369,  374-376 
Koka,  1 10 

Kokuba  Estuary,  316,  318,  322,  324- 
326 

Kokuba  Gawa,  311,  325 
Kondo,  Maj  Toshinoro,  220 
Korea,  149,  361,  362,  366-368,  370, 
375,  378,383,  387,  388 
Korean    War    begins    (25  June 

1950),  361 
Korean  War  (1950-1953)  hastens 
reactivation  of  4th  Marines, 
362 

intervention  of  Chinese  Commu- 
nists, 361,  362 

Marines  involved  in  Korean  War, 
362 

North  Korean  People's  Republic, 
361 

Republic  of  Korea,  373 
signing  of  armistice,  367,  368 
38th  Parallel,  362 
3/4  aids  return  of  liberated  Chi- 
nese POWs,  373 
UN  Command,  366,  373 
UN  Forces,  366 
Kunishi  Ridge,  328 


INDEX  441 


Kuomintang,  135 
Kwajalein,  257 
Kwangchow  Bay,  124,  125 
Kyle,  Col  Wood  B.,  375,  379 
Kyoto,  369,  371 

La  Ceiba,  74 
La  Cumbre,  62 
La  Gina,  72,  75 
Lajas,  61 
La  Loma,  88 

Lamberson,  istLt  George  B.,  340 
Landing  craft 

LCI(G),  260,  26on,  271 

LGM,  285 

LGT,  320 

LGVP,  260,  26on 
Lane,  LtCol  Rufus  H.,  7 
Lang,  Maj  Harry  G.,  233 
Langley,  106-108 

Lansing,  Secretary  of  State  Robert, 

26,35,67,  94 
La  Paja,  89,  90 
La  Paz,  18,  19 
Lapiay  Point,  212,  215,  216 
La  Romana,  83 
Larsen,  2dLt  Henry  L.,  44 
Las  Trencheras,  Battle  of,  46-47,  49, 

50,  58 
Latin  America,  94 

La  Vega,  39,  65,  66,  72,  75,  81,  86, 
87,97 

League  of  Nations,  151,  157,  163 

Leatherneck,  1 15 

Lexington,  109 

Lebanon,  388 

Lee,  BriGen  Harry,  92 

Lejeune,  Major  General  Comman- 
dant John  A.,  96,  102,  103,  105, 
1 1 1 

Limay-Bagac  Road,  201 
Limited  military  force,  1 
Lingayen  Gulf,  200,  202 
Little  Creek,  Virginia,  357 
Litzenberg,  BriGen  Homer  L.,  369 
Liuho,  174 


Llanos,  60 

Lloyd,  2dLt  Egbert  T.,  54 
Lockhart,  Frank  B.,  192 
Longoskawayan  Point,  2  1 0-2 1 9 
Los  Angeles,  California,  110,  113, 

114,  116 
Los  Mochis,  25,  26 
Louisiana,  36,  41,  66 
Low,  Capt  William  W.,  5 
Luckey,  Col  Robert  B.,  291 
Lungwha  Junction,  133,  135 
Luzon,  200,  202,  209,  225,  281 
Luzon  Force,  227 
Lyman,  Col  Charles  H.,  92 


Mabatank,  209 

MacArthur,  Gen  Douglas,  198,  201, 
202,  208-210,  218,  226,  227, 
244,  245,  251,  280,  281,  332, 
343 

MacMurray,  John  Van  A.,  1 19,  126- 

128,  141,  142,  144 
Machias,  86 

Machinato  Airfield,  316,  321 
Machisi,  315 
Macoris,  83-85,  87 
Madero,  Francisco,  1,  1 1 
Magpo  Point,  264 
Mahan,  Alfred  Thayer,  9 
Mail  Guard,  1 1 1-1 13,  1 15,  1 16 
Makin  Island,  241 
Makua,  380 

Malinta  Hill,  205-207,  222,  230, 
233,234,236,237,239,240 

Malinta  Tunnel,  234 

Manchu  dynasty,  125 

Manchukuo,  152,  167 

Manchuria,  148,  150-154,  156,  157, 
166 

Manila,  165,  174,  196,  200,  202, 
220 

Manila  Bay,  196,  198,  201,  205,  206, 
231 

Manning,  istLt  Alan  S.,  240 
Marajan,  273 

Marco  Polo  Bridge  incident,  167 


442        HOLD  HSGH  THE  TORCH 


Mare  Island,  California,  i,  3,  6,  11- 

13,  18 
Marianas,  258,  277 

first  plans  for  seizure  of,  252 
significance  to  Japanese  defense, 
251 

Marine  Barracks 
Gavite,  165 

Navy  Yard,  Mare  Island,  3 
Navy  Yard,  Puget  Sound,  2,  12 
Marine  Corps,  1-4,  8-1 1,  19,  22,  23, 
43,  76,  101-103,  105,  115,  116, 
148,  164,  166,  182,  241,  308, 
318,  327,  333,  346,  353,  359, 
360,  365,  374,  376,  377,  386, 
388 

air-ground  task  force  conceived, 
378 

amphibious  doctrine,  106 
amphibious  warfare,  109 
cadre  system,  103,  104 
combat  organization,  10,  11 
company  designation,  10,  11,  nn 
concepts  of  mission,  1,  8—10 
first  permanent  regiments  (19 14), 
1 1 

marine  band,  344 
organization,  364,  365 
postwar  reduction  (1924),  103 
postwar  reduction    (1947),  355, 
357 

provision  for  3  Divisions  and  3 

Air  Wings,  362 
Tables  of  Organization  (1922), 

104 

Tables     of     Organization  ("J" 
Series,  April  1947),  357,  358 
Marine  Corps  Air  Station,  Kaneohe 

Bay,  377,  379,  384 
Marine  Corps  Base,  San  Diego,  10 1 
Marine   Corps   Commandant,  364, 

367,  377,  386 
Marine  Corps  Headquarters,  2,  3,  7, 

10,  11,  1  in,  12,  109,  113,  367 
Marine  Corps  hymn,  347 
Marine  Corps  Schools,  106 
Marine  raiders,  241 


Mariveles,  196,  199,  202-204,  207- 
210,  212,  216,  225,  227,  229 

Marix,  Capt  Arthur  T.,  47,  49,  51, 
52,  65;  Maj,  66,  72,  74 

Markham  Road  Bridge,  136,  176 

Marshall  Islands,  252,  258 

Marsman  Building,  202 

Marvin,  GySgt  Milton  C.  "Slug", 
182,  183 

Maryland,  4 

Masters,  Col  James  M.,  Sr.,  382 

Mata  Palacio,  91 

Matsui,  Gen  Iwane,  1 80 

Mauban,  209 

MAUKA,  382,  383 

Maunalua  Bay,  107 

Mazatlan,  14,  16-18 

McBride,  BriGen  Allan  C,  214 

McCrae,  John,  243 

McCullough,  Col  Samuel,  USA,  206 

McHugh,  Maj  James  M.,  184 

Mclntyre,  283,  284 

McKelvey,  Maj  William  N.,  20 

Mears,  Passed  Assistant  Surgeon  John 

B.,  USN,  45 
Medal  of  Honor,  58,  72,  173,  306 
Medhurst  Road,  173,  175 
Mediterranean,  358 

assignment  of  4th  Marines  BLT 
to,  360 

U.S.  policy,  359 
Mee  Foo  XIV,  133 
Melhorn,  Passed  Assistant  Surgeon 

Kent  C,  USN,  45 
Memphis,  36,  41,  66 
Mercurio,  MGySgt  John,  234 
Messer,  Maj  John  S.,  257,  260,  270 
Mexico,  4,  13,  19,  26 

crisis  of  191 1,  1,2 

Revolution  (1913-1915),  11,  24 

U.S.  investments,  2 

U.S.  relations  (1914),  12,  14 
Mexico  City,  Mexico,  14,  16 
Mezado  Ridge,  328 
Midway,  9 
Mikado,  149 
Military  force  in  being,  1 


INDEX  443 


Miller,  Capt  Ellis  B.,  24 
Miller,  Col  John  C,  Jr.,  371,  374 
Miller,  Maj  Lyle  H.,  165 
Mission  Valley,  106 
Missouri,  333,  338,  342 
Mitscher,  VAdm  Marc  A.,  257,  285 
Miura,  MajGen  Saburo,  187-189 
Miura  Peninsula,  335,  337,  339,  341, 
345 

Moca,  39,  65,  97 
Molokai  Island,  107 
Mona  Passage,  3 1 
Monkey  Point,  222,  236 
Montague,  358 
Montana,  1 1 2 

Monte  Cristi,  36,  37,  39,  41-45,  5°> 

53,  54,  65,  97 
initial  U.S.  Marine  landing,  36 
Monte  Gristi-Santiago  road,  43,  47, 
53 

Moore,  MajGen  George  F.,  USA, 

206,  222,  238,  239 
Moore,  Capt.  James  T.,  88,  89 
Moore,  Capt.  Paul  C,  USA,  238 
Morgan,  Sgt.  Albert  J.,  217 
Morning  Light,  284 
Moron,  210 
Morrison  Hill,  207 
Morrison  Point,  231 
Motobu    Peninsula,    298-300,  303, 

307,  308 
Mt.  Alifan,  256,  263,  264,  272 
Mt.  Barrigada,  272 
Mt.  Fuji,  339,  370,  371,  374,  375 
Mt.  Natib,  209 

Mt.  Pucot,  212,  214-216,  218,  219 
Mt.  Santa  Rosa,  272,  273 
Mt.  Taene,  264 

Mt.  Yaetake,  299,  300,  302-307 
Munoz,  Gen,  25 

Murai,  Japanese  Counsul  General, 
156 

Myers,  Maj  John  Twiggs,  20,  23,  26, 
27 

Nagai,  371 
Nagasaki,  277,  332 


Nagato,  341 
Nago,  298,  308 

Naha,  311,  314-316,  318,  322 
Naha  Airfield,  318,  322,  323 
Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru  line,  309,  317 
Naicklek  Point,  212,  214 
Nanking,  76,  141,  166,  181,  185 
Nanking  Road,  172,  179-181,  193 
Nantao,  123,  180 
Napoleon,  180 

Nara,  368,  369,  371,  373,  374 
National  Government  of  China,  164, 
191,  356 

Nationalists,  Chinese,  126-128,  133- 
136,  139-142,   150,  151,  178, 
350,  352 
Nationalist  Chinese  Army,  135 
Nationalist  Chinese  1st  Division,  135, 
140 

Nationalist  Chinese  flag,  183 
Naval  Academy,  U.S.,  242,  289 
Naval  gunfire,  259,  269,  270,  321, 
324,  382 

Naval  Training  Station,  Yerba  Buena 

Island,  3 
Navarette,  42,  53,  58,  59,  62 
Navy  Cross,  182 

Navy  Department,  2,  10,  16,  17,  19, 

36,  136,  144,  184,  192 
Navy  Unit  Commendation,  271 
Nelson,  Lord,  107 
Nevada,  1 1 2 

Neville,  MajGen  Wendell  C.,  106 
New,  Postmaster  General  Harry  S., 

in,  116 
New  Britain,  245 
New  Caledonia,  282 
New  Georgia,  241 
New  Guinea,  245,  251 
New  Ireland,  245 
New  Jersey,  36,  42,  66 
New  London,  Connecticut,  10 
New  Mexico,  1 1 2 
New  Orleans,  29 
Newport,  Rhode  Island,  10 
Niagara  Falls,  19 
Nicaragua.  1 16 


444        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Nihart,  LtCol  Brooke,  366 

Nimitz,  Adm  Chester  W.,  245,  247, 

251,  252,  280-282,  310,  310/1,, 

332 

Nine-Power  Treaty,  150 
Nishio,  Gen  Juzo,  186,  187 
Noble,  BriGen  Alfred  H.,  247,  250 
Noble,  284 

Norfolk,  Virginia,  356 

Norford,  Capt  Archie  B.,  303 

Normandy,  283 

North  African  landings,  283 

North  Camp  Fuji,  374,  375 

North  Channel,  228,  230 

North  China,    141-143,    166,  188, 

350,  356 

Americans  in,  141,  143 

U.S.  policy,  141 
North  Island,  4-6,  19,  20 
North  Point,  234 
North  Station,  135 
North  Szechuan  Road,  129,  157 
Nouel,  Archbishop  Adolfo,  33 


Oahu,  107,  108,  377,  382 
Oakland,  California,  114 
Obregon,  Gen  Alvaro,  18 
Ogden,  Utah,  1 14 
"Okies",  292 

Okinawa,  279,  281-285,  287,  28772, 
289,  291-294,  296,  297,  299, 
302,  307-311,  313,  3i6-3i8, 
323,  327,  328,  330,  341,  346, 

364,  371,  374 
Army  troops,  309,  317,  328 
Battle  for  Naha,  311,  316 
Boeitai,  29971 

breaking  the  Shuri  defenses,  313- 
315 

capture  of  Naha,  316 
Conical  Hill,  311,317 
description  of,  292,  293,  328 
end  of  organized  resistance,  330 
end  of  the  campaign,  330 
estimated   Japanese   strength  on 
Oroku  Peninsula,  318 


Okinawa — Continued 

estimates    of   Japanese  strength, 

287/2 
final  days,  328 
4th  Marines 

advance  to  east  coast,  294 
assault   Mount   Yaetake,  300, 

302-306 
assigned  to  capture  Mount  Yae- 
take, 299 
capture  Yontan  Airfield,  291 
land,  289 

leave  for  Guam,  330 

move  south,  3 1 1 

move  to  Motobu  Peninsula,  298 

organization  of  RCT-4,  288/2 

push  north  on  Ishikawa  Isth- 
mus, 295,  296,  297 

reach  east  coast,  295 

secure  Mount  Yaetake,  306 
Green  Beaches,  285 
Guerrillas,  296,  307 
H-Hour,  287,  288 
Half  Moon,  313-315 
Hill  53,  325 
Hill  58,  325 
Hill  200,  303-305 
Hill  210  (Green  Hill)  303,  304 
Horseshoe,  313-315 
Initial  progress  ashore,  291 
Ishikawa  Isthmus  secured,  298 
Japanese 

defenses  in  South,  309,  310,  313 

final  defense  line,  318 

stand     expected    on  Motobu 
Peninsula,  298 

strategy,  291,  292 

strategy  of  Motobu  Peninsula, 
299 

L-Day,  281,  291 
lack  of  initial  resistance,  289 
Little  Sugar  Loaf,  323,  324 
mop-up  after  Mount  Yaetake,  307 
Motobu  Peninsula  secured,  307 
Northern  Okinawa  secured,  308 
Red  Beaches,  285,  289 


INDEX  445 


Okinawa — Continued 

Sugar  Loaf,  311,  313,  314,  317, 
326 

U.S.  strategy  in  South,  310 

Wana  Draw,  313 
Okinawan  conscripts,  3 1 8 
Olongapo,  141,  142,  146,  196,  199, 

200,  203 
Olongapo  Naval  Station,  196,  203 
Ono  Yama,  322 
Opium  War  of  1842,  121 
Ora,  298,  308 
Oregon,  1 1 2 

Oribiletti,  PFC  Bruno,  263 
Orion,  210 

Oroku  Peninsula,  321,  32  m,  325, 

326,  330 
capture  of  Little  Sugar  Loaf,  324 
capture  of  Naha  Airfield,  323 
description  of,  318 
end  of  Japanese  resistance,  327 
4th  Marines 

assigned  to  assault  landing,  320 

land,  321 
H-Hour,  320 

Japanese  defense,  318,  322,  323 
K-Day,  320-322 

Nishikoku  beaches,   Red    1  and 

Red  2,  320 
6th  Marine  Division  assigned  to 
capture,  320 
Orote  Airfield,  269,  270 
Orote  Peninsula,  254,  256,  259,  265, 

266,  268,  270-272 
Osaka,  369 

Osterhout,  Maj.  George  H.,  157 
Ota,  RAdm  Minoru,  318,  325,  327 
Otter,  istLt  Bethel  B.,  USN.,  238 
Ozark,  333 

Pacific  Area,  378,  387 
Pacific  defense 

British  concern  with,  190 

Dutch  concern  with,  190 

U.S.  concern  with,  190 
Pacific  Ocean  Areas,  280,  281 
519667—60  32 


Pacificador,  66 
Pago  Bay,  331 

Pai  Tsung-hsi,  Gen,  135,  139 
Palace  Hotel,  Shanghai,  187 
Palaus,  251 
Pali,  377 
Panama,  9,  10 

Panama-California  Exposition,  23, 
386 

Panama  Canal,  23 

strategic  importance,  3 1 
Panama  defense  area,  33 
Panama- Pacific  Exposition,  23,  27, 

386 
Panay,  181 
Panther,  36 

Parker,  Maj  Gen  George  M.,  USA, 
209 

Pasadena,  California,  114 
Pate,  Gen  Randolph  McC,  (CMC), 
388 

Peabody  Stadium,  no 

Pearl  Harbor,  105,  144,  190,  199, 
242,  252,  253,  280,  339,  377 

Peck,  Col  DeWitt,  1 86-1 91 

Peiping,  142,  166,  167 

Peking,  125,  136,  150 

Peking-Tientsin  railway,  125 

Pendleton,  Col  Joseph  H.  "Uncle 
Joe",  12,  14,  17,  19,  21-23,  28, 
39,  42,  43,  45-47,  53,  54,  5^, 
59,  63-67;  MajGen.  101 

Pennant,  279 

Pennsylvania,  4 

Pepper,  LtGen  Robert  H.,  366,  375 
Perez,  Dr.  Juan  B.,  60,  63,  70-72 
Perez,  Manuel,  75 
Perry  Como  Matthew  C,  149 
Perskie,  istLt  Marvin  D.,  294 
Pescadores,  124 

Peshek,  2dLt  Michael  E.,  216,  218 
Pew,  Lt(jg)  Leslie  A.,  USN,  209, 

212,  215 
Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania,  1 1 
Philippine  Air  Force,  225,  226 
Philippine  71st  Division,  214 


446        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Philippine  campaign 

Battle  of  the  Points  begins,  210 

significance  of,  195 
Philippine  forces,  195,  196,  202,  208, 
210,  228 

Philippine  National  Army,  198,  202 
Philippine  Scouts,  218,  219 
Philippine  Sea,  Battle  of  the,  258 
Philippines,  9,  10,  131,  141,  146,  161, 
192,  195,  196,  198,  201,  207, 
208,  244,  251,  258,  280,  325, 
383 

Phoenix,  Arizona,  1 1 4 
Pickup,  Capt.  Lewis  H.,  233,  236 
Pimental,  74 
Pittsburgh,  121 

Piatt,    LtCol    Wesley   McC,  356; 

Col,  387 
Piatt  Field,  387 
Plymouth,  Vermont,  1 1  o 
Poe,  Pvt  John  M.,  90 
Pohakuloa,  384 

Policia  Nacional  Dominicana,  77,  96, 
97 

Pond,  RAdm  Charles  F.,  65,  66 
Pootung,  123 
Port  Ajayan,  272 
Port  Arthur,  124 

Russians  at ,  125 
Portland,  Oregon,  112,  114,  116 
Potsdam  ultimatum,  332 
Powers,  Maj  William  C,  157 
President  Grant,  141 
President  Harrison,  192,  193,  196 
President  Jefferson,  174 
President  Line,  1 93 
President  Madison,  192,  195 
Presidential  Unit  Citation,  327 
Price,  Col  Charles  F.  B.,  168,  169, 

171,  172,  174,  175,  180-183 
Pringamosa,  91 

Pritchett,  Capt  William  H.,  56,  57; 

Maj,  87 
PT  Boat  No.  34,  210 
Pu  Yi,  Henry,  152 
Pueblo,  Colorado,  1 14 


Puerto  Plata,  36,  37,  39,  42,  53,  58- 
62,65,  95,97 
initial  U.S.  Marine  landing,  36 
Puerto  Plata  railroad,  64 
Puerto  Rico,  9,  3 1 
Puget  Sound,  3,  6,  1 1-13,  18 
Puller,  LtCol  Samuel  D.,  27 1 
Putnam,  Capt  Russell  B.,  43 
Pusan,  361 
Pyle,  Ernie,  287 

Quantico,  105,  106,  112,  147 
Quebreda  Honda,  6 1 
Quinauan  Point,  210,  219 

Rabaul,  244,  245,  247 
Radford,  Adm  Arthur  W.,  378 
Radio  Tokyo,  287,  296 
Ramsey,  Col  Frederick  A.,  374 
Ramsay  Ravine,  224 
Range  Road,  134 

Recruit  depot,  establishment  of,  771 

Red  Cross,  354 

Red  society,  140 

Reid,  2dLt  James  T.,  72 

Reifsnider,  Como  Lawrence  F.,  247 

Reinecke,  Col  Frank  M.,  358,  360 

Reno,  Nevada,  1 14 

Rhode  Island,  36,  42,  66 

Ridgely,  Maj  Reginald  H.,  Jr.,  193 

Rio  Grande  River,  7,  1 1 

Risely,  Maj  Gen  James  P.,  376 

Riverside,  California,  1 14 

Robinson,  Capt  Ray  A.,  139 

Robinson  Road,  183 

Rochester,  203 

Rock  Point,  231 

Rockey,  MajGen  Keller  E.,  352,  355 
Rockwell,  RAdm  Francis  W.,  196, 
203 

Roll,  Col  George  A.,  387 
Romana  Sugar  Company,  86 
Ronin,  159,  160 

Roosevelt,    Assistant    Secretary  of 
Navy  Franklin  D.,  19; 


INDEX  447 


Roosevelt,  President  Franklin  D., 
189,  190,  227,  280— Continued 

Roosevelt,  President  Theodore,  30, 
3i,  33 

Rowbottom,      Chief  Trumpeter 

George  V.,  22 
Royal  Marines,  334,  337 
Rupertus,  LtCol  William  H.,  1 73 
Russell,  William  H.,  35,  36,  66 
Russia,  124,  149,  332 
Ryukyus,  281,  292 

Sabana  de  la  Mar,  86,  88 
Sacramento,  California,  1 14 
Sacramento,  36,  131,  171,  175 
Sagami  Bay,  338,  339 
St.  Mathias  Group,  244,  245 
Saipan,  251,  252,  254,  258,  259,  299 
Salladay,  Maj  Jay  McK.,  85 
Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  113,  114,  116 
Samana  Bay,  37,  65,  66,  86,  87 
Samana-Santiago  railroad,  65 
Sambijima,  Baron,  160 
Samoa,  American,  9 
Samurai  swords,  263 
San  Bernardino,  California,  1 14 
Sanchez,  37,  39,  65,  72,  74,  75,  79, 
86,97 

San  Diego,  California,  2-5,  19,  22, 
23,  25-27,  29,  98,  101,  102,  105, 
106,  no,  in,  116,  119,  136, 

141,  335,  345 
San  Diego,  26,  335,  339 
San  Diego  harbor,  4,  27,  365 
San  Diego  Union,  5 
"San  Diego's  Own",  19,  101 
San  Francisco,  California,  2,  3,  12- 

14,  20,  23,  26,  27,  106,  1 12-1 14, 

116,  349 
San  Francisco  Bay,  3,  13 
San  Francisco  de  Macoris,  39,  65, 

70,  72,  74-76,  97 
San  Jose,  California,  114 
San  Pedro  de  Macoris,  83,  85,  86 
Santa  Barbara,  California,  1 10 


Santiago,  37,  39,  41-43,  45,  50,  51, 
58,  59,  62,  63-66,  69,  70,  74, 

81-83,97 
Marine  occupation  of,  63 
Santiago  Operation 
intelligence,  43 
logistics,  43 

Marine  task  force  organization,  41 
plans,  39,41 
purpose,  39 
Santo  Domingo,  28,  29,  41,  65,  66, 

69,  70,  76,  92,95,  104,  113 
Santo  Domingo  City,  35,  37,  39,  41, 
43,  63,  66,  67,  95,  98 
landing  of  U.S.  Marines,  35 
Saratoga,  109 
Sato,  Col,  234,  236 
Savannah  Ranch,  52 
Saywer,  Sgt  Leslie  D.,  2 1 7 
Schaeffer,  Maj  Max,  226,  237-239 
Schofield  Barracks,  380 
Seattle,  Washington,  3,  20,  1 13,  1 14 
Secor,  Maj  Theodore  A.,  119,  131 
Seibo,  83-85,  87,  89 
Senaga  Shima,  324 
Service  Command  Area,  2 1 6 
Shanghai,  116,  119,  121,  123,  126, 
127,  129,  131,  133,  135,  136, 
138-148,  152,  153,  157,  163- 
165,  167,  169,  171,  175,  176, 
178,  181,  182,  184,  185,  187, 
188,  190,  191,  196,  253,  351, 
353,  387,388 
Americans  at,  119,  121,  123,  127- 
129,  130,  138,  143,  147,  153, 
157,  168,  178,  189 
American  Chamber  of  Commerce, 

Safety  Committee,  138 
British  at,  121,  123,  124,  128,  134, 
136,  153,  157,  161,  168,  178, 
186,  188,  189 
customs  duties,  1 78 
declaration  of  emergency  (January 

1932),  156,  157 
Dutch  at,  130 

evacuation  of  Americans  (1937), 
174 


448        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Shanghai — Continued 
foreigners  at,  1 84,  1 85 
4th  Marines  at,  143,  148 

community  participation,  1 64 
dependents  leave  (1940),  191 
defense  sector,  157 
escape  plan  (1941),  191 
recommendations      for  with- 
drawal, 189 
withdrawn  from   (1941),  192, 
193 

Yangtze  River  vessel  duty,  164 
French  at,  121,  123,  124,  128-130, 
138,  178 

International     Defense  Scheme, 

154,  157,  159,  160 
Italians  at,   130,   136,   178,  185, 

186,  188 

Japanese  at,  123,  128,  130,  136, 

153,  159 
Japanese  atrocities,  1 59 
MLR  (Main  Line  of  Resistance), 

173-175 
Portuguese  at,  130 
Sino-Japanese    fighting  (1932), 

157,  162,  163 
Spanish  at,  130 

state  of  emergency  ended  (June 
1932), 164 
Shanghai  Defense  Force,  135 
Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo  Rail- 
road, 130 
Shanghai  Hotel,  184 
Shanghai  Municipal   Council,  121, 

129,  134,  146,  148,  156,  163, 

168,  183,  184,  193 
Shanghai  Municipal  Police,  135,  137, 

168,  179,  183,  184,  187,  191 
Shanghai  Power  Company,  171,  175 
Shanghai  Race  Course,  145,  147,  179 
Shanghai  Rugby  championship,  147 
Shanghai  Special  City  Government 

Municipal  Police,  185 
Shanghai  Volunteer  Corps,  130,  134, 

137,  145,  154,  157,   161,  168, 

172,  174,  185,  188 
Shanghai-Woosung  Railway,  169 


Shantung,  124,  166 
Shantung  Peninsula,  150,  351 
Shantung  province,  Germans  in,  125 
Shantung  University,  351,  354 
Shansi,  166 

Shapley,  LtCol  Alan,  242,  243,  247, 
248,  257,  262,  270,  271,  274, 
279;  Col,  27971,  283,  289,  299, 
300,  302,  305,  316,  320,  328, 

331,  368 

Shaw,  Maj  Melville  J.,  47,  49,  54,  65 
Shell,  BriGen  George  R.  E.,  383 
Shepherd,  BriGen  Lemuel  C,  Jr., 
253,    254,    263-265,  268-274, 
276,  287/1,  300,  308,  311,  314, 
315,  320,  324,  325,  327,  328, 

332,  35°;  MajGen,  280;  LtGen, 
378,  379;  Gen,  363,  375 

Sherman,  VAdm  Forrest  P.,  358,  359 

Shibeyama,  Baron,  154 

Shinn,  Assistant  Surgeon  Herbert  L., 

USN,  89,  90 
Ships 

APAs,  287,  365 

LCI  gunboats,  288 

LSTs,  257,  25771,  258,  260,  284, 

287,  333,  345,  353,  373 
LSVs,  333 

Mine  sweepers,  285 
Shiozawa,  RAdm,  153,  156,  162 
Shuri,  309-31 1,  313,  315 
Shuri  castle,  3 1 7 
Shuri  line,  309,  31 1,  314 
Shuri  Hill  mass,  313 
Silver  Star  Medal,  242 
Silver  Strand,  Coronado  Island,  365 
Simpson,  istLt  Carter  B.,  212,  214, 

215 
Sinaloa,  25 
Singapore  Road,  1 59 
Sino-Japanese  war,   119,   154,  167, 
186 

Battle  of  Shanghai  (1937),  167— 
169,  1 7 1-1 76 
Smith,  istLt  Holland  M.,  6,  6n,  47 ; 
LtGen,  252 


INDEX  449 


Smith,  istLt  Julian  C,  46,  4.611,  57 
Snowden,  RAdm  Thomas  R.,  93,  94 
Solace,  58 
Solomons,  241,  245 
Soochow  Creek,  130,  136,  156,  157, 
159-162,     167-169,  172-174, 
176,  181,  185,  189,  191,  193 
South  China,  124 
South  China  Sea,  215 
South  Dakota,  4,  13,  14,  1471,  16-19 
South  Dock,  224 
South  Harbor,  224 
South  Manchuria  Railway,  150 
South  Pacific,  244,  245,  247,  277 

first  allied  offensive  moves,  245 
South  Pacific  Area,  245 
Southeast  Asia,  190 
Southern  California,  22 
Southwest  Pacific,  227,  244 

first  Allied  offensive  move,  245 
Southwest  Pacific  Area,  280 
Southwest  Pacific  Forces,  245 
Soviet  Russia,  1 39 
Spanish- American  War,  9,  10 
Spanish  government,  30 
Sparks,  Fred,  44 

Spokane,  Washington,  113,  114,  116 
Spruance,  Adm  Raymond  A.,  252, 

258,  281 
Spunt  Cup,  147 

Standard  Oil  Company,  Shanghai, 

120,  133 
Stewart,  Capt  William,  269 
Stimson,  Secretary  of  State  Henry 

151,  152 
Stockton,  California,  114 
Stone,  2dLt  Paul  W.,  349 
Stone  Bridge,  1 76 
Subic  Bay,  196,  200,  201 
Suiyuan,  166 
Sumay,  269—271 
Sun  Yat-sen,  125 
Sunkiang,  176 

Sutherland,    BriGen    Richard  K., 
USA,  201,  202 


Tacoma,  Washington,  114 
Taft,  President  William  Howard,  1, 
2 

Taira,  298 
Taiwan,  388 

Takashina,  LtGen  Takeshi,  256,  271, 
272 

Takeda,  RAdm  Moriji,  188 
Tamai,  Cdr  Asaichi,  266 
Tampico,  12 

Tandy,  2dLt  Jack  H.,  89-91 

Task  Force  31  (Yokosuka  Occupa- 
tion Force),  334,  335,  339,  343 

Task  Force  51  (Joint  Expeditionary 
Force),  282 

Task  Force  56  (Expeditionary 
Troops),  282 

Task  Force  58,  257 

Task  Group  31.3  (Fleet  Landing 
Force),  334 

Task  Group  Able,  333 

Tassafaronga,  243,  248,  250,  256, 
257,  282 

Tateyama,  342 

Taylor,  Chaplain  Leroy  N.,  45 
Taylor,  Adm  Montgomery  M.,  160 
Telfer-smollett,  Brigadier  A.  P.  D., 

British  Army,  168,  172 
"Tell  It  to  the  Marines",  1 15 
Thailand,  220 
Thetis  Bay,  385 

Thomas,  RAdm  Chauncey,  5,  6 
Thorpe,  LtCol  George  C,  86-91 
Thrasher,  istLt  Thomas  E.,  45,  52 
"Three  Principles,"  125 
Tientsin,   141-144,   147,   166,  350, 

352,  355 
Tinian,  251,  277 
Togcha  River,  273 
Toguchi,  299,  300 
Toguchi-Itomi  Road,  306,  307 
Tojo,  Premier,  348 
Tokyo,  258,  333,  335,  343,  345 
Tokyo  Bay,  335,  337~340 
Tomigusuki,  324,  325,  327 
Topolobampo,  25,  26 
Toto,  273 


450        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Totsuka,  VAdm  Michitura,  335,  339, 

34i 
Toya,  293 

TRADE  WINDS,  384,  385 
Training,  4th  Marines,  6,  102 

Camp  Pendleton  (1952),  363,  364 
China,  133,  145,  164 
Fleet  Landing  Exercise  (FLEX), 
Vieques,  Puerto  Rico  (1948), 
358 

Hawaii,  105-109,  380-385 
Iwo  Jima  landing  exercise  (1954), 
374 

Japan  (1954),  37°,  371,  374,  375 
Okinawa  landing  exercise  (1954), 
374 

PACPHIBEX-II     (1953),  365, 
366 

Tripartite  Pact,  1 90 
Tripoli,  358 
Truk,  346 

Truman,  President  Harry  S.,  332, 
350,  361 

defines  Marine  mission  in  China, 
356 

policy  re  Communist  aggression, 
359 

Tsang-kou  Airfield,  350,  352 

Tsinan,  352 

Tsingtao,  124,  172,  357 
British  at,  351 
Chinese  at,  351,352 
description  of,  35 1 
foreign  powers  at,  351 
4th  Marines  at,  349,  351-35^ 
General    Shepherd    receives  sur- 
render  (25  October  1945), 
350 

Germans  at,  125,  351,  352 
history  of,  35 1 

Japan    dominates    (193  7-1945), 

35i,  352 
Koreans  at,  351 
6th  Marine  Division  lands,  350 
U.S.  Navy  at,  353 
White  Russians  at,  35 1 


Trinidad,  1 14 
Tri-Partite  Pact,  190 
Tulagi  Island,  241,  245 
Turkey,  359 

Turner,  VAdm  Richmond  K.,  252, 

254,282,  287 
2 1  Demands,  150 
29  Palms,  364 

Udo,  Col  Takehiko,  298,  299,  307 

Uji,  371,374 

Ulithi  Atoll,  283,  284 

U nadilla,  3 

Union  Nacional  Dominicana,  94 
United  Nations,  361 
UN  troops,  361,  362 
United  States,  8,  12,  14,  19,  25,  27, 
3i,  33-36,  39,  43,  59,  67,  81, 
94,  101,  123,  141,  150-152,  157, 
167,  178,  179,  189,  190,  349, 
350,  356,  361,  375,  378,  388 
steps  short  of  war  ( 1 94 1 ) ,  190 
U.S.  Army,  105,  107,  109,  201,  202, 
208,  228,  250,  335,  368,  375,  380 
U.S.  Army  Air  Forces,  252 
U.S.  Army  Air  Force  Units 
3d  Pursuit  Squadron,  2  14 
2 1  st  Bomber  Command,  281 
U.S.  Army  engineers,  224 
U.S.  Army  units 

2d    Amphibious    Support  Com- 
mand, 370 
Service  Command,  Bataan,  208 
Southwestern  Command,  369 
Tokyo  Bay  Occupation  Force,  333 
United  States  Army  Forces  in  the 
Far  East    (USAFFE),  196, 
198,  200-202,  208,  209,  214, 
216,  218,  227 
United  States  Forces  in  the  Philip- 
pines (USFIP),  227 
Armies 

Eighth,  342,  343,  345,  348 
Tenth,  280,  282,  284,  285,  291, 
310,  311,316,  317,  330 
Corps 

I,  208-210,  218 

II,  208-2 10 


INDEX  451 


U.S.  Army  units — Continued 
Corps — Continued 
XXIV,  282,  283,  285,  296,  309, 

310 
Divisions 

nth  Airborne,  335,  339 

7th  Infantry,  282,  285,  317 

24th  Infantry,  366 

25th  Infantry,  368 

27th  Infantry,  252,  258,  282, 

3io,  335 
32d  Infantry,  245 
77th  Infantry,  252,  259,  265, 

270-273,  282,  317 
8 1  st  Infantry,  282 
96th  Infantry,  282,  285,  311, 

317,328 

RCTs 

187th  Airborne,  370,  374 
1 1 2th,  342 
305th,  259 
Regiments 

59th  Coast  Artillery,  239 
88th  Field  Artillery  (PS),  216, 
217 

31st  Infantry,  161 

45th  Infantry  (PS),  227 

147th  Infantry,  250 

305th  Infantry,  264 

306th  Infantry,  265 
Battalions 

2/57  (PS),  218 

3/45  (PS), 218 

7th  AAA  (AW),  273 

708th  Amphibious  Tank,  322 
Batteries  and  Companies 

Battery  Geary,  2 16,  2 1 7 

Denver  Battery,  236-239 

Battery  I,  60th  Coast  Artillery 
(AA),  207 

91st  Chemical  Mortar  Company, 
320 

301st  Chemical  Company,  214 
U.  S.  Marine  units 

Advance  Base  Force,  n,  19 
Aviation 

MAG-13,  377,  380,  382,  384 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
VMO-6,  355 
VMR-152,382 
VMR-352,  382 
Department  of  the  Pacific,  1 1 2 
1  st  Provisional  Marine  Air-Ground 
Task  Force,  377,  379,  382, 
383 

Fleet  Marine  Force,  Pacific,  6n, 
349,  364,  366,  376-378 

Fleet   Marine  Force,  Western 
Pacific,  357 

Mail  Guards,  Eastern,  1 12 

Mail  Guards,  Western,  112,  113 

Marine  Corps  Expeditionary  Force 
(1925), 106 

Marine  Corps  Expeditionary  Force, 
Asiatic  Fleet,  136 

Marine  Forces,  China,  formed  of 
4th  Marines  (Tsingtao)  and 
1st  Marine  Division  (Tient- 
sin), 355 

Marine  Forces,  Tsingtao,  355 

Provisional  Detachment,  U.S. 
Naval  Forces  Operating 
Ashore  in  Santo  Domingo,  41, 
42,45,59,  66 

Third  Fleet  Marine  Landing  Force, 

334,  337,  34i 
Corps 

I  Marine  Amphibious  Corps 
(IMAC),  243,  247 

III  Amphibious  Corps  (IIIAC), 
252,  253,  256-259,  273, 
274,  282,  283,  285,  296, 
3n,332,  350,353,355 

V  Amphibious  Corps  (VAC), 
6n,  252,  258 

Provisional  Corps,  Japan,  370 
Divisions 

1st,  241,  245,  282,  285,  295,  296, 
310,  311,  317,  328,  350, 
355,  361,  362,  375,  376 

2d,  282,  356-359 

3d,  182,  242,  247,  252,  254,  259, 
271-273,  362-370,  373, 
376,  377 


452        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Divisions — Continued 

6th.  279,  280.  282.  284,  285, 
287,  293..  296,  298,.  307- 
311,  313,  314,  3i6,  317, 
321,  327,  328,  333,  341, 

343,  349,  35°;  355 
6  th    Marine    Division  Special 
Troops,  280 
Brigades 

1^,383,384,  387..  388 

1  st  Provisional,   250—254,  256, 

258-260,     271-274,  279, 

280,  341.  361,  378 
2d,  66,  77,  82,  92,.  96-98,  175, 

178 

3d:  136,  142,  143,  355 
RCTs 

RCT-4,   288,   334,   337,  350, 

376,  377,  379,  380,  383 

RCT-22,  256 
Artillery  Regiments 

10th,  106,  136 

1 2th,  142,  144,  363 

15th,  280,  291,  306 
Infantry  Regiments 

1st,  11,  317 

2d,  1 1,  360 

3d,  78,  84,.  86,  88..  89,  92,  274, 

357,  363 
4th,  1,  2,  3,  5,  7,  8,  11,  12,  14, 
17-21,  24-27,  29,  36,  37, 
39..  41,  44,  63,  65,  66,  69, 
76,  78-82,  84,  88,  89,  91, 
92,  95-98,  101-106,  109- 
112,  115,   119,   121,  129, 

131,  133,  136-138,  140, 
142-148,  153,  156,  157, 
16 1  —  1 64,  166,  168,  169, 
171—1763  178,  179,  1 8 1— 
183,  185-193,  195,  196. 
198,  200—204,  2°6,  207, 
217,  221,  222,  224-226, 
228,  240-243,  247,  250. 
253,  254,  256-258,  260, 
262,   264,   265,  268-274, 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Infantry  Regiments — Continued 
4th — Continued 

276,  277,  279,  280,  282- 
285,  288,  289,  291,  293- 
300,  304-309,  3",  3i3, 
315-318,  320,  321,  324, 
325,  327,  328,  330-333, 
333".  334,  335,  337,  34*- 
346,    349-358,  360-371, 

374-377,  379,   383,  385- 

388 

Band,  147,  148,  28872,  33371 
Concert  orchestra,  148 
Crest  (1954),  374 
Dance  orchestra,  147 
Headquarters,  18,  21,  23,  25, 
26,  81,   119,    145,  159, 
169,  173,  187,  196,  203, 
204,  243,  291,  308,  335, 

344,  349,  350 
Hospital,  175,  192 
Intelligence  officer,  171 
Marching  song,  22,  386 
Motto:     "Hold     High  the 

Torch,"  243,  368 
Organization,  80—82,  103- 
105,  in,  114,  115,  142, 
144,  148,  165,  166,  241, 
243,  248,  28871,  31  in, 
333^  349,  350,  355,  358, 
360,  363,  364,  370,  377, 
383 

Quartermaster,  193 

Strength,  95,  97,  102,  103, 
105,  in,  113,  115,  119, 
161,  165,  166,  173,  1 70, 
196,  222,  228,  229,  284, 
333,  349,  35i,  356,  357 
5th,  147,  313 

6th,  136,  141,  142,  144,  175, 

178 
7th,  3 1 1 
9th,  363 
15th,  78,92 

2ISt,  276 


INDEX  453 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Infantry  Regiments — Continued 
22d,  253,  262,  264-266,  268- 
272,  274,  276,  280,  285., 
291,  298,  300,  308,  311, 
313,  320,  324-326,  328, 
35i 

29th,  280,  285,  291,  298-300, 
304,    306-308,   313,  314, 
316,  320,324-326 
Raider  Regiments 
1  st,  241 
2d,  241,  242 
Service  Regiments 
3d,  376 

Amphibian  Tractor  Battalions 

4th,  321 

9th,  321 
Armored  Amphibian  Battalions 

1st,  288 

3d  (Provisional),  320 
Artillery  Battalions 

1st  Separate  Marine  Battalion, 

198,  202-204,  207 
1/10,  106,  141 

1/15,  291,320,33372 
3/12,355,  376 

Pack  howitzer  bn,  4th  Mar,  253 
Defense  Battalions 

9th,  273 

14th,  248 
Guard  Battalions 

2d  Separate  (Provisional),  349 
Headquarters  Battalions 

3d  MarDiv,  376 
Infantry  Battalions 

i/3,  274 

1/4,  5,  20,  23,  26,  27,  42,  45,  47, 
50-54,  57,  58,  81,  82,  104- 
106,  114,  119,  131,  139, 
146,   157,   173,  187,  193, 

199,  203,  204,  207,  222, 
225,  228,  229,  233,  234, 
237,  239,  243,  248,  257, 
260,  262,  264,  266,  268- 
270,  274,  276,  279,  289, 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Infantry  Battalions — Continued 
1  /  4 — Continued 

294,   296,    297,  302-305, 

307,  308,  315,  320,  321, 

323,  324,  326,  337,  340, 
341,   344,   349,  356-358, 

363,  366,  383-385 
1/6,  360 

1/22,  265,  266,  273,  304,  308 
2/3,  274,  365 

2/4,  5,  20,  26,  42,  45,  47,  49,  54, 
65,  81,  104,  106,  1 10,  1 14, 
116,  120,  141,  142,  165, 
173,  174,  192,  199,  204, 
207,  222,  229,  240,  241, 
243,  248,  257,  260,  264, 
265,  270,  274,  279,  285, 
288,  291,  296,  297,  300, 
302-308,  313,  315,  316, 
320-322,  324,  326,  335, 
337,  339,  34i,  344,  349, 
356,  357,  363,  373,  382, 
384 

2/8,  358 

2/22,  265,  351 

2/29,313,322,351 

3/4,  104,  106,  119,  131,  136, 
139,   146,   156,   157,  166, 

207,  216,  222,  229,  240, 
241,  248,  257,  262,  264, 
268-270,  274,  276,  289, 
296-300,  303,  304,  307, 

308,  3i3-3!6,  320,  322- 

324,  326,  337,  340,  341, 
344,  349,  356,  357,  363, 

364,  373,  382,  384 
3/6,  136,  141 

3/22,  265,  295,  316,  351 
3/29,  300,  302-304,  307,  322 
4/4,  229,  230,  238,  364,  367 
Naval  battalion,  4th  Marines, 

208,  209,  216,  218,  219 
Provisional       Battalion,  4th 

Marines,  106,  131,  142, 
144,  146 


454        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Infantry  Battalions — Continued 
Reserve  Battalion,  4th  Marines, 
229,237 
Medical  Battalions 
4th  Marines,  253 
Raider  Battalions 
1st,  241-243 
2d, 241-243 
4th,  241 
Service  Battalions 

6th,  33372 
Tank  Battalions 
6th,  297,  320 
Companies 

Battery  A,  4th  Marines,  204, 
207-209,  214,  215,  225,  226 
Company  A,  4th  Marines,  5, 
98,  234,  237,  238,  262,  263, 
266,  272,  302,  304,  305, 
323 

Company  A,  4th  Amphibian 
Tractor  Battalion,  333/1 

Company  A,  6th  Engineer  Bat- 
talion, 28872,  296,  33372 

Company  A,  6th  Medical  Bat- 
talion, 28872,  33372 

Company  A,  6th  Motor  Trans- 
port Battalion,  28872 

Company  A,  6th  Pioneer  Bat- 
talion, 28872,  33371 

Company  B,  4th  Marines,  5,  98, 
173,  234,  262,  263,  266, 
294,  302,314 

Company  B,  3d  Shore  Party  Bat- 
talion, 376 

Battery  C,  4th  Marines,  204, 
207-209,  212,  214,  215, 
228 

Company  C,  4th  Marines,  5,  98, 
166,  173,  226,  237,  262, 
263,  266,  268,  302,  304- 
306,  323 

Company  C,  3d  Motor  Trans- 
port Battalion,  376 

Company  C,  6th  Tank  Battalion, 
333" 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

Company  D,  4th  Marines,  5,  98, 
176 

Company  D,  6th  Medical  Bat- 
talion, 33372 
Company  E,  4th  Marines,  5, 

173,  175,  304,314,324 
Company  E,  3d  Medical  Bat- 
talion, 376,  383 

Company  F,  4th  Marines,  203, 
204,  272,  273,  295,  304, 
3H 

Company  G,  4th  Marines,  166, 

174,  264,  303,  304,  324, 
340,  382 

Company  H,  4th  Marines,  182, 

203,  216 
Company  I,  4th  Marines,  269, 

314,326 
Company  K,  4th  Marines,  262, 

263,  298,  313,  314,  326, 

364,  367 
Company  L,  4th  Marines,  269, 
293,  294,  313,  314,  326, 
342 

Company  P,  4th  Marines,  226, 

237,  238 
Company  Q,  4th  Marines,  229, 

238 

Company  R,  4th  Marines,  229, 
238 

Company  S,  4th  Marines,  229, 

238 

Company  T,  4th  Marines,  229, 
238 

1st  Company,  53 

1  st  Bomb  Disposal  Company,  6th 

Marine  Division,  28872 
2d  Ammunition  Company,  1st 

Provisional  Marine  Brigade, 

253 

4th  Company,  42,  60-62,  66,  80 
6th  Company,  41,  42,  45,  53, 
66,  80 

6th  Amphibious  Truck  Com- 
pany, 28872 


INDEX  455 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

6th  Joint  Assault  Signal  Com- 
pany (JASCO),  28871,33371 
6th  Military  Police  Company, 

333^  345 
8th  Company,  29,  42,  47,  50, 

52-54,  81 
9th  Company,  42,  59-62,  65, 

66,  80 

10th  Company,  80,  82,  104,  105, 

1 14,  116,  165 
13th  Company,  41,  42,  44,  45, 

47,51,54,56,  64,66 
19th  Company,  120 
2 1  st  Company,  120,  139 
2 2d  Company,  120,  133 
24th  Company,  62,  65,  66,  120 
25th  Company,  13,  14,  18,  22- 

26,  41,  42,  65,  82,  88,  97, 

104,  105,  114,  139 
26th  Company,  13,  18,  20,  23, 

25,  42,  47,  49,  52,  54,  58, 

81,  104 

27th  Company,  13,  18,  20,  23, 
25,  26,  42,  45,  47,  49,  52, 
54,  56,57,8i,  104,  114 

28th  Company,  18,  20,  21,  25, 
28,  42,  45,  47,  49,  52,  56, 

82,  95,  104,  105,  114,  173 
29th  Company,  27,  42,  45,  54, 

57,  63,  81,  104,  116,  165 
31st  Company,  13,  18,  20,  42, 
49,  52,  65,  70,  104,  105, 
112,  114,  116,  165 
32d  Company,  13,  18,  20,  42,  49, 
52,  53,  58,  65,  72,  75,  82, 
87,  104,  105,  112,  114,  116, 
165 

33d  Company,  80,  82,  88,  89, 

91,  92,  97,  104 
34th  Company,  13,  18,  20,  42, 

49>  53,  65,  72,  75,  81 
35th  Company,  13,  18 
36th  Company,  18 
45th  Company,  66,  81 
47th  Company,  66,  70,  81 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

48th  Company,  72,  75,  80,  86- 
88 

69th  Company,  81,  82,  97 

88th  Company,  1 3 1 

89th  Company,  131 

90th  Company,  1 3 1 

91st  Company,  131 

4. 2 -inch  Mortar  Company,  4th 
Marines,  363 

Headquarters  Company,  4th 
Marines,  81,  82,  104,  105, 
no,  114,  131,  136,  173, 
222,  225,  226,  233,  253 

Headquarters  and  Service  Com- 
pany, 4th  Marines,  349, 
350,  356,  357,  363 

Howitzer  Company,  4th  Ma- 
rines, 82,  97,  104 

Military  Police  Company,  6th 
Marine  Division,  28872 

Military  Police  Company,  4th 
Marines,  253 

Motor  Transport  Company,  4th 
Marines,  173 

Ordnance  Company,  6th  Ma- 
rine Division,  288^,  33371 

Provisional  Company,  4th  Ma- 
rines, 105 

Reconnaissance  Company,  6th 
Marine  Division,  316,  322, 
324 

Regimental  Reserve  Company, 
4th  Marines,  226,  233 

Service  Company,  4th  Marines, 
82,  104,  119,  173,  204,  222, 
226 

Service   Company,   3d  Marine 

Brigade,  136 
Service  and  Supply  Company, 

6th  Marine  Division,  28871 
Signal  Company,  1st  Provisional 

Marine  Brigade,  253 
Signal  Company,  4th  Marines, 

253 


456        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


U.S.  Marine  units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

Signal  Company,  6th  Marine 

Division,  322 
Supply  Company,  4th  Marines, 
81 

Tank  Company,  4th  Marines, 
263,  269,  270 

Truck    Company,    6th  Motor 
Transport  Battalion,  33372 

Weapons   Company,   4th  Ma- 
rines, 291,  297,  303,  304, 
308,321,349,351,356 
Detachments 

5th  Provisional  Rocket  Det.,  320 

Louisiana  Det.,  42,  53 

Memphis  Det.,  42 

Mounted  Det.  4th  Marines,  42, 
52 

New  Jersey  Det.,  42,  62 
Olongapo  Guard  Det.,  196 
Puerto  Plata  Det.,  41,  42,  53 
Rhode  Island  Det.,  42 
Field  Depots 

5th  Field  Depot,  253 
Replacement  Drafts 

26th  Replacement  Draft,  288/1 
33d  Replacement  Draft,  288/1 
Reconnaissance  Platoon,  4th  Ma- 
rines, 274 
U.S.  Navy,  228,  250,  280,  287,  335, 
340,  353,  359,373 
Fleet  Reserve,  225,  226 
U.S.  Navy  units 

Asiatic  Fleet,  102,  121,  143-145, 
172,  189,  198,  199,  201,  202, 
208,  214,  215 
Asiatic  Station,  161 
1 1  th  Special  Naval  Construction 

Bn,  288/1 
Fifth  Fleet,  252,  281 
53d  Naval  Construction  Battalion, 
253 

58th  Naval  Construction  Bn,  288/1 
Naval  Ammunition  Depot,  214, 
215 

Pacific  Fleet,  2,  6,  26,  199,  379 


U.S.  Navy  units — Continued 
1 6th  Naval  District,  196 
Sixth  Task  Fleet,  358,  359 
Seventh  Fleet,  353-355 
Third  Fleet,  333~335,  33**,  339, 
343 

Transport  Group,  III  Amphibious 

Force,  247 
United  States  Fleet,  105,  190,  281, 

291 

Amphibious  Forces,  Pacific  Fleet, 
282 

III  Amphibious  Force,  247 

Third  Fleet  Naval  Landing  Force, 

334,  337,  34i 
Emirau  Attack  Group,  247 
Southern  Attack  Force,  260 
Cruiser  Force,  Atlantic  Fleet,  35 
Cruiser  Force,  65 
U.S.  occupation  forces,  Japan,  370 
U.S.  State  Department,  2,  26,  27,  35, 
94,  126,  128,  129,  141,  144,  169, 
171,  192 
Uraga  Strait,  335,  339,  342,  346 
Ushijima,  LtGen  Mitsuru,  287/1,  291, 

309,  318,  325,  330 
USO,  354 
Utah,  1 1 2 

Vaga,  199 

Valdes,  Jose  Bordas,  33 
Vallejo  Junction,  California,  3 
Vandegrift,  Maj  Alexander  A.,  120, 
131,  136,  137,  139; 
LtGen,  242,  308 
Vasquez,  Horacio,  97,  98 
Vera  Cruz,  14 

Versailles  Peace  Conference  (19 19), 
150 

Vicentico  Evangelista,  85-87 
Victoria,  Alfredo,  33 
Villa,  Francisco,  12,  24 
Villaespesa,  Francisco,  95 
Villistas,  25 
Vitiaz  Strait,  245 


INDEX  457 


Wake  Island,  9 
Waikane,  380 

Wainwright,  Ma j Gen  Jonathan  M., 
209,  210,  216,  218,  227,  239, 
240 

War  Department,  227 
Washburn,  istLt  James  G.,  302,  30572 
Washington,  State  of,  112 
Washington      Conference  (1921- 

1922),  150 
Washington  Naval  Treaty  of  1922, 

205 

Watson,  MajGen  Thomas  E.,  282 
Weapons 

antiaircraft  guns,  231 

BARs,  137,  199,  269 

bazooka,  263 

flame  thrower  tanks  ("Zippos"), 
325 

guns 

3-inch,  12,  14,  22,  24,  47,  56,  60, 

62,  206-208,  212,  225 
6-inch,  17 
14-inch,  232 
20mm,  318,  321,  326 
37mm,  225,  234,  243,  324 
47mm,  313/1 
60mm,  305,  326 

75  mm,  217,  224,  225,  231,  234, 

243 
8cm,  345 
105mm,  220,  340 
105mm    self-propelled  assault 
(M-7s),  321,  323,  324,  326 
155mm,  220,  225,  232 
240mm,  226,  231 
howitzers 

2.95-inch  mountain  pack,  214, 

217 
37mm,  173 
105mm,  380 
Japanese  Baka  bomb,  344 
Japanese  8-inch  rocket  ("Whistlin' 

Willie"),  323 
machine  guns,  3,  21,  46,  47,  56- 
58,  60,  61,  206,  207,  209,  224, 
225,  380 


Weapons — Continued 
mortars 

3-inch  Stokes,  238 
4.2-inch,  364,  380 
12-inch,  216,  217 
50mm,  314 
60mm,  380 

81mm,  216,  217,  243,  318,  380 
pistols,  1 13 

rifles,  3,  21,  225,  364,  380 

riot  type  shotguns,  1 1 3 

star  shells,  314 

submachine  gun,  113,  137 

tanks,  239,  263,  266,  269,  270, 
294-297,  300,  313,  320,  321, 
323-326,  352,  359,  364 
Weitzel,  istLt  Harry  W.,  86,  87 
Well,  istSgtNoble  W.,  234 
Welles,  Sumner,  97 
West,  1  stSgt  William,  86 
West  Coast  expeditionary  forces,  10 1 
West  Road,  214 
West  Virginia,  4,  18,  19,  23 
Western  Carolines,  283 
Western  Pacific,  251 
Western  Powers,  1 78,  1 79 
Whaling,  Col  William  J.,  351 
Whampoa  Academy,  125 
Whangpoo  River,  120,  123,  130,  143, 

168,  172,  174,  193 
White,  2dLt  Thomas  B.,  no 
"White  labor  movement",  140 
White  Russians,  135 
Wilbur,  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Curtis 
D.,  in 

Wilkinson,  RAdm  Theodore  S.,  245, 
247 

Willcox,  Maj  Julian  P.,  131 
Williams,  Col  Alexander  S.,  102 
Williams,  Capt  Charles  F.,  53 
Williams,   Adm   Clarence   S.,  121, 

127-129,   134,   136,   137,  139, 

141,  143 

Williams,  Maj  Dion,  10;  Col,  95,  96, 
106 

Williams,  istLt  Ernest  C,  70-72 


458        HOLD  HIGH  THE  TORCH 


Williams,  Capt  Francis  H.  "Joe," 

203,  229,  238,  239 
Williston,  North  Dakota,  1 1 2 
Wilson,  Secretary  of  Defense  Charles 

E.,375 

Wilson,  President  Woodrow,  12,  14, 

23,34,67,  96 
Dominican  policy  of,  34,  35,  67 
WTinans,   1st  Sgt  Roswell,  57,  58; 

LtCol,  1 73 
Windward  Passage,  3 1 
Winslow,  RAdm  Cameron  McR.,  26 
Wisconsin,  334 
Woosung,  120,  167,  174,  184 
World  War  I,  150,  243,  351 
World  War  II,  109,  149,  173,  182, 

186,  195,  25771,  26on,  328,  345, 

346,  349,  357,  364,  365,  383 
Wright,  Capt  John  N.,  5 
Wu,  Mayor  of  Shanghai,  153,  156 
Wuchen  Bridge,  1 76 
Wyoming,  1 1 2 
Wyoming,  107 

Yaeju  Dake,  3 1 8,  328 
Yalu  River,  361 

Yangtze  Rapid  Steamship  Company, 
164 

Yangtze  River,  120,  131,  174,  178, 
181 


Yangtze  River  Patrol,  145,  189,  192 

Yangtze  River  pirates,  1 64 

Yangtze  Valley,  121,  124,  126,  141, 

144,  167,  176 
Yaque  del  Norte  River,  37,  41,  47,  51 
Yaqui  Indians,  25 
Yaqui  Valley,  24 

Yarnell,  Adm  Harry  E.,  172,  174, 

175,  183,  189 
Yokohama,  335,  339,  345 
Yokosuka,  348,  354,  371 

Airfield,  337,  340,  341,  344 

British  at,  341,  343 

Naval  Base,  335,  337,  338,  340, 

341,343-345 
U.S.  Fleet  Shore  Activities,  343 
Yonabaru  Airfield,  3 1 7 
Yontan  Airfield,  285,  289,  291,  292, 
295" 

Yucatan  Peninsula,  3 1 
Yui,  Mayor  O.K.,  167 
Yuna  River,  37 
Yu  Ya  Ching  Road,  1 80 
Yuza  Dake,  3 1 7,  328 

Zampa  Misaki,  284 
Zapata,  Emiliano,  14,  24 
Zapatistas,  17 
Zeilin,  257 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE:  I960 


ALFRED  M.  G  3AY  MARINE  CORPS 

RESEARCH  CENTER 

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QUANTICOVA  22134-5107 


DEC    5  2005